A study of policy process and implementation of the National Tuberculosis Programme in India. by Narayan, Thelma
Narayan, Thelma (1998) A study of policy process and implemen-
tation of the National Tuberculosis Programme in India. Doctoral
thesis, London School of Hygiene Tropical Medicine.
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/682263/
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Copyright the author
A STUDY OF 
POLICY PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE 
NATIONAL TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL PROGRAMME 
IN INDIA 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Science 
of the University of London 
in fulfilment of the requirement for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
by 
DR. THELMA NARAYAN 
March 1998 
Health Policy Unit 
Department of Public Health and Policy 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
University of London 
ABSTRACT 
TB, a major public health problem in India since the 1900s, has a current prevalence of 1-.+ 
million and an estimated annual mortality of 500,000 persons. Nation-wide government 
sponsored anti-TB public health measures introduced in 1948, developed into the National TB 
Programme in 1962. Despite gains, implementation gaps between programme goals and 
performance, over 35 years, have been of a magnitude sufficient to cause concern. This study 
aimed to understand explanatory factors underlying the implementation gap. 
A policy analysis approach was adopted, focusing on the policy process and specifically on 
implementation, at national, state, district and local levels. It undertook a historical review with a 
two-tiered framework covering the period 1947-97. In the first tier the historical narrative is 
woven around a framework of context, content, process and actors. The nature of the problem 
" 
and policy relevant technical dimensions of intervention measures are discussed, as are effects of 
pharmaceutical policies and financial resource flows on TB policy. The second tier applies a 
framework of implementation factors to national policy development and implementation at state 
and district level. Interviews were conducted with TB patients, elected representatives, front-line 
health workers, doctors, district and state staff, national programme managers, researchers and 
representatives from international agencies. Documents were reviewed. Thus the study 
incorporated an integrative bottom-up cum top-down approach. 
Findings highlight that interests of patients, medical and allied professionals, pharmaceutical and 
diagnostic industries and the state are interdependent, but often conflictual. Unequal societal 
relations affect not only the development and transmission of TB, but also the implementation of 
control programmes, particularly for the impoverished, among whom high levels of indebtedness 
due to the disease and difficulties accessing private services were noted. Techno-managerial 
approaches to TB control often mask societal and policy process factors accounting for the 
implementation gap. The importance of leadership, institutional development, capacity at the 
patient provider interface and accountability and need for sustained policies were noted, within 
an affirmative framework embodying social justice and safeguarding the interests of the majority 
of patients. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TUBERCULOSIS AND ITS CONTROL IN INDIA: UNFOLDING PROBLEMS 
A PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
1.1 Introduction: 
Tuberculosis (TB) received official recognition as a major public health problem in India 
from the early 20th century (Wilkinson 1914, TAl 1956, GOI 1961). Limited efforts 
towards TB care and cure were initiated primarily by the voluntary sector in the 1920s and 
1930s, a time when effective curative and preventive technology had not developed. TB 
control measures 1 at national level were introduced in 1948, with the new Govenlillent of 
independent India taking responsibility for interventions (T AI 1956). This period coincided 
with increased use of BCG as a preventive intervention and rapid developments in TB 
chemotherapy globally. 
Implementation problems in the TB programme were encountered almost from inception 
(Andersen and Banetji 1963, TAl National Conference Proceedings 1968-78). National 
assessments consistently reported gaps between expected performance and outcome (ICMR 
1975, ICORCI 1988, GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992). Only approximately 8-16% of expected 
cases of tuberculosis received complete treatment from the public health services annually 
(Radhakrishna 1988). Evaluations led to little apparent change in performance. 
Renewed global interest in tuberculosis control in the 1990s resulted in a global policy 
strategy (WHO 1994-1997). Termed the Revised National TB Control Programme 
(RNTCP) in India, it has techno-managerial components, along with appeals for increased 
political will and funding. This study argues that unless deeper underlying explanations for 
the implementation gap2 are understood and acted upon, renewed inputs and modified 
strategies of the type suggested in the RNTCP may face the same fate as the National TB 
I TB control involves introducing planned interventions in the relationship between tubercle bacilli and 
man to render the epidemiological situation more favourable to man (NagpauI1984). 
2 Difference between policy statements, promises, expectations and subsequent performance. 
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Programme in the long tenn. A policy analysis approach has been used to study policy 
process and implementation of the NTP at national, state and district levels. The analytical 
model is based on concepts of context, process and actors, besides policy content (\Valt and 
Gilson 1994) and has developed a framework to study implementation factors. This study 
explicitly focuses on access to services under the NTP by the impoverished, comprising 
approximately 40% (360 million people) of the popUlation below and around the poverty 
line3 (Patel 1995, Reddy 1997). This is because the poor bear the burden of TB 
disproportionately (ICMR 1959) and have less access to general health care services 
(Chatterjee 1988). The policy analysis approach in this study also derives from a value base 
of social justice and equity in health and health care (Ganapathy 1985, Barker 1996). 
This chapter starts with a brief historical account of TB in India, discussing Issues 
concerning problem definition of TB for policy purposes. It highlights how incremental 
additions to incomplete knowledge regarding the problem affected policy content and 
strategy, and outlines the series of related, interlocking problems that unfolded during 
implementation. This leads to a discussion of the implementation gap in the TB policy over 
the years, which is the problem being addressed by this study. Recognising that policy 
content dominates scientific and academic discourse, excluding other critical elements of 
policy process (Walt and Gilson 1994), this chapter provides a background to the main 
findings and discussion regarding policy implementation in later chapters (4-8). Technical 
aspects of policy content are discussed in Annexe 1. Chapter two builds a conceptual 
framework for the study from the policy science literature and Chapter three discusses study 
design and methods. Chapter four and five reviews historical policy development at 
national level, including related financial and pharmaceutical policies. Chapter six debates 
current policy changes in the 1990s. Chapter seven and eight discuss implementation issues 
at state and district level. Chapter nine draws conclusions from the entire study regarding 
explanatory factors for the implementation gap. 
3 The poverty line used in India presently is the level of per capita total expenditure by families at which 
basic food requirements in caloric tenus are met (Krishnaji 1997). 
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1.2 A Brief History of Tuberculosis in India: 
Tuberculosis has had along history in India. Tuberculosis-like conditions are recorded in 
ancient Indian texts (Stead and Dutt 1994), the Ayurvedic Samhitas (Gothi 1982). The 
disease is reported to have occurred in domesticated elephants in India prior to 2000 BC 
(Metcalf 1991). It was written about in Sanskrit Vedas suggesting that pulmonary 
tuberculosis was known in 1500 BC, the approximate date of the earliest written records, 
the Rigveda (ibid), and in later works by noted physician Sushruta in 500 AD (ibid, CHEB 
1960, Gothi 1982). It was and still is called Rajya-Roga, the 'king of diseases' 
(Manjunath*41995). The disease evidently existed in the region since ancient times, was 
recognised and named by Indian systems of medicine, which also developed therapeutic 
guidelines (ibid)5. It is not known whether the disease was sporadic, endemic or epidemic 
(Nagpaul 1978). 
Despite its early presence, Wilkinson (1914) commented on the rarity of tuberculosis in 
India in the first half of the nineteenth century and its progressive increase in the middle 
years of that century as industrialisation and popUlation density increased. Other authors 
report that as late as 1880 tuberculosis was relatively uncommon in India (Daniel et al 
1994). It is probable that the present secular epidemic was brought to the Indian 
subcontinent from Europe, as has been recorded to have occurred in South Africa and 
among the indigenous peoples of the Americas (Packard 1989). Population movement is an 
old, well-established method of spread of infectious disease. 
In 1910, the growing magnitude of the problem of tuberculosis in the country was first 
officially noted by Sir Pardly Lukis, Director General of the Indian Medical Service (Gupta 
1985). The All India Sanitary Conference in Madras in 1912 recorded a rapid increase of 
tuberculosis among the population (TAl 1956). Dr. A Lancaster studying the tuberculosis 
problem in the country from 1914-16 for the Government of British India, found prevalence 
alarmingly high in large areas which 40 years previously were 'virgin soil' to TB (CHEB 
4 A star following a name indicates that the source of information is an interview. 
S Recent studies suggest immuno-modulating effects of traditional medicinal preparations given alongside 
modem chemotherapy (TAl 1996). 
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1961; 1). He noted that though phithis was possibly present for centuries in cities, even there 
considerable increases occurred during the period, with spread to smaller towns and \'illages 
'following development of commerce and industry', being most marked in centres with 
greatest commercial development and in villages linked to them by direct lines of 
communication (ibid; 1). Rogers studying post mortem reports in the 1920s suggested that 
17% of total deaths in Calcutta were due to TB (Gupta 1986). Social forces possibly primed 
the population for the current epidemic of tuberculosis, a disease strongly linked to poverty 
and overcrowding (GOI 1946, Dubos and Dubos 1952). These included: 'looting and laying 
waste the land of defeated enemies, .. extorting very high land revenues ... in the last half of 
the eighteenth century' (Jeffery 1988; 17); increasing landlessness among sections of the 
population resulting from colonial policy (Spear 1978); impoverishment; the frequent 
occurrence, every 3 years, of famine, drought and scarcity in the 19th century (Jeffery 
1988); and other epidemics such as plague, reported to have caused a mortality of 15 
million persons in British India and 18 million in the princely states over 20 years following 
the 1896 epidemic. Severe, countrywide famines occurred in 1877-78; 1897-98 with the 
plague epidemic; in 1919-20 preceded by an epidemic of influenza and in 1943 (ibid). 
Large scale movement of refugees around 1947 exacerbated the problem (GOI 1961). 
These social forces operating over a prolonged period could have lowered the resistance of 
the population, increasing susceptibility to epidemics of disease (McNeill 1976). Growing 
industrialisation and urbanisation, associated with worsening living and working conditions, 
provided the ecological setting, as occurred during the industrial revolution in Europe and 
the USA (Dubos and Dubos 1952). 
In summary, TB has been known in India for many centuries, although relatively rare until 
the mid-19th century. Adverse social conditions led to widespread disease, evident in rising 
and high rates of infection and disease in the early 20th century. Today, with 40%) of India's 
popUlation living in similar adverse social conditions, including poor access to health 
services, the possibility of rapid epidemiological decline seems unlikely (Quadeer 1994). 
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1.3. Problem Definition: An Epidemiological Construct of TB 
As scientific methods of measurement and diagnosis developed, the problem of TB became 
defined in predominantly biomedical terms, while consideration of its social dimensions 
receded. Policies developed around this dominant framework. The evolving understanding 
of the biomedical/epidemiological aspects ofTB in India, developed from over two decades 
of research, are summarised. This is followed by a brief overview of broader, inter-related 
problems that developed during the policy process. 
1.3.1 Prevalence and Incidence of Infection6: From 1930, high proportions of reactors to 
tuberculin testinglcuti-reaction (70-88% in those above 15 years, and 11-400/0 in children) in 
studies by Ukil (1930), Benjamin, Rao and Lal (cited in CHEB 1961), revealed the 
magnitude of the problem. Tuberculin testing during the nation-wide Mass BCG Campaign 
in the 1950's detected widespread infection both in rural and urban areas, challenging 
prevailing views that TB was an urban problem as in Europe (CHEB 1968). This had 
resulted in a concentration of TB services in urban areas (T AI 1970). Implications of this 
distribution of infection, confirmed by the National Sample Survey (1955-58), were 
enormous, as 820/0 of India's population was rural and under-served by health care services 
(ICMR 1959, CHEB 1961). The rural thrust of the National TB Programme derived from 
this finding (ibid). Prevalence of infection in 1961 was 520/07 (Subramanian 1963). Infection 
rates were substantially higher among adults, necessitating a shift in focus from children 
through school BCG programmes, to providing TB services for all age groups. An NTI 
study in Tumkur district found 38.3 % of the population infected (induration more than 9 
mm considered positive) (Raj Narain et aI1963). 
Studies observed two types of reactions and distribution curves to Tuberculin tests. One 
with low degree, non-specific sensitivity (smaller indurations), due to non-pathogenic/ 
6 Prevalence of infection is the proportion of persons with significant tuberculin test results (eg. more than 
10 mm) at any point of time, usually expressed as a percentage (NTI 1990). 
Incidence of infection is the rate of new infection among non-infected persons of the earlier year (ibid) 
7 Comparisons to be made with caution due to different types of Tuberculin used, different dosages, 
varying levels of reaction/induration selected to indicate positivity, different age groups (Mayurnath et al 
1991 ). 
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atypical mycobacteria is highly and widely prevalent in India (ICMR 1980, Frimodt-Moller 
1960). The other with larger indurations caused by infection with Mtuberculosis. Animal 
and other studies show a slight protective effect following infection with some atypical 
mycobacteria, with an inverse relationship between prevalence of TB and of non-specific 
sensitivity (ibid citing Palmer and Long, Gothi et a11976, Raj Narain et aI1984). However 
it was considered unlikely that non-specific sensitivity could account for the complete lack 
of protective effect of BCG in the TB Prevention Trial (ibid). Overall prevalence of 
infection in the early 1980s was estimated at 40% (Baily 1983) and currently is about 30% 
(TB Division 1995). Prevalence of infection among children 0-9 years old ranges between 
3.1-11.2 %, with more than 50% of the population aged 20 years and above infected 
(GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992). There is a wide gap between the 30% infected and 2% ill with 
disease (NTI 1994c). The large pool of infected people, at life-long risk of disease, reduce 
probabilities for rapid TB control, requiring long term, sustainable policies8. 
NT! studies in Bangalore district report an average Annual Risk of Tuberculous Infection 
(ARTI)9 (Annexe 1) of 1.1 % in 1961 and 0.61 % in 1985 i.e. a 37% decline occurred over 
23 years or 3.2% per year (Chakraborty et aI1992). Studies in Chingleput district show no 
decline in the 1.7% AR TI, suggesting that regional differences occur (Mayurnath 1991, 
Chakraborty 1993). Differing ARTI's in two neighbouring taluks were attributed to socio-
economic differences (ibid). A survey in a drought prone, deprived region of Rajasthan in 
1991 reported an ART! of 1.44 (Siddiqi et aI1996). Policy managers cite risks of 1-2% (TB 
Division 1995). 
1.3.2 Disease Prevalence10: Frimodt-Moller (1960) cites prevalence rates of X-ray 
positive pulmonary tuberculosis from previous studies: 3.1% among labourers and 0.80/0 
among Gurkha recruits (Asp in 1946); 1.2% among school children, factory workers and a 
section of Trivandrum's popUlation (Hertzberg 1952); 1.4% in Faridabad near Delhi 
(Sikand and Raj Narain 1952); 2.3% among industrial labourers in Madras, with estimates 
8 An important reason for integration with general health services. 
9 The probability of an uninfected person becoming infected with TB during a one year period (TB 
Div.1995). 
10 Differences in case defmitions, diagnostic criteria and methods over time need to be kept in mind. 
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of 1.5% for urban Madras (Philip 1952)11. In the first community survey in MadanapaUe 
town the prevalence was 6.811000 X-rayed, with 5.7 bacteriologically positive casesl1000 
(Frimodt-Moller 1960). 
The National Sample Survey of pulmonary TB, covering six zones of India, reported 
prevalence rates of 13-25/1000 of active and probably active TB and 2-811000 of 
bacteriologically positive TB, both increasing with age and lower in females than males, 
especially over 35 years (rCMR 1959). Some suggested that active abacillary disease was 
probably over-estimated (TAl 1970). An NTI study in Tumkur District (1960-61) found 
2.5% of the X-rayed with probably active/active tuberculosis and 4/1000 of the X-rayed 
population aged 10 years and above sputum positive (Raj Narain et al 1963). A second 
survey in the same district after 12 years of the District TB Programme revealed no change 
in disease prevalence. However studies from Madanapalle, Bangalore and New Delhi over 
time showed a declining prevalence with increased concentration in older groups (T AI 
1970). 
Surveys in Delhi from 1962 to 1973 reported 12-1511000 cases of active/probably active 
disease and 2.1-4/1000 bacillary cases (Pamra et al 1973 cited in Gothi 1982). In the 
Longitudinal Study (1961-68) of the National Tuberculosis Institute in Kamataka the rate of 
bacteriologically confirmed disease was 3-411 000 (Gothi 1982). In the TB Prevention Trial 
prevalence of bacillary TB in persons 10 years and above was an estimated 911 000 in 
Ponneri and 7.5/1000 in Kanchipuram of Chingleput district (ICMR 1980). A study by the 
Tuberculosis Demonstration Centre, Agra in 1978 in an urban population found the rate of 
bacteriologically confirmed disease to be 8.9/1000. In Kashmir prevalence of culture 
positive TB in 1978 was 3/1000 and of abacillary X-ray positive patients 14/1000, with 
differences between districts (Mayurnath et aI1984). 
Regional variations continue to be reported. Prevalence rates of 4.38/1000 culture positive 
cases and 0.6811 000 of smear positive cases in age groups 10 years and above were reported 
from Bangalore district between 1984-86 (Chakraborty et al 1995). A large survey in 
II Higher rates among labourers noted. 
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Wardha district, central India, between 1982-88 found a prevalence of 1.611 000 of sputum 
positive pUlmonary TB by smear or culture or both (Narang et aI1992), which is lower than 
the national average. Interestingly 56.2% were positive only on culture (with 
recommendations to increase use of cultures for diagnosis), 66.3% were males and 33.7% 
females. A high prevalence of 15/1000 of bacteriologically positive cases is reported among 
a tribal population in Madhya Pradesh (Chakma et aI1996). 
An average prevalence rate of 4/1000 sputum positive pulmonary tuberculosis is used by 
the NTP as the basis for estimating numbers of expected cases in a district and for target 
setting. Differences between regions and over time could partly explain gaps between 
expectations and achievements and suggest a need for flexibility in deriving administrative 
estimates/targets. 
1.3.3 Incidence of Disease: A review of Indian studies reports that disease incidence is 
approximately one third prevalence (Rang an et aI1997). With good TB services prevalence 
may be the same as incidence, or if services are not fully effective, approximately twice 
incidence (Murray 1994). Incidence of all active cases in the Delhi and Madanapalle studies 
were 340 and 41011 00,000 (Sivaraman 1982). Incidence of sputum smear positive TB in the 
first NTI survey was 65/100,000 and 23 years later 2311 00,000 in the same area, indicating 
a decline (Chakraborty 1993). In the TB Prevention Trial incidence of culture positive 
pUlmonary TB was 250/100,000 per year, with incidence among males three times that 
among females, and increasing with age in both sexes (ICMR 1980). Programme managers 
calculate incidence of sputum positive TB at 111000, excluding children under the age of 5 
years (TB Division 1995). 
1.3.4 Mortality: Little is known about TB death rates in India in the 19th and early 20th 
century (NagpauI1978). Summary data from reviews and recent findings (Table 1.1) show 
d 1· . d 12 ec Ining tren s . 
12 Readers are cautioned about differing quality of estimated data and regional variations (Nagpaul 1978). 
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Table 1.1 Mortality Rates Over Time due to Tuberculosis in India 
Researcher Year Annual TB Mortality Rate Comments 
Leonard Rogers around 80011 00,000 overestimation due to selection 
1918 bias of post mortem record 
analysis 
Lancaster 1920 5911100,000, Ahmedabad speculated 4001 100,000 for most 
Indian cities 
Cummins * 1921 530/100,000 among Indian Labour Corps of 
British Empire Force in France 
Benjamin et al 1939 46211 00,000, Saidapet 15 TB deaths in 6,500 in 6 month 
survey 
McDougal 1949 2001100,000 estimate basis not clarified 
Frimodt-Moller 1960 6411 00,000 in 1953-54 Steep decline from est. 
211100,000 in 1955, in 263/1 00,000 after introduction of 
Madanapalle community based control 
programme. Initial figures 
overestimated extrapolation from 
hospital data 
ICMR ** 1955-58 77.8/100,000 estimated annual deaths in the 
country 6,570,000 
NTI 1961-68 10011 00,000 longitudinal survey findings 
NTI ** 1977-81 411100,000 estimated annual deaths 346,000 
Chakraborty et al 1978 841100,000, Bangalore higher in males and older age 
regIOn groups 
Goyal et al 1972-76 4011 00,000 Delhi congested urban area, low income 
with good domiciliary services 
Source: Nagpau11978, Goyal et al1978 GOthl 1982, *clted ill UkIl, 1930, **clted m GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992. 
Gothi (1982) attributes declining TB mortality to socio-economic improvement associated 
with increased availability and utilisation of anti-tuberculosis measures. Earlier rates may 
have been overestimates due to extrapolations from hospital data (Frimodt-Moller 1960), 
mis-diagnosis and presence of early tubercular lesions in deaths due to other causes (in rates 
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from post-mortem records). Current estimates range from 50/100,000 population (Datta 
1994) to 841100,000 (NTI 1994). TB mortality rates are not good indicators of disease 
dynamics in populations, as they can decrease while morbidity and infection rates remain 
almost unchanged. (Chakraborty 1993). 
Case fatality among untreated patients was about 50% (NTI 1974). With chemotherapy this 
declined and is currently estimated to be 13% (NTI 1994). However a case fatality of over 
25% was reported from a district using Short Course Chemotherapy under routine 
conditions (Datta et aI1993). Patients put on Standard Regimens and lost to treatment have 
outcomes similar to the natural history of the disease, with 49.7% dead in five years (J agota 
1995). These findings suggest poor functioning of the NTP, with case fatality among 
patients with irregular/incomplete treatment, comprising 66% of those treated by the public 
sector, remaining unacceptably high. 
The Bhore Committee estimated 500,000 annual deaths from TB (GOI 1946). Current 
estimates range from 346-500,000 annual deaths (GOVWHO/SIDA 1992, TB Div. 1995). 
Lowered mortality rates are compensated by demographic growth. Approximately 10% of 
total deaths in persons aged over 10 years are estimated to be due to TB (NT! 1994). It is 
plausible that higher rates occur among the impoverished. Globally TB is the largest cause 
of death from a single disease, accounting for 26% of avoidable deaths (Kochi 1991), 800/0 
of which occur in productive adults aged 15-59 years (WHO/TB/94). 
1.3.5 Natural History: Five year follow-ups of 126 sputum positive patients in rural 
Bangalore, without access to treatment for want of resources and facilities, showed that 
49.2% died (with a higher proportion during the first 18 months), 18.3% remained 
bacillary/infectious, and 32.5% converted spontaneously (NTI 1974). Outcomes changed 
among newer infectious cases in subsequent surveys of the same population. At 18 months, 
mortality decreased to 14.3 %, sputum conversion increased to 52%, while 33% remained 
bacillary, increasing sources of transmission (Gothi 1982), indicating altered dynamics of 
the disease in popUlations. 
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A 30 month follow-up of infectious TB patients In Delhi, with good domiciliary 
chemotherapeutic services, showed 11 % mortality, 74% sputum conversion, while 15% 
remained infectious (ibid}. Prevalence did not vary significantly even after 15 years of 
providing good chemotherapeutic services (ibid}. The same was noted by Frimodt Moller 
(1960) in Madanapalle. It was estimated that epidemiological impact of interventions would 
occur slowly, requiring three or four decades to show change (Banerji and Andersen 1963). 
1.3.6 Magnitude Of Problem: In the 1950s 5 million people (1.30/0 of the population) 
were estimated to have active pulmonary disease of whom 1.5 million (0.40/0) were 
infectious (ICMR 1959). With demographic change and continuing prevalence rates of 
15/1000 (all forms) (ICMR 1959 and subsequent studies) current estimates are 14 million 
TB patients, including 3.5 million (4/1000) sputum positives (TB Div.1995). Based on an 
ARTI of 1.70/0 it is estimated that 1.6 million new cases (all forms) including 714,000 new 
smear positive cases of TB occur annually in India (GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992;11). In an 
average district of 1.5 million people the annual incidence is an estimated 750 sputum 
smear positive patients (Chakraborty 1993). The problem is widely dispersed with 2-3 
sputum positive patients and 10-12 patients with radiologically active TB in each of the 
600,000 villages in India (NIHFW 1988). TB is an adult problem with 93% of all cases 
occurring over 20 years of age (NTI 1994). 
In 1970, 400,000 patients received treatment at government clinics (TAl 1970) rising to 
700,000 in 1981 (NIHFW 1988). More recently 1.5 million TB patients are diagnosed 
annually by the NTP of whom 20% or 300,000 are sputum positive (Nagpaul 1989, 
GOI/WHO/SIDA 1992). Patients treated at organised sector public sector are not included 
(NIHFW 1988). An equal number are said to be treated by the private sector (Nagpau1 
1989). Recommendations to make pulmonary TB notifiable (TAl 1970), giving an idea of 
the actual magnitude, have been consistently ignored by government. 
1.3.7 Time Trends: Grigg's hypothesis (1958) of secular TB epidemics in countries 
spanning 200-400 years was accepted by NTP planners since the 1960's (Nagpaul 1978, 
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Chakraborty 1993)13. As epidemic waves in populations decline, the age structure of 
infected persons shifts towards older age groups. Longitudinal surveys in India indicate that 
this is taking place (ibid). Earlier surveys found over 50% of cases in the over 40 year age 
group, while more recent surveys report 70-800/0 cases in this age group (ibid). Decline in 
infection rates and incidence of smear positive disease has been noted. The nature of the 
disease has changed from acute, fulminating, exudative presentations to more chronic, 
fibrotic forms with reductions in primary disease (Nagpaul 1978, Uke 1994). TB experts 
suggest on the basis of changing epidemiological patterns that the epidemic is in decline. 
Impact of Intervention: In Madanapalle following intensive application of community based 
control measures, sputum positive morbidity reduced from 411 000 in 1950 to 211 000 in 
1964, though prevalence of infection and disease incidence may not have altered (Raj 
Narain 1964). The decline in disease in 6 towns with a good TB service was not 
significantly different from 6 control towns without any special TB service (Frimodt-Moller 
1981). 
14 1.3.8 TB and HIV 
HIV infection rates in patients with pulmonary tuberculosis rose from 0.77% to 3.4 % 
between 1991-1993 in a sample of 1430 pulmonary tuberculosis patients in South India 
(Solomon et al 1995). In another series of 7000 patients 1 % were HIV positive (Prabhakar 
1995). Sixty percent of the approximately 450 AIDS patients reported by 1995 had active 
TB (TB Div.1995). 
HIV seroprevalence among TB patients in Bombay is reported to have increased from 2% 
in 1988 to 10-15% in 1991 and 1992 (Snider et aI1994), though the basis of this data is 
unclear. WHO estimates a rise to 10% in Asia by 2000AD (WHO/TB/94). 
1.3.9 Drug Resistance 
The first ICMR multi-centric survey of drug resistance (1964-65) involving patients without 
history of previous chemotherapy, showed fairly high levels of drug resistance, 14.7% to 
isoniazid, 12.50/0 to streptomycin, and 20.4 % to one or more drugs (Fox 1990). Further 
13 This comprises part of the explanation by them for only a marginal improvement in the epidemiological 
situation over 3 decades. 
14 Further discussion on technical aspects of drug resistance and HIV and TB in Appendix A, 1.5 and 1.6. 
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analysis at the TCC, Madras suggested that part of this was initial drug resistance and not 
primary drug resistance. The second ICMR multi-centric survey (1965-67) additionally 
involved patients with history of chemotherapy. Earlier findings were repeated, but 
resistance was found to increase with duration of chemotherapy, with resistance to isoniazid 
or streptomycin or both increasing to 46% at 1 month and 74% at 6 months, lower than 
findings in Hong Kong in 1962 (ibid). Others were more optimistic suggesting that data 
from Madras and Madanapalle in India between 1957-67 revealed low primary drug 
resistance despite drug and staff shortages and resultant treatment deficiencies (Toman 
1979, 78). A review of studies (1968-1995) of Initial Drug Resistance (lDR) in India 
concluded it is low with less than 20% resistance to isoniazid, less than 10% to 
streptomycin, and around 1 % to rifampicin (Rangan et al 1997). However 
acquired/secondary drug resistance resulting from irregular, inadequate TB chemotherapy 
is higher. In a retrospective cohort in North Arcot district between 1986-1988 31 % of 
patients had active disease following treatment at government health facilities (Datta et al 
1993). Among these 65% were resistant to isoniazid, 12% to rifampicin, 12% had 
combined resistance to isoniazid and streptomycin and 4% to isoniazid and rifampicin 
(ibid). In another study, of 2779 patients in North Arcat district 25% had resistance to one 
or more drugs including 2% to rifampicin while in Pondicherry 13% had initial resistance 
to one or more drugs (Paramasivan et aI1993). A high proportion of patients with initial 
resistance responded favorably to treatment (ibid). As a comparison recent studies in the 
USA reveal a 14.2% crude prevalence of any resistance (Reider 1994). 
1.4 Societall Social Dimensions : 
Health policy makers in the 1940s explicitly acknowledged the role of socio-economic 
factors by linking TB and its spread to 'malnutrition and undernutrition, insanitary and 
overcrowded housing conditions' (GOI 1946;157). They specifically advised government 
that 'the attack on the disease should be launched simultaneously in two directions .. 1) , 
improvement of socio-economic conditions .. to provide for a higher standard of living, 
better housing, adequate nutrition and ... (better) environment in their homes, their H'ork 
24 
places and places of public resort, and 2) towards effective control of the spread of 
infection from patients to those who are healthy. (They) referred to the necessity for 
sustained State action towards the achievement of definite results in .... the amelioration of 
social conditions' for TB control (ibid;158). Need for government action towards improved 
housing, environment and nutrition, in relation to TB control, was re-emphasised in the 
1960s by a government committee (GOl 1961). The 'social and economic repercussions' of 
the disease affecting almost all families, directly or indirectly, was acknowledged (CHEB 
1961; 1). The voluntary sector too recommended action concerning poverty, overcrowding 
and nutrition (T AI 1956, 1970). It undertook public education concerning social customs 
such as the purdah system and habits like spitting in public places was undertaken (ibid). It 
thus focussed on individual behaviour. 
The first government sponsored National Sample Survey (1955-58) reported greater TB 
prevalence among lower socio-economic groups living in poorer housing, with high 
prevalence rates of 4-5% among the poorest in urban slums (lCMR 1959). From a socio-
political perspective, the study and TB control work from 1947-58 highlighted the 
inadequacies of institutionalised, technology-based, specialist TB work being conducted, to 
the socio-economic context of India, and strengthened the search for alternative, indigenous 
approaches to TB control (Nagpaul 1989, BaneIji 1993). The central government 
established institutions with mandates to evolve policies based on public health principles 
and community based strategies (GOl 1959, 1961)15. The government proactively framed 
societal parameters for research and policy, commissioned studies and articulated the 
radical new National TB Programme (GOl 1962), influencing global policy (WHO 1964, 
1982). 
A sociological study in the early 1960s of symptom awareness and health seeking 
behaviour found 70% of sputum positive patients and 80% of X-ray positives, conscious of 
symptoms (BaneIji and Andersen 1963). Motivated by their suffering, substantial 
15 The TB Chemotherapy Centre, instituted in 1956, tested the scientific basis and efficacy of domiciliary 
treatment pioneered in the 1940's at the New Delhi TB Centre (Banerji 1993). The National TB 
Institute,established in 1959, developed a nationally applicable, socially relevant programme within existing 
resource constraints (GOI 1961, NagpauI1989). 
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proportions of symptomatics (50% of sputum positives and 33% of radiologically active) 
took action, approaching health services for relief (ibid). This study formed the basis for 
adopting a felt need approach in the NTP with passive case detection and integration of 
tuberculosis with general health services (Banerji 1993). It formed part of the argument 
against house to house surveys/active case finding and use of Mass Miniature X-rays (ibid) 
promoted by some experts and an industrial lobby (interview 1995). Supportive arguments 
included unsustainable costs and poor reliability of X-rays as diagnostic tools (Raj Narain 
and Subramaniam 1962, Raj Narain et al 1964). It was hypothesised that non-specialised 
personnel using simple standard questions could identify symptomatics for further 
investigations (Banerji and Andersen 1963). Symptoms provided a simple mechanism for 
screening. Sputum smear examinations in patients with symptoms of chronic cough at 
peripheral health institutions provided a simple method for diagnosis of pulmonary TB 
(Baily et al 1967). Findings that 50% of symptomatics approaching health services were 
mis-diagnosed and treated with cough mixture, suggested that educational efforts be 
focused on the health system and the medical profession rather than on mass health 
education campaigns for patients (Banerji and Andersen 1963). It is argued that social 
science inputs interacting with interdisciplinary studies during policy formulation led to 
'subordinating technology to the needs of people, deprofessionalisation (and) 
demystification ' (Banerji 1993,65). 
Early studies from the NTI found irregularity in drug taking un-correlated with economic, 
social, educational and other status of patients and their families (Andersen 1962). A later 
study in Gujarat found greater utilisation of government District TB Centre facilities by the 
poor, scheduled tribes, Muslims and scheduled castes (Mankodi 1982). However District 
TB Programme services in general were under-utilised, despite adequate institutional 
facilities. Poverty was not found to be a cause for incomplete, irregular treatment and it was 
suggested that sociological problems of implementation needed greater attention (ibid). A 
study in Maharashtra on the other hand found a higher proportion of defaulters living in 
poor socio-economic conditions, lacking health information, social support and good 
relationships with health care providers (Barnhoom and Adriaanse 1992). Problems of 
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distances and transport, inaccessibility of health institutions to the poor, particularly women 
among them were identified as causes for non-adherence in addition to poor drug supplies 
and apathy of doctors (Quadeer 1994). 
After articulation of the NTP in 1962 explicit statements concerning socio-economic 
development were dropped from the TB control policy. Major directions of research in 
government institutions were towards case finding, case holding and defaulter action, 
chemotherapy and technical components. There was little work on effects of income and 
social class on TB, access to care, treatment outcomes and coping mechanisms of these 
groups. There was little work on general health services, a key component for the NTP. The 
societal dimensions were thus almost deconstructed. 
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In summary, the magnitude and complexity of the problem ofTB is immense. Research 
regarding the extent and nature of the problem strongly influenced the development of 
treatment and control strategies and policies. 
Problem of TB in India: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Prevalence of infection decreased from 70-88% to 52-30% of the popUlation. It is equally 
distributed in rural/urban areas, increasing with age. 
Incidence of infection is 1-2% per year. Gradual decline over time fits in with natural decline. 
Prevalence of disease is 16/1000 (all forms), including 3-411000 bacillary TB, increases with 
age, lower in women, higher in lower socio-economic groups, regional variations and declining 
prevalence noted. 
Incidence of disease is 1I1000lyear (sputum smear positive), 1-511000 (all forms) 
Mortality is reduced but still high at 50-8411000 
Magnitude of problem: 13.5 million TB patients of which 3.6 million are infectious. In absolute 
numbers it is larger than in 1947 due to demographic reasons. Widely dispersed, predominantly 
rural, adult problem affecting men more. 
• The secular epidemic appears to be on the decline. 
• Drug resistance, chronic excretors, and TBIHIV co-infection are additional problems. 
• Socio-economic factors considered during policy formulation but overshadowed by technical 
components. 
• Poor functioning of the programme is indicated by high case fatality rates, high ratios of 
prevalence to incidence, increasing proportions of chronic excretors and increasing drug 
resistance. 
1.5 Policy Related Problem Definitions/Approaches to TB Control 
TB control programmes conventionally frame the problem within epidemiological, bio-
medical and public health/programmatic parameters described in 1.3 and also case finding, 
case holding, default, relapse, treatment failure (e.g. WHO 1964, 1974, Kochi 1991). 
Beneath epidemiological/public health articulations are conflictual societal relations and 
interests, more apparent in sectoral action/non-action and implementation. However societal 
and political economy issues were infrequently raised. This thesis views the problem of TB 
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and its control within societal and policy parameters in addition to the above. Finance, 
infrastructure, sectoral responses, and pharmaceuticals are referred to but are not 
specifically addressed by TB policy makers. These broader policy related problems even for 
single diseases like TB are not simple or static. The historical review (Chapter 4) revealed 
multi-layered complex problems unfolding over time, affecting and sometimes resulting 
from implementation (Table 1.2). Dominant paradigms and the power/powerlessness of 
various actors (policy makers, implementors and patients) influenced the understanding of 
the problem and choice of solutions. 
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Table 1.2 Layers of TB Related Problems and Policy Responses Over Time 
Period Multi-Layered Problems Policy Response 
1900-1940 a) TB recognised as a major public health a) The family; voluntary sector; medical 
problem and medically intractable; profession in predominantly private 
b) Knowledge gaps about problem, inadequate sector; 
technology for public health intervention; b) An emerging public sector (local govt.), 
c) No state responsibility for problem solving. c) No organised national response. 
1947-mid a) Continues as major public health problem; a) State responsibility, active intervention, 
1960's b) Links to poverty recognised and stated; b) Build up of knowledge through 
c) Inadequate health care infrastructure, indigenous state sponsored research; 
resources and organisational mechanisms; c) NTP evolved mandated by central govt., 
d) TB drugs imported, expensive, in short supply d) Gobal development of chemo-
e) TB redefined as a technical problem with therapeutics makes cure more possible; 
techno-managerial solutions: mass application e) International public health players, 
ofBCG and domiciliary chemotherapy. UNICEF, WHO, become active. 
Mid 1960 a) Continues as major public health problem; a) Growth of private sector medical 
-1980's b) Resource constraints continue; practice; 
c) Competing interests (family planning within b) Growth of Indian pharmaceutical 
health) and underlying forces more obvious; industry reduces prices and increases 
d) Inadequate development and poor functioning availability of TB drugs in the market. 
of state run general health services. 
1990's a) Absolute numbers of TB patients higher than a) Re-emergence of international actors: 
1947 due to demographic reasons. Continues WHO, World Bank, bilateral donors: 
as foremost public health problem; b) Global policy linked to financial aid; 
b) Continued focus on technical factors, societal! c) National policy makers forget! ignore 
policy process factors inadequately considered; indigenous research contributions and 
c) Problems of chronic excretors and drug implementation experiences. 
resistance created by poor implementation; 
d) Co-infection with HIV a new problem. 
NB: This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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Changing and sometimes competing definitions of the problem often co-existed. TB was 
variously viewed as an intractable medical problem in need of simple, reliable diagnostic 
methods and an effective cure (TAl 1956); a social problem linked to widespread poverty, 
poor housing and under-nutrition requiring developmental effort (GOI 1946, 1961); a public 
health problem with techno-managerial solutions (GOI 1961); a behavioural problem 
requiring health education (CREB 1961); an international problem and threat requiring 
urgent global solution and action (WHO/TB 1994); a symptom of inequitable societal 
relations demanding social justice or from the perspective of the poor with TB, a struggle 
for life (MFC 1984). With technology development public health and bio-medical 
constructions became dominant, driving policy nationally and internationally. Societal 
analysis and strategies (GOI 1946, 1961) receded from government's TB policy agenda. 
In 1962 the NTP attempted accommodating sociological and epidemiological definitions 16 
without acknowledging inherently different goals/interests. The sociological definition went 
beyond the medical domain with the problem of pulmonary TB understood as the 'total slim 
of all the suffering, discomfort and economic dislocation directly or indirectly brought 
about by the tubercle bacillus destroying human lung tissue. '(Banelji and Andersen 1963). 
Reduced suffering being a goal, the programme was deliberately named the National 
Tuberculosis Programme (NTP) and not the National Tuberculosis Control Programme 
(NTCP), differing from other concurrent vertical disease control programmes (malaria, 
smallpox) (interviews 1996). Competing epidemiological definitions focused on reducing 
disease transmission and on control, the latter deemed to be achieved when prevalence of 
infection reduced to 1% at 14 years of age (WHO 1964, Gupta 1985). This indicator was 
said by a key policy maker to have developed 'from the top of one's head' (interview 1995), 
an interesting insight into how measurable policy objectives developed in the abstract 
domain were imposed on implementors working in real life situations. Control was also 
16 Whether defmitions, articulated by researchers, are meaningfully adopted becomes evident during 
implementation processes. 
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defined as reduced disease prevalence over time. The target was a 50% reduction III 
prevalence of excretors1? over 20 years (Piot 1962). 
Epidemiological arguments narrowed policy by focusing on infectious pulmonary TB thus 
implicitly favouring public health and state interests over patients interests. Patients with 
sputum smear negative, active pUlmonary TB or with childhood and extrapulmonary TB 18, 
being non-infectious and consequently not threatening society, received cheaper, less 
effective drug regimens, though physically suffering as much or more (MFC, 1984). This 
group comprises over 50-60% of patients with TB. This approach continued in the 1980's 
with Short Course Chemotherapy (multi drug, shorter duration, better cure rates) available to 
infectious patients and Standard Regimens (longer duration, less effective, cheaper) to 
others (NTI chemotherapy guidelines) 19. Justified by resource constraints, the policy was 
none the less discriminatory. The resource constraint argument, accepted for five decades 
represents societal relations and state priorities (Chapter 4).20 
Despite acceptance of association ofTB with socio-economic factors and poverty, there 
were few efforts to understand causal and mediating societal mechanisms, how these affect 
policies and services, or to propose strategies to engage with deeper causes. An initial 
model (Table 1.3) suggests need for linkages between different levels. 
17 Infectious patients excreting tubercle bacilli in their sputum. 
18 TB is a systemic disease manifesting in different organs depending on the response of the immune system 
and other factors (Bloom 1994). 
19 The Revised NTP covering a small proportion of the population offers see to seriously ill sputum negative 
patients (TB Div. 1995). ., . . . 
20 This study views TB (all forms) as a cause of human suffenng and a major public health Issue that IS 
intricately linked to societal relations. 
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Table 1.3 TB and Society: Levels of Analysis and Solutions 
Levels of Analysis of TB Causal Understanding Solutions/ Control Strategies 
Surface phenomenon Infectious disease/ germ theory. BCG, case fmding and 
(medical & public health problem) domiciliary chemotherapy. 
Immediate cause Undernutrition! low resistance, poor Development & welfare -income 
housing, low income/ purchasing capacity generation improved housing. 
Underlying cause (symptom of Poverty/ deprivation, unequal access to Land reforms, social movements 
inequitable relations) resources. towards an egalitarian society. 
Basic cause Contradictions and inequalities in More just international trade, 
(international problem) socioeconomic and political systems at fmance and political relations 
international, national & local levels. etc. 
Source: ModIfied from Ganapathy (1985) 
1.6 Implementation Problems and Gaps 
Delays and difficulties in implementing public policies are frequent worldwide (Lazin 
1995), and differences between public policies and their performance, termed the 
'implementation gap' are reported (Chapter 2). In India, concerns about the inability of the 
TB programme to achieve its objectives (Chapter 4), with consequent effects on potential 
programme impact were repeatedly expressed (Table 1.4). 
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Table 1.4 Implementation Gap in the National TB Programme 
Year Report 
1956 Second Five Year 
1961 Plan; 
1969-
70 
1975 
1988 
1992 
GOI, Mudaliar 
Committee. 
Fourth Five Year 
Plan. 
ICMR, 
NTP Assessment. 
ICORCI, In-Depth 
Study ofNTP. 
GOIIWHO/SIDA 
Indicators of an Implementation Gap 
1st Plan (1951-56) 5000 TB beds established of 10,000 planned, 55 new 
TB clinics started, the majority without laboratorylX-ray facilities & staff: 
2nd Plan (1956-61) 2,500 TB beds of 4000 established, 100 TB clinics set 
up against a target of 300, some without minimum requirements, utilisation 
of UNICEF supplied equipment behind schedule, integration of BCG 
campaign not possible because clinics, school health and other services did 
not develop as anticipated. Only 3 out of 10 planned State TB Training and 
Demonstration Centres established 
Implementation by States was poor despite guidance/assistance by Centre 
By 1968, end of 3rd plan, only 170 out of 330 districts were covered by the 
District TB Programme, several districts had no TB beds as adjuncts to 
domiciliary treatment. Two major States had no State TB Centres. 
'the working of the NTP is far from satisfactory'; 
2.1%-15.5% of eligible children given BCG, 
19-44% of new bacillary cases detected against estimated incidence, 
2.5%-33% of all forms ofTB treated against estimated prevalence, 
very high proportion of patients discontinue treatment. 
performance of this 'carefully planned programme' continued below 
expectations even after evaluations, causing concern. Case detection in 
1987 was 1I4th the annual incidence of TB (too low for significant impact 
on the TB problem). Only 27% of those starting treatment made 12 or more 
monthly drug collections from 1982-86. 
'the programme is not having a measurable impact on transmission and 
TB Program Review appears to function far below its potential' . 
Sources: GOI,2nd & 4thPlan, GOI 1961, ICMR 1975, CHEB 1977, ICORCI 1988, GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992 
Implementation21 problems and gaps viewed from different perspectives (discussed below) 
were highlighted by researchers at the NTI (Andersen and BaneIji 1963, Raj Narain 1964); 
21 Implementation is defined as the functioning of the NTP in accordance with its basic principles of 
integration, meeting felt needs, referral system, supervision, training, guidance and supplies etc. (ICORCI 
1988). 
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by the voluntary sector (Bordia 1971, Deshmukh 1971, MFC 1984, VHAI 1984) leading to 
requests for evaluations by the TB Association of India; and by parliamentarians. The latter 
two resulted in government sponsored comprehensive research based reviews identifying 
operational, organisational and administrative bottlenecks (lCMR 1975, ICORCI 1988). 
While democratic processes elicited response, political processes prevented findings from 
being implemented. 
The government (GOI 1961) acknowledged assessments of the first two plans that resources 
were inadequate for the institutionalised, vertical approach then pursued. Government 
resource constraints became an over-riding parameter within which the NTP was 
formulated. Implementation problems (e.g. 80% irregularity in chemotherapy) in the NTP, 
reported from a well resourced urban programme, predicting rising drug resistance, 
concluded that theoretical solutions of mass chemotherapy were small steps towards 
achieving the difficult goal of TB control (Andersen and BaneIji 1963). 'Critical problems 
for achieving TB control within a reasonable time' were identified as 'organisational and 
administrative ... rather than medical and technical' (Andersen 1962; 1). 
Others argued that the NTP using diagnostic and treatment techniques with inherent 
limitations, through minimal facilities at District TB Centres and elementary services at 
Primary Health Centres, could not be expected to achieve TB control in the near future (Raj 
Narain 1964). With about half the sputum positive cases positive by direct smear, and 50% 
of direct smear positive cases being symptomatic in some studies, the NTP had a maximum 
potential of reaching 30% of total bacteriologically positive cases (ibid). Isoniazid 
monotherapy (300 mg/day) would convert 60% of sputum positive cases, glvmg a 
maximum programme effect of sputum conversion of 18% of cases (60% of 30% possible 
to diagnose) (ibid;6). Most transmission to family contacts occurred before diagnosis, hence 
chemotherapy was unlikely to contribute much to TB control (ibid). Drug resistance and 
chronic excretors were predicted causing suffering and expense to patients and society 
(ibid). These unintended policy consequences where solutions became part of the problem. 
were later documented. In the fifth survey of the Chingleput BCG Trial only 29% of cases 
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found were new, with 71 % being old cases detected in previous rounds but not yet cured 
(Jagota 1995). Others reiterated that poorly functioning programmes produce chronic 
excretors, increasing disease transmission and drug resistance (Grybowski 1993). Findings 
that peripheral institutions detect only 34% of all cases and that just 24% of cases detected 
by the NTP were bacillary, indicate that basic principles of the programme were not being 
practised by implementors (Sivaraman 1982). 
The Indian Council of Medical Research report (1975) focusing on the public sector, dealt 
implicitly with issues concerning power such as apathy and lack of interest in Peripheral 
Health Institutions, need for authority and competence at district and state TB centres, poor 
implementation by states, and need for greater centralisation. It took on the medical 
profession by recommending that private practice by Government medical officers be 
banned, and suggested greater community participation. It pointed the way forward beyond 
a techno-centric approach. The report was released at a time of social and political unrest, 
when family planning dominated the health agenda and Emergency22 was introduced 
(Chapter 4). Besides introduction of monitoring in 1978, most of the recommendations 
were not acted upon. 
The 1988 report (ICORCI) viewing the NTP as part of the health system, found it was given 
low priority, with integration slow, incomplete and hampered by 'conflicting personal and 
group interests' (ibid; 190), with other programmes such as family welfare producing 
detrimental effects. Infrastructural inadequacies of staff, accommodation, equipment and 
facilities were highlighted while lack of supportive supervision at all levels was the weakest 
point. Staff discontent and conflict, with health workers 'almost on the point of revolt' 
(ibid;209) in one State was reported. Case finding and case holding was low along with a 
paradoxical overdiagnosis and treatment of 'suspect' cases. Recording was 'incomplete and 
unreliable' (ibid;222), monitoring was not used locally/meaningfully and pressures of 
targets for case detection led to over-diagnosis (ibid). The only action on the exhaustive 
report, commissioned by government, financed by WHO and submitted in November 1988, 
22 A national emergency was declared by the central government under which civil rights were curtailed 
(Chapter 4). 
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was circulation of the summary recommendations to the States (interview 1996). 
International approaches were being developed by WHO in 1989 (Kochi 1991) through 
which the TB programme in India was to receive World Bank support (Banerji 1993;78). 
This partly explains why the 1988 report was shelved. 
The 1992 Programme Review (GOIIWHO/SIDA) identified a weak central structure, 
inadequate development of State resources, poor coordination at district level, insufficient 
utilisation of health assistants and no credible technicaVpolicy advisory body. Problems in 
case finding, treatment practices and organisation, poor drug supplies and financing, 
training and supervIsIOn, and the role of private practitioners were raised. 
Recommendations however were in the old mode focusing on diagnostics, treatment and 
cure, recording and cohort analyses, training and operational research. Creating an apex 
making policy body and task force (a suggestion made earlier), strengthening the central 
unit, and additional staff at sub-district level were other recommendations (ibid). This 
review led on to the Revised NTP (Chapter 5). Till 1997, about 23 million people of 950 
million were covered in phases by the Revised NTP, but no action was taken on critical 
issues raised. 
All three authoritative, analytic reports involving experienced, committed national TB 
experts, were commissioned by government. Despite being incisive and comprehensive, 
these assessments and other critiques have not influenced implementation and performance, 
pointing to the role of deeper underlying factors. 
An implementation gap in TB control was also observed globally. For instance, 
'Inspite of sustained efforts made by WHO and IUAT to assist the implementation of 
realistic and effective TB control programmes .. practical progress is still lagging behind. 
Achievements fall short not only of what could reasonably be expected even in 
unfavourable conditions, but also of what would be required to make an impact on the TB 
problem. Thus only a small proportion of the world's population benefits today from 
scientific advances in the prevention and chemotherapy of TB. This applies not only to 
developing countries; so far only a few of the affluent countries have taken any determined 
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steps to rationalise their TB services' (Hitze, Chief, TB, WHO Geneva, 1971 quoted in 
USPHS 1976). 
A decade later a WHO study group said, 'TB represents the prototype of a disease for 
which the natural history is known and substantially quantified and against which an 
effective, simplified, standardised, technology has been developed and organised into 
NTP's and yet there is a continuing gap between expectations and achievements which is 
creating concern' (WHO 1982;7). 
Problem analyses and policy for tuberculosis control during the past 4-5 decades, the phase 
of 'scientific optimism,23, has been relatively apolitical. Questions concerning susceptibility 
of certain societal groups to TB, their reduced access to care, and underlying structural 
issues are raised by a few (MFC 1984, VHAI 1994, Farmer 1995, Rangan et al 1997). 
These questions are generally unheeded in the policy process in India. In the 1990's WHO 
reframed the problem in epidemiological terms (Kochi 1991). Its appeal for increased 
political will (WHO 1996, 1997), to governments with a variety of political systems and 
beliefs across the world, to initiate action on TB is important, but too general from a 
political science perspective, besides being merely a background to the main techno-
managerial policy package. 
In conclusion, the problem being addressed by this policy is intrinsically complex. 
Development of policy content was part of the policy process and cannot be seen as a 
separate technological entity. Societal factors/ forces and effects of poverty on TB in India, 
apparent from historical data, received insufficient policy consideration from policy makers. 
Rationalism and indigenous research helped understand the extent, nature and 
epidemiological aspects of the problem and to develop policy content along scientific 
principles. Limitations of this approach to understanding other crucial elements of policy 
process and implementation were not appreciated. Though sociological findings and 
national socio-economic context influenced policy strategy, the emphasis was on the 
epidemiological/public health approach. Research contributions were internationally 
23 Exemplified by statements such as 'specific tools are now ava ilable for preventing and curing 
tuberculosis making it possible to plan and execute effective anti-tuberculosis programmes under 
practically any epidemiological or socio-economic conditions '(WHO 1964;1). 
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accepted and basic policy principles considered sound by repeated evaluations, which 
however raised issues beyond the scientific domain to explain problems with 
implementation. Implementation gaps consistently persisted over forty years at levels such 
that epidemiological impact was elusive, reduction of suffering inadequate, and with 
unintended negative consequences. This study suggests that the NTP, while technically 
sound, is flawed in that policy process factors, particularly societal and political issues 
concerning power, alluded to in evaluation reports as affecting implementation are 
inadequately considered. These need to be seen as part of the problem requiring specific 
strategies. These are discussed further in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLICY PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION: 
BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
Policy studies as an academic discipline emerged in the 1950's, with 'The Policy 
Orientation' by Lasswell in 1951 (Sapru 1994, Parsons 1995), in response to development 
of public sector policies. From the 1940's, many governments invested substantially in 
national public sector social policies, including health, education, housing, water supply, 
sanitation and social welfare. International priority given during this period and until the 
1980's, to the role of the state in the economy and development is widely recognised (Walt 
and Gilson 1994). This was exemplified in the USA by the New Deal initiatives under 
President Roosevelt, and in the UK, with nationalisation and the setting up of public 
services and utilities under the welfare state. 
However by the 1970's, despite gains, dissatisfaction developed regarding a perceived 
'implementation gap' (Dunsire 1978), or 'implementation deficit' in which 'the modem 
state promised programmes which it cannot deliver' (Hjern and Porter 1993;248). Delays, 
difficulties and failures in implementation were perceived as frequent (Lazin 1995). 
In India, following political independence in 1947, ambitious development policies were 
formulated. They were to function through a public administration structure evolved in 
British India primarily for tax collection purposes and maintenance of law and order. They 
were embedded in an ancient society with its own institutions (family, caste, religion, 
panchayats or mechanisms of local governance, Indian systems of medicine), social 
relationships (some of which were hierarchical and stratified) and philosophical framework. 
Health sector policy documents written just before Independence articulated major social 
goals (BaneIji 1985 citing the Sokhey report of 1939, GOI 1946) as did the Constitution of 
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India in 1950 and five year plan documents. Written during a phase of nationalism and 
deriving from the freedom struggle, they provided vision and direction to the health sector. 
They perhaps reflected the ideals of the authors and personalities involved, which may not 
have been shared or internalised by the system through which they were to be executed. 
Specific policies evolved subsequently to control major public health problems 
(tuberculosis, malaria, smallpox), develop health services, and train health personnel (park 
1994). From the 1960's expert committees, evaluation! research studies and monitoring 
systems revealed implementation problems in health sector and tuberculosis control policies 
(Chapter l;Table 1.4, ICSSRlICMR 1981, Banerji 1982, 1990). 
2.2 Understanding Policy 
The meaning of the term policy as used in policy science and an understanding of its 
dynamics has been evolving. Varying definitions arise from different disciplines, schools of 
thought and ideologies. Definitions, frameworks and methodologies used, reflect 
assumptions about social relationships, and influence the way policy process is perceived. 
Some definitions are operational without reference to underlying assumptions and 
philosophies. Pressman and Wildavsky described policy in 1973 as a 'hypothesis containing 
initial conditions and predicted consequences'. Policies were formulated because of 
dissatisfaction with certain conditions (by the public or other interests) e.g. tuberculosis, 
poor health services or unemployment and also due to other politico-economic forces. 
Different interpretations and analyses of causes of conditions resulted in different policies. 
While predicted consequences from social policies sometimes did not occur, unintended 
consequences not uncommonly did (Leichter 1979). 
Early work on policy making focused on the primacy of decision making as a rational 
choice between various options, often supported by policy research (Howlett and Ramesh 
1995). Hogwood and Gunn (1984) refer to policy as being larger than a discrete decision, 
involving a series of decisions sometimes in a rational sequence, and also as specific 
activities undertaken as an expression of general purpose, a specific proposal or a 
programme. Health sector policy, defined as broad statements of goals, objectives and 
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means that create frameworks for activity, and developing rules to guide action or inaction 
(WHO SEARO 1989, Palmer and Short 1989), was apolitical with an implicit rationalism. 
The assumed linearity had the following sequence: problem- research- policy formulation-
interventioniimplementation- output! outcome/impact- monitoring and evaluation- feedback 
and correction. Other analysts recognising the limitations of a rationalist approach, 
described policies as being more complex, and interactive (Walt 1994). 
Walt (1994) drew attention to implementation and a broader set of actors. 'Health policy 
embraces courses of action that affect the set of institutions, organisations, services and 
funding arrangements of the health care system. It goes beyond health services, however, 
and includes actions and intended actions by public, private, and voluntary organisations 
that have an impact on health (ibid;41). Not creating agencies or organisations with 
authority and adequate budgets after policy decisions to act on problems, would suggest that 
government is not fully committed to the policy (Walt 1994 and 1994b). 
Political dimensions received explicit recognition from some scholars. Dye (1972) for 
example suggested that public policy was anything that governments chose to do or not to 
do i.e. governments were politically motivated in policy formulation. Political system 
analysis of policy includes what governments do, why and the consequences that follow 
(Leichter 1979) and not merely the analysis of 'rational' policy processes (Jordan and 
Richardson 1987). Placebo or symbolic policies are 'not actually designed to solve societal 
problems, but introduced as a means of managing the political agenda' (ibid;233). Policies 
formulated because of the need to be seen to be doing something, may never be expected to 
be implemented. While policies may be expressed as explicit written documents, they may 
also be implicit or unwritten (WHO SEARO 1989). Very generally worded policy 
documents and widespread use of implicit goals and practices allow room for manoeuvre 
and hidden political agendas. Gaps between statements and action occur, between what 
governments say they will do, what they do, and what they decide not to do (Palmer and 
Short 1989, Walt 1994). Policy statements could become political tools to appease societal 
pressures and demands. Recognition that the state was not necessarily a neutral actor 
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working for the common good, but was influenced by strong societal forces reflecting the 
distribution of power in society, added to the use of political approaches to policy analysis. 
Policy is affected by the political system within which it functions. Society centred 
approaches (Grindle and Thomas 1991) such as pluralism conceptualise the policy 
environment as several interest groups competing to exercise power and influence (Hill 
1993). Negotiation, bargaining, compromise, formation of alliances and coalitions of 
interests characterise policy process including implementation. This school earlier assumed 
that distribution of power is more or less equal among interest groups functioning in an 
open, liberal democratic political framework. However later analysis recognised unequal 
distribution of power and influence in society (Barker 1996). In health care policies, 
medical professionals, medical Insurance companIes and producers of 
pharmaceuticals/medical technology have disproportionate power In companson with 
consumers and the poor (Patel and Rushefsky 1996). 
Other society centred approaches suggest that policies respond to and benefit different 
societal groups differentially. They do not assume homogeneity of 'people, popUlations or 
public'. Varying political strengths of groups (class, caste, gender, ethnicity, religion, 
professionalismlknowledge base etc.) are strong influencing factors in the policy process. In 
implementation it has been reported in the USA that 'the character of client treatment at the 
hands of street level bureaucrats reflects and reinforces class and ethnic divisions' (Hudson 
1993;396). While the state theoretically could playa policy role in evening out inequalities, 
it could also serve the interests of dominant groups. 
State centred approaches (Grindle and Thomas 1991) such as political economy/elitist 
theories conceptualise corporate/business and economic forces as predominant. The ruling 
class or elite control market structures, state functioning, resource allocation and political 
decision making through strategies of manipulation, information control and sanctions 
(Blowers 1993). Powerful networks of business, military, aristocratic, bureaucratic and 
political elite influence government agencies and decision making (Barker 1996). Political 
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and policy agendas and implementation processes are subservient to these deeper forces, 
with national and international capitalism as important determinants. 
Public policies refer to those for which governments are primarily responsible (palmer and 
Short 1989, Walt 1994). They affect public interest and are carried out in the name of 
people as a whole. They may restrict certain areas for the public sector while creating an 
environment for private sector growth in other areas, along with regulation and monitoring. 
National health policies are guiding principles for health sector efforts of the State, also 
setting the tone for the entire health sector operating in a country. However business and 
corporate interests exert a powerful influence on government policy (Blowers 1993). 
Market forces gained prominence in the dominant neo-liberal framework during the past 
two decades. Whether they are suitable for the health sector including pharmaceuticals is 
under debate, particularly in the context of ethics and values of social justice and equity. 
For this study, tuberculosis control policy was defined as a series of related decisions, 
action or inaction, around a framework of goals and objectives, evolved and undertaken 
over a period of time, by several actors at different levels, explicitly or implicitly, impinging 
directly or indirectly on the problem, with intended and unintended consequences. It 
includes the creation of the means to guarantee execution and affects institutions, 
organisations, health personnel, services and funding arrangements within the health care 
system (adapted from Walt 1994). Implementation was seen as an integral part of policy 
process, related to political processes, societal structures and values. 
2.3 Policy Analysis 
Policy analysis is multi-disciplinary and multi-method (Williams 1982) and studies the 
policy process. Policy research provides policy makers with information and options to 
solve problems (Majchrzak 1984). A distinction is made between analysis for policy 
(provision of technical and economic information for policy making, monitoring and 
evaluation) and analysis of policy (focusing on processes and values affecting origins, 
intentions, constructions and conduct of policies) (Gordon, Lewis and Young 1993). 
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Theoretical approaches to policy analysis, using varying frameworks and disciplines have 
developed. Analysis for policy focuses on a linear, rational, problem solving, prescriptive 
approach (Majchrzak 1984). Others recognise the limitations of the rational choice approach 
(Schelling 1985, Grindle and Thomas 1991, Walt 1994). In the health sector, epidemiology 
contributes an understanding of the nature, magnitude and determinants of the problem 
(Levine and Lilienfeld 1987). Economic approaches have introduced concepts of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and value for money to make best use of scarce resources (Clegg 1993). They 
have been little used in the health care services sector in India, though are reported to be 
widely utilised in other policy areas. The limitations of an economic approach, especially in 
coping with political dimensions and value systems have been raised (Ganapathy 1985). 
Several analysts using political science approaches focus on actors, institutions and societal 
groups involved in policy making. Studying the role of policy elites (Grindle and Thomas 
1991), health bureaucracies (Justice 1986), interest groups and conflicting interests (Reich 
1993a), economic and class interests (Navarro 1994) are typical of this body of analyses. 
Political mapping (Reich 1993a) and stakeholder analysis (Crosby 1992) study political 
resources, support for and opposition to policy. Banetji (1990) analyses health policies in 
India using a multi-disciplinary approach, a historical perspective, and a pro-poor value 
base. Differing ideological assumptions underpin all policy analyses explicitly or implicitly. 
Walt (1994) and Walt and Gilson (1994) use a political economy approach, suggesting an 
analytical model for health policy analysis incorporating context (social, political and 
economic), process, actors (international, national, subnational) and content. Policy analysis 
can potentially be an intervention and input into policy making and policy change processes 
(ibid, Barker 1996). It has descriptive as well as prescriptive or normative aspirations. 
Caution regarding its prescriptive uses is suggested, given the complexity of policy 
processes and the political compulsions of the moment that drive policy makers (Howlett 
and Ramesh 1993). Concepts such as context are general, open to varying political 
interpretations. 
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The above analysts tend to focus on national/central actors with an inherent top-down 
approach, ignoring public perspectives and participation in the policy process. This could 
mask societal conditions and gloss over the human aspects of health policies dealing 
intimately with the lives of people. 'Critical Policy Analysis' as an alternative includes a 
critical reflection of social science methodologies used for policy analysis, recognising their 
values, interests, assumptions, and structural limitations (Ganapathy 1985). The method is 
explicitly committed to social justice, recognises issues of power and conflict, takes a 
historical and dialectical approach, uses different methods to get divergent perspectives, 
feels that public participation is essential to generate valid knowledge, sees policy analysis 
as an intervention building on critical reflection, dialogue and collective social action with 
demystification and repoliticisation of policy analysis. Generating multiple perspectives and 
undertaking a dialectical analysis of these perspectives supports a deeper understanding of 
reality. Every proposition is true only upto a point, hence multiple perspectives help 
overcome individual limitations (ibid). 
As mentioned above the role of the public has been neglected in policy analysis, which 
takes the government or policy perspective as reference point. Representation of peoples' 
interests was assumed to be ensured by existing state and interest group mechanisms in a 
democratic framework. This may not occur for the weaker unorganised sectors given the 
inequalities of power in any society. Citizens are key stakeholders in policy process 
(Ganapathy 1985), not just passive recipients, dependant beneficiaries and objects of 
developmentlhealth services or of research. There is need for people to be participants, 
subjects and producers of meaning in policy analysis (ibid). 
Most analysts tend to overlook the impact of the complexities of health problems (inherent 
biological features of TB for instance) on policy. Content too is often considered as 
predominantly technical and value free, though it may be as influenced by political factors 
as processes are. 
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2.4 Policy Process and Implementation 1 
Early policy studies focused on decision making and suggested linear stages of formulation, 
implementation, evaluation and termination in the policy process (Lazin 1995). In the 
stagist, policy cycle approach to understanding policy process, issues or problems first reach 
the political agenda. Decisions, laws or regulations are then made by policy makers. 
Implementation was expected to follow automatically and was considered part of public 
administration. Monitoring, evaluation and finally termination occurred. This model is a 
modified version of the seven stage model first articulated by Lasswell i.e. intelligence, 
promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination and appraisal (Parsons 
1995). These conceptual approaches reflected the perspectives of policy/decision 
makers/planners. 
Inductive implementation studies identified different issues and interactive processes. 
Phillip Selznick's study on the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1949 is one of the earliest 
analyses on implementation (Parsons 1995). It indicated that organisations adapt, survive 
and thrive as complex organic systems interacting with their environment. Selznick showed 
how informal organisations developed within formal structures. Decisions often followed 
the interests and values of its members and not the formal policy goals of the organisation. 
Pressman and Wildavsky's case study on unemployment in 1973 is a widely cited early 
study of implementation failure. Its central point was that policies/programmes requiring a 
number of decision points (at which agreements are to be made), clearances (at which 
participants have to consent), and with multiple actors involved, are unlikely to achieve 
their objectives. However their identification of failure strengthened their recommendations 
and support to a strong top-down approach. They stressed the need for clearly defined and 
understood goals, capacity to assemble and control resources, co-ordination, effective 
communication and control of individuals and organisations in performance of tasks 
I 'Policy implementation covers the operationalisation of policy prescriptions into goals and actions that 
specify the agents, procedures, capacities and behaviors required to produce the intended outputs at various 
levels (national to local). Brinkerhoff (1997 ;205) deriving from Mazmanian and Sabatier' s definition/top-
down approach in 1989. 
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(Parsons 1995). Their later writings acknowledged implementation as a process, as 
evolution, learning and mutual adaptation (ibid). 
Pressman and Wildavsky reinforced the linear stagist understanding of policy process (Hill 
1993, Lazin 1995) by drawing a distinction between policy making and implementation. 
The top-down approach was critiqued by many as being policy-driven, hierarchical, 
concerned with effectiveness and control, with an emphasis on getting implementors to 
meet objectives. There is an assumption of power at the top and of significant control over 
political, organisational and technical factors (Williams 1982). Policy goals were assumed 
to be valid (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). However increasingly research suggested that 
policies were often altered/'subverted' by actions of local implementors, and that 
organisational and inter-organisational factors transformed policy (Hill 1993). 
Implementors coping with circumstances and field conditions that were difficult and 
continuously changing with 'the problem' presenting in different dimensions often made 
crucial decisions. They however rarely participated in the planning or in the design and 
analysis of research. Their perspectives, if considered, were represented or interpreted by 
others. 
Other studies acknowledged implementation to be complex. It was called the 'missing 
link in the study of social policy' (Hargrove 1975, cited in Sapru 1994) and 'the Achille's 
heel of social policy' (Williams 1982). Disinterest and naivete in implementation in the 
real world were found to be impediments in the policy process (Sapru 1994, citing 
Williams 1975). Regardless of rigorous plan formulation, build up of organisational 
structures and substantial resource inputs, gaps between intent and implementation were 
common (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). It became evident that a decision did not imply that 
implementation would take place. It was also realised that implementation was a crucial and 
intrinsic part of the policy process (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). A more inclusive and 
democratic approach to policy making and policy analysis seemed necessary. 
Using a different research approach with a bottom-up perspective, other aspects of the 
policy process were identified. Rather than starting with policy makers, and policy 
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objectives and studying to what extent they were implemented, this approach started from 
street-level implementors. Lipsky in 1971 (cited in Parsons 1995) first argued that 
interaction between bureaucrats and clients at street level should be taken into account. His 
studies of urban policy and special education reform found that the rational model was not 
effective in practice or theory; that control over people was not the way forward to effective 
implementation; that services were maintained by coping strategies of committed and 
dedicated street level staff. Thus alteration of policy was not seen as subversion but as 
necessary adaptation. 
Others too found local actors' personal motivation, goals and strategies, their re-
interpretation of programmes, along with interorganisational interaction and the 
development of a network of contacts, substantially transforming and altering policies 
(Elmore 1982, Howlett and Ramesh 1995). Implementors often reinterpret policy in 
relation to local circumstances, requirements and demands of clients, personal 
preferences and styles. It was realised that the policy is not the only or major influence on 
the behaviour of imp lemen tors (Elmore 1982). Formal and informal relationships constitute 
policy networks and subsystems and influence policy processes (Howlett and Ramesh 
1995). Several analysts found negotiation, bargaining, conflict, compromise and consensus 
building integral to policy process, acting as constraint or contribution according to 
circumstance (Jordan and Richardson 1987, Grindle and Thomas 1991). Policies and 
programmes adapted and adjusted to local political and socio-economic environments 
(Lazin 1995). Findings from studies reviewed indicated that: vague and conflicting goals 
are the norm, policy objectives are unstable, changing over time, interorganisational and 
intergovernmental structures are inter-dependant and interactive, constant change and 
reinterpretration of goals make programme evaluation almost impossible. It was suggested 
that policies or policy makers cannot solve problems, but those in immediate proximity, 
with problem solving skills and discretion can (Elmore 1982). Policies can only direct 
attention towards a problem and provide individuals an occasion for the application of skill 
and judgement. A major shift in power is implied by this approach. Hence relationships 
between the problem and the closest point of contact is a critical stage of analysis (Elmore 
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1982). However even here the perspectives and participation of the affected public is not 
considered. 
Discretionary behaviour by those delivering servIces was characteristic of several 
programmes studied (Williams 1982). Workers' behaviour which controlled programmes 
and determined outcomes was shaped by organisational structure and processes of 
functioning that either supported and motivated workers or left them isolated. It was 
suggested that instead of discretion being viewed as illicit it should be seen as an asset. It 
was stressed that organisations were effective mechanisms for working with difficult public 
problems, rather than relying only on the option of market forces. This reflected the 
underlying conflict and debate concerning the role of the state and the market. 
Others argued that while flexibility allows greater freedom to respond effectively to a 
changing situation, it could be misused for personal! bureaucratic/ dominant local interests 
(Jordan and Richardson 1987). While findings from bottom-up perspectives are descriptive 
of what happens, it was questioned whether it should be the norm for the policy process 
(Sabatier 1993) 
More recent implementation studies suggest that 'demonstrating the complexity of 
implementation processes is an antidote to predetermined problem analysis and 
standardised solutions which short circuit situational learning and adaptability' (Brinkerhoff 
1997b;229). Several of these insights are relevant to public health programmes. 
To sum up, analysis of policy processes could be described as falling into two categories: 
top-down, and integrative with a bottom-up perspective. Their characteristics and 
underlying differences are highlighted in Table 5. The approach taken affects the way 
implementation is understood, with important consequences for the effectiveness of 
programmes such as the NTP. Policies evolved by experts, think-tanks, planning bodies 
tend to be top-down. The field of medicine/public health is particularly prescriptive, with 
specialised knowledge controlled largely by medical professionals providing a source of 
power. Following in this tradition policy formulation and analyses ofTB programmes so far 
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have been top down, and as described later result in certain conclusions. Policy 
implementation is however dependent on a large proportion of other professionals/groups 
and on the participation of patients, supported by their families. Indicative of the imbalance 
of power these crucially important groups receive little consideration in policy processes 
other than being expected to comply/adhere with what they are told. This study values and 
incorporates the views/participation of patients and front-line implementors by utilising a 
bottom-up, integrative approach. 
Table 2.1 Top Down and Integrative Approaches & Their Influence on 
Implementation 
Approach Policy Process Implementation 
Characteristics Characteristics 
Top-down rational, linear, stagist, hierarchical, policy driven, technical, managerial, 
approach problem-solving, with objectives, measurable outputs, administrative 
analytical, content and lines of control and command, compliance, 
decision focused. people as target groups/ objects. 
Bottom-up/ incremental, process builds on motivation! capacity/ strategies of 
integrative oriented, recognises the implementers at front-line and different levels, 
approach political, iterative, interorganisational interaction, 
interactive, evolutionary. people as participants/ key actors/subjects. 
2.4.1 Explanatory Factors for Implementation Gaps 
Analysts working on implementation identified factors responsible for implementation 
failures and gaps. Others framed conditions considered necessary for success. Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973 (cited in Cleaves 1980), suggest that if complexity of technical features, 
complicated methodologies and new untried technologies characterise a policy, chances of 
good implementation are reduced. Administrative complexity requiring new organisational 
forms, extensive co-ordination, multiplicity of actors, long duration's, multiple goals, and 
dependence on resources make implementation difficult and require greater power for it to 
be carried out (Cleaves 1980). Others too explained implementation failure of policies 
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processed through large bureaucracies as a managerial problem resulting from inadequate 
co-ordination, control and compliance (Jordan and Richardson 1987). 
Several analyses construct health policies instrumentally as mechanistic interventions, 
emphasising surface level cause effect relationships in technical terms. A process of 
reductionism converts social problems into narrower technical entities. Increasing levels of 
specificity, measurable objectives and time frames are deemed desirable. Requirements for 
management, organisation and administration of policies on large scales and for compliance 
follow logically. Experience over four decades of international and national health policies 
(family planning, malaria, TB) reveals the complexity of problems and systems, both 
deeply embedded in society. 
While metaphors, models and theories create insight or ways of seeing, they are also ways 
of not seeing (Parsons 1995). Perspectives and ideologies of authors/researchers influence 
findings and inferences inspite of attempts at objectivity and neutrality. Obtaining multiple 
perspectives and reflecting dialectically on tlie assumptions, world views and values of 
, 
, 
theories/methodologies may deepen understanding and suggest additional explanations 
(Ganapathy 1985). 
The complexity of health problems has latterly received greater recognition. So have 
underlying issues of power and conflict inherent in problems intricately linked to iniquitous 
social relations and their influence on policy processes. Public policies were to level social 
inequity, but policy making and implementation structures being part of society have 
internalised its social relations. Hence social sector policies may perpetuate the existing 
social order. 
2.4.2 Conditions for Successful Implementation 
Conditions identified as necessary for successful implementation are the other side of 
factors responsible for perceived implementation gaps. Ideal models of how things should 
be were developed from the 1970's. Hood in 1976 suggested five conditions for perfect 
implementation (Parsons 1995): clear lines of authority; definitive objectives and 
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enforceable nonns; compliance/obedience; perfect communication in and between units of 
organisation; and no time constraint. In this approach policies apparently valid and for the 
greater, common good, were conceived as separate entities stripped of socio-political 
context and social reality. Imbued with authority and power at the top, they appear like 
military operations, dependant on good management and compliance for success. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian in 1979 & 1980 synthesised variables into six sufficient and 
necessary conditions for effective implementation of legal objectives (Sabatier 1993). These 
were: clear consistent objectives; good causal theory; implementation process legally 
structured to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups; committed 
and skilful implementing officials; support of interest groups and sovereigns; changes in 
socio-economic conditions not substantially undennining political support or causal theory. 
Thus concepts expanded with recognition of political factors and realities such as causality, 
legality, context, importance of interest groups and implementors. Interestingly the studies 
identified implementing agency support as the most critical point. 
The 'perfect implementation' model of Hogwood and Gunn (1984) developed ten 'ideal' 
conditions for successful implementation, namely: availability of adequate time and 
sufficient resources, availability of the right combination of resources at each stage, 
minimal dependency relationships, policy based on a valid theory of cause and effect, direct 
relationship between cause and effect, agreement on objectives, fully specified tasks 
conducted in the correct sequence, perfect co-ordination, perfect compliance and that 
external circumstances do not impose severe constraints. Implementors facing uncertainties 
on most conditions and powerless to alter them are not necessarily helped in moving 
policies forward. Its rationalistic assumptions do not consider more complex political 
processes. The health sector with concepts and interventions developed within a scientific 
paradigm fit logically with the rational approach. 
Cleaves' (1980) more realistic approach discussing political power as a condition for 
successful implementation is outlined below. The scope, ability and political acumen of 
actors to mobilise sufficient power and political resources influences policy 
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implementation. So does the strength and power of other actors with other agendas in the 
policy environment. Power that is widely distributed or fragmented in a policy arena with a 
mUltiplicity of actors may lead to smaller chances of significant change occurring. In open 
democratic political systems, with political organisation (parties), governmental agencies 
and interest groups, formation of alliances can tilt the content and implementation of 
policies. Through elected representation, previously powerless groups and their preferences 
are incorporated into the policy and decision making system. State-society relations 
condition the power underlying implementation and implementors need to have a general 
idea of power distribution in society. Greater power is required for more problematic policy 
areas. Public apathy may manifest as non-opposition to a policy, which may reduce 
participation and possibility of success. Hence demands, pressures and questioning are a 
positive sign of interest and support. 
Implementation is now widely considered an intrinsic, continuous part of policy process, 
interactively linked with other elements (Grindle and Thomas 1991, Walt 1994, 
Brinkerhoff 1996). Complex processes of interdependency, adaptation and potential 
learning are recognised (Jordan and Richardson 1987). This study views implementation 
as integral to policy process that maybe as dependent on political processes as on techno-
managerial elements. 
2.4.3 Additional Policy Characteristics Influencing Implementation 
Specific policy characteristics affecting implementation, identified by policy studies since 
the 1980's, are discussed below. However one is cautioned against the assumption that 
policy makers control the organisational, political and technological processes that affect 
implementation (Elmore 1982). 
Political characteristics: Within organisations the use of discretion at point of service 
delivery, the point where 'big decisions become operating policy' (Elmore 1982), the 
formation of local bargaining coalitions particularly involving those affected by the 
policy, and non-hierarchical 'reciprocity of relationships between superiors and 
subordinates in organisations' have been observed to alter policies. Inter and intra-
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organisational conflict is common with differences between different sections and Je\eJs 
of government (Howlett and Ramesh 1995). The ability of policy leadership to mobi lise 
political forces in support of policy and to counteract those likely to pose significant 
threats is important, as are mechanisms for public involvement and participation, systems 
of infonnation sharing and accountability, enhanced autonomy and empowerment of 
people/patients and positive public reaction or apathy (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 
Cleaves 1980). 
Interest groups/stakeholders in society support and oppose change (Brinkerhoff 1997b). 
Their relative strength is detennined by location (dispersed or urban), organisation 
(internal communication systems, leadership structures, mobilisation) and socio-
economic structures (capacity to get infonnation and wield influence) (Grindle and 
Thomas 1991). Elite consensus and possible conflict between groups are determining 
factors. Policies of private groups can affect public policies (Cleaves 1980). 
In long-tenn policies, during the prolonged period required for implementation, actors 
may alter goals, leadership may change, new actors enter with different goals and 
unintended consequences may take place. Ownership of policy change and of capacity 
building effort, with development of 'indigenous policy champions' (Brinkerhoff 1996). 
Ownership is clearly important, but it could be created to serve various interests. Policy 
legitimisation, constituency building, resource accumulation, strategic and contingency 
planning, adaptation, managing external relationships and linkages (ibid). For political 
leaders the public visibility of programmes, difficulties with coerciveness, chances of 
failure and the nature of support and opposition may influence choice (Howlett and 
Ramesh 1995). 
Financial Aspects: Several types of resources are required for sustainable policy 
implementation (Crosby 1996). Finances are not real resources, but can purchase 
infrastructure, equipment, skills etc. which take time and effort to develop, especially 
human resources with competencies. There is need to focus resources on organisational 
units with greatest likelihood of affecting delivery level perfonnance. Skills required are 
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financial management, ability to utilise resources effectively, generate funds from 
alternate sources, shift unspent resources, use special accounts/ external aid and to 
function within financial constraints. 
Managerial Characteristics: Besides control of budgets, personnel appointments and 
promotion, support services from transport to purchasing, these include institutional 
development (Grindle and Thomas 1991), human relation skills, conflict resolution, team 
work, developing mechanisms for supportive supervision and continuing education, 
problem solving, interacting with other departments, ministries and politicians. Skills are 
required to 'shepherd policies through a complex and shifting geography on the political, 
socio-economic and bureaucratic landscape' (Brinkerhoff 1996; 1396). Leadership 
qualities and skills at different levels are crucial as are continuity of administrative 
resources and infrastructure. Corruption in association with weak organisational capacity 
is a particularly difficult institutional challenge (Brinkerhoff 1997b). 
Technical Aspects: At the national level capacities for technical analysis, economic 
analysis, forecasting, and sector specific competencies are required (Grindle and Thomas 
1991). The role of research in evolving policy content, and in monitoring/assessing its 
implementation is important. 
New scientific and technological developments influence policy change (Howlett and 
Ramesh 1995). Issues concerning social control and accountability, social relevance and 
their effects on social relationships are crucial. Implementation depends on capacity and 
problem solving skills of front line staff. 
2.4.4 Studying Implementation 
First generation implementation studies were case-studies, while the second wave included 
more analytical comparative studies (Sabatier 1993). Both used 'top-down' approaches 
discussed earlier, starting with policy decisions, studying extents to which objectives were 
achieved, and reasons why they were not achieved, with the methodology itself biasing 
findings towards identifying failure. 
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Other than 'forward mapping', the top-down VIew of implementation, alternative 
approaches to implementation studies are 'backward mapping' an analytical approach 
centring at the point of service delivery (Williams 1982, Elmore 1982). It starts with 
perspectives of those delivering and receiving services and works sequentially through 
levels of organisational actors till the traditional top is reached. It concentrates on resources 
available and those needed for the policy from the perspective of those delivering and 
receiving services. This is similar to the bottom-up approach where implementors are seen 
as important players/participants in a process that could inform policy upwards (Walt 1994). 
Policy goals are often incomplete, vague and even contradictory, with new ones being 
added on to existing ones. Methodologically, studying implementation from the bottom 
may help make sense of the new additions/inputs (Hill 1993). A third integrative approach 
combines the two (Lazin 1995) 
As a framework to study implementation an interactive, dynamic model has been 
suggested, with several participants at different levels and with 'formulation and 
implementation in a continuous loop and both as political as the other' (Walt 1994;157). 
Factors such as commitment of central government to policy, centre-state relations 
especially where states/ local authorities are dominated by opposition parties, 
source/adequacy of funds, communication networks, availability of information, values of 
accountability, social justice, equity, and organisational loyalty all playa role in process and 
implementation of policy. 
In-depth case studies utilising historical approaches/longitudinal designs permit clearer 
understandings of public policies and implementation, though they may not be 
representative (Williams 1982, Ganapathy 1985, Lazin 1995). They can illustrate or test 
theories concerning important aspects of the policy process (Sabatier 1991a). 
In studying implementation, it was found that relying on official reports and secondary 
sources of information give partial and often incorrect understandings of what takes place in 
the field (at points of interaction between provider and patient in health) i.e. of local 
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implementation of policies and programmes (Williams 1982). This approach was also 
unhelpful in arriving at explanations for gaps between policy intent and implementation. 
Alternative concepts and approaches in studying implementation include (Williams 1982): 
a) capacity, commitment and behaviour at point of service delivery, with individual persons 
actually providing services forming the central focus of an implementation perspective; b) 
organisational structure and process within which interaction between provider and patient 
takes place, highlighting resources available and supports and barriers at that level of 
service delivery organisation. This thesis has incorporated these perspectives as part of its 
bottom-up integrative approach. 
Early literature and conceptualisation regarding policy process and implementation arose 
from case-studies of sectoral policies within industrialised countries where the State 
played a dominant role. The context in different parts of the world with differing politico-
economic and socio-cultural realities and policy processes requires greater study. A body 
of work in the past 15 years derives from studying the implementation of 'reform' driven 
by the economic imperative, with a shift from statist to neo-liberal market oriented 
policies. Implementation problems in 'developing' country reform policies, concen1ing 
rural electrification, nutrition and housing, have been studied by donor agency 
consultants with a view to improve performance (Grindle and Thomas 1991, Brinkerhoff 
1996 &1997, Crosby 1996). Valuable insights have been gained, but the perspective is 
external and relates to and is driven by a particular agenda. This study has an Indian 
perspective, building on the policy work of Banerji and Ganapathy and the research work 
connected with the NTP in the Indian context. 
2.5 Conceptual Framework 
This study analyses explanatory factors for the implementation gap of the NTP in India by 
focusing on context, process, actor and content (Walt 1994, Walt and Gilson 1994). It uses a 
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historical approach, starting from the mid-1940's when the policy originated, centring on 
the: 
a) social, economic, political context within which the NTP functions; 
b) definitions/construction of the problem (TB) i.e. its policy relevant societal, 
epidemiological and technical dimensions; 
c) evolving technical content and assumptions of the programme; and particularly on 
d) policy processes and implementation factors (Table 2.2) including the role of actors and 
interest groups. 
There is a paucity of implementation studies using a policy analysis approach particularly 
in the health field, posing a methodological challenge. Hence a framework of 
implementation factors (Table 2.2), based on the literature cited in this chapter, has been 
developed as a conceptual approach to understand implementation of the NTP at national, 
state and district/local levels. The factors are not mutually exclusive, but are inter-related 
with several influencing all three levels. 
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Table 2.2 
Level 
Implemen 
-tation 
Factors 
Political 
Process 
Technical 
Managerial 
Resources 
Values 
Framework of Implementation Factors at District, State & National 
District Level State Level National Level 
Public participation or Adequacy of power; Factors/ forces reSUlting in evolution & 
apathy; centre-state relations; change of policy; 
interpretation and use of functioning of local govt.; power, commitment, capacity of central 
discretion by delivery interest groups; negotiation, unit; sense of policy ownership; 
staff; adaptation to local bargaining, alliance formation, leadership of policy, ability to mobilise 
circumstances; compromise (all levels), power & resources, advocacy, 
accommodation between accommodation of interests. developing multisectorallinkages; 
personal goals, interests, mix of state and market mechanisms -
values vs. program goals; their interaction; 
informal networks within strength & power of other actors \\Ith 
formal structures. other agendas, conflict; 
rolelinvolvement of private and 
voluntary sector & international actors 
Praxis of tasks related to Technical support to Cause effect relationship; new 
objectives; capacity, implementors; availability, use technological developments; 
problem solving skills of & sharing of information. technological complexity; strength & 
staff; sufficient regulation of medical profession; 
uninterrupted supplies. unintended consequences. 
Organisational structures/ Administrative complexity; Clarity of objectives, norms, lines of 
processes that support/act multiple actors; support and authority, single/multiple actors, 
as barriers to health powers to district level. communication, duration. 
service delivery 
A vailability of Source and adequacy of funds, Adequacy and source; 
infrastructure, staff, drugs. use as policy leverage; 
equipment. competing interests. 
Social justice, equity, 
accountability , 
participation (at all 
levels). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 Research Questions 
The key questions were: 
a) What explanatory factors underlie the perceived implementation gap of the 
National Tuberculosis Programme in India? 
b) Can these be analysed in terms of policy content, contextual factors, 
policy process and actors? 
c) What are the implications for policy from this analysis that can strengthen the 
NTP? 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Using an iterative method, tentative hypotheses (given below) were developed regarding 
reasons for the perceived implementation gap. They derived from an initial analysis of 
documents, interviews and a brief historical review. They provided direction to subsequent 
search and were not designed to be tested or proved! disproved. Issues identified were 
focused on more analytically and in greater depth during data collection and analysis. 
3.2.1 Private For Profit Sector 
Governments' implicit support for the private sector undermined the NTP and public sector. 
• While the NTP concerned itself almost exclusively with the public sector, separate 
Government steps simultaneously promoted and supported growth of private sector 
health care, from the 1950s onwards. The private sector grew without regulation and 
without cognisance of the principles of the NTP. The number of allopathic doctors 
working in the private sector increased from 60.4% in 1963-64 to 73.40/0 in 1986-87 
(FRCH 1990). Physicians of Indian and other systems of medicine are almost all in the 
private sector. 
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• Utilisation of public sector resources (staff time, drugs, infrastructure) for private 
practice, including charging for free services, partially reduces access to public serVICeS 
or causes irregular treatment among the poorest. 
• Economic interests of the pharmaceutical industry, of medical professionals and of 
those concerned with drug purchasing for the public sector play an important role in 
these developments. Economic constraints of government due to external and internal 
factors are related. 
3.2.2 Public Sector Dynamics 
Weak States and peripheral institutions, inadequate resources and urban rural disparities in 
health care provision suggest low Government commitment to the NTP. 
• The State level is crucial to implementation of the NTP (and other health programmes) 
in India's federal system. State Governments however depend on Central Government 
financially and technically, and provide inadequate direction, support and motivation to 
their employees implementing the programme. 
• Resources (financial, personnel, drugs and equipment) required to achieve the 
objectives of the NTP were inadequate, especially at sub-district level, from the start of 
the programme. 
• Peripheral Health Institutions (PHI's) at sub-district level, the point of contact between 
patients and providers for the majority rural population, are the weakest in the NTP in 
terms of capacity to handle this complex programme. Negative staff attitudes to poor 
patients and to TB playa role. 
• The historic and growing disparity between medical and public health services for 
organised sector employees (large public and private sector industry/services) and urban 
areas, as against those for the rural poor and unorganised workers, affects the NTP. 
• Economic and class interests probably underlie developments mentioned above with 
social relations being reproduced in this sector. 
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3.2.3 Conlpeting Interests 
Health programmes backed by stronger interests adversely affected the NTP. 
• From the 1950s vertical programmes (malaria, smallpox, family planning/welfare and 
immunisation) dominated public health, adversely affecting general health services at 
primary care level and the NTP, which was integrated with this. Vertical programmes 
had support of the bureaucracy, political leadership (for a major part of the period), 
national elite and international agencies. 
3.2.4 Political Will 
Political support to the NTP was inconsistent and counterproductive when coercive. 
• After an early phase of central government commitment from 1947-1960s, TB was 
neglected. Renewed political attention in 1982, included it in the Twenty Point 
Programme, but with insufficient resources. Introducing targets for sputum examination 
at this time resulted in negative consequences. 
3.2.5 The Voluntary/ NGO and Peoples' Sector 
Marginalising voluntary sector participation in policy limits the balancing influence of civic 
society. 
• The TB Association of India (T AI) helped place TB on the agenda in the 1940s, a ti me 
when government was responsive to voluntary sector initiative. NGO's subsequent 
attempts to raise issues concerning inadequate and irrational tuberculosis care were 
unsuccessful in influencing policy change. Since establishing the NTP, NGO role in 
policy process has been partly marginalised by Government policy makers. 
Health issues, particularly specific disease problems like TB, are peripheral to peoples' 
social movements. There is thus little countervailing power to the strong interests 
mentioned earlier. 
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3.3 Aim 
To understand underlying explanations for the perceived implementation gap III the 
National Tuberculosis Programme of India by undertaking: 
a) A historical, analytical study of policy process and implementation at the national level 
since the 1940s, and 
b) A case-study of policy implementation in one State, at District and Taluk level. 
3.4 Objectives 
A. National Level Policy Formulation and Development 
3.4.1 To contextualise the NTP to economic, political and social factors influencing policy 
formulation and development. 
3.4.2 To review briefly changes In policy content namely problem definition, 
epidemiological methods used to determine its size and nature, basis of intervention 
strategies and their modifications over time. 
3.4.3 To study implementation processes (Table 6), including creation of infrastructure 
(TB specific and general health services), resource flows and to identify roles of key 
actors/interest groups and levels of power in implementing the NTP. 
B. Implementation at State, District and Taluk level 
3.4.4 To identify how actors/interest groups influenced implementation. 
3.4.5 To study the availability and distribution of resources for the NTP at State, district 
and peripheral levels. These include trained staff, training institutions, physical 
infrastructure, TB diagnostics and drugs. 
3.4.6 To study organisational mechanisms and inter-relationships of the NTP at different 
levels. 
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3.4.7 To compare implementation processes at taluk level between the public sector and 
an NGO which has taken responsibility from Government for the NTP in one taluk. In the 
two taluks to study: 
a) Staff perceptions regarding the NTP; 
c) Perceptions of TB patients regarding their experience of the NTP functioning; 
d) Perceptions of elected representatives and informal leaders regarding functioning of the 
general health services with which the NTP is integrated. 
3.5 Research Methods 
3.5.1 General Approach 
An empirical, historical/longitudinal, in-depth case study of the NTP was undertaken, using 
a mix between a bottom-up and top-down framework to study policy process and 
implementation. The inductive component studied the functioning of the NTP to understand 
explanatory factors for the perceived implementation gap. In this approach to theory 
building, explanations of events are developed through a detailed analysis of those events 
(Edwards and Talbot 1994). 
An iterative process of policy analysis (Hogwood and Gunn 1984) was used, with 
progressive focusing of issues around the framework of context, process, actor and content, 
leading to newer directions of search. To structure the understanding of policy process, a 
framework of implementation factors was developed from the literature, providing a two-
tiered framework of analysis. 
Multiple sources of information/ methods of data collection used were: 
a) semi-structured! in-depth interviews (with checklists); 
b) review of internal documents, records, published reports, media reports; 
c) observations of implementing agencies at local, district and state level. 
Interviews were unstructured, open-ended, with respondents picked not by statistical 
methods but because of their knowledge/ status (Yin 1982). 
A multi-level sample was drawn from the following administrative and political units: locall 
village, subdistrict or taluk, district, state, national and international. Respondents 
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comprised TB patients, elected representatives, private practitioners, government personnel 
including peripheral health workers, PHC medical officers, DTC staff, state and national 
programme managers, and personnel representing international agencies. 
Validation of findings was done through triangulation (use of more than one source of 
information /method for data collection). Triangulation, used in inductive research, involves 
taking multiple, often three perspectives on a phenomenon! event (Edwards and Talbot 
1994). Different types of data (qualitative and quantitative) and data collection methods can 
reveal different aspects of reality. Additionally triangulation can use different investigators, 
study the problem over a period of time, and/or use different theories/ perspectives to 
interpret a single set of data (WHO Mental Health Div. 1994). Most commonly mixed 
triangulation is used. It is also used as a method of checking reliability in qualitative 
research. Because of the complexity revealed by the process one major data collection 
method is primarily used, while others provide supplementary evidence. In this study, the 
main method for the district and sub-district levels was interviews, while for the historical, 
national level it was review of documents. 
A Research Assistant, a sociologist, with experience of survey research (in medical and 
developmental/social topics) was trained to conduct semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
with patients, elected representatives and peripheral health workers. He belonged to the 
area, was familiar with the local dialect and established a good rapport with respondents. 
The checklist of questions was double translated into Kannada (the local language). Pilot 
testing of interviews with PHC Medical Officers, Health Assistants, TB patients and elected 
representatives was done. Patients were interviewed at their homes and health personnel at 
the health centre. A 10% sample of patients were re-interviewed 4-6 months later to check 
reliability. About half of the interviews with TB patients were tape recorded, as testing 
showed non-interference with flow and quality of interviews, with patients essentially 
telling their story and nothing to lose or gain. Regular debriefing sessions with the research 
assistant were held. Many related valuable observations and perceptions picked up during 
the extensive fieldwork were shared. At other levels (e.g. some governmental persOImel) it 
was found that sometimes even making notes during the interview caused respondents to 
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hesitate. To achieve maximum recall in these interviews (two-thirds of the total) notes 
were written as soon after the interview as possible, and on the same day. This 
necessitated time scheduling as writing up took a little longer than the interview. 
There was a need to release emotional tension that accumulated during intense encounters 
with suffering. Sharing, meetings, writing (the research assistant is a poet) helped, but a 
deep imprint remains. 
3.5.2 Sample 
Sampling commenced with listing: 
• key policy makers involved in the NTP over time at national and state level; 
• representatives of interest groups; and 
• key actors at local level (patients, doctors, health workers and elected representatives). 
A non-probabilistic sampling approach was used. Snowball or chain sampling (Edwards 
and Talbot 1994) helped select additional respondents. The initial sample provided names 
of many knowledgeable about/involved in the NTP. These were prioritised and numbers 
limited due to time constraints and logistics. 
Selection of state, district and taluks were as follows: 
1. State: Kamataka, one of 25 States in India, with a population of 44.8 million (1991 
census) was selected. With reference to national standards, indicators show that it has 
average levels of socio-economic development and that the NTP performs moderately 
(ICORCI 1988). The researcher was based in the capital city Bangalore, in the Community 
Health Cell, an NGO resource centre which provided the study infrastructural support. The 
National Tuberculosis Institute in the city provided much information. 
2. District: Mysore district, one of twenty districts in Kamataka state, with a population of 
3.1 million (1991 census) was selected. It has an average index of development and 
moderately developed health services. It is larger than the average district. It was chosen 
because NTP services for an entire Taluk had been taken over by an NGO and this could 
provide a point of comparison for identification of implementation factors. Positive 
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experiences would demonstrate that in spite of contextual constraints, implementation was 
attainable within a socio-cultural situation. 
3. Taluk (sub-district administrative unit): Implementation was studied in 2 of 11 taluks 
in Mysore district: a) Heggade Devana Kote taluk (210,000 population), an average taluk 
with a mix of public, private and voluntary sector services and the countrywide pattern of 
the NTP being run by the government. This was socio-economically the poorest taluk in the 
district. 
b) Yelandur taluk (population 70,000) had the same mix of services, but a voluntary 
organisation had taken responsibility for provision of TB services for the taluk from the 
state government since 1991. Reasons for this, processes of implementation and outcome of 
NGO intervention were studied. 
Patient Sample: Lists of TB patients were obtained from the District TB Centre, Taluk 
General Hospital, voluntary organisations and Primary Health Centres. Selection criteria 
were: 
• equal numbers of men and women, though prevalence of disease is 2/3rd in men and 
1I3rd in women - to identify gender discrimination, if any, in programme functioning; 
• geographical spread of patients in villages throughout the taluk i.e. remote and near the 
headquarters town; rural urban mix; 
• economically and socially disadvantaged patients; 
• drop-outs from treatment; 
• a few children and patients with extra-pulmonary TB; 
• patients from above backgrounds treated by public and voluntary sector. 
A mix of the most powerless were consciously chosen. There was no statistical analysis as 
this is a policy process study, focusing particularly on political dimensions. 
A sample of elected representatives from local government at Gram Panchayat (village 
level) and Zilla Parishad (district level), for their perceptions regarding the functioning of 
the public health services with which the NTP is integrated. Public health comes under their 
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purview of responsibilities. Members from socially disadvantaged groups and women were 
chosen 
3.5.3 Specific Research Methods for Different Levels of Study 
a) National Level 
• Documents for the historical reVIew included administrative and research reports, 
evaluations, journal articles and books. It involved gaining access, reading and re-
reading, identifying themes regarding context, content, actors and processes followed by 
a process of analysis by sub-themes, synthesis and interpretation (sources in Annex.e 2 
and bibliography). 
• Semi-structured interviews with 62 policy makers and senior researchers involved 
historically and currently with the NTPIRNTP and 23 respondents from international 
organisations (list in Annexe 2). Repeat interviews were necessary and useful. 
Attending national level meetings provided insights and opportunities for discussions 
with a wide range of people with different views and perspectives (list of meetings 
attended in Annexe 2). 
b) State, District and Taluk Level 
• Interviews with key actors and interest groups (lists in Annexe 2, checklists of questions 
in Annexe 3): 
- 90 TB patients; 
- 22 elected local government representatives and 8 staff members from the Zilla 
Panchayat office; 
- 70 implementors from the front-line upwards (health assistants, doctors, voluntary 
organisation staff, district level staff); and 
- 11 private practitioners and visits to pharmacies in the two taluks. 
• Answers to relevant questions raised in the State Legislative Assembly; 
• Media coverage- TB and health service coverage in a local language (Kannada) district 
newspaper were reviewed. 
• Records from the National TB Institute concerning the District; 
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• Records from the State Directorate of Health Services and TB Control section· and , 
• Records from the District TB Centre and the voluntary organisation. 
3.6 Limitations Of The Study 
The researcher fell ill towards the end of the fieldwork resulting in some curtailment of 
State level and organised sector data collection. In retrospect, the Erythema Nodosum that 
developed were early signs of TB. Later supraclavicular lymph node enlargement led to a 
biopsy, diagnosis and six month therapy with rifampicin, pyrazinamide and isoniazid during 
the writing up phase. Cardiac shadow enlargement during treatment and growth of lymph 
nodes at the end of treatment added anxieties. Hence analysis was supplemented by a 
personal experience of the disease under study, adding an unintended emic perspective. 
Efforts were made to reduce possible 'researcher bias', reported in policy studies as 
researchers becoming co-opted by the unit of observation as advocates or critics (Williams 
1982). Awareness of researcher subjectivity in data collection and interpretation influenced 
by personal values, professional background and experience was maintained in order to 
limit it. 
Selection and recall bias among respondents is a well known factor. In this study repeat 
interviews and validating interviews helped reduce this. The inherent complexity of the 
problem and adoption of a wide ranging approach necessary for policy analysis resulted in 
certain issues not being followed up. 
Efforts were made to minimise limitations by using multiple methods, divergent sources of 
information, pilot testing check lists and practising interviewing. 
Though the private sector is an important actor in TB care in India, issues concerning it 
were minimally addressed as the study focused on the policy process and implementation of 
public policy. It therefore provides a partial picture. This is an area for further policy 
analysis. 
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3.7 Ethical Dimensions of the Study 
Permission of the concerned authorities was obtained before conduct of the study. Similarly 
consent of people was taken prior to interviews and confidentiality was assured to 
respondents for their protection. This was maintained through confidentiality in rep0l1ing, 
thus names of interviewees are not mentioned in the body of the text. Even designations are 
not mentioned e.g. district health officer or WHO official as this would make it possible to 
identify respondents. Finally, study findings will be discussed with authorities and groups 
involved. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HISTORICAL CONTEXTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE NATIONAL TUBERCULOSIS PROGRAMME 
This chapter reviews the evolution of the TB programme at national level over fifty 
years (1947-97), with a brief background from 1900. Time periods covered correspond 
to major phases of policy development and change. Processes and actors are highlighted 
within a contextual background. 
4.1 Evolution of the Tuberculosis Policy in India 
4.1.1 1900-1940: Emergence and Recognition of the Problem 
India was under British colonial rule during this period. Organised medical and public 
health services primarily served the interests of the army, civil service and local elite 
(Ramasubban 1984). The nationalist movement for independence had formal roots from 
1885, with the formation of the Indian National Congress. Negotiations resulted in 
Legislative Acts in 1919 and 1935 through which certain powers and responsibilities 
were transferred to elected Provincial governments (Spear 1978). This included medical 
care, public health, sanitation and statistics. Being relatively unimportant 'low politics' 
issues (Walt 1994), imperial interests were not affected by the transfer (Jeffery 1988). 
The shift was opposed by the medical profession (ibid). Hospitals and dispensaries were 
started by provincial and local bodies, possibly more responsive to needs of the 
electorate. Interestingly rising public sector health expenditures are reported after 1919 
(ibid). With increasing numbers of graduates from new Indian medical schools, private 
practice grew, especially in urban areas. In 1947, output from 22 medical schools were 
inadequate for a population of 340 million, with doctor population ratios below required 
norms. Shortages of nurses and allied health professionals were greater. Voluntary 
medical work was initiated by philanthropists and missionary groups. Practitioners of 
Indian and other systems of medicine functioned primarily as individual private 
practitioners. Indian systems of medicine lacking state support and recognition, 
languished consequently (Banerji 1985). While all sectors treated patients with 
tuberculosis, the private sector dominated medical care. 
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Two world wars and the great depression of the 1920's and 1930's worsened the 
economic situation, adversely affecting people and health services, besides absorbing 
the attention of government. The intensified struggle for independence after 1928, was 
the most important agenda for the nation. Anticipating freedom, the Congress set up a 
National Planning Committee, with the Sokhey Subcommittee on Health, in 1938 
(Banerji 1985). Recommendations included a state organised free health system, health 
as an individual right, universal popUlation coverage with medicaVpublic health services 
especially under-served rural areas, integration of systems of medicine, large scale 
training of village level health workers and para-medical staff (ibid, Chatterjee 1988). 
This was an experimental period in technology development for TB (diagnostic, 
therapeutic and preventive). Koch's established causal relationship between 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis and the disease in 1895, strengthened a powerful medical 
paradigm, the germ theory. Treatment was non-specific and relatively ineffective. 
Isolation in sanatoria, with dry climates, good food, rest and graded exercise, developed 
in the West (Davies 1994), were available to only a few in India with ability to pay 
(Nagpaul 1989). During the 1930's, various therapies (Annexe 1) were unsuccessfully 
tried. Essentially, the natural history of the disease ran its course. New technological 
developments were introduced in India fairly soon after their discovery (including cuti-
reaction/tuberculin testing and BCG) by medical professionals in the private/voluntary 
sector. TB therapies of Indian systems of medicine were not considered, investigated or 
encouraged. 
TB care/treatment continued almost exclusively to be the domain of private actors. 
Voluntary, not-for-profit efforts were isolated not linked (CHEB 1961, GOI 1961) and 
inadequate for the magnitude of the problem. In 1947 there were 120 TB specialists in 
the country, while 15,000 were required for the population (Dubos and Dubos 1952). 
Families were the main carers, in the absence of state or institutional services. Some 
provincial governments/ municipalities offered limited services (CHEB 1961). 
The King George V Thanksgiving (Anti Tuberculosis) Fund in 1929, and the King 
Emperor's Anti-Tuberculosis Fund in 1934, were first efforts at a larger level, started by 
the voluntary sector with official patronage (T AI 1956). Anti-TB leagues, the TB 
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Association of Bengal established in 1929 (CHEB 1977) and the first TB survey by the 
Government of Bengal were precursors of an anti-TB movement (MSTA 1971). The 
first BCG vaccinations were given by Ukil who had worked with Calmette and Guerin 
(ibid). The Tuberculosis Association of India (TAl) formed in 1939 (GOIlMudaliar 
1961) provided intellectual and organisational impetus to addressing the problem 
nationally with a scientific basis and a community health approach (lCMR 1975). It 
undertook training and research. A membership organisation primarily of medical 
professionals, it received patronage from the colonial government, with the Vicerine as 
president (TAl 1956). Funds for these associations were raised from the public in India 
(ibid). These developments resulted from 'public opinion gathering strength demanding 
action to deal with the increasing menace of tuberculosis , (CHEB 1977;7). 
The state was conspicuous by its absence in the policy arena for TB control during this 
period. Reasons cited are that, concrete steps were not taken, because of preoccupation 
with diseases like cholera, plague and smallpox and (because of the staggering 
magnitude of the problem and a lack of clear conception as to what should and could be 
done to combat it' (CHEB 1961;9). Initial research was undertaken by the Indian 
Research Fund Association, a quasi-governmental body in Calcutta, to understand the 
extent of the problem. The state transferred responsibility for care of army personnel 
with TB to the voluntary sector in 1944 (CHEB 1961). 
In summary, voluntary and private for profit actors were major players and as seen later, 
continued to influence policy during subsequent phases. This and other evidence 
suggests that existing, older policies, especially if serving dominant interests, are 
resilient, exercising continuing presence. With patients and families the main sufferers 
and carers, public demand for action is reported. Non-decisions and inaction, by the 
state in this instance, were components of the policy process. 
4.1.2 1941-1950: Getting Onto the Political Policy Agenda 
This was a period of dramatic political change. The second world war caused shortages 
and privation in India. A severe Bengal famine, largely man made, claimed thousands of 
lives in the early Forties. There was intense political activity, uncertainty and repression 
of the freedom struggle. Finally India attained Independence in August 1947. Partition 
74 
of the country resulted in much violence, death and disruption, a war with Pakistan in 
1948, displacement of people on both sides of the new border, and an influx of 10-15 
million refugees into India (Joshi and Little 1994). Economically 80% of the population 
were below the poverty line. All these societal factors could be expected to worsen the 
TB epidemic, with consequences lasting at least a generation. 
Partition and its aftermath exacerbated the TB problem (GOI 1961) and consumed 
national energies. Refugees with TB received governmental financial assistance while 
awaiting hospitalisation or on home treatment and hospital beds were earmarked for 
them (MOHIGOI 1959-60, Planning Commission 1956) 1• Prevalence of tuberculosis in 
the general popUlation was high (Chapter 1). However quantitative information was 
inadequate for national planning. Of about 2.5 million TB patients, less than an 
estimated 5% (mainly urban), received treatment in 1947 (Ete & Khrime 1995) through 
the 85 TB clinics and 6,500 TB hospital beds (CHEB 1961). 
The key post-Independence change was the Indian Government's acceptance of 
responsibility for the health of all its citizens. The denominator for Government health 
services expanded to cover the entire population. This was necessarily an 'ideal' with 
scarce finances, trained personnel, physical infrastructure, equipment and drugs. 
Following this political decision, the state began equipping itself and emerged a stronger 
player. The Indian Medical Service, linked to the colonial administration and army, was 
abolished in 1947 (CBHI 1985i. Integrated posts of Director Generals of Health 
Services were established in Central and State Ministries of Health to advise 
Governments on medical and public health matters (park 1994). Indicative of a sense of 
priority and urgency, a new Tuberculosis Unit was created in 1948 in the Directorate of 
Health Services at the Centre, with an Advisor in Tuberculosis to the GOI (CHEB 
1961). The incumbent with over 20 years experience in TB work as physician! 
researcher in the voluntary sector and as technical advisor to the TB Association of India 
(TAl 1956) had direct access to the political leadership (Nair* 1996). The health minister 
became president of the TAl continuing traditional formal linkages. Expertise and policy 
I Increased TB morbidity, mortality and transmission are recorded in populations affected by war (Barr 
and Menzies 1994) and among refugees/displaced people (Annexe 1). 
2 A decline in public health capacity ensued as this was not replaced by a national alternative (Banerji 
1990). 
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advice from voluntary/professional groups were used by government to develop its 
services. It was widely believed that the state would uphold the interests of all its 
citizens. The alliance was fruitful in terms of research, development of policy content 
and implementation. 
Political change, strong central leadership, and technical breakthroughs in TB treatment, 
offered a unique historical moment or window of opportunity (Walt 1994) that was 
seized, to initiate a national policy for tuberculosis control. 
The decade saw expanding knowledge and technology III TB therapy globally. 
Streptomycin the first TB drug was discovered in the USA in 1944 and isoniazid in 
1952. In 1948 the Government of India commissioned research, using voluntary sector 
(TB Association of India) expertise to study local application of technology at 
community level. These included studies of safety and efficacy of BCG under Indian 
conditions and effectiveness of community based control programmes (Frimodt-Moller 
1960). The Bhore Committee recognising difficulties of increasing TB beds for isolation 
(the internationally recommended treatment), from an existing 6000 to the required 1-
1.5 million using western norms, gave priority to organised home treatment through TB 
clinics (GOI 1946), used/studied from 1940 by Sikand at the New Delhi TB Centre 
(TAl 1977). It recommended thirty three 200 bedded TB hospitals (1110 million), 33 
main clinics for training, and 183 TB clinics (lIdistrict), district mobile units with X-
rays/drugs, 'intensive educational propaganda' (P165), expanded training for 13,000 TB 
specialists, research to understand the extent and nature of the problem and 
encouragement of non-official efforts (GOI 1946). Despite making local modifications, 
it was strongly influenced by Western methods (CHEB 1977). However it located 
specific anti-TB measures in the context of socio-economic development (Chapter 1). Its 
membership comprising many professionals part of or influenced by the freedom 
movement stated, 'Governments cannot absolve themselves of their responsibility' for 
care, after-care and welfare services for infectious TB patients (GO I 1946; 166). 
Addressing health service development they considered district health boards, village 
health committees and informed public opinion necessary to improve national health 
(GOI1946). 
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The Technical Committee of the TAl, a powerful think-tank for government functioning 
since 1948, helped place TB on the political agenda and recommended a national BCG 
Campaign. It continued the Bhore Committee tradition with a small group of 
professionals dominating policy making. TAl was a member of the International Union 
Against TB3 and maintained contacts with the newly established WHO and UNICEF 
(TAl 1956), forming an international policy network influencing global TB policy. 
The International Tuberculosis Campaign (experienced from post-war BCG campaigns 
in Europe in 1945) helped the Indian BCG pilot project and campaign from 1948-51 
(CHEB 1961), supported by WHO and UNICEF from 1951 (UNICEF 1980's). The 
international agencies provided funds, equipment and technical staff. The GOI 
established a BCG Vaccine Plant in Guindy, Madras in 1948, with WHO and Danish 
support, producing tuberculin, vaccine, and diluent to supply the Indian programme, 
Afganistan, Ceylon, Burma, Pakistan and Malaya (MOHIGOI 1959-60). The WHO set 
up its Field TB Research Unit, with the GOI in Madanapalle in 1949. Assuming greater 
susceptibility of children and urban workers and the protective efficacy of BCG, the 
vaccination programme expanded to organised groups such as school children and 
factory workers, developing into a school BCG programme in 1949-51 in all States 
(ibid). This was despite high profile controversies in the media and Parliament about the 
safety of BCG (interviews). Public resistance in some regions required mass publicity 
campaigns to increase its acceptability (UNICEF 1980s). The BCG campaign could be 
described as policy borrowing (Leichter 1979) or global policy dissemination which 
became increasingly common in international public health. 
The government started building dispersed institutional capacity/expertise with three TB 
training and demonstration centres started in Delhi, Patna and Trivandrum, with WHO 
and UNICEF support (CHEB 1961). 
The small circle of political and technical actors at the top with Prime Minister Nehru4, 
Health Minister RajKumari Amrit Kaur5, TB Advisor Dr. V Benjamin, and Dr. KCKE 
3 TAl members occupied executive positions in the IUAT. The annual meeting of the IUA Twas 
organised in New Delhi at which research findings were discussed. TAl helped set up the Eastern 
Regional Unit of the IUAT (TAl 1956). . . 
4 His wife Kamala Nehru also active in the freedom struggle, suffered from TB for 18 years and died In 
1939 in a sanatorium in Switzerland. Her daughter Indira, future Prime Minister of India, was with her 
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Raja Director of Health Services, member of the Bhore Committee (UNICEF 1980s), 
were powerful, with strong personal commitments and supportive of each other. Several 
TB/chest specialists, members of the TB Association, advised State governments on TB 
control. The Indian Medical Association representing medical professionals' interests 
supported the programme, with Dr. BC Roy's6 nationalistic, political leadership. A 
consultative approach between key actors was used when making content related 
decisions regarding TB control during this period. There were no institutional actors 
other than the TAl then. The States were relatively weak actors and the centre grew 
stronger in the policy process of national health programmes. 
4.1.3 1951-1962: Early Policy Cycles 
Formulation, Implementation & Reformulation 
The context during this period has been characterised as one of hope, planning, and 
creative activity with internal stability, single party (Congress) rule in all States and 
international goodwill (Spear 1978, Mukruji 1993). A key political process factor was 
the enactment of the Constitution by Parliament in 1950. Important Constitutional 
features included strong powers for Central government, division of subjects between 
Central and State governments, with health being largely a State subject (as were 
agriculture, power and irrigation) and division of revenues and finances between Centre 
and States (Joshi and Little 1994). Concerning health, Article 47 under the Directive 
Principles of State Policy reads, 'The Constitution of India ... aims at the elimination of 
poverty, ignorance and ill-health and directs the State to regard the raising of the level 
of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health 
as among its primary duties, securing the health and strength of workers, men and 
women, especially ensuring that children are given opportunities and facilities to 
develop in a healthy manner' (park 1994). Article 246 enumerates health subjects in the 
Seventh Schedule under Union, Concurrent and State lists. The State list includes 
provision of medical care and preventive health services, giving State governments 
till she passed away. Thus TB had directly influenced 3 Prime Ministers of the country Pandit Nehru, 
Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi (Ali 1991). 
5 A committed Gandhian social worker, was a friend of the TB Advisor to the GOI, took a personal 
interest in TB. 
6 Dr Be Roy, President of the Indian Medical Association (IMA), was active politically in the freedom 
movement. The profession was influenced through the Journal of the IMA. He became the first Chief 
Minister of West Bengal after Independance. 
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authority over all health services operating in its jurisdiction (Park 1994). The centre 
however ensured dominance in health policy by monopolising linkages with 
international agencies, through grants to State governments for preferred programmes, 
and through national health programmes (Banerji 1990). 
The Planning Commission a new central policy advisory body established in 1950, 
played a lead role in economic and social policies through analysis and control of Plan 
finances (NIHFW 1992). In the health sector it covers national programmes including 
TB, medical education and pharmaceuticals. Other institutional mechanisms were 
ministerial bodies, the National Development Council and Central Council of Health 
and Family Welfare, discussing and ratifying Planning Commission proposals, 
providing avenues for democratic participation (ibid). 
The economic situation, though poor, improved during the First Plan (1951-56), 
followed by a balance of payments crisis during the Second Plan (1956-61) and 
emerging political problems (Spear 1978). Integration of princely states into the Indian 
republic, reorganisation of States, and formation of new States were the high politics 
issues of the time, overshadowing health, though politico-administrative changes had 
consequences for it. 
For tuberculosis, the first Plan7 expanded organised home treatment through increased 
TB clinics, before the well-known study on domiciliary treatment. It was soon realised 
that expansion of TB clinics for home treatment according to norms (111 0,000 
population i.e. 3,400 were required) and Bhore Committee recommendations for beds 
were impossible requiring investments of over Rs.5000 million (CHEB 1977;16). 
Priority was therefore given to preventive measure through BCG, considered low cost, 
quick and of relatively proven value internationally (ibid). Despite stated priority the 
first Plan TB budget was just Rs.46.3 million over 5 years, of which Rs.38 million was 
in the State sector (ibid). Resource constraints, epidemiological findings of equal rural 
prevalence of TB, against the urban concentration of services promoted earlier, and 
technological developments of chemotherapy, led to an intensified search after 1955 for 
7 After Independance the government ofIndia adopted a model of planned development. Five year 
plans were initiated in 1950. 
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TB control measures/ a policy strategy for the disease under Indian conditions with a 
sound scientific basis (NagpauI1989). 
Policy alterations during implementation, non-implementation and problems occurring 
in the first two Plans, further indicated it was not high priority. TB clinics, including the 
55 newly established, were poorly run with inadequate diagnostic facilities and staff for 
effective domiciliary services (CHEB 1961). Despite Plans, no TB Training and 
Demonstration Centres or rehabilitation centres were established in the first plan, and of 
5000 new TB beds, not all were with the TB programme or used for infectious cases 
(ibid). 
With tuberculin tests revealing large proportions of infections occurring after school 
leaving age, and not all children attending school, the BCG Campaign intensified into a 
mass campaign8 in 1951, implemented nationally by central government. It aimed to 
cover an estimated 170 million susceptible, unprotected young population, and new 
births in 10-12 years before integration with health services for ongoing newborn 
coverage (CHEB 1961, Barna 1971). 
By 1958, 120 million persons were tuberculin tested, of whom 42 million were 
vaccinated with BCG (ICMR 1960). By 1960, 167 million persons were tuberculin 
tested and about 57 million vaccinated by 170 teams working in various States (CHEB 
1961, GOI 1961). Administrative reports highlighted achievements such as being one of 
the largest public health campaigns carried out in any country. By 1962, 178 million 
were tuberculin tested but the proportion unvaccinated was large (Barna 1971). 
Coverage was incomplete and slow with organisational and other difficulties faced by 
mobile teams. Difficulties in storage, transportation and cold chain maintenance, 
resulted in shifting to freeze dried vaccine (CHEB 1961). The proportion of ineffective 
immunisations due to poor cold chains and ineffective vaccines remains unknown. 
Varying vaccine trial results and the high prevalence of atypical mycobacteria generated 
debate and doubts concerning protective efficacy of BCG, leading to the setting up of 
the world's largest prospective BCG vaccine trial in the 1960s. 
8 During village to village visits Tuberculin skin tests (Mantoux) were done, read after 72 hours, with 
those negative given liquid BeG vaccine by special mobile teams. . 
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The relevance methods used in Europe such as diagnostic mass miniature radiography 
and hospitalisation, was increasingly questioned. While lack of resources and 
infrastructure made these impractical for widespread use, their scientific basis \\'as also 
weak. Studies suggested low specificity of X-rays and that good cure rates were possible 
with domiciliary treatment. Costs of diagnosing a patient with infectious TB by mass 
radiography was about Rs.500 (T AI 1970;5). With 1.5 million estimated infectious 
patients (lCMR 1959) minimum costs were Rs.750 million. Commercial interests and 
the medical profession promoted these approaches (interviews). It was estimated that 
hospitalisation of all infectious patients would cost Rs.3,600 million, in addition to 
capital required for construction and staffing (T AI 1970). Some foreign experts even 
suggested that since TB infection was so widespread, isoniazid should be introduced 
into the water supply system (Nagpaul*1996). 
Consequently research was given high priority in evolving the content and conduct of 
the programme. A political mandate to policy makers, and new research institutions to 
develop socially relevant, nationally applicable policies provided the impetus for new 
approaches to be experimented with. From this process new ideas emerged that shaped 
the National TB Programme. Most elements of policy changes were introduced after 
operational research. Findings became part of a public health approach to TB, but were 
continuously contested or not internalised by the medical profession. 
Vertical, disease/problem specific programmes established by central government for 
family planning in 1952 and malaria in 1953 (Park 1994) were much better resourced, 
paying for infrastructure and staff in peripheral services, became strong competing 
interests to the TB programme. Vertical approaches were considered necessary as 
peripheral health services were still undeveloped and it was held that these problems 
could be conquered/eradicated with concerted efforts, with international public health 
lobbies behind them. 
The process of developing a countrywide health service infrastructure and of setting up 
training institutions for doctors, nurses, auxiliary nurse midwives and allied health 
personnel was initiated in the 1950s. The Community Development Programme 
launched in October 1952 for comprehensive rural development included health as an 
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integral component. The first Primary Health Centres (PHC's) were started in 1952 
(Park 1994, Banerji 1985). 
Establishment of TB clinics for diagnosis and home treatment of patients was planned as 
a practical approach that could be introduced fairly quickly for the management of TB 
with hospitalisation only of seriously ill patients and those with complications 
(GOIlMudaliar 1961). 
Bhore Committee recommendations for hospitals and sanatoria were no longer 
considered feasible or necessary. An important reason for this change was the discovery 
and increasing market availability of effective anti-bacterial TB drugs. 
Rapid increase of State run medical colleges in the 1950-1960s made medical education 
available at very subsidised costs, with reservations of seats for socially disadvantaged 
groups. Most graduates (60-70%) subsequently worked in the private sector (FRCH 
1990). This public policy decision increased numbers of medical practitioners, provision 
of medical services, and generated employment in the medical and related sectors. 
However the private medical sector grew with little regulation. Incentives given to 
doctors for rural practice did not overcome strong urban predilections, reSUlting in 
continued urban rural disparities. The private for profit health care service sector was not 
formally involved in the national TB control effort though there was referral in TB and 
informal interaction. Notification of TB was not made mandatory hence the proportion 
of TB patients treated by the private sector is unknown. There was state collaboration 
with the voluntary health sector from national to district level through District TB 
associations (T AI Annual Reports/Conference Proceedings), though varying in type and 
quality of work. The public sector became the dominant sector in policy planning. 
The circle of actors from the earlier phase continued up to the mid-1950's. Two 
important institutions were started viz. the TB Chemotherapy Centre (TCC), Madras in 
1956 and the National TB Institute (NTI), Bangalore in 1959 (Gupta 1985)9. 
9 The role of the Indian Medical Association, the Medical Council of India and the medical profession 
requires further study. 
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During the period radical conceptual shifts occurred from individualised treatment, 
isolation and specialist care available to a few, to a community based, public health 
approach which included protecting vulnerable populations with BeG, early case 
detection, converting infectious to non-infectious patients with domiciliary 
chemotherapy in the shortest possible time, by generalist doctors and health teams in an 
attempt to reduce transmission and control TB in the population (GOI 1961). 
Policy processes during this period are summarised in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Tuberculosis Control Policy Process in India: August 1947-1962 
CONTEXT CONTENT ACTORS PROCESSES 
Political Independence Tuberculin testing, GOI- Union and 1947 IMS disbanded, Ministries of health at Union and State levels with 
Partition, violence BCG as preventive, States, Directorates of Health Services. 
10-15 million refugees introduction of TAl, 1948 TB Advisor to Union Government appointed, 
1948 war with Pakistan antibiotics, isoniazid and UNICEF, 1950 Constitution - State responsibility for health, 
Integration of Princely streptomycin, UNRAA, Health a State subject, communicable diseases on central list as well, 
states/ kingdoms research commissioned, International 1950 Planning Commission - allots Plan funds for TB/ health, 
Reorganisation of regimens developed - BCG campaign, 1952 Central Council for Health formed, 
States domiciliary & WHO 1948 BCG Vaccine Production Unit set up, 
intermittent, 1954 Antibiotic Production Unit set up, 
NTP strategy developed. 1948 onwards research studies commissioned to understand the problem in 
Indian context [*], 
1956 TB Chemotherapy Centre established, 
1959 National Tuberculosis Institute established, 
Gradual increase in TB clinics, TB beds, build up of State and District TB 
Centres, primary health centres, hospitals, training of staff. 
* vaccine efficacy, community based control, domiciliary chemotherapy, appropriate diagnostic technology, sociological and epidemiological studIes, 
operations research, evolution of a National Tuberculosis Programme. 
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4.1.4 1963-1980: Implementation with Changing Priorities & Competing Interests 
The NTP, articulated in 1962, with the District Tuberculosis Programme (DTP) as 
functional unit (NTI 1994d), was research based, rationalistic, managerial, with logical 
goals, objectives, strategies, definitions and measurable elements. For instance, the NTP 
is 'an organised effort which aims to bring under control the problem of tuberculosis ill 
the community through defined objectives, activities and resources. It comprises of H'ell 
known anti-TB measures knit into a comprehensive, practical, acceptable and 
economically feasible programme' (Sivaraman 1982;82). 
Its aim is to reduce suffering, disability and death due to tuberculosis, and long term 
goal 'to reduce the problem of TB in the community sufficiently quickly, to the level 
where it ceases to be a public health problem' (Sivaraman 1982;82, Uke 1994; 1). This 
would occur when: a) One case infects less than one new person annually; b) The 
prevalence of infection in the age group 14 years is brought down to less than 1 % 
against about 30% at present (Gupta 1985). 
With general objectives 'to break the chain of transmission by active detection and 
treatment of infectious cases', short term, operational objectives included: BeG 
vaccination of majority of eligibles (possibly more than 70%); detection of the 
maximum number of symptomatic TB patients among outpatients attending health 
institutions, with adequate treatment and priority to sputum positives; to function all 
institutions as an integral part of the general health services in the country (Sivaraman 
1982;82, Gupta 1985). Services designed to meet people's felt needs, were to be free, 
within easy reach, with local government (panchayat) and Community Development 
department participation (NTI 1994d, Piot 1962). States held responsibility for 
implementation and evaluation (Nagpaul 1989). 
Principles included: passive case finding, reliance on sputum microscopy for diagnosis 
(low cost, appropriate, effective technology), domiciliary treatment, integration at point 
of first interaction between patient and provider (NT! 1994d). This was a radical 
departure from its own vertical BCG campaign and other national programmes for 
nlalaria, leprosy and smallpox (park 1994). The programme was two-tiered, integrated 
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at service delivery in peripheral health institutions, but specialised above District level. 
The District TB Centre, the nodal point for referral, management, training, supervision, 
and flow of reporting, had a five member managerial team with a Medical Officer (the 
District Tuberculosis Officer), Treatment Organiser, Laboratory Technician, X-ray 
Technician and Statistical Assistant (NTI 1994d). Two MO's were recommended for 
simultaneous clinical and programme work. Together these elements comprised the 
District TB Programme, the functional/organisational unit of the NTP (ibid). 
Though apparently receiving political recognition, financial allocations were meagre in 
comparison to recommendations and need (Chapter 5). There were pressures to select 
the least expensive strategies for public programmes. Despite knowledge that combined 
treatment achieved better cure with lower risks of drug resistance, monotherapy with 
isoniazid (costing Rs.8/patient or Rs. 35,000/district) was chosen instead of isoniazid + 
PAS, which increased costs (Rs.80/patient for entire treatment or Rs.235,000/district) 
(Piot 1962). Those with ability to pay accessed private sector treatment reflecting 
societal stratification. The organised public sector from the 1950's and earlier developed 
health systems (NIHFW 1988) with better quality care, paid partly by contributions but 
largely by the public exchequer (Chatterjee 1988), creating disparities within public 
sector health care. 
Specialised programme training by the NTI since 1962, evolved new concepts of team 
training for DTC teams, who were to provide in-service training/supervision to 
peripheral health institutions in the District (NTI 1994d). DTC's provided referral, 
additional diagnostic (X-ray) and inpatient facilities for seriously ill patients and those 
with complications (Nagpaul 1989). NTI published manuals in 1962 (revised in 1969, 
1978 & 1994) with detailed descriptions of methods, activities and tasks for each 
member of the DTC team and for peripheral health institutions (NTI 1994a). 
By 1974, 301 District TB Centres were established, increasing to 329 by 1979 (NTI 
1994d). These were largely TB Clinics that were upgraded. The NTP a centrally 
sponsored scheme, supplies TB drugs and equipment to DTC's, financed on a 50-50 
shared basis between Centre and State. States bear 100% of operational costs (Chapter 
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S). For Union Territories and TB clinics run by voluntary bodies, drugs and equipment 
are supplied as a 100% centrally sponsored scheme (TAl 1987). 
Based on the National Sample Survey, planners estimated average districts with 1.S 
million people to have 20,000 radiologically active cases, of which SOOO were infectious 
(Piot 1962). Four thousand new radiologically active cases, including 1000 sputum 
positives, were estimated to occur annually assuming an incidence lISth prevalence 
(ibid) Eighty percent of patients were rural, spread over 2000 villages/district. 
Operational studies found 3.S% of new outpatients at peripheral institutions aged 10 
years and above were chest symptomatics (cough for more than two weeks), of whom 
11 % were new cases of pulmonary TB detected by sputum microscopy at peripheral 
institutions (Baily et al 1967). Findings were used to develop potentials/expectations 
and later targets for sputum examinations and positivity. DTP's were found capable of 
diagnosing 4S% of the estimated prevalence of infectious cases in a district in a year 
(ibid). The workload for TB case-finding at peripheral institutions involved 1-2 sputum 
examinations per working day, requiring no extra staff (ibid). All chest symptomatics 
were referred to the DTC for X-rays, but 66% agreed to go, while only 160/0 actually 
went (ibid). Thus referrals were envisaged a minor role, with most case finding ideally 
close to patients' homes. Sputum microscopy at PHI's was often by paramedical 
personnel with short training, not by qualified laboratory technicians. Assessments in 
the 1960's found standards fairly good, but compared to culture results under-diagnosis 
of 38.20/0 and over-diagnosis of 2.6% occurred (Rao et al 1971). Again, financial 
considerations decided the choice, with cost ratios between microscopy and culture of 
I :6.6 (ibid). 
The Eighth Expert Committee of WHO (1964) standardised and promoted the NTP 
model among member countries lO (WHO 1974, Rao 1984). Thus Indian 
research/experience contributed to international TB policy (NagpauI1989). 
Direct BCG vaccination without prior tuberculin testing was introduced in 1965 on a 
house to house basis (Park 1994). Problems of the BCG campaign became further 
10 The Ninth WHO Expert Committee opined that decline in TB was not proportionate to resources spent, 
attributing this to inadequate national planning, coordination and evaluation, and failure to change from 
traditional approaches to current knowledge (WHO 1974). 
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manifest in the miG-1960's, with estimated coverage's of just 16.5% of the 0-14 year 
age group in 1968 (Barna 1971). 
Awareness regarding implementation difficulties in the NTP gradually grew. Studies by 
the TB Association found apathy, lack of implementation/expansion of the NTP at 
PHC/subcentre level, lack of supervision by DTC's, staff indiscipline, political 
interference and low salary scales (Bordia 1971, Deshmukh 1971). They predicted drug 
resistance and chronic invalidism due to irregular drug taking and ineffective 
chemotherapy (ibid). None of the 'non-technical' issues, that appear crucial to 
implementation had been considered during formulation. TB workers across the country 
reported unsatisfactory functioning of the NTP (T AI 1968-78). Remedies suggested to 
Government were to give priority to TB as the foremost 'public health enemy', 
undertake large scale expansion of organisation and clinics, ensure adequate numbers of 
trained personnel, ensure availability of sufficient quantities of TB drugs, and evolve 
methods for drugs to be taken regularly by patients (T AI 1970). Largely techno-
managerial, these did not address basic problems being encountered. Though no longer 
as influentiaVpowerful in policy making as in the past, the TB Association was a 
respected body and in touch with the field particularly with District TB Officer's, 
through annual conferences held from 1946 and its publication (Indian Journal of 
Tuberculosis). Following internal discussions the Association raised its concerns 
directly with the Union Health Minister Karan Singh suggesting an evaluation, which 
was accepted and conducted by the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR 1975). 
Thus the voluntary sector again played an important policy watch-dog role. 
Consequently, in 1978 a monitoring system was introduced, with monthly reports from 
PHI's to DTC's, and quarterly reports from DTC's to the NT!. 
Demographic growth and changes in districts affected the administrative functioning of 
the NTP. India's population was approximately 400 million in the 1950's. There were 
about 340 districts ll each with an average of 50 peripheral health institutions (Nagpaul 
1989). Though DTC's started functioning in 1962, coverage of all districts was never 
achieved, with time lags before DTC's could be created in new districts. Intra-district 
coverage of PHI's by the NTP was also incomplete. 
II Numbers changed with new administrative districts carved out of larger ones. 
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The NTP was launched during a turbulent period, with two wars (aggressions by China 
1962, and Pakistan 1965) and political instability (Joshi and Little 1994). Foreign aid 
was suspended in 1965 (NIHFW 1992). The ruling Congress party declined in 
popularity in the third general elections in 1962 (Frankel 1984). Prime Minister Nehru 
died in 1964 and his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1965. Severe droughts from 1965-
1967 worsened the economic situation and the rupee was devalued in 1966 (NIHFW 
1992). In the 1967 general elections the Congress lost 8 of 16 major States, with its 
majority declining in the Centre as well (Spear 1978). 
India's population growth was perceived as a major impediment to development by 
national and international elites, with the mid-1960's population approaching 500 
million. Family Planning began to dominate the health agenda of the country (Banerji 
1982). Advised by Ford Foundation and the UN, the Family Planning Programme was 
reorganised in 1963, adopting intensive programmes for sterilisation's, condoms and the 
loop (Intra-Uterine Contraceptive Device) for large scale implementation in 1965 (Rao 
1994). India's food and economic crisis made it vulnerable and dependant on US food 
aid, tied with pressures to increase private investment and retreat from its social goals 
(Frankel 1984). Active pursuance of the family planning programme was promoted as 
part of this and supported by the World Bank, UNFPA and SIDA, with budget increases 
inspite of the economic crisis (Rao 1994). 
The Congress split in 1969 with the Indira Gandhi led group coming to power (Frankel 
1984). Policy measures like bank nationalisation, cessation of privy purses to erstwhile 
princes, substantial increase in the Fourth Plan budget, among other factors, led the 
Congress to win a massive majority in the 1971 elections under the slogan Garibi Hatao 
(remove poverty) (ibid). 
Very soon afterwards with unrest in East Pakistan against West Pakistan nearly 10 
million refugees came into India (Spear 1978). Following military action by Pakistan 
and build up of US presence in the Indian Ocean, India intervened and the Republic of 
Bangladesh was created in 1971. Crop failures and the international oil crisis in 1973-
74, price rises and scarcities of essential commodities in 1974-75 created hardship and 
unrest (Frankel 1984). In June 1975, the Indira Gandhi government, declared a state of 
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'Emergency', during which civil rights were severely curtailed and authoritarian 
tendencies reigned supreme. This lasted till 1977. In 1976 the Prime Minister's Twenty 
Point Programme was initiated and on 16/4176 a new Population Policy enunciated 
(BaneIji 1982). The focus of the entire health system was forcefully turned to family 
planning with targets and a 'host of harsh incentives and disincentives' (Rao 1994;65), 
with 13.2 million sterilisation operations were conducted between 1974 and 1978 
(Jobert 1985 quoting Minhas). Credibility of the Government health system with people 
declined, particularly with the poor at whom the family planning programme was 
directed (BaneIji 1982). 
A student and political movement spearheaded by Gandhian socialist JP Narayan and 
escalating political events led to the 1977 election, in which a coalition of opposition 
groups forming the Janata Party, defeated Congress. Analysts attribute the fall of 
government partly to family planning excesses (Rao 1994, Brass 1994). 
Thus during the critical initial period when the NTP was developing, the contextual 
policy environment was unsupportive and increasingly complex. When an issue 
becomes low profile politically, other more parochial interests within institutions and 
bureaucracies gain importance. The quality of political and policy leadership at Centre 
and States declined (BaneIji 1990). Though rural health services did not grow 
adequately in quantity or quality (ICSSRlICMR 1981), special schemes for the 
organised sector such as the Central Government Health Scheme, Employees State 
Insurance Scheme expanded (Park 1994). Services such as the defence, railways, post 
and telegraphs, police, public sector industries organised their own health services with 
higher per capita outlays (ChatteIjee 1988). The private sector grew and was available to 
those with ability to pay, resulting in growing disparities in access to health care. 
Analysts also refer to an increasing awareness of a larger crisis in India's health system 
since the end of the 1960's (BaneIji 1982, Jobert 1985). 
A summary of the policy processes during this phase is in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Tuberculosis Control Policy Process in India 1963-1980 
CONTEXT CONTENT ACTORS PROCESS 
Two wars (1962 and 1965); The NTP comprises: Multiple Actors Starting District and State TB Centres; 
Political instability; Passive case detection, a) Central & State ministries, Drug supply systems; 
Death of two Prime Minister's with sputum microscopy, Centre DDG/central unit District team training at NTI; 
1964 and 1965; domiciliary multi drug chemotherapy, DTO's/ team, PRC MO's, Communication: NTI Newsletters; 
Suspension of foreign aid; free treatment, diffuse. Inadequate resources; 
Severe drought 1965-67; through peripheral health institutions, Special central schemes: ESI, Competing interests - FP, EPI, malaria; 
Economic crisis; Dist. TB Centre referral/ supervision, CGHS, defence, railways, Health services credibility poor due to FP 
Rupee devaluation 1967; Dist. TB Programme functional unit, post and telegraphs, police excesses and other factors; 
Refugees from East Pakistan 1971; District team training, etc. Poor implementation leads to evaluation; 
Military action, Bangladesh formed complications hospitalised, b) Private sector; Organised sector, urban bias; 
Oil crisis 1973-4, crop failures, cases estimated per district based on c) Voluntary sector: TAl Fall in mortality especially in higher 
price rises, popular unrest; epidemiological studies, nationally, service NGO's in Income groups; 
Emergency declared 1975 -77; BCG vaccination integrated with the field; Decreased international interest; 
Family planning excesses; general health services. c) International agencies NTP on back burner. 
Janata government 1977-80, WHO, SIDA. 
political factions and infighting. 
-
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4.1.5 The 1980's: New Solutions, Persisting Problems 
In 1982 it was estimated that 47% of the country was not covered by the TB programme 
(Sivaraman 1982). Incremental changes continued in policy content and strategy driven 
by varying forces. TB was mentioned in central government's New Twenty Point 
Programme in 198212 (GOr 1982), though without supportive discussion/strategies, that 
other selected issues relating to the economy received in the document. The National 
Health Policy of 1982 mentioned the NTP as priority, outlining targets (GOr 1985). 
Central expenditure increased from Rs.204 million for the entire Sixth Plan (1980-85) to 
Rs.111 million in 1985-86 and Rs.141 million in 1987-88 (NIHFW 1988). SIDA 
assistance to the NTP from 1979 (ibid) 13 accounted for part of the increase. The number 
of District TB Programmes increased from 320 in 1980 to 375 in 1989 (NTI 1994d). 
Some argued that following adverse public reaction to Family Planning, government 
needed to appear to demonstrate commitment to programmes concerning the poor, 
hence the special attention (interview 1995). 
Top-down strategies were soon adopted, with targets set centrally in 1983 for numbers 
of sputum examination to be conducted at peripheral institutions and District TB 
Centres, and in 1984 for case detection, which increased every year (NIHFW 1988). 
Multi-purpose workers at sub-centres and PHC's were involved (Nagpaul 1989) in a 
policy shift to active case finding, with monthly targets, collecting sputum samples from 
chest symptomatics during home visits14. However potentially positive health worker 
involvement, proven by operations research in 1981 (ICORCI 1988), used with coercive 
targets had unintended effects. While numbers of sputum examinations increased, 
particularly at peripheral institutions, sputum positivity rates among chest symptomatics 
declined from 13% to 5% (ICORCI 1988). Over-diagnosis and treatment of X-ray 
suspects in the public sector of an estimated 5-600,000 patients annually, caused 
unnecessary iatrogenic suffering/anxiety, and cost Rs.80-90 million (ibid). This 
accounted for a large proportion of the increased case detection from 700,000 new cases 
in 1981 to 1.4 million in 1988 (NIHFW 1988). Sputum positivity declined from 250/0 in 
12 To 'substantially augment universal primary health carefacilities and control of leprosy, TB and 
blindness' (GOI 1982, Point 14). 
13 The rupee value was shown in the NTP budget statement (interview 1996). 
14 600 new sputum examinations annually was the target for Primary Health Centres (NIHFW 1988). 
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1980 to 20-21 % in the late 1980's (Nagpaul 1989, Datta 1994). Contradictions such as 
low achievements of sputum examinations but high case detection in some States 
suggest poor quality work (NTI 1994d). Damage done included wasted resources on 
sputum examinations, lowered morale and credibility, and a masking of the real 
situation. Though there were some gains, political action in this case was 
counterproductive. The Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation centrally 
monitored 119 items under the Twenty Point Programmes 1986 (GOI 1995a). The NTI 
continued monitoring the NTP, with inadequate response to their repeated feedback 
regarding corrective action (NTI 1996 & Bulletins). In 1994 acknowledging the futility 
of the approach, targets were dropped (Datta*VHAI 1994). 
From 1978 responsibility for BCG moved from the NTP to the Expanded Programme of 
Immunisationl5 . In 1985 this was converted by the GOI to the Universal Immunisation 
Programme (UlP) in India, as a living memorial to the late Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi 16. Senior experts were sceptical about quality of BCG technique used 
(Baily*1995, Ramesh*1995). Following budgetary constraints to the BCG Laboratory, 
India moved from self-sufficiency to importing part of its BCG vaccine requirements. 
Family planning/welfare continued to dominate health services. Its budget of Rs.34.5 
billion in the 7th Plan (1985-90) compared to Rs.33.9 billion for all other health 
programmes, reflecting the interests of the political, bureaucratic and professional 
leadership (Banetji 1990). The negative impact on the NTP was highlighted by national 
assessments (ICORCI 1988). Malaria, the other competing programme, received a 
budget ofRs.970 million in 1992-93 compared to Rs.290 million for TB (NTI 1994d). 
Persisting Problems: By 1988, only 25% of the 371 DTC's had fully trained teams, 
30% did not have trained DTO's, supervision was poor, only 60% of DTP's had 
vehicles, budgets were inadequate and drug supplies irregular (ICORCI 1988, Nagpaul 
1989). An evaluation team stressed the need for greater devolution of responsibilities, 
powers and budgeting for integration to really play its role (ICORCI 1988). Disparities 
15 A global time bound programme by UNICEF and WHO for 6 immunisable diseases to cease to be 
public health problems. 
16 A national review of the VIP in 1989 and studies in West Bengal reported problems with supplies, 
cold chain, vacancies, poor work culture, and poor perfonnance by multi-purpose health workers, such 
that most vulnerable segments were inadequately covered (Banerji 1990). . 
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in access to NTP services continued, with 37% of the rural popUlation lacking access in 
1988, while semi-urban/more populated rural areas were better served (Nagpaul 1989). 
The coverage of 630/0 was incomplete (ibid). If quality of care and functional efficacy 
are considered, the proportion lacking access increases. 
Treatment completion with standard regimens was 27% around 1981, against a potential 
of 45% (Nagpaul 1989), when tuberculosis was included in the Twenty Point 
Programme. Partly concerned about this low rate, Short Course Chemotherapy (SCC) 
was introduced in 1983-84 on a pilot basis in 18 selected districts of the country 
(MOH&FW 1983-84) monitored by the Tuberculosis Research Centre, Madras. While 
monitoring results were still awaited, SCC was introduced to 26 districts in 1986-87 
(Jhunjhunwala 1994). With low treatment completion rates of 52% (though higher than 
the Standard Regimen), potential dangers of drug resistance developing to second line 
drugs, were anticipated with SCC introduction in a programme functioning through 
weak health services, with insufficient managerial capacity (BaneIji*VHAI 1994). 
Despite these arguments and with insufficient attention to training field staff particularly 
at peripheral level, or to developing infrastructure and streamlining supply lines, see 
coverage of districts increased rapidly during the Seventh Plan, from 26 districts in 
1986, to 75 in 1987, and 194 in 1989 (MOR Annual Reports). By 1991-92,253 districts 
(650/0) were reportedly covered (Datta 1994). SIDA grants supported introduction and 
expansion of SCC (MOH Annual Reports, 1979-80 to 1990-91). Coverage never 
extended to entire districts, and drug shortages occurred increasing likelihood of later 
drug resistance (interviews 1996). There was no public report till 1995 from the TRC 
from its monitoring of SCC. In 248 districts monitored by NTI, only 35% of peripheral 
institutions were covered by SCC, drug collection of 750/0 or more was 450/0 in 
streptomycin containing regimens and 53% in those with ethambutol (Suryanarayana et 
aI1994). Smear examinations were done only for 33% of patients put on treatment, with 
90 and 96% sputum conversion among them (ibid). Only 33.20/0 in a district using 
unsupervised SCC collected 75% or more of their drugs, though 72-77% became smear 
negative irrespective of adherence (only 48% with drug resistant strains) (Chaudhuri el 
al 1993). Implementation gaps occurred even with the best technology, with potentially 
more serious consequences. While expanding SCC coverage in this manner, the 
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Ministry continued referring to it as a pilot study phase up to 1992-93 in its annual 
reports (lhunjhunwala 1994, MOH 1984-85 to 1992-93). Political reasons (to be seen to 
provide for their constituencies), economic forces (pharmaceutical industry including 
multinationals gaining greater profits from SCC) and personal gains for various people 
involved fuelled rapid extension of SCC (interviews 1996). BCG coverage in 1993-94 
was 8.4 million, only 68% of its target and 8.2% less than the performance in the 
previous year l7 (GOI 1996). 
Stratified TB services continued with better quality treatment for the better resourced 
and organised public sector. By 1984, the Employees State Insurance Scheme (ES1S) 
covered over 7 million industrial workers and 21 million dependants and the railway 
health service covered 7.6 million employees and dependants (Jeffery 1986). The 
Central Government Health Scheme covering 4.5 million central government employees 
(current and retired) incurred an annual expenditure ofRs.888.7 million (Rs.222/person) 
in 1992-93 (GOl 1996;62). The private sector was estimated to treat an equal proportion 
of patients as the public sector, i.e. about 1.5 million new cases per year 
(Nagpaul*1995). 
Changes in national context sharpened in this decade with increased privatisation and 
liberalisation18 (Duggal 1997). Following the assassination of Prime Minister Mrs. 
Gandhi in 1984, the new Prime Minister and others accelerated processes of 
globalization (Patel 1995). Over 30 years while slipping in the world economy19 
economists observed growing inequalities in ownership of productive assets20, while 
'the balance of social power ... in villages and cities ... moved in favour of the upper 10% 
(Patel 1995;ix). Government spent more than its revenue collections, non-development 
expenditures rose faster than for development and domestic and external debt increased 
with rising burdens of debt servicing (ibid). These social forces, and diminishing state 
intervention in public services and development have negative impacts on TB as 
17 There seems to be a discrepancy in numbers. Another table in the report mentions 21.6 million BeG 
immunisations in 1991-92 and provisionally in 1992-93 (GO I 1996). 
18 'A rolling back of the State from the sphere of production and productive investment, and a 
significant curtailment in the level of social expe.nditure' (Patnaik, 1994). 0 . . , 
19 India's share in world trade reduced from 4% In the early 1950 s to 0.5 Yo m the mld-1980 s (Patel 
1995). 
20 Assets of the top 20 business houses were 3 times higher than all the possessions of 100 million 
Indians (Patel 1995). The top 10% held 56% of total land under cultivation (ibid). 
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discussed elsewhere (Chapter 1, Annexe 1). The policies had specific effects on the 
health sector. Stagnant public expenditure on health over the decades and in the 1980s, 
allowed growth of the private sector (Jesani and Ananthraman 1993, Barn 1994), with 
National Sample Survey data from 1986-87 showing over 700/0 of people utilising 
private practitioner outpatient services (Barn 1994). 
A summary of processes during the 1980s is given in Table 4.3 and policy changes in 
the 1990's are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Table 4.3 Tuberculosis Control Policy Process in India 1981-early 1990s 
-- --
CONTEXT POLICY CONTENT ACTORS PROCESS 
, Congress Govt. back in power; Active sputum testing and case Central and State routinisation ofNTP processes; 
Central tendency strong; finding through MPW's; governments, increased infrastructure - PRC's, subcentres, 
Revised 20 Point Programme; 1985 BCG part ofUIP; Private sector growth DTC's· , 
Economic liberalisation and BCG study results question its in the 1980s, corruption, irregular, inadequate drug supplies; 
privatisation from mid-1980s; protective efficacy against adult SIDA donor to New voluntary sector actors raise critical issues 
Internal political instability; pulmonary TB; central govt. regarding TB care -MFC, AIDAN, FRCR, VHAI 
terrorism, separatism; 1983-84 18 distict study of SCC; WHO & WB active shift from service provision to advocacy and 
fundamentalism; 1986 -87 SCC extended to 246 from the 1990s research; I 
Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi districts; promoting global World Bank a major new actor- provision ofloan 
assassinated 1984, and ex-PM 1988 In-depth study of the NTP; policy, from social security net for TB, linked 
Rajiv Gandhi in 1991; 1992 GOIIWHO/SIDA Voluntary sector conditionally to introduction of policy package. 
Frequent change of government; programme reVIew; advocacy, Recognition of private sector presence. 
Structural Adjustment 1993 pilot phase of Revised NTP 
Programme since 1991. with DOTS. 
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Summary: The historical overview of the development of the TB programme gives a 
number of clues that begin to explain why implementation was never as strong as 
envisioned. 
• Old policies especially serving dominant interests exercised considerable influence. 
Government inaction, a strong private sector, clinical approaches, urban biases, and 
central control over policy are examples. 
• With hindsight we know that BeG, the chosen strategy for a nation-wide campaign 
at great cost was of limited value. Thus the basic cause effect relationship underlying 
the policy was flawed. This experience and others factors such as geographic 
distribution, role of Mass Miniature Radiography highlight gaps in knowledge, 
cautioning against dogmatism and policy borrowing, common in international public 
health. 
• The new NTP was a research based model that worked under special conditions. 
Gaps between performance and expectations raise questions regarding original 
expectations. Exclusive focus on epidemiologicaVtechnical dimensions of policy 
content, though developed within a context of social relevance overshadowed 
societal dimensions. 
• The dynamic, political nature of policy processes with covert/overt conflicts of 
interest, stratification of TB services, competing programmes, changing roles 
between public, voluntary and private for profit sectors, complex contextual 
environments and the influence of these factors on implementation are evident. 
Given this, the inattention to policy process factors was a major weakness. 
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4.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NTP: AN OVERVIEW 
4.2.1 Incremental Policy Change 
References to the NTP suggest that a specific policy package was implemented III 
1962. This review reveals that the TB policy developed and was implemented 
incrementally over time (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 Incremental Changes in TB Policy In India 
Year TB Policy Comment 
1946 Bhore Committee recommendations on TB. Not implemented. 
No specific national policy by government. Private and voluntary sectors main actors, 
provincial govt.'s emerging actors, families 
pnmary carers. 
1947 TB Advisor to new GOI appointed. Health services restructured. 
1948 BCG campaign started, with school children BCG vaccine plant established. 
and factory workers. 
1951 Mass BCG Campaign started-tuberculin testing Bhore Committee recommendations began to 
and liquid BCG, increase in TB beds, be implemented, found to progress slowly, 
establishment of State TB Demonstration & established centres not always functionally 
Training Centres and District TB Clinics using effective. 
home treatment. BCG campaign used a vertical approach. 
1962 NTPIDTP articulated with passive case finding, Shift to integration with health services. 
domiciliary chemotherapy, free treatment, Central government sponsorship 100% for 
recording/reporting system, DTC team as nodal development of DTC, training of DTC team, 
point. drugs and equipment. 
BCG campaign shifted to house to house State responsibility for staff salaries and 
vaccination, integration of BCG teams with implementation. 
DTP started. 
1965 BCG approach shifts to direct vaccination for Shift of production technology from liquid to 
0-20 year age group, and freeze dried vaccine. freeze dried vaccine. 
1969 Refocus on school coverage with BCG. 
1973 Involvement of Multi-Purpose Workers Shift from a doctor dominated programme to 
(115000 popUlation) in identification of chest greater peripheral health worker 
symptomatics, sputum collection, smear involvement. 
preparation, motivation, community education, 
BCG vaccination. 
Continued ...... 
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1977 BCG merged with Expanded Programme of BCG given by MPW's, no longer under 
Immunisation (EPI). administrative control ofNTP. 
Community Health Volunteer Scheme started , 
involved with identification motivation , , 
follow-up, defaulter retrieval. 
1978 Monitoring of NTP by NT!. No feedback mechanisms to districtslPHI's 
1982 NTP put on New Twenty Point Programme. 
1982 National Health Policy sets targets for NTP. Shift to active case detection during home 
-83 Annual targets introduced for sputum visits by MPW's. 
examinations at Peripheral Health Institution's. 
1983 Annual targets for case detection at PHI's. Targets were dropped in 1994. 
-84 Introduction of Short Course Chemotherapy. 
1986 Expanded coverage of districts with Short 253 districts (65%) covered by 1991-92. 
-87 on Course Chemotherapy. 
1990 Case detection by multi-purpose workers 
withdrawn from the NTP. 
1992 Programme review. Negotiations initiated with TB control gains the attention of 
WHOIWB regarding Revised NTP. international bodies from the late 1980's. 
1993 Pilot phase of Revised NTP. Covers 23 million out of 950 million by 
1997 Agreement signed with WHO and WB. 1996. 
Increased coverage planned over 3 years. 
Source: Chapter 1 and 4 
Politico-economic need was often the reason for change, with research used to provide 
the justification e.g. domiciliary chemotherapy, use of targets, introduction of SCC. 
The incremental nature of the policy process can be explained by the following 
factors: leadership, power relations, inequality and infrastructural development. 
4.2.2 Leadership 
The importance of individuals with personal/social skills, VISIOn, capability, 
dynamism and commitment to take leadership was raised frequently during 
interviews. Political leaders in 1947 selected leadership for the new TB programme 
not from government cadres, but from the voluntary sector of a person experienced in 
TB work. He in turn energetically selected professionals with multi-disciplinary 
backgrounds from different parts of the country, for the BCG campaign and to build 
the NTIIother national institutions. This laid the foundations for second generation 
leadership with long tenn benefits. Personalities of leaders played an important role in 
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the policy process. Autonomous policy leadership ansIng from and supported by 
advocacy networks, characterised by 'passionate commitment to make a difference by 
advancing a particular policy quest' has been discussed in the policy literature 
(Wallis and Dollery 1997;1). 
While leadership can reinforce top-down approaches, it can also create an 
environment in which bottom-up perspectives get space to influence policy. 
Mechanisms used in the 1950's included regular contact with front-line workers, 
familiarity with and concern for field problems and national consultative meetings to 
discuss problems. Interviews for this study pointed out that early leadership promoted 
the programme proactively, developed national and international alliances, and 
generated resources. Successful leaders do not always lead, but often play catalytic 
roles depending on their networks for policy advice and support (Wallis and Dollery 
1997). This happened with young researchers at the NTI questioning basic tenets, 
suggesting alternative approaches. This included learning from people, changing their 
own vertical approaches, questioning the protective efficacy of BCG, in which they 
believed and invested heavily, among others. 
Evolution and implementation of the NTP was best when political leadership sought 
and supported good national policy leadership, which promoted leadership at other 
organisational levels. When this changed, state and district leadership still being 
developed, weakened with reduced power and personal involvement in the 
programme. There was an interdependent domino effect of political and policy 
leadership at national, regional and institutional levels. A sense of policy ownership 
by iInplementors is important for any programme/policy to be carried through 
(Brinkerhoff 1997). Team leadership for the NTP at peripheral health institutions, 
particularly PRC's, never developed and continues to be a major weakness. 
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Table 4.5 National Leadership in the NTP 
Period Leadership Qualities Evidence 
1947-62 a) Dynamic, responsive to new developments and a) Conducted mass BCG 
understandings, created mechanisms for generating new campaign- largest in the 
knowledge, research oriented, analytic, critical, questioning world. 
given theories and its own policies based on implementation b) Started TB Chemotherapy 
experience, accepting /learning from problems/mistakes and Centre and National TB 
changing policies. Institute whose research 
b) Created political space, had negotiating skills, developed influenced global TB control. 
and sustained international linkages, built institutions with c) Initiated building of State 
clear political mandate. TB & Demonstration Centres 
c) Energy invested in selection and development of staff- & District TB centres. 
younger researchers, administrators and practitioners. d) Stability in leadership-15 
d) Commitment to cause, experienced in TB/researchl years. 
voluntary sector, risk taking. e) Influenced WHO, 
e) Used a collective approach. sustained international links. 
1962-92 Committed, experienced in TB, honest, less dynamic, Operationalisation of NTP, 
increase in bureaucratic styles, faced a more difficult policy about 400 DTC's started, 
and political environment. research, training, newsletter, 
incremental policy changes. 
1993 Frequent change, not always experienced in TBINTP, greater Four incumbents in 4 years, 
onwards political interference, absence of open debate influencing 1 charge sheeted for 
policy, lowered morale of other staff, confusion. possessing wealth beyond 
source of income, corruption 
in TB drug purchase . 
.. 
Source: NTP documents; intervIews; BaneIJI 1993 
Leadership during the second phase was less effective in generating resources and 
influencing state governments. It was also less pro-active, accepted constraints more 
easily, was dependant on political masters and 'higher ups' (preoccupied with other 
interests), unwilling to challenge status quo, appearing relatively uninterested and 
apathetic. The cutting edge was blunted as the policy environment became more 
complex. Unconstructive internal conflicts and routine became more manifest. 
Programme managers lacked assertiveness. Weak leadership became one of the 
factors adversely affecting policy implementation. It could be argued that lower 
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priority in later phases reflected structural factors, the lower socio-economic-political 
power of patients dependant on effective public policy. 
For a chronic problem like TB, to consciously nurture and plan for leadership at 
different levels is important. 
4.2.3 Power Relations in the NTP 
A thinly spread intervention strategy functioning through general health services for a 
problem diffusely spread across a large population theoretically requires stronger 
power for success (Cleaves 1980). However power in the NTP is weak and 
fragmented and demand for effective services ineffective. 
Around 1947, with 800/0 of the population below the poverty line, the socially 
powerful were vulnerable to TB (exemplified by the death from TB of Kamala 
Nehru). Political pressure for effective public policy for TB was greater, expressed as 
'public demand' (4.1). Later with economic development, TB declined among the 
privileged classes, who were well served by policies promoting the private sector, and 
had no further need to exert political pressure to improve the NTP. Patients without 
access to effective services, the poor and powerless though large in number, were 
dispersed, lacking organisation to promote their interests. Hence little countervailing 
power or pressure existed for effective policy implementation. 
Central policy leadership in the 1990's is small and fragmented for the task. The 
Central TB Unit in the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) has 4-6 
technical staff for the entire country, drawn from the Central Health Services, usually 
with a public health training but not necessarily a background in TB or the NTP. 
Preoccupied with routine administration (such as processing drug supplies to DTC's), 
inadequately in touch with the states (lCORCI 1988), transferable between 
units/programmes, they function in a relatively politicised environment (interviews 
and observation 1995 & 1996). Personal commitment to the programme, vital to 
sustain the same at state and district levels, is variable. 
Underlying conflicts currently exist between the central unit, and the NTI with a total 
staff of 200. Technical staff here are experts in TB/the NTP, more conversant with 
field problems, but lacking administrative powers, are primarily advisory unable to 
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take action (interviews 1995). Policy analysts suggest that institutional assets like the 
NTI with specific mandates are currently being consciously denigrated, allowing 
space for new policy initiatives. The NTI IS criticised for paSSIve 
participation/absenteeism from national meetings concerning the Revised NTP 
(interviews 1996). It is suggested that bureaucratisation and relative apathy set in 
before the RNTP process21 • The NTI is also criticised for centralising training and 
being rigid and resistant to change (Uplekar and Rangan 1996). Though promoting 
integration, it has been disease and programme oriented not applying itself to 
strengthening general health services in policy or practical terms. 
The third national organisation is the TB Research Centre under the Indian Council of 
Medical Research, with internationally accepted research contributions Consultative 
mechanisms between the national institutions exist, but their vitality depends upon the 
personalities involved. There is a tendency for each to promote its own institutional 
interests, partly at the expense of energy that could be invested in improving the NTP. 
With the RNTP (Chapter 5) newer institutional power centres are being created (e.g. 
the LRS Institute in Delhi), required for a country the size of India, but there seems to 
be a whispering campaign against older institutions (observations and interviews). 
Whether this process will strengthen or fragment power depends on perceptions and 
strategies of those involved. 
Power at state level is weak and at implementation level extremely diffuse in the 
21800 Primary Health Centres in rural India and 4432 public sector hospitals through 
which it functions (CBHI 1991). Inadequate administrative power and resources (also 
disempowering) of District TB Centres, the fulcrum of the NTP, is a key factor 
explaining poor implementation. They are reduced to being curative centres, at the 
cost of their primary function of direction and management of the DTP. This 
generates frustration, apathy and poor quality services at PHC's. 
Inadequate power given to the NTP at various levels provides an important 
explanation for poor implementation. Without power and a sense of direction the state 
2lApathy, a political statement of disinterest, can greatly harm a policy. 
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apparatus seems caught up in its own interests and internal competitions. The review 
also suggests that power is not just given, but needs to be created, mobilised and 
demanded. This is more necessary when the problem (TB) is related to conditions of 
poverty, insecurity and social injustice disproportionately affecting the powerless in 
society. In the absence of effective public services the private sector filled the gaps 
with questionable treatment practices and no systems of accountability or regulation. 
4.2.4 Inequities in Health Care Services 
Commitments to equity in health and health care have been repeatedly made 
nationally and internationally (Table 4.6). However implementing such commitments 
lagged behind and by 1997 global inequities reportedly increased (WHO 1997c). 
Table 4.6 Equity in Health and Health Care 
Report Recommendations 
Bhore Committee Universal access to health care irrespective of ability to pay. 
1943-46 TB had special mention. 
Several Government Build up of rural health infrastructure, national health programmes (TB 
schemes! initiatives, control was among the earliest since 1947), reorientation of medical 
1947 onwards education, training of paramedical staff, community health worker 
scheme. 
WHO, Alma Ata Health for All by 2000 with Primary Health Care as strategy. 
Declaration 1978 
GOI & GOK, Eighth Health for the Underprivileged. 
Plan Document, 1992 
WHO, 1997 Renewal of Health for All in the Twentieth Century. 
Source: GOI 1946, 1992; WHO 1978; WHO 1997c 
In India urban rural differences in health status continue with substantially higher 
rural mortality (CBHI 1991). Urban preferences in provision of health care services 
are seen in the implementation of the NTP (Nagpaul 1989), despite 74% of the 
population being rural (1991 census). 
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Table 4.7 Urban and Rural Health Care Infrastructure-1991 
Health Facility Total Number Urban Rural 
Hospitals 11,254 7,286 3,968 
Hospital beds 6,19,433 5,24,118 95,315 
Dispensaries 27,994 15,710 12,284 
Dispensary beds 22,184 9,270 12,912 
Source: CBHI 1991 
Of the increase in hospital beds SInce 1951, numbers in urban areas are greatly 
disproportionate to those in rural areas (WB 1992). The population per bed in rural 
areas is three times that in urban areas (ibid). Rural PRC's/dispensaries have low 
functional capacity providing low quality of care. For serious illnesses including TB, 
patients often have to go to urban centres. From a gender perspective women 
underutilise health services or have lower access. Shortages of women doctors and 
nurses in rural areas accentuates this situation (Chatterjee 1988, Rangan et al 1997). 
Disparities between and within States and between districts in health and health care 
have been increasingly discussed and studied during the past decade (WB 1992) but 
have not been taken into account by the NTP. 
While the NTP shifted policy towards majority rural needs, no special efforts were 
made to reach poorer sections of the population or to provide greater inputs to districts 
with weaker infrastructures. By not explicitly responding to disparities and differing 
levels of power in society, the uniform policy of the NTP could mask and/or 
reproduce social realities. 
4.2.5 Infrastructural Development 
Training and infrastructural development are critical to TB programmes providing 
mechanisms for their functioning. Acute shortages of all categories of health 
personnel existed in 1947. Health care services were inadequate, urban based, curative 
in focus, providing preferential access to the army, expatriates and local elites 
(Ramasubban 1984). Changes relevant to TB during the subsequent five decades are 
discussed briefly below. 
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Production of Medical Graduates/ Growth in Medical Education: 
TB treatment is doctor dominated, though the training/role of laboratory technicians, 
radiographers, nurses, treatment organisers, and multi-purpose workers is equally if 
not more important. The central government, responsible constitutionally for medical 
education, made policy decisions increasing the production of medical graduates 
through increasing state sponsored, subsidised medical education (GOI Plan 
documents). Increased annual outputs of medical graduates (Table 4.8) after 1947 
changed a doctor deficit situation to one of saturation. 
Table 4.8 Growth in Medical Colleges & Annual Output of Medical Graduates 
Year No. of Medical Colleges Annual Admissions Annual Output 
1947 22 1,983 959 
1957 52 4,083 2,743 in 1955-56* 
1966 87 10,620 5,387* 
1977 106 11,176 11,962 
1987 125 11,622 12,280 
1993 145 16,200 approx.13000 
.. Source: SCHARA 1995, *BanerJl 1985 
Doctor-population ratios were 116,300 in 1937 (Ete & Khrime 1995). With 1,90,838 
medical graduates (allopaths) by 1974 and over 3,94,068 in 1991, the ratio became 
1 :2159, over the prescribed norm of 1 :3500, despite the population tripling. Including 
graduates from Indian and other systems of medicine, the ratio is 1: 1000 (SCHARA 
1995). Thus the number of service providers trained to treat TB increased 
substantially since 1947. The NTP in 1962 by removing TB treatment from the 
domain of specialists to general practitioners multiplied the spread effect (Banerj i 
1993). Problems of urban rural distribution of doctors exist particularly for specialists, 
but market forces and sheer numbers now push practitioners to the countryside 
(interview). Treatment of TB and NTP concepts were introduced into the 
undergraduate curriculum (Park 1994). The NTI organised orientation workshops for 
teachers from medical colleges and participated in student training (NTI annual 
reports). 
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Private ownership of medical colleges grew from less than 5% in 1947 to 30% in 
1993-94 with the largest increase occurring after 1988 during the phase of 
privatisation (SCHARA 1995). The New Education Policy from the mid-1980's 
promotes private sponsorship of higher education including medicine, while the State 
focuses on primary and secondary education (ibid). Government colleges (700/0) 
provide highly subsidised education to students. A majority of graduates (75%) 
subsequently practice in the private sector whose growth is thus supported/promoted 
by the public sector (FRCH 1990). State run medical and health services and 
infrastructure increased after 1947 providing job opportunities for about 30% of 
graduates (ibid). Questions concerning quality, social relevance and community 
orientation of medical education and role of other health workers have been raised 
(GOI-Srivastava Report 1975, MFC 1991, Narayan et a11993) with several initiatives 
and experiments over the years. However despite over production of doctors, 
vacancies exist in Primary Health Centres adversely affecting the NTP. In 1994, 40% 
of PHC doctors posts were vacant in Uttar Pradesh, India's largest state. Maharashtra 
one of the richest states had 250/0 vacancies (SCHARA 1995 citing Bajaj 1994). 
Government promoted/subsidised medical education, producing graduates for the 
private sector. The public sector particularly in rural areas is still understaffed. 
Development of General Health Services: Central government policies since the 
1950's, developed a health care infrastructure (Table 4.9) through which national 
health programmes function (Banerji 1985). 
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Table 4.9 Government Health Care Infrastructure 
Health Centre Health Centre Characteristics Comments 
Sub-Centre Covers a population of 5000 Vacancies exist, buildings inadequate, 
(rural) (3000 in hilly terrain's), salaries of female HA' s come from F amil y 
based on 1987 population, Welfare budget and for male HA' s from 
staffed by 1 male & female Junior National Malaria Eradication Programme. 
Health Assistant (HA). Work in NTP is minimal. 
Primary Developed since 1952 as nodal point for Vacancies/understaffing, staff commute, 
Health Centre- national health programmes, often unavailable; drug shortages; 
PHC covers 30,000 people (20,000 in hilly illegal private practice; 
(rural) areas), has 4-6 inpatient beds, staffed by excessive focus on family planning 
1 MO, 7 paramedics, 7support staff, 6 & immunisation; 
subcentres administered by each PHC. people lack confidence in them. 
Community Introduced in the 1980's, Complete country-wide coverage not yet 
Health Centre- 1 CHC covers 4 PHC's, it is the first attained, regional differences, vacancies 
CHC level of referral, has 30 inpatient beds, 4 esp. of doctors, NTP has not specified any 
(rural) specialist doctors, 11 paramedics, particular role to them other than being a 
population covered 60-120,000. peripheral health institution. 
Taluk 50 bedded with specialist staff, Based in taluk headquarter town, 
Hospital population covered 100-200,000, vacancies particularly of doctors, seen by 
(urban) provides medical care, run by State NTP only as a PHI. 
Govt. 'so 
District Bed strength varies from 400 upwards, Regional variations, economically 
Hospital if it is a medical college hospital it could backward districts with poorer populations 
(urban) provide tertiary care. and greater health needs are underserved 
i.e. there are internal inequities at district 
level, though for PHC/CHC's population 
norms ensure greater equity 
Teaching and Attached to medical colleges and post Located in State capitals and larger cities. 
Specialist graduate teaching centres. Some tertiary Graduate & post graduate centres treat TB. 
Hospitals care and autonomous research centres. TB sanatoria have become TB & Chest 
(urban) Disease Hospitals 
Source: GOI 1995d; Park 1994 
The NTP's rural focus seemed a distant dream. With 800/0 of India's 439 million 
population (1961 census-CBHI 1991) being rural, spread over 5,80,000 villages, and 
medical services then largely urban, the problem was immense. Rural health services 
were then just being developed from 1952 (Table 4.10 below). From a negligible rural 
109 
servIce In 1947, the creation of a nation-wide rural health infrastructure and the 
training of an anny of allied health workers is widely recognised as an achievement 
by government (Banerji 1985, Chatterjee 1988, Jeffery 1988, GOl/WHO/SIDA 1992, 
WB 1992). For an integrated programme like the NTP this potentially provided a 
multiplier effect. The shift in balance of power that this entailed was not fully 
recognised and rural services remain relatively underfunded. 
Table 4.10 Development of Public Sector Rural Health Care Infrastructure 
Period Sub-Centres Primary Health Centres Community Health 
Centres 
1st Five Year Plan til11955 NA 725 
-* 
2nd Plan-till 1960 NA 2,565 (when the NTP was 
-
articulated) 
3rd Plan-till 1965 NA 4,631 
-
Annual Plans-ti111969 22,826 4,919 -
4th Plan-ti111974 33,509 5,283 -
5th Plan-til11980 47,112 5,484 -
6th Plan-ti111985 84,590 7,284 759 
7th Plan-ti111991 130,960 21,641 1855 
8th Plan-till 1995 132,285 21,802 2401 
., 
Source: CBHI 1991, GOI 1995d, Commumty Health Centres were mtroduced m the 1980s. 
Time lags for centres to become functional, and shortfalls in achievements adversely 
affected the NTP. Earmarked funds under the Minimum Needs Programme for 
creating primary health care infrastructure were not fully utilised, especially by poorly 
perfonning states with weak infrastructures (MOR/GOl 1994-95). Politicisation of 
health institutions, corruption, profit motives of doctors, subservience of authorities to 
political bosses in government health services adversely affect quality of care 
(Subrahmanyam 1997). 
TB services through DTC' s increased after 1962, though population growth required 
continual expansion of services (Table 4.11). 
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Table 4.11 Growth in Population and NTP Infrastructure 
Period Population No. of Average No. of No. of No. & % PHI's 
Districts pop.!district DTC's PHI's/district implemented 
1950's 400 million 300 1.5 million - 50 -
1988 800 million 437 1.8 million 371 60 14,000 (63%) 
1992 920 million 438 - 390 - 16,363 
. SOU1ce. Nagpaull989, NT! 1994d 
Utilisation of public sector infrastructure for private interests by government health 
care personnel and pharmaceuticals is documented (Kamat 1995, Subrahmanyam 
1997, Chapter 7). Experience of voluntary agencies in the field (VHAI, MFC) suggest 
its occurrence for decades. These aspects are not considered by the NTP in its 
strategies. Official evaluations and reports on the NTP record low performance, staff 
vacancies, old equipment unused because of repairs, idle equipment not installed, loss 
due to expiry of life of medicines (ICMR 1975, CAG 1988, ICOReI 1988). 
The private medical service sector, comprising private clinics, nursing homes, 
pharmacies and diagnostic services, has grown considerably even in rural areas, since 
the 1980's (Jesani and Anantharam 1989). 74.6 % of qualified allopathic doctors 
practised in the private sector (ibid). Utilisation of private sector services by all 
sections of society is about 75%, inspite of cost of services and quality of care issues 
(Duggal and Amin 1989). There are concerns about inadequate mechanisms for 
regulation of the private health care sector (Bhat 1993, Srinivasan*1996). In TB, 
private practitioners diagnose and prescribe irrationally and over-prescribe (Uplekar 
and Shepard 1991, Uplekar et al 1996). No strategies have evolved in the NTP 
regarding the role of the private sector though the issue has been recognised for long 
(Sivaraman 1982) and the TB Association evolved training modules for general 
practitioners since 1984 (TAl 1991). Due to a lack of a system of notification and few 
macro studies concerning the private sector and TB, the contribution ofprivate 
practitioners to TB control cannot be accurately assessed. It is assumed that nationally 
that the proportion of patients seen by them equals those by the NTP (Napaul* 1995). 
The basis of the estimates is fragile and probably does not account for regional and 
social class differences. Also it appears from indirect evidence that the increase in the 
number of medical graduates and practitioners has not altered the TB situation. 
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Conclusions: 
Implementation of the NTP was incremental and failed to achieve its goals for a 
number of reasons including resilience of older policies, non-decisions favouring 
existing biases, conflictual political factors and a difficult policy environment. When 
reviewed against characteristics that enhance or reduce the 'problematique' of a 
policy, the NTP simplified and standardised technical components and 
developed/disseminated clear goals and objectives. However more problematic 
aspects were that the policy is inherently of long duration, involving multiple actors in 
a federal constitution, and perhaps more importantly implied a fairly radical shift from 
existing practices and policies. 
Table 4.12 Policy Characteristics of the NTP 
Less/more Problematique Policy Characteristics NTP Characteristics 
Simplicity/ complexity of technical features Simplified, demystified technical features, but 
older more complex features still function. 
MarginaV comprehensive change from status quo Radical change proposed from urban to rural 
focus, from a vertical to an integrated approach, 
from specialists to generalists. 
Single/ multi actor target Multiple actors spread across a vast area 
Single/ multi goal objective Reduction of suffering and transmission, however 
it was dependant on several factors viz. health 
services, commitment of states in a federal 
system. 
Clearly stated! ambiguous goals Clearly stated- but time scale, social disparities & 
political processes need greater attention. 
Short/long term duration Long term, needs sustained interest and resources 
Source: Developed around framework by Cleaves (1980) 
Implementation Gains of the TB Programme 
Despite the focus on implementation gaps/problems, several strengths of the 
government TB programme are discernible (Table 4.12). These include creation of 
institutional frameworks for research, adoption of a multidisciplinary approach, 
radical evidence based policy changes, conceptual links to national development in 
the early phase, newsletterslbulletins, team approach, training manuals, orientation of 
state policy managers and medical college teachers, interaction with NGO's etc. As 
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evident in the literature, the period was characterised by zeal and commitment of 
several individuals that has provided motivation/inspiration to others. The 
development of a country-wide infrastructure, self-reliance in trained staff and 
pharmaceutical production have long-term benefits. 
Table 4.13 
Gains 
1. Development of 
knowledge base. 
2. Development of 
institutional 
mechanisms. 
3. Development & 
staffing of health 
care infrastructure. 
4. Patient coverage. 
5. Pharmaceutical 
Implementation Gains of the NTP 
Effect 
Altered TB control policy content in India and globally. 
Shifted away from: hospitalisation, reliance on X-rays for diagnosis, reliance 
on BCG as preventive against adult pUlmonary TB and for epidemiological 
gains, vertical approaches, active case fmding. Developed scientifically 
sound, cost effective methods in conjunction with other global research. Of 
value to individuals and the state. Older approaches more expensive for 
patients and public providers and profitable to private providers. 
State institutions for research and graduate /post-graduate education. 
TB Units at national and state directorates of health services. 
17 State TB & Demonstration Centres. 391 District TB Centres/496 districts 
Creation of countrywide network of Primary Health Centres, CHC's, Ta/uk 
& District Hospitals, Specialist and Teaching Hospitals. 
Creation of a large & adequate number of teaching & training institutions. 
Estimated that 50% ofTB patients are detected/treated by the public sector. 
Others benefit by related policies. 
1.5 million TB patients diagnosed annually- in contrast to 5% receiving 
treatment from all sectors in 1947. This has been in the context of limited 
resources within which NTP functions. 
Public policy has stimulated and supported the growth of the private sector 
which treats a substantial proportion of patients. 
Self reliance in production of TB drugs. Maintenance of drug prices at a 
Policy. reasonable level. 
Sources: NTI 1993-94, NTI 1994d 
Considering the financial constraints and political pressures under which it 
functioned, these gains of government TB policy, though tempered and diluted by 
struggles, are substantial and form the foundation of future policy development and 
implementation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COMMITMENT TO THE NTP: FINANCIAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL 
5.1 Financial Commitments: 
Insufficient financial resources for the NTP has been identified as an important 
explanatory factor for the NTP not performing to expectations (Gupta 1986, ICORCI 
1988, GOIlWHO/SIDA 1992, Singh et al 1994). Chronic underfinancing of a 
programme concerning a preventable and treatable disease with high mortality and 
morbidity, under-utilisation of financial and other resources at Central and State 
levels, and dynamics of current policy initiatives, raise issues concerning political 
economy. 
5.1.1 Central Government Health Expenditures 
Health received small and declining shares of public expenditure through Central 
Government Plan allocations over the decades (Table 5.1), indicating low political 
priority in terms of state investment. 
Table 5.1 Central Government Expenditure for Health & Family Welfare! 
Five Year Plans Health Actuals in Rs. & as Family Welfare 
% of Total Plan Outlay 
FirstPlan 1951-56 652mill. 3.3% 1 mill. 
Second Plan 1956-61 1408mill. 3.0% 50mill. 0.1% 
Third Plan 1961-66 2259mill. 2.6% 249mill. 0.3% 
Fourth Plan 1969-74 3355mill. 2.1% 2780mill. 1.8% 
FifthPIan 1974-79 7608mill. 1.9% 4918miII. 1.2% 
Sixth Plan 1980-85 20252mill. 1.8% 13870mi11. 1.3% 
Seventh Plan 1985-90 36886mil1. 1.7% 31208milI. 1.4% 
Eighth Plan 1992-97 75822mill. 1.7% 65000milI. 1.5% 
Source: CBHI 1993 
I Sixty Rupees = £ 1 (1998) 
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Low allocations by the political leadership, the Planning Commission and Finance 
Ministry, were despite recommendations by other governmental bodies. The Bhore 
Committee recommended 15% of government budgets to health (GOI 1946), the 
Central Council of Health in the 1950's suggested 10% (CBHI 1985), while the 
Mudaliar Committee observed that allocations during the first two Plans were too 
meagre (GOI 1961). During the 1980's the NTP budget comprising an average l.7% 
of the central health and family welfare budget (CBHI 1994), with a per capita 
expenditure of Rs.0.15 (Krishnamurthy 1993), was very inadequate. In India indirect 
taxes (e.g. sales tax on common commodities) from the majority population, form the 
major source of revenue for public services including health, rather than direct income 
tax from richer segments of society (Patel 1995). Meagre funding for a major public 
health problem suggests little accountability to tax payers. 
The development of strong competing interests, particularly family planning2 from the 
mid-1960's, is evident from expenditure patterns in Table 5.1. Among centrally 
sponsored programmes (excluding family welfare) in 1992-93, TB received 110/0 of 
the central health budget, compared to 35% for malaria and 220/0 for AIDS (Verma et 
al 1994). Financial support for primary health care infrastructure and staff salaries 
come from vertical programmes (ICORCI 1988). The family welfare budget covers 
development of subcentres, training and salaries of female multipurpose workers and 
training and honoraria of community health workers. Training and salaries of male 
multipurpose workers and of microscopists/laboratory technicians is from the malaria 
budget. These workers potentially play an important role in the NTP. Health workers 
focus primarily on programmes paying their salaries, at the expense of integrated 
programmes like the NTP (lCORCI 1988). Recommendations for a common salary 
pool (ibid) have not been accepted. 
Declining real expenditure in the 1970s and 1980s did not keep pace with popUlation 
growth (WE 1992). Infrastructural expansion in the mid-1980s3 resulted in reduced 
2 Renamed Family Welfare after widespread protest to state excesses in the Family Planning 
Programme during the 1970's. 
3 There was an increase in establishment of primary health centres and sub-centres, though not 
necessarily of functional efficacy. 
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spending on non-salary inputs, with public health and communicable disease 
programmes most affected (ibid). 
Plan allocations cover capital expenses and new schemes. Non-Plan funds particularly 
from State governments, covering salaries and maintenance, account for 
approximately 65-75% of annual health expenditure (Chopra* 1995, Chatterjee 1988). 
This is spent mainly on Taluk, district and other hospitals, where a large proportion of 
patient care, even for TB, takes place (Chapter 8), making State governments major 
funders and providers of TB care. 
5.1.2 Government Expenditures on the NTP 
It is difficult to correctly estimate public expenditure on TB/the NTP because of 
contributions made by central, state and local governments and varying patterns of 
assistance from Plan to Plan (Gupta 1986). The programme being horizontal at 
peripheral level, makes it difficult to work out the proportion of expenditure on health 
services for salaries and infrastructure utilised for the programme (ibid). Additionally 
there are inter- and intra-state variations in government health spending over time. 
States often reportedly do not contribute their agreed 50% share towards purchase of 
drugs, materials and equipment (interviews 1996), while central government funds for 
the NTP get diverted for other purposes (CAG Report 1988). Funding of health 
services for present/retired employees and their dependants of the organised public 
sector 4, providing more expensive TB care, with more investigations, Short Course 
Chemotherapy and hospitalisation in the defence services (T AI 1996), is not included 
in NTP budgets. Total annual public expenditure on the TB programme was estimated 
at Rs.950-1050 million (Rs1.50 per capita) in the mid-1980s (Gupta 1986, Table 5.2). 
4 Railways, Defence, Post and Telegraphs, Police, Labour Welfare, Employees State Insurance Scheme 
(ESI), Central Government Health Services, and large public sector undertakings. 
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Table 5.2 Estimated Total Government Expenditure on the NTP in the 1980s 
Items of Expenditure Annual Expenditure 
Cost of hospitalisation In 46,000 TB beds; domiciliary 
services through 600 TB clinics, including 365 DTC's Rs.600-650 million 
Central assistance for drugs & equipment; maintenance of 
NTI and TRC; State government funds- Plan & NonPlan; Rs.350-400 million 
other public sector services and schemes 
Source: Gupta 1986 
This is an under-estimate as manufacturing, distribution and supply costs of freeze 
dried BCG, diluent and PPD, and service provision through the Universal 
Immunisation Programme are not included in the table or in financial analyses. The 
Central government manages and pays for public sector drug companies producing 
about 300/0 of TB drugs required. Their investment, maintenance and manufacturing 
costs, along with distribution systems through Medical Stores Depots, contribute to 
TB control efforts but are not computed in analyses. Similarly budgets for 
institutions/special projects such as the NTI, the TB Research Centre, the TB 
Prevention Trial are not included. In 1994-95 the budget for the NTI was Rs.11 
million, for the BCG Vaccine Laboratory Rs.l9.5 million, for the LRS Institute ofTB 
and Allied Diseases Rs.47 millionS (GOI 1996). 
Central government allocations to the NTP in the 1980s and expenditures for some 
years are given in Table 5.3. 
5 This reveals an imbalance of resources between organisations, with the first two covering the entire 
country and receiving one-fourth the budget of a capital city institution. 
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Table 5.3 Central Government Allocation and Expenditure on the NTP 
Rs. in millions 
Year Allocation Expenditure 
TB Drugs Materials & Equipment Total 
1980-81 n.a. 7.4 11.5 18.9 
1981-82 n.a. lD.7 9.6 20.4 
1982-83 32 18.5 1.5 19.9 
1983-84 60 34.3 12.6 46.9 
1984-85 80 93.3 4.9 98.2 
1985-86 110 96.9 13.2 110.2 
1986-87 120 96.0 12.5 108.5 
1987-88 135 123.3 12.1 135.5 
1988-89 125 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1989-90 120 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1990-91 140 n.a. n.a. 117.5 
1991-92 152 n.a. n.a. 68.8 
1992-93 270 n.a. n.a. 259.5 
1993-94 350 n.a. n.a. 143.0 
1994-95 420 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Verma et al 1994, ICORCI 1988, DGHS 1995 (Greater spendmg IS by the States, as seen in 
the differences in expenditures in the 1980's when comparing this to Table 5.2.) 
In 1988-90 general budget cuts in health were reflected in the NTP budget which 
decreased from RS.135 to 120 million(Table 5.3). In 1991-92, a substantial reduction 
in expenditure occurred, followed by a sustained increase. In 1993-94, only 143 
million was spent from the enhanced NTP budget of Rs.350 million indicating poor 
performance, capacity or commitment (interview* 1996). 
In 1995 TB drug costs (SCC) for 1 million new sputum positive cases/year at 
Rs.l ,500/patient (estimates by Health Secretary) would cost Rs.1500 million annually. 
Increased budgets (assuming equal contribution by States) under the Revised NTP are 
inadequate for these needs, without even considering the 50-66% sputum negative 
patients or costs of diagnostics and infrastructure. 
The budget was inadequate to cover drug costs for the estimated 10 million patients in 
1981, with Rs.1.30 available per patient, or Rs.2.60 assuming equal State 
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contributions. Budgets below critical levels, with most expenditure on 
salaries/maintenance rather than on effective services, can be counterproductive (WB 
1992). Additionally in TB, drug resistance consequent to low funding and 
poor/irregular drug supplies is harmful and costly. 
For the budget, external assistance given in kind, is expressed in monetary terms. 
Increases in the 1980's partly reflect SIDA assistance (X-ray machines, vehicles, film 
rolls, drugs for Short Course Chemotherapy) (MOR/GOI Annual Reports 1980-1990). 
5.1.3 Cost Sharing of the NTP Between Central and State Governments 
The pattern of funding has been changing. Central government provided 100% 
assistance from 1947-1974 for the BCG vaccine plant; the BCG campaign; 
establishment of TB clinics; State TB Demonstration and Treatment Centres; new TB 
beds; the National TB Institute; the TB Research Centre in part; after the NTP the 
establishment of District TB Centres, training of DTC teams, TB drugs for 
domiciliary chemotherapy (MOR Annual Reports, Verma 1994). It helped create an 
infrastructural and institutional base, but also used funding for policy leverage. Its 
contributions came partly from international agencies (UNICEF, WRO and later 
SIDA) which provided supplies often from international markets (MOR Annual 
Reports, interviews). Its control of linkages with international agencies gave it power 
(Banerji 1990). State Governments met maintenance and salary costs, a substantial 
proportion. 
From 1975 (5th Plan) a further shift of financial responsibility to the States occurred, 
with costs for establishing DTC's and TB beds borne by State governments, while 
continuing 100% assistance for drugs. This coincided with the period that UNICEF 
discontinued funding the NTP. From 1980 (6th Plan) moving from a Centrally 
Assisted Programme to a Centrally Sponsored Scheme, the centre provided X-ray 
machines from SIDA6 and only 50% of drug costs (Verma et al 1994). As the shift 
occurred, State governments did not match central government contributions over 
6 SIDA shifted its funding from the discredited Family Planning programme in 1979, following debate 
in the Swedish media and parliament, to the TB programme as it met the needs of the poor 
( interviews). 
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long periods, showing low commitment to the NTP and the people affected (Table 
5.4). 
Table 5.4 State Utilisation of Central Assistance to the NTP (Rupees in millions) 
State Year Central Assistance Expenditure by States 
(in kind) (in cash) 
Andhra Pradesh 1980-81 0.62 0.1 
1981-82 0.75 0.27 
1982-83 0.8 0.34 
1983-84 1.0 0.89 
1984-85 5.0 4.1 
Kerala 1980-81 0.47 Nil 
1981-82 0.52 Nil 
1982-83 0.84 Nil 
1983-84 1.65 0.01 
1984-85 3.1 0.7 
1985-86 3.0 0.87 
1986-87 3.1 0.94 
Source: CAG 1988 
The Comptroller and Auditor General found States X-ray machines unutilised due to 
staff shortages or waiting for minor repairs and large numbers of patients lost to 
follow-up resulting in a wastage of resources (CAG 1988;42). 
States with a better development index such as Maharashtra and Gujarat get larger 
allocations (based on NTP performance, not on population norms) while Rajasthan, 
Madhya Pradesh and Bihar, in greater need, receive and utilise less (Table 5.5). While 
better developed and administered states like Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Punjab 
underutilise NTP funds, others (Maharashtra, Kamataka) over-spend. Large variations 
from year to year lead to chaos in the field. Disparities occur with the capital city 
Delhi (population 10 million) receiving a disproportionate share of the budget as 
compared to Bihar (population 90 million). Delhi also has public sector hospitals 
under the Central Government Health Scheme, for defence personnel etc. whose 
budgets are not included here. Since 1993 pilot projects of the Revised NTP are also 
sited in Delhi. Plan allocations also 'get quietly diverted to non-Plan areas and to large 
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urban hospitals' (interview 1996) accounting for differences between NTP allocations 
and expenditures. 
Table 5.5 Central Government Allocations and Expenditures on the NTP 
at State Level in the 1990's (Rupees in millions) 
Year Karnataka Gujarat Maharashtra Rajasthan Bihar Delhi India* 
1990-91 
Allocation 4.0 9.5 16.0 5.0 10.0 6.1 128.0 
Expenditure 6.4 6.8 18.7 4.2 6.4 6.0 117.4 
1991-92 
Allocation 4.5 10.8 15.5 5.3 9.7 7.3 133.7 
Expenditure 2.8 4.4 9.6 3.6 1.8 2.3 68.8 
1992-93 
Allocation 8.9 22.8 30.8 11.8 14.3 6.6 270.0 
Expenditure 17.0 15.8 38.6 8.5 6.8 9.2 259.5 
1993-94 
Allocation 11.7 27.6 36.6 16.6 20.6 8.6 351.3 
Prov.Exp. 10.2 11.1 16.1 3.6 1.0 11.0 143.2 
1994-95 
Allocation 15.4 28.2 41.3 18.7 20.7 29.0 404.0 
Source: DGHS 1995, * small dIscrepancIes are seen m allocatIOns m Table 5.3 due to different 
sources. 
Deficient knowledge, information and interest in the budget was observed among 
senior NTP programme managers at State level (ICORCI 1988), indicating low 
involvement and power in the process. 
Operating costs and salaries/wages are calculated at 20% each of expenditure on the 
RNTP, with 60% on drugs (Jhunjhunwala 1994). In the NTP currently States cover 
salaries and wages and operating costs of DTC's, TB beds, TB clinics and PHI's 
through which the NTP works. They also cover 50% of the cost of drugs (for 
domiciliary treatment), film rolls and chemicals. Thus extrapolating the RNTP break-
up to the NTP, the States bear approximately 70-75% of the costs of TB care in the 
public sector. This is probably an underestimate as cost of treatment in sanatoria, and 
secondary care hospitals (which a substantial proportion of patients in this study used, 
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Chapter 7) is borne by the States. Though some states do not contribute their 50% 
share, towards matching grants for the NTP their overall contribution is still higher 
than the Centre. However their policy role, particularly in policy making for national 
health programmes is weak, despite health being a State subject. The Central Plan 
budget forms less than 6% of public expenditure on health overall but exerts a 
disproportionate leverage over the States (WB 1992). 
5.1.4 Political Economy Factors 
It is useful to estimate total costs (private and public) for TB care. Studies of health 
care utilisation suggest that the public sector accounts for approximately 20% of 
service provision and the private/voluntary sector for 80%7. Assuming a similar scale 
of expenditure for TB as the public sector, private sector expenditure would be about 
RsA,OOO million annually making an estimated total expenditure of Rs.5000 million 
annually, an underestimate since private expenditure is usually higher. Estimates are 
10 years old and diagnostic/drug costs have increased. With population increase (160 
million in a decade) and increased life expectancy, the absolute number ofTB patients 
have increased during the decade. Thus total national spending on TB is considerable. 
Gains accrue to the diagnostics and drug industries (see 5.2) and to medical 
professionals, whose macro interests differ from those of patients and of public health. 
Irrational prescribing practices in TB by private practitioners (Uplekar and Shepard 
1991), overdiagnosis of X-ray positive suspects in the public sector (ICORCI 1988) 
and overmedication (Uplekar*1994), benefits industry and providers. The doctor-drug 
producer axis as an exploitative force has been recognised by the Indian Council of 
Social Science Research and the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICSSR&ICMR 
1981). For BCG, though the government Vaccine Laboratory has production 
technology and capacity, because of budgetary constraints a high dependency on 
imports has developed. In 1992-93, of a total of 47 million doses 30 million were 
ilnported at considerable cost in foreign exchange (Gal 1996). 
7 The 42nd round of the National Sample Survey in 1986-87 found 75% of all health care in the private 
sector and 25% in the public sector (WB 1992). A district study found utilisation of government 
facilities in 13% of illness episodes (Duggal and Amin 1989). Hence an approximation of 20% IS used. 
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Financial resources are not real resources but can purchase resources such as trained 
staff, buildings, equipment and supplies. Increased budgets/drug supplies have not 
ensured better NTP performance at Primary Health Centres and with weak 
organisational structure and poor leadership at every level may increase leakages and 
drug resistance (Jhunjhunwala 1994, VHAI 1994). 
Economic costs from TB have been estimated at Rs.20,000 million a year through 
person hours of work lost (Ram Kumar 1993). Indirect costs of treatment to affected 
families are high, including transport, food, costs of accompanying person, loss of 
economic productivity of the patient and at least one other member of the family, and 
are larger than direct costs of diagnosis and treatment8. Levels of indebtedness and 
pauperisation resulting from TB are distressingly high (Chapter 8). Economic loss to 
patients, families and the nation is significant (Singh et al 1994) while suffering is a 
price paid that is immeasurable. 
Government resource constraints were accepted unquestioningly by NTP programme 
managers, unable or uninterested in increasing allocations to it from different sources. 
Resource inadequacies over 40 years make it almost a placebo policy, raising 
questions regarding the commitment of central and State governments. The nature of 
the problem requires long term sustained resource commitments. 
In summary, 
• Government financial resources for the NTP though underestimated are 
inadequate. TB policy leadership is unable to mobilise sufficient funds for the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
programme; 
Funding is used for policy leverage between various levels; 
State government's spend more than the centre on TB; 
Underutilisation of financial resources, particularly by some states, suggest low 
commitment tothe programme; 
Competing programmes funded vertically receive disproportionate funding; 
There is low accountability to the major source of funding which is from the 
general public through indirect taxation; 
8 Costs to patientslhouseholds of Rs.4-5,OOO are reported from Malshiras village, Pune by an FRCH 
team (interview citing FRCH 1988). 
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• Total public and private expenditure on TB nationally is substantial, benefiting 
phannaceuticals, diagnostics and the medical profession, while the price is paid by 
patients. 
• Inter-State disparities occur favouring better developed States. 
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5.2 DOMINO EFFECT OF DRUG POLICIES AND THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ON TB CONTROL 
The phannaceutical industry is an important actor in TB control linked in complex 
relationships with government. The latter provides a conducive environment for the 
industry'S economic growth, in which both have a shared interest. Government 
simultaneously controls and regulates industry, attempting to make its products 
respond to national epidemiological and social need. The industry's economic profit 
making drive, while providing the engine for growth, is in conflict with these societal 
needs. The Indian government, mandated to uphold public interest, is a player in a 
more involved sense, having become a drug manufacturer itself. It is not neutral, nor 
unified in purpose or consistent over time. Ongoing negotiation and compromises, 
driven by these underlying interests, impact on prices and availability of TB drugs, 
affecting TB control. 
Consumer and voluntary groups active in health! drug issues are other players in this 
game. TB patients in India are powerless, unorganised and dependant on the medical 
profession, which is wooed by the phannaceutical industry9. 
5.2.1 Pharmaceuticals and TB Control - A Double-Edged Relationship 
Internationally and nationally, TB control strategies in the past 35 years rely on drugs, 
with chemotherapy as their mainstay (WHO 1964, 1997). This became more so from 
the 1980's, when the epidemiological impact of BCG in tenns of reduced 
transmission of TB was accepted as being small (WHO 1982). The development of 
effective TB chemotherapy started in 1944 with the discovery of streptomycin 10. 
Tec1mological and chemotherapeutic developments led to increased economic growth 
and political clout of the chemical and phannaceutical industries. It is an international 
industry dependant on scientific research which it sponsors or conducts. A relatively 
small number of Trans-national Companies (TNC's) dominate the global market for 
specific drugs. The fonnation of cartels gives them control over drug prices (interview 
9 These elements, though important, are not considered here. 
IOPollowed by: thiacetazone (1946), isoniazid (1952), pyrazinamide (1952), para-amino-salicylic acid, 
ethambutol (1961) and rifampicin (1967) (CDR! 1993). . 
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1996). Governments had to legislate to restrain monopoly and to install pricing and 
production controls in the interests of consumers and citizens. 
Eighty percent of the pharmaceutical market is in developed market economies (\\110 
1988) whose needs and demands determine production patterns. TNC's are a 
dominant force with 70% of the market share (ibid). New TB drugs have not 
developed since 25 years, following a decline of the TB epidemic in these economies 
by the 1960's (WHO 1997). Research was initiated subsequent to resurgence ofTB in 
the USA and Europe and development of Multi-Drug Resistant TB. Global estimates 
are that $300 million are spent annually on TB drugs. With markets likely to double, 
the pharmaceutical industry is showing renewed research activity (ibid). 
Existing TB drugs have passed the patent period and market prices are relatively low. 
This makes TB one of the most cost effective infectious diseases to treat (WHO 
1995). However inadequate production and distribution, low purchasing capacities of 
patients and programmes and high indirect costs make the issue less straightforward. 
In India, in the 1940s and early 1950s imported drugs were expensive and in short 
supply, foreign exchange limited and there was no indigenous TB drug production. 
Those in need could not benefit from lifesaving drugs for TB and other diseases. The 
state therefore intervened. 
5.2.2 Development of the Pharmaceutical Sector in India: A Brief History 
Foundations for indigenous pharmaceutical manufacturing capability were laid by 
nationalist entrepreneurs in 1901, with the Bengal Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Limited (ICSSRlICMR 1981). Growth of the industry took place during the two 
world wars when imports were restricted (Narayana 1984). However at Independence 
(1947) the pharmaceutical sector with sales of Rs.1 00 million was almost entirely 
dominated by foreign owned companies (ibid). Drug prices were among the highest in 
the world (Sengupta 1996, citing Kefauver Senate Committee) 1 I. The Indian 
II The Kefauver Committee in the USA was the Senate Committee on Pharmaceutical Companies on 
'Administered Prices in the Drug Industry-1959-1962'. 
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Parliament expressed concern that life savIng drugs were not affordable to the 
common person (Ekbal 1988). 
Development of Public Sector Policies and Institutions: The new government's 
industrial policy from 1947 encouraged growth of the Indian public and private sector 
as part of a planned, mixed economy approach to development. Foreign companies 
were encouraged. The 1948 Industry Policy Statement noted that participation of 
foreign capital, technology and knowledge was necessary for rapid industrialisation 
(Narayana 1984) acknowledging a dependency. Government, often responding to 
parliamentary debate or external events (as in health and TB), developed institutional 
and legal frameworks, within which the pharmaceutical industry grew. Table 5.6 
indicates key state policy interventions. 
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Table 5.6 Government Interventions and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Year In terven tions/ Develop men ts Comment 
1951 Pharmaceuticals included in 'core sector' of industry by Stated priority to respond 
parliament, under purview of Director General of Technical to vast unmet health need. 
Development, through a Development Council with industry, Pragmatic policy support 
trade and official representation. Pharmaceutical Enquiry to public, private & 
Committee Report, 1954, outlined framework for growth of foreign sector. 
pharmaceuticals. 
1954 First public sector drug manufacturing company, Hindustan HAL produced 
Antibiotics Ltd (HAL), set up by central govt. with WHO and Streptomycin from 1958. 
UNICEF assistance. 
1961 Second public sector company, Indian Drugs and Other TB drugs were 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd (IDPL), set up by central govt. with Soviet among the earliest to be 
technology. It gradually developed 6 units in different cities. produced here by the 
They undertook technology intensive, low profit bulk drug public sector. 
production. 
1962 Drug Price Control measures introduced during emergency at Policy shift towards govt. 
time of Chinese aggression under Essential Commodities Act. regulation of industry. 
1960's Govt. supported Indian private sector development in two Indigenous TB drug 
streams- small scale sector (SSS) and organised sector through production increased with 
financial incentives, gradual transfer of technology and provision increased availability and 
of bulk drugs from public sector for formulation. reduced prices. 
State Trading Corporation (STC) established to pool imported 
and domestically produced raw materials and distribute them to Antibiotic prices fell by 
drug manufacturers in the public and private sectors. 60-70% with growth of 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Policies Act placed a ceiling public sector and related 
on foreign share holdings of foreign owned companies. policy measures. 
1970 Drug Price Control Order introduced on Tariff Commission 
Recommendations. 
1971 Indian Patent Act (Process Patents for 7 years) passed by Production of isoniazid, 
Parliament. CSIR labs (council for scientific & industrial PAS, thiacetazone (easy 
research) through indigenous R&D developed new processes for to manufacture) shifted to 
drug production for public and Indian private sectors. SSS & private sector. 
1974-75 Parliament concern about ownership and role of drug industry. TNC's produced and 
Hathi Committee Report advised priority be given to the public marketed more Category 
sector and to essential drugs. 3&4 drugs -relatively non 
1974 Drug Price Control Order covered 450 drugs. essential, higher profits. 
128 
1978 New Drug Policy-graded price and production controls, 
leadership to public sector, restriction of foreign owned 
companies, reserved markets for public and private sectors. 
1979 Drug Price Control Order- categorised drugs on basis of 
essentiality with restricted profit mark-up for these. 
Price control coverage reduced to 347 drugs. 
6 Joint Sector companies set up between HAL & IDPL and state 
govt's. In 1972, 1978 and 1981,3 other sick private sector 
companies taken over by central govt. 
1980 UNIDO classified Indian pharmaceutical industry in Category V 
i.e. capable of self sufficiency. 
1984 Formation ofNDPDC* to evolve drug policy-with drug industry 
representation, no consumer or health action groups involved. 
1986 Drug Policy focused on growth of the industry with production 
and price decontrol, delicensing, import liberalisation i.e. greater 
shift to market mechanisms. 
1987 Drug Price Control Order reduced coverage to 166 drugs. 
1991 New Economic Policy and New Industrial Policy promoting 
liberalisation, TNC's with foreign equity of 51 % treated on par 
with wholly Indian companies. 
1994 New Drug Policy- greater liberalisation, increased returns 
allowed on bulk drug manufacture. 
1995 Drug Price Control Order reduced coverage to 73 drugs 
*NDPDC- National Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Development Commlttee 
Source: GOI 1975a, Ekba11988, Narayana 1984, Sengupta 1996, Shiva 1996 
e.g. 45% mark-up allowed 
for TB drugs, 100% for 
non-essential drugs 
Industry claims this had a 
counter-productive effect 
with decreased production 
of essential drugs. 
Role of public sector and 
Indian private sector 
expanded 
Organised Indian private 
sector & TNC's lobbied 
against price & 
production controls. 
Drug prices increase. 
Shortages of essential 
drugs including TB drugs 
continue. 
Industry continues 
growth. 
Drug prices treble since 
1980. 
The table shows that the phannaceutical industry was on the political and policy 
agenda throughout this period, with a continuous conflict between economic and 
social needs sought to be mediated by political means. The public sector with varying 
political support became an important new player in an arena previously the 
monopoly of the private sector. International organisations like the UNICEF and 
WHO supported the establishment of the first public sector company and efforts 
towards self reliance in drug production. Several developing country governments 
similarly moved towards greater state intervention in a sector dominated by 
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multinationals. They developed national fonnularies (Chile and Sri Lanka in the 
1950's), drug regulation (Sri Lanka) and introduced generics (Pakistan in 1972) 
(Chowdhury 1996). The Indian Patents Act in 1970 provided for Process Patents 
rather than Product Patents. Indigenous R&D helped develop local modifications of 
processes (interviews 1996). This encouraged competition rather than monopoly and 
reduced prices, gaining recognition and support from UNIDO (Keayla*1996). The 
Hathi Committee Report (GOI 1975a), an extensive study of the phannaceutical 
situation in India, introduced the essential drugs concept and discussed the ownership 
and regulation of the phannaceutical industry. The WHO in support published the first 
model list of Essential Drugs in 1977, initiated the WHO Action Programme on 
Essential Drugs in 1981 and developed 'Guidelines for Developing National Drug 
Policies' in 1988 (WHO 1988). 
Not surprisingly, problems were encountered and the process was complex. Public 
Sector Phannaceutical companies produced bulk drugs, reducing imports, thereby 
conserving foreign exchange. They became the 'mother company' providing bulk 
drugs for fonnulation and enhancing diffusion of technology and growth of the private 
(small scale and organised) Indian sector. TNC's too bought bulk drugs from the 
public sector reaping larger profits from fonnulation. Bulk drug production is 
technology intensive and has fewer profits. Isoniazid initially produced by the public 
sector was almost entirely taken over by the small scale sector by the 1980's. 
Streptomycin, with a more complex fennentation production process, is still largely 
manufactured by the public sector company, Hindustan Antibiotics Limited (interview 
1996). Most basic raw materials (32/35) for production of isoniazid, PAS, 
streptomycin and thiacetazone were produced indigenously by public and private 
sector chemical and petrochemical units (GOI 1987). Thus while the public sector 
challenged the foreign and private sector, it also supported their growth and profits. 
Profit margins of 45% were allowed for essential drugs including TB drugs, while a 
maximum of 100% profit was allowed for non-essential drugs. Prices in India now 
became among the lowest in the world. However, according to industry, price controls 
were disincentives to produce essential drugs in adequate amounts. Private companies, 
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particularly TNC's, opted for nonessential drug production with higher profit margins. 
Mandatory requirements to produce basic drugs were not enforced. 
5.2.3 Policy Processes and Pharmaceuticals 
Analysts argue that most recommendations of the Hathi Committee were not 
implemented under pressure of multinationals and the organised Indian sector 
represented by the Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI) (Shiva 
1996, Sen Gupta 1996). The Indian Drug Manufacturers Association (lDMA) 
represents the Small Scale Sector. They compete, but form alliances to promote 
-common interests such as opposing the price control policy. They are a powerful, 
well-resourced and organised lobby, with rapid means of communication and ability 
to mobilise the opinion of medical professionals in their favour. Most big companies 
have 'liaison offices and officers' based in Delhi comprising influential people with 
access to the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals (Ministry of Industry), the 
Ministry of Health and political decision makers. Government orders banning certain 
drugs are delayed or circumvented by obtaining stay orders from Court, employing 
the best lawyers. The lobbies influenced a revision of the drug policy in 1984 to their 
advantage at a time when political forces favoured privatisation. This was at the cost 
of weakening the public sector, reducing constraints on the product range and profits 
of the private sector and allowing growth of monopolies by TNC's. 
Despite adequate indigenous technology and manufacturing capacity, shortfalls 
between production and requirements of TB drugs (see Table 5.7) were reported by 
prestigious government bodies (lCSSRlICMR 1981). They documented that with half 
the world's TB patients, India only produced a third of its requirements of TB drugs. 
It is suggested that shortages of inexpensive first line drugs were created, through 
under-production, allowing costlier, imported drugs to enter the market (Majumdar 
1984). 
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Table 5.7 TB Drug Requirements and Production (in metric tons) 
1979-80 1980-81 
Drug Requirement Production/Imports Requirement Production/Imports 
Streptomycin 300 220-localllarge co.'s 330 227-localllarge co.'s 
72.8-imports 44-imports 
Isoniazid 200 112.5-localllarge co. 's 240 129-localllarge co. 's 
41.8 -SSS 150.5-SSS 
26.2-imports 6.8-imports 
Ethambutol 60 23.6-localllarge co. 's 78 24.9-localllarge co. 's 
0.7-SSS 10.1-SSS 
96. I-imports 29. I-imports 
Rifampicin 5.4 5.4-imports( no local 7.3 8.9-imports 
. 
.. . . . . SOUlce. VHAI 1984 (cItmg MInIStry of ChemIcals and FertIlIsers) 
This was the period following the second oil shock of 1979, when average annual 
growth rates in drug imports in developing countries, which were 20.80/0 between 
1970 and 1980, fell to -1.3% between 1980 and 1984 (WHO 1988). It probably 
stimulated development of the small scale sector. 
TB drug shortages, noted by the voluntary sector from 1978 (VHAI 1984) inspired the 
fonnation of the All India Drug Action Network (AIDAN) in 1982 (Shiva* 1996). 
Several state specific and local drug action groups (e.g. Drug Action Forum 
Kamataka, West Bengal Drug Action Forum, groups in Maharashtra, Gujarat, 
Tamilnadu) raised issues concerning drug policy and rational therapeutics for public 
debate through the media, publications, study groups, training programmes for 
professionals, and working with parliamentarians. Campaigns concerning specific 
drugs were conducted, TB drug issues studied and discussed at national meetings on 
'TB and Society' (MFC 1984), and at various levels by the Voluntary Health 
Association of India. 
One example is the banning of strepto-pencillin, a combination used as a broad 
spectrum antibiotic for general infections and likely to cause drug resistance with 
short tenn use, if patient have TB. The need for a ban was raised by the AIDAN since 
the early 1980's. Four groups (Drug Action Forum, Karnataka, AIDAN, National 
Campaign Committee for Drug Policy and LOCOST) subsequently filed a Public 
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Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court in 1993 to ban a range of harmful and 
bannable drugs, including strepto-penicillin. The case continues in Court. Delays and 
problems occurred in the setting up and functioning of a special technical advisory 
committee. Arguments and persuasion by drug companies regarding need to clear 
existing stocks prevailed over dangers faced by individuals and the community , so 
that striped-penicillin will finally be banned only from January 1998. These examples 
indicate the interests and power of the pharmaceutical lobby, and the mechanisms by 
which they work. 
Production technology for newer drugs, ethambutol and pyrazinamide, were acquired 
and out of 10 basic raw materials required, 8 were produced indigenously in 1987 by 
the chemical industry. Efforts were made for several years by the public sector to 
produce rifampicin, requiring more complex fermentation processes. Technology 
acquired and experimented with by the IDPL proved inefficient and was abandoned. 
Rifampicin was produced by the private sector in the 1980's from imported 
intermediate stages. Recently in the past 3-4 years a private Indian company has 
started manufacturing from the basic stage. An Indian private company (Lupin) is a 
major global producer and exporter of ethambutol. 
There are 60,000 formulations on the market, many of which are irrational, useless or 
harmful. Thus the industry has grown and the market flooded with drugs, but essential 
TB drugs are in short supply in the public health system and not within the purchasing 
power of impoverished patients. Manufacture of TB bulk drugs (isoniazid, 
thiacetazone, PAS, ethambutol, pyrazinamide and rifampicin) have been delicensed 
making it easier to start new units or expand capacity. In the past and present, licensed 
capacity is underutilised due to low mark-ups. Isoniazid, the sheet anchor in TB 
chemotherapy, is very inexpensive and simple to produce. However these features 
make it unattractive for production as profit margins are low. Newer TB drugs 
including rifampicin are placed in Category 2 allowing a higher 150% mark-up. This 
acts as an incentive for production, but removes the products fronl the purchasing 
power of the poor. As has been pointed out, market mechanisms are inadequate in the 
pharmaceutical sector (World Bank 1996a). They are also incompatible with India's 
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stated social goal of 'Health for All, Particularly the Impoverished' in the Eighth Plan 
(GOI1992). 
The involvement of TNC's in TB drug production is minimal. The few involved 
(Ciba-Geigy and Glaxo) lobby strongly to capture the substantial NTP/RNTP orders. 
A leading Indian company has discontinued dealing with the GOI recently alluding to 
an unacceptable level of underhand dealings (interview). 
Drug policy analysts envisage that GATT (General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs) 
and TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) will have a major impact on 
the pharmaceutical sector with greater monopoly by TNC's, rise in drug prices, drug 
production patterns responding to the needs and purchasing capacity of the middle and 
upper classes, closure or merger of Indian companies and gradual loss of 
technological capacity (Keayla 1996; Shiva*, Sengupta* 1996). 
Since liberalisation substantial price rises of several drugs have been documented 
(Shiva 1994, Sengupta 1996). However, price rises of TB drugs noted after the 1986 
Drug Policy (Tribune 1994) and the 1994 drug policy (Rane 1995, Sengupta 1996a) 
are relatively small, as they are still protected by price controls. TB drug production in 
India responds to market demand. For a disease of poverty like TB, where poorer 
patients are unable to afford drugs for the entire course of treatment, the market is a 
partial and incorrect indicator of actual drug needs based on the burden of disease, 
estimated using epidemiological data. The NTP has been critiqued for not ensuring an 
adequate supply of TB drugs (Shiva 1994). Mechanisms of dialogue and negotiation 
between the NTP, the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals and the industry 
are lacking (interview). 
Pharmaceutical companies and drug purchase/supply systems for the NTP: The 
NTP provides its contribution to States in kind, as drugs and equipment, through the 
Directorate General of Supplies and Distribution (DGS&D) which functions under the 
Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS). Drugs are procured centrally through 
a rate contract system wherein public sector companies receive a slight preference, but 
lowest tenders get the orders. Some companies lower costs by reducing concentrations 
of active ingredients. Mandatory quality assurance tests can be falsified (several 
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· . * 12 . IntervIews 1996 . Respondents suggest that Infonnal contacts and commissions paid 
at different levels playa role at the stage when the contract is made. Ultimately drug 
purchase orders are passed by the Health Minister, who may also benefit (interview 
1996). It is reported that manufacturers are unreliable, sometimes delaying delivery of 
consignments, affecting supplies to districts. Similar processes occur during drug 
purchases by States for their 50% share. The consequences are irregular drug supplies 
to DTC's and PHI's (frequently reported by NGO's and the media). 
Production and growth of the combined Indian phannaceutical sector is considerable 
(Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8 Indian Pharmaceutical Production Trends (Rs. in millions) 
Year Estimated value of Estimated value of Total 
formulations bulk drugs 
1947 100 NA 100 
1952 350 NA 350 
1962 1,000 150 1,150 
1972 3,500 600 4,100 
1982 14,300 2,890 17,190 
1993-94 69,000 13,200 82,200 
1996 n.a. n.a. 90,000 
Source: Narayana 1984, Sengupta 1996 
Structural changes occurred in the industry as a result of policy instruments used by 
government. The industry was dominated by foreign owned companies in 1947. In 
1979-80, 33% of aggregate investment was in the public sector, 24% in the Indian 
private sector and 43% in the foreign sector (Narayana 1984). An analysis in 1994 of 
the top 200 brands found that the share of TNC's was 17.8% i.e. predominant 
production is in the Indian sector (Sengupta 1996 citing Retail Survey by the 
Operations Research Group). Before introduction of the Patent Act (1971) TNC's 
provided 80% of drugs, whereas in 1992, 75% were from the Indian sector (BanneIjee 
1996). Rapid economic growth in the industry took place after liberalisation of the 
12 Concrete evidence was difficult to gather, though one case was reported where rifampicin sent for 
testing contained less than the required amount of active ingredient. 
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policy (1986&1994). However TB drug shortages continue In the T\TP 
(GOIlWHO/SIDA 1992, VHAI 1994). 
In India, the RS.2050 million TB drug market in 1996 comprised a small part, 
approximately 3.2%, of the pharmaceutical market (Srivastava 1996). The TB drug 
market has about 30 main players (top eleven in Table 5.9). They have reportedly 
benefited from the RNTP as WHO's recommendation of combi-packs 'created a new 
marketing opportunity leading to a 18.9 crore (Rs.189 million) market' (ibid; 17). 
Public sector companies are not mentioned in this market analysis. While Lupin an 
Indian company has the largest single share, several TNC's have recently entered and 
are trying to increase their market share. 
Table 5.9 Major Players in the Indian TB Drug Market 
Company Rs. in millions % of total market TB products at stake 
within company (%) 
Lupin 873 42.6 59 
Ciba 239 11.7 23 
Cadilla Pharma 106 5.2 11.4 
PCI 95 4.6 45.6 
Plethico 75 3.7 27 
Themis Group 88 4.3 64 
Glaxo 92 4.5 2.7 
Concept 71 3.5 45.2 
Tata Pharma 76 3.7 33.1 
Unichem 68 3.3 9.6 
Macleod 65 3.2 96 
Source: Snvastava 1996 
The quantum of drug production, from the viewpoints of industry and Ministries of 
Industry and Chemicals & Fertilizers, depend on market off-takes, demand and time 
trends and not on the public health dimensions of the problem (interview 1996). The 
latter is mediated through the Ministry of Health, a much weaker and often 
uninvolved player. 
Assuming expenditures of about Rs.150 million by Central government on drugs 
(little over 1993-94 figures), an equal amount by States (the actual spending is always 
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less), and an equal amount in the organised public sector, the total spending of about 
Rs.450 million by the public sector is a small proportion of the market. Drug 
purchasing occurs more in the private sector, even if half the patients treated are in the 
public sector. This supports findings in Chapter 8 that physicians in the public sector 
give private prescriptions to their patients. Whether this is justified or ethical from the 
patients/citizens point of view, and whether small compromises lead to exploiting 
patients at a time when they are vulnerable and dependant, raise broader questions. 
The pharmaceutical sector in India reveals strong conflicts of interest with major 
stakeholders being Central Government (with fluctuating and contradictory interests), 
the TNC's (who dominate), and the Indian private sector (subdivided into organised 
and small scale sector). The carefully documented experience of Bangladesh shows 
that TNC's use the mediation of international organisations like the WHO, of 
multilateral donors like the World Bank, and their own home country governments to 
support their trade interests (Chowdhury 1996). In India TNC's are represented in 
important Government policy making bodies such as the Drug Technical Advisory 
Board (Shiva 1996). They often delay implementation of regulations by obtaining stay 
orders in Court, through employing senior medical consultants as witnesses, and 
selective use of information (interviews 1996). The NTP by not actively advocating 
their case, provide tacit support to pro-private sector policies. 
The private sector pharmaceutical industry has a close symbiotic relationship with the 
medical profession. Companies sponsor national and state TB conferences, providing 
hospitality, gifts, sightseeing trips, and even air-fares for influential participants 
(observations, interviews). 
Pharmaceuticals, insecticides and equipment consume a major part (70-800/0) of 
Central Government expenditure on national health programmes costing millions of 
rupees per year. Public sector production of TB drugs currently accounts for only 25-
300/0 of the market (interview* 1996). The conflict between government's economic 
policy and health policy is not being addressed adequately, though economic 
imperatives seem to predominate. 
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The pharmaceutical policy salience is in contrast to tuberculosis (with greater human 
social effects and equally strong but negative and less visible economic effect) which 
has at times been on the agenda symbolically, but not carried through in 
implementation. 
In conclusion, the impact of the pharmaceutical policy on TB control is insufficiently 
recognised by Indian TB policy makers and programme managers. Govenment policy 
built indigenous capacity for TB drug production, reducing monopoly by TNC's, 
lowering drug prices and increasing availability. This has been an important 
contribution to TB care in the public and private sectors, by the central government 
(through the ministries of industry and petrochemicals). Market demands are being 
met, though there is an under-production in relation to estimated epidemiological 
need. Although it is recognised that market mechanisms do not work well in the 
pharmaceutical sector, the pharmaceutical industry is a strong political force, and 
conflicting interests have to be reconciled. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
POLICY CHANGE IN THE NINETIES: THE REVISED NTP (RNTP) 
Introduction: 
Origins of the 1990's policy change processes, their complex and divergent underpinning 
forces, and varying perceptions and interests of different actors are discussed in this 
chapter l . Impetus for change in India had a strong international component. Hence TB 
control strategies of international organisations are discussed prior to the RNTP process 
at national/local level. Bottom-up patient and staff perspectives on implementation are 
highlighted briefly. 
6.1 Changing Global Dynamics and Perceptions of TB 
Although TB continued as a major public health problem for several decades in 
economically disadvantaged countries (WHO 1988, WHO-SEARO 1994), it became 
portrayed as a globally re-emerging crisis following its re-emergence in a few powerful 
countries from the late 1980's. Conceptualising and creating its 're-emergence' as a 
globaVnational health crisis, indicates the strength of perceived interests of major players 
and sections of global society in agenda setting and public health action, even if focusing 
on the problem in industrialised countries was a strategy to elicit attention, interest and 
funding for TB. 
With 14% of the world's population, India accounts for an estimated 17-23% of new 
cases annually2, with a prevalence of 14 million persons (all forms) and 500 thousand 
deaths annually (NTI 1994c). In comparison China had 1.3 million new cases annually in 
the 1990's (Dolin et al 1994), a prevalence of 5.7 million cases of active pulmonary 
1 Much data for this chapter is obtained from interviews and observations. For ethical reasons, to protect 
respondents, especially as this is still a current issue, names/designations are not mentioned. 
2 9 million new cases per year are currently estimated globally and 2.1 million in India (Dolin et at 1994). 
It was estimated that 1.6 million new cases occur annually in India (GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992). 
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disease in 1984-85 (Friedman 1994, citing China's national survey results) and 250,000 
deaths annually (Dakui 1993). However, the disease reportedly lost salience on the 
international health policy agenda from the 1970's (WHO 1994), reappearing in the 
1990's, when TB rates rose in established market economies/the West (Murray 
1994;587). 
Increased TB in the West from the mid-1980's was reported following three decades of 
decline. Reversal of a sustained 30 year 5.3% average annual decline in incidence of TB 
in the USA was observed in 1985 (Snider 1994), with a 20 % nation-wide increase 
between 1985-92 and a 30% increase in New York City between 1988-92 (Reichman 
1996). CDC estimated 63,800 excess cases between 1985-93 or approximately 8000 
cases annually (Raviglione 1995). While 71 % of cases in 1992 occurred in racial and 
ethnic minorities especially Hispanics, Asians, Pacific Islanders and Africans (Snider et 
al 1994), 27-30% of all cases in 1992-93 occurred among foreign born persons 
(Raviglione et al 1995). In Europe cases rose by 27% in Italy from 1988-92, 21 % in 
Norway from 1988-91 (WHO 1994) and 33% in Switzerland from 1986-90 (WHO 1993). 
Seven of 15 Western European countries reported increased cases, attributed largely to 
immigration, with HIV contributing only marginally to the excess (Raviglione 1993). An 
excess of 4000 cases occurred between 1988-1992 in England and Wales (1000/year), 
when earlier declines in notification rates were reversed (Mangtani 1995, The 
Independent 1993). Increased absolute numbers in the USA and Europe are small 
compared to the magnitude of TB in lower income countries. Outbreaks of Multi Drug 
Resistant (MDR) TB in the USA and co-infection with HIV/AIDS (Raviglione 1995) 
caused alarm in international public health circles (WHO 1993, 1995). However less than 
5% of TB cases world-wide were estimated to be associated with HIV (Snider 1994) and 
a relatively small proportion have MDR-TB in community based as against hospital 
studies e.g. 4% were resistant to isoniazid and rifampicin in South India (Datta 1993). 
The rise of TB in industrialised countries elicited a global response as articulated by 
WHO. For instance, 'TB long considered a disease of the past has re-emerged ... ', and 
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'We cannot expect to contain TB in one region of the world. Ultimately control of TB in 
industrialised nations will depend on its being sharply reduced as a public health threat 
in the developing world' (WHO 1993;inside front cover). 'WHO is warning that TB 
cannot be completely controlled in the industrialised world until it is sharply reduced as 
a health threat in developing nations ... '(ibid;press release WHO/31). Similar views were 
repeatedly expressed (World Health Forum 1993;3, Raviglione 1993;297, WHO 1994;2). 
This was fuelled by fears of further spread in an interdependent, globalised world, with 
increased travel, migration (WHO 1993) and movement of labour. 
The inaccurate image created, that TB had been controlled globally and recently re-
emerged, was reinforced by the media3. One story suggested, 'As tuberculosis infection 
rates plummeted world-wide in the past decades, health authorities relaxed their guard' 
(Newsweek, May 17, 1993). Another that, 'TB is Back with a Bang! To many of us, TB is 
a disease of the past, or at least of the poor' (The Pioneer, October 3, 1992). 
6.1.1 The State: Its Health Services, Funding and TB Programmes 
Besides HIV co-infection, reasons cited for the re-emergence of TB, included chronic 
neglect and under-funding of state TB control programmes (WHO 1993). In the USA 
targeted federal government TB grants from 1959 resulted in sustained declines of TB in 
the 1960's (Reichman 1996). In 1970 replacement of targeted funds by general block 
grants to states for public health services adversely affected TB services and was one of 
the factors for the resurgence ofTB (ibid). This was exemplified in New York City where 
TB control budgets decreased from $40 million in 1968 to $4 million in 1988, followed 
by substantial increases in TB (WHO 1995). TB funding patterns in the USA were 
reversed in 1991, but it was feared that block grants would be reintroduced due to 
declining TB rates from 1994 and local political pressures (ibid, Hopewell 1995). 
European countries on the other hand adopted 'direct government responsibility' for 
diagnosis, treatment and prevention as a basic strategy to counteract increased TB cases 
(Raviglione 1993;304). 
3 Newsclippings from major English language papers were reviewed. The revised strategy had wide press 
coverage. This was possibly due to use of the media and press releases by WHO. 
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In India, NTP budgets increased over time but were inadequate (5.1 ). Following policy 
change and international attention the NTP received higher though still inadequate 
funding, with certain contradictions. The World Bank, which increased its health sector 
lending to India in the 1990's, advised that infectious disease control programmes should 
come under purview of the public sector, while general medical care, particularly 
secondary and tertiary care, should be left to the private sector (World Bank 1993, 
Duggal 1997). This dichotomy does not hold for TB where it is established that early 
diagnosis and cure integrated with primary health care is the best control/preventive 
measure (WHO 1988). As discussed in Chapter Four general medicallhealth services are 
crucial to TB control, and reduced budgets to public sector medical care systems, as part 
of minimising the state, adversely affect general health and consequently TB care. Thus 
declining trends in GOI central health sector expenditures and declining State 
expenditures on national disease control programmes (Duggal 1997) counteract increased 
NTP IRNTP budgets. 
Government initiated and run NTP's are termed failures, as being poorly conceived and 
contributing to rising drug resistance through poor organisation (WHO 1993-96). These 
statements ignore the fact that basic concepts concerning TB control integral to the RNTP 
were made by State institutions in developing countries with international collaboration 
and more importantly that NTP's and basic infrastructure have been laid by the State 
(Chapter 1&4). They do not explore why funding and organisation are inadequate. While 
expectations have not been fully realised, gains and the inherent complexities of TB are 
inadequately acknowledged. In the absence of such analysis and action not suprisingly 
implementation problems recognised in the NTP have emerged in the RNTP (6.7). 
6.1.2 Social Roots and Technical Frames 
The situation analysis concerning the re-emergence of TB continues to de-emphasise the 
social roots of tuberculosis and underestimates the complex conditions under which the 
NTP's function. Having established the failure of government run TB control 
programmes, and potential threats of global spread of a disease that' cannot be controlled 
by political boundaries' (WHO 1993; 11), the scene was set for international intervention. 
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'The global community must act quickly to control TB and the growing health threat it 
presents' (ibid; 12). The international public health community have not played a 
significant role in drawing attention to relationships between underlying structural causes 
of poverty and the continued presence of TB as a global problem. Political economy 
factors including unfair terms of international/national trade and finance, cause millions 
to live in poverty, with overcrowded housing, poor nutrition, hard labour, stress, long 
working hours, in polluted environs, or unemployed. These conditions comprise the basic 
causal factors for TB to develop and spread (Table 1.3). This 'social suffering' which has 
merited little public health action, requires 'health care systems to extend their gaze 
towards the social construction o/disease and suffering' (Benatar 1997;1635). In relation 
to TB this social perspective, acknowledged by Dubos and Dubos 1952, GOI 1946, GOI 
1961 and described more sharply and politically as a by-product of 'structural violence' 
(Farmer 1997) has few proponents in the RNTP debate. Health professionals working as 
NGO's, academics and researchers attempting to place TB and its control in the context 
of a global societal analysis during the current policy discourse (VHAI 1994, Quadeer 
1994, Banerji 1996) are considered unrealistic and marginalised from policy discussions, 
or 'managed', being invited to meetings to share views, which are subsequently ignored 
(interviews 1996). 
The role of purely technical interventions in achieving sustained success for a socially 
rooted disease, especially for popUlations living in continuing poverty, can be debated4• 
Sri Lanka in earlier decades (interviews 1995) and Cuba achieved success despite poor 
economic circumstances because TB programmes were part of wider national health and 
development efforts (Gonzalez 1994). Incidence rates of TB in Cuba declined from 
11.61100,000 in 1979 to 6.2 in 1987 and 4.7 in 1991, the mortality rate in 1991 was 
0.2/100,000 while primary drug resistance declined from 6% in 1982 to 2.4% in 1991, 
MDR strains are not identified and no reversal of the declining trend has occurred 
(ibid; 192-193). However it is rarely mentioned in the current discourse. 
4 IVA TLD programmes discussed in 5.2.1. 
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The revised strategy continues in the dominant bio-medical frame re-emphasising techno-
managerial interventions. It narrowed this further by not recognising adequately the 
importance of good quality general health services within which the RNTP must function. 
Very prescriptive planning could reduce the space for implementors to evolve area and 
situation specific, flexible, humane, community based, alternatives for action and 
discourse. Strategies neglect the need for social support and rehabilitation, for community 
participation, ownership, empowerment, and for building alliances with movements for 
development and social justice5. TB patients become objects in this frame, in which the 
TB programme is projected as being more interested in their welfare than they are 
themselves. Directly observed therapy promoted to overcome treatment non-
adherence/non-compliance/default ignores the life circumstance/social class barriers to 
regular, complete treatment, in which inadequate health services for the poor pose 
additional obstacles. Though described as a supportive partnership with patients 
(interview 1997) the medical profession or WHO does not use DOTS for diseases not 
perceived as threats6. 
6.2 International Actors and Policy Change 
6.2.1 The International Union Against TB and Lung Diseases (IUATLD) 
The IUATLD, a non-governmental, professional association, headquartered in France, 
active internationally in TB control since 1920, contributed to global TB control through 
mutual assistance, educational and public policy programmes, helping TB control 
programmes in developing countries from the late 1970's (Snider 1994, Enarson 1995, 
Reichman 1996). It was the main internationally active group at this time. Programmes 
developed in Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Nicaragua achieved cure rates of 70-
80% at a cost of about US$47 per case detected (WHO 1994, 1995, Enarson 1995). In 
Tanzania 'the average cost for curing one patient, including staff costs, transportation and 
other infrastructure costs, was under $200' (WHO 1995;6). TB programmes in these 
countries depend on external assistance for 40%) of their funding (Enarson 1995). Adverse 
5 This applies to the NTP as well. 
6 It is used for leprosy and Sexually Transmitted Disease's (Porter and Ogden 1997). 
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impacts of vertical programmes on general health services in Tanzania, with other health 
problems not getting the attention they need, question the sustainability of the programme 
(Nagpaul*1995). A controversy arose about the International Union's use and 
recommendations for hospitalisation during the intensive phase of chemotherapy to 
ensure supervised therapy/compliance, with final consensus for domiciliary supervision 
(Editorial, IndJTub. 1987). Hospitalisation was not necessary (TCC 1959) or 
feasible/sustainable in many circumstances and WHO guidelines recommended that 'it 
has no value per se in the management of TB patients' (WHO 1993b;19). Successful 
features of the IUATLD approach included: use of 8 month SCC (2 months intensive 
phase of daily isoniazid, rifampicin, pyrazinamide and streptomycin under strict 
supervision including hospitalisation); uninterrupted supply of good quality drugs/other 
materials; network of microscopy centres; recording and reporting cases and treatment 
outcomes; staff training and supervision; and political commitment of government 
(Snider 1994). The model, assessed by the Health Sectors Priority Review of the World 
Bank in 1989, was adopted for developing countries by WHO and used in China 
(Enarson 1995). Dr. Styblo of the IUATLD visited several countries, including India, as 
technical advisor (Chopra* 1995). The New York City epidemic using similar principles 
reported considerable success in cure rates, with a 21 % decrease in reported cases from 
1992-94 (Frieden 1995). However costs were high, approximately US$20,000 per patient 
in New York City (ibid;232), which increased its annual spending on TB to more than 
$40 million annually by 1993 for a popUlation of 18 million (WHO 1995). Transport 
costs, food vouchers and other incentives were given to patients (ibid). Direct and indirect 
costs of the TB epidemic in the USA are estimated to be over 2 billion by 2000 AD 
(WHO 1994;10). This scale is inconceivable in India and appears not to fit with the cost-
effectiveness claims for TB control. The approach, adopted in the World Bank supported 
project in 1991 in China (WHO 1995), is reported to considerably exceed the projections 
of cost per death directly averted made by the WDR 1993 (Bogg and Diwan 1996). 
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6.2.2 Past and Present TB Control Policies of the WHO 
During the 1950's WHO supported Training and Demonstration Centres, epidemiological 
surveys, mass BCG campaigns (WHO 1965), and Isoniazid monotherapy as part of 
chemotherapy till the problem of drug resistance was realised. It then promoted NTP's in 
the 1960's-70's (WHO 1964, 1974). Some principles of the NTP were precursors of 
Primary Health Care (Mahler 1985). These include giving primacy to people, using a 
need based socio-epidemiological approach, developing appropriate technologies/systems 
and integrated health systems (Banerji 1990b). After the Alma Ata Conference in 1978 
TB dropped from the international health agenda as a specific disease programme. 
Though a single officer looked after TB at WHO from the 1970's-1989, it was integrated 
into primary health care and statements regarding basic causative factors were explicitly 
articulated (WHO 1982, 1988). For instance, inter-relationships between socio-economic 
conditions, dually with TB and efficiency of TB programme implementation, were 
specifically recognised by a WHO/IDAT study group which concluded, 'economic 
development based upon basic egalitarian principles is paramount for the final control of 
TB I (WHO 1982;26). 'Fundamental changes in the world economic structures are called 
for and are basic for the long-term solution of health problems .... emphasising bilateral 
and multilateral transfers of resources I (ibid;21). It was observed that disease specific 
programmes were established 'often with external urging and assistance " 'strongly 
influenced by external donors and indigenous doctors with specialised interests I (WHO 
1988;7). Since vertical programmes 'competed with each other for ... scarce resources I 
and were 'wasteful and relatively unproductive I, TB control was integrated into Primary 
Health Care (ibid;7). However the broader based approach met with early resistance and 
was soon verticalised (Banerji 1993) reducing the potential it had to provide a strong base 
for TB/other programmes. 
During this period WHO played a facilitatory role, channelling assistance, (e.g. from 
SIDA to the Indian NTP) and supporting training of personnel from developing countries 
at various centres e.g. the NTI (a WHO Collaborating Centre), India and the TB Research 
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Institute, Tokyo, Japan (interviews 1996). WHO drew on national consultants for TB 
related work in member countries, with Indian consultants going to the Philippines, North 
Korea and other countries (Nagpaul*1995). Since TB had declined as a problem in 
Europe the number of experienced European TB consultants also declined 
(Tiroler* 1995). 
Dr. Kochi headed the WHO TB Unit from 1990, facing a worsening global TB situation. 
To have a positive impact on TB control, targets of curing 85% of detected sputum smear 
positive cases and detecting 70% of existing cases by 2000 AD were set by the WHO 
World Health Assembly in 1991 (WHO-SEARO 1994). A small team developed into the 
Global TB Programme assessing the global situation, undertaking country reviews, and 
initiating a new package of action (WHO 1993-97). This team in WHO placed TB on the 
international health agenda, for example by getting TB declared a Global Health 
Emergency on 23 April 1993 (WHO 1994). It publicised the TB epidemic by hiring an 
international public relations firm (Reichman 1997). WHO worked with national 
governments to give TB higher priority, with bilateral donor agencies to increase external 
funding for TB programmes in countries with the largest problem, with the 
pharmaceutical industry to revive research towards new TB drugs (which had declined in 
the 1970's after TB was controlled in the West), used the media and professional 
advocacy to promote the cause, promoted operations research to refine the programme 
and worked towards evolving methods for patient education (WHO 1993-97). Some 
argue that the WHO does not cooperate adequately with national and international NGO's 
including the IUATLD underutilising their resources (Reichman 1997). They refer to 
'political minefields and internal competition between segments of WHO and its TB 
programme' (ihid;9). 
The rationale for WHO's renewed interest in TB was that it was the largest adult killer 
among infectious diseases, with cost effective interventions, but low priority since 1975 
and likely to become unmanageable if no action was undertaken. The worsening TB 
situation was due to demographic growth, HIV co-infection, population movement, 
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deteriorating social environments and emergencies, and inadequate control efforts (Kochi 
1995). In Southeast Asia lack of leadership, diagnostic facilities, trained personnel and 
technical expertise for TB control were identified as problems, in addition to adoption of 
a centralised approach to control activities and low awareness concerning the problem 
(WHO-SEARO 1994). 
TB was linked to social justice at the 1993 World Health Assembly, 'TB is closely 
associated with conditions of poverty, and those social justice groups and non-
governmental organisations interested in assisting communities to deal with the root 
causes of poverty should make TB control an element of their strategies '(WHO 1993, 
WHAlI4). Justice dimensions were again stressed (WHO 1994;1), appealing to the 
humane element, 'Who would refuse to spend $30- the cost of TB medicines in many 
countries to save this human life?'. An understanding of the implications of these 
statements with a clear social perspective are not evident in the strategies that have 
evolved, which continue to be time bound and within a rational, scientific frame. Political 
processes and struggles involved in social justice issues appear taken for granted. 
The WHO TB Programme assumed global leadership in 1993, stating its 'regional and 
country level structure and contacts within individual ministries of health. .. make it 
uniquely suited to lead the fight against the TB crisis' (WHO 1993). Its objectives to 
reduce TB deaths by half by 2000 AD and cut transmission and infection rates by 
identifying and treating smear positive patients till complete cure was endorsed by the 
World Health Assembly in 1993 (WHO-SEARO 1994). The strategy included (ibid) a) 
passive case finding7 with direct microscopy for smear positive cases, b) standardised 
see for all smear positive and seriously ill sputum negative patients, with proper case 
management incorporating supervision/direct observation for the first two months. Four 
drugs during the initial phase (2-3 months) were recommended to avoid emergence of 
drug resistance, and a full course of treatment ensured to avoid relapse. c) drug 
procurement, uninterrupted supplies, timely delivery and adequate drug stocks. d) 
7 Case detection among symptomatic patients self reporting to health services (WHO, 1997,5). 
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monitoring systems at district level with data on new cases, relapses and treatment 
outcomes. 
The action plan was to: co-ordinate and target resources; use its experience and credibility 
with governments in the developing world to organise effective programmes; and co-
ordinate control efforts and international research. Specifically, within two years it aimed: 
1) to create political will; 2) disseminate WHO's treatment policies; 3) assist additional 
nations; 4) focus donor funds on priority TB projects; 5) improve drug supplies; 6) 
produce a simple and rapid test to improve TB diagnosis; 7) develop better methods to 
treat TB in countries with high rates of HIV infection (ibid). These were ambitious goals 
given the time frame and deeper societal factors operating and suggest that the 
complexity of processes was under-estimated. 
In 1995 'a battle plan for fighting TB' was identified by WHO to 'prevent at least 12 
million deaths from TB in the next 10 years' (WHO 1995;24). Directly observed 
treatment, short-course (DOTS) where' health workers must watch their patients swallow 
each dose of medicines. This supervision must continue everyday for the first two months 
and, ideally, for all six months of treatment' (ibid;3). DOTS was identified as 'the key to 
curing the patient and controlling the TB epidemic' (ibid; 15). It made the point that TB 
control cannot succeed unless health care workers are highly involved in their patient's 
lives (WHO 1995). In 1995 the Co-ordination, Advisory and Review Group of WHO's 
Global TB Programme recommended strengthened monitoring of detection and treatment 
of sputum positive cases to document and report progress towards the programmes Year 
2000's targets annually (WHO 1997b). 
Seven countries, including India and China, all low to middle income, with large 
populations and major TB problems were targeted as high priority (WHO 1994) and 
interventions initiated. In India, a programme review of the existing NTP was the first 
step (GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992). In China (1991) and later in Bangladesh the policy was 
initiated directly with World Bank loans. Training modules for managing TB at district 
level were initiated. The South-East Asia Region emphasised that, 'besides the 
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conventional approaches being adopted in most countries, there was a great need to 
formulate new practical strategies aimed at integrating control measures with Primary 
Health Care' (WHO-SEARO 1994; 1). 
The current TB control package for 'the success of its strategy' rests on 5 points: 
i) government commitment to the NTP, ii) passive case finding, iii) short course 
chemotherapy for all smear positive PTB cases, under direct observation for at least the 
initial phase of treatment, iv) regular uninterrupted supply of all essential TB drugs, v) 
monitoring system for programme supervision and evaluation (Harries and Maher, 1996). 
Four points were already components of the NTP in India. The fifth, namely SCC has 
been introduced gradually since 1982-83 covering 259 1506 districts, limitations for 
further rapid extension being budgetary. The additional element of direct observation is 
controversial. Principles underlying DOTS, of supervised and intennittent therapy, were 
reported first reported from Madras (TCC 1964), with several subsequent studies. 
Because of poor results under field conditions it is not widely used in the NTP. In 
Bangladesh directly observed therapy used from 1984 through an NGO programme with 
community health workers achieved 85% cure rates in the 1990's (Chowdhury 1997). 
While the WHO strategy appears rational, logical and scientific, it has backtracked on the 
socio-political underpinnings of the 1970-80's and has not built on implementation 
lessons of the past. At the end of 1994, WHO estimates were that 10% of TB patients 
globally were under the new strategy. By 1995, 23% lived in regions where the strategy 
was available (not the same as coverage), 35% were sputum smear positive, with 76% 
treated successfully compared to 42% in regions not implementing the WHO strategy 
(Raviglione 1997). Thus, assuming the validity of routine data, progress was slower and 
achievements lower than anticipated, even in the early honeymoon phase of policy 
implementation. 
6.2.3 The World Bank (WB) 
The Bank, a more recent, important player in international public health (Buse 1994) 
made its presence felt in the TB arena in the 1990's, becoming the largest financier to TB 
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programmes in developing countries (WHO 1996). Promoting TB treatment as one of the 
most cost-effective public health interventions (World Bank 1993;63), they urged 
governments to adopt national TB control programmes. The WB utilised the leverage of 
lending capital to underfunded TB programmes and supported, often as a conditionality, 
WHO's specific, time bound, measurable global strategy. In India the WB moved into 
health development programmes in 1990, with priority to disease control (WHF 1995). 
Loans for leprosy, HIV/AIDS, blindness, strengthening secondary care hospitals were 
negotiated. In this context the propagation of western medicine on behalf of multinational 
drug and health care companies was questioned (Srinivasan 1995). 
The WB offered 'soft loans' to targeted countries for TB control programmes, using 
WHO's technical consultants and conditional to countries adopting WHO's global 
strategy. Bilateral agencies provided supplementary support. The relatively united and 
coordinated approach by WHO, WB and bilateral donors narrowed the space for 
negotiation by national policy makers. The effect of other WB/IMF policies particularly 
Structural Adjustment has increased the burden on the poor and reduced their access to 
State health services (Loewenson 1995). 
International actors, particularly a small group of individuals within these organisations, 
played a key role in promoting policy change through the RNTP. This analysis shows that 
the roles of international actors differed markedly in the 1960's and the 1990's. During 
the earlier period of close international collaboration and policy change in 1962 the NTP-
DTP concept arose from within the country (in India), supported by the UNICEF and 
WHO, but not driven by them (Banerji 1993). Concepts were challenged and changed 
using an inductive approach with indigenous research, with mutual respect and shared 
beliefs of social relevance, self reliance and international solidarity. This received 
acknowledgement. IUAT/WHO 'emphasised the major role played by underprivileged 
countries in the development of modern chemotherapy, from which the affluent cOllntries 
have been the major beneficiaries' (WHO 1982;21). Similarly, 'in so many aspects of 
tuberculosis the western world owes a debt to developing countries and particularly to 
India where many excellent studies on TB have been done in the recent past' 
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(Grzybowski 1983;preface). In the 1990's international actors are proposing a particular 
strategy rather inflexibly generating unconstructive conflict in the process and Indian 
partners are not engaging with the earlier spirit. 
6.3 India's National Context in the Nineties 
The political climate in India changed since the idealism of the post-Independence period 
during which the NTP was articulated. During the 1980's and 1990's there was a rise in 
sectarianism, parochialism, fundamentalism and criminalisation of politics (Parthasarathy 
1997, Brass 1994). Political leadership appeared short-sighted and was criticised for 
developing a 'politics of patronage which extended the scope for the pursuit of self 
interested power by privileged social groups both within and outside the State system. 
Without a will to implement the mandates, state intervention and development policy 
were highly politicised'(Pannikar 1997;82). There was frequent change of government 
with four governments in quick succession, three without majorities, and the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 (Patel 1995). 
Many observers felt the most positive development has been the legal strengthening of 
the process of democratic decentralisation to Panchayati Raj institutions (local 
government at district, Taluk and village levels) by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment 
Act, 1992. Their role in ensuring better quality of care in health care services is widely 
recognised (World Bank 1992). 
India had stayed out of the debt trap till the 1970' s, but external debt grew to 20 billion 
dollars in the 1980's and nearly 80 billion dollars in 1991 (Patel 1995). Debt servicing 
rose from under 20% to over 30% of export earnings (ibid). CompUlsions to bring in 
foreign exchange to the country grew. The process of privati sat ion accelerated in the mid-
1980's and India entered the Structural Adjustment Programme with the New Economic 
Policy in 1991 (Duggal 1997) reducing barriers to liberalisation and globalisation. 
With 14% of the global population India currently has 28% of the world's poor. In 
absolute numbers the poor are about 360 million, the population of the entire country in 
152 
1951, (Reddy 1997). The importance of rapid economic growth for the elimination of 
poverty has long been recognised by the Planning Commission. While liberalisation 
increased GDP growth rate close to 7% during 1994-95 to 1996-97, there has been 
inadequate attention to distribution and equity issues and the development of the social 
sector (ibid). Inequalities in income, wealth and economic power widened. The 
proportion of indirect taxes to direct taxes increased, with lower income groups 
contributing an increasing share of government's revenue and expenditure (Patel 1995). 
During the 1990's growing numbers of corruption scandals in several Ministries, 
including health, increased public scepticism and cynicism about the government and its 
policies. Widely reported in the media, including details of judicial investigations, they 
include the HDW and Bofors Scam in 1987, Securities Scam in 1992, Sugar Scam 1994, 
Jain Hawala Racket in 1995, JMM case in 1995, Housing Scam and Telecom Scandal in 
1996, to name a few (Outlook 1997). This added to widespread corruption of smaller 
magnitUde at lower levels of government. 
Thus the broader context within which the RNTP functions is more complex and difficult 
than that facing the NTP. The direction of the economy and the political economy of the 
pharmaceutical industry (Chapter 4) and of international aid are important forces shaping 
health and TB policy (Newstime 1994). 
6.4 RNTP Policy Process in India 
Real expenditures on disease control programmes were stagnant during 1985-91 (Index 
1984-85=100), falling during the adjustment period (Index 92-93=83), when compression 
of government expenditure was required by the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(Tulasidhar 1993). In 1991-92 the MOH prepared an annual proposal for Rs.7000 
million, double that of the previous year, later reducing it to RS.5020 million. The 
Ministry of Finance cut it further to 90% of the previous years budget. This was restored 
to the level of the previous year by the Planning Commission. This included a new World 
Bank loan for Rs.580 million out of a health budget of RS.3020 million that year, so that 
actual health sector allocation was Rs.2440 million (World Bank 1992). Thus in effect 
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there was a 20% reduction in the health budget including for the NTP. The malaria 
budget was reduced by 40% from Rs.830 million to Rs.500 million (ibid). This has a 
ripple effect since male Multi-Purpose Workers, involved in many communicable disease 
programmes including the NTP, were paid under this bUdget. There was also a 30% cut in 
rural water supply programmes and a 47% cut in the rural sanitation programme (ibid). 
Health budgets changed not in response to health needs but to financial and political 
economy imperatives. 
On being advised by the World Bank that the NTP budget cut was too drastic, the GOI 
raised it in 1992-93 (VHAI* 1994). This exemplifies how multilateral agencies such as 
the World Bank intervene in policy processes at least with regard to budget setting and 
how decision making moves out of the sphere of national policy managers. 
The formal process of discussion/negotiation between the WHO, WB and GOI was 
initiated in 1990-91, resulting in the 1992 Joint Programme Review of the NTP 
(GOIlWHO/SIDA 1992). Though done apparently on request by the GOI, the real 
initiative appears to have come from international organisations (WHO 1994). It was also 
just 4 years after a nine month, research based 'In-depth Study of the NTP', 
commissioned by the GOI and supported financially by WHO (ICORCI 1988) whose 
findings were largely ignored (interview 1996). WHO's renewed and increasingly 
proactive interest in TB was made known through informal and formal channels along 
with the possibility of funding for TB programmes through the World Bank (interview 
1995). Informal linkages, networks and communications were important in the initial 
phases and in decision making even at the national/international interface. Formal 
processes including studies/research took place later, playing a legitimising role. 
Besides there being a need for foreign exchange, the TB programme was underfunded. 
The WHO, World Bank and international experts were therefore invited in. Unutilised 
money from SIDA assistance allocated for the NTP (for drugs, X-rays) was used for the 
Review (interview 1994). A senior official said this was 'a sad and scandalous story' 
because of the resulting countrywide shortages of TB drugs in the NTP (interview 1996, 
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reports by NGO's, Sudarshan* VHAI*1995). This was the year following introduction of 
SAP and the 20% NTP budget cut. 
The Joint Programme Review team of 27 members with seven external consultants 
completed work in seventeen days (weekends included). Three subgroups visited 3 States 
(Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh) interviewing state level officers and paying brief 
visits to PHC's and sub-centres. A report prepared earlier by the NTI was extensively 
used (interview 1996). A review team member said that certain inputs and comments by 
experienced Indian TB workers were excluded from the final report (interview 1995). 
Technical officers from the TB Association of India were met briefly at the end of the 
study, more as a courtesy call than for substantive discussion (interview 1995). There was 
little reference to the 1988 study. Recommendations included: strengthening central/apex 
policy making authority, establishing diagnostic criteria, ensuring quality of microscopy, 
using three smear examinations for diagnosis, short course chemotherapy, uninterrupted 
drug supply, cohort analysis of treatment outcome, decentralised treatment, treatment 
organisers and laboratory supervisors at subdistrict level (500,000 population), 
developing training materials, conducting operations research and pilot proj ects 
(GOIlWHO/SIDA 1992). Three sputum examinations and subdistrict staff were new, and 
observed therapy was not yet named DOTS. Given India's research history in the 
NTP/TB, the review could be said to have been used to internalise new strategies and 
create local ownership for policy change, which was projected as a GOI initiative. The 
GOI then applied to the World Bank for a loan to implement the Revised NTP (TB 
Division 1995b). 
As a loan requirement, national financial commitment to the programme had to be 
forthcoming, hence the government increased the central budget for TB progressively 
from Rs.lOO million in 1991 to Rs.500 million in 1995-96 from local resources (MOH 
Annual Reports). However in 1993-94 the TB Unit in the DGHS did not expend the 
enhanced budget allotted to it (Chopra* 1995). The loan being negotiated was for US$150 
million for a 3 year period and was conditional to the Revised NTP being introduced, 
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with the use of the WHO strategy which in 1995 (still within the prolonged negotiation 
period) had DOTS as its key component. 
The Ministry of Finance and Department of Economic Affairs had informed the DGHS 
that it was necessary to secure this loan from the World Bank (interview* 1996). Thus 
there were different interests within government and the key decision was already made. 
Whether seriously ill patients or health workers had to travel several kilometres for 
treatment thrice a week was immaterial. 
An early approach paper for the Revised NTP (RNTP) focused on tribal populations/areas 
in five States, Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal (TB Division 
1993). Selective attention to tribal populations was subsequently dropped from the 
proposal. 
A draft proposal was revised following discussions with the World Bank Preparatory 
Mission in November 1993 and the WHO Technical Mission in April 1994. The proposal 
then envisaged implementing the RNTP in the same 5 states and 10 metropolitan cities 
(Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, Jaipur, Lucknow and 
Bhopal). 187 million people comprising one fifth of India's popUlation were to be 
covered with an estimated budget of Rs.6340 million over 5 years (TB Division1995b). 
Reported figures regarding the total population to be covered and the size of the loan 
varied with time. 
Later attempts to focus on urban TB control were justified by a 7.7% growth of the urban 
population from 17.9% in 1961 to 25.7 % in 1991. The then DDG-TB said, 'It is 
important to note that the infrastructure for TB was more organised and efficient in terms 
of domiciliary management in rural areas compared to urban areas' (Datta 1994). It is 
recalled that since TB was considered an urban problem till the 1960' s, most TB 
infrastructure was urban. Even today, the 330 TB Clinics, 47,300 TB beds, general 
hospitals, medical college hospitals are urban. DTC's too are located in district 
headquarters towns. As discussed in Chapter 4 rural health services are still inadequate, 
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with lower funding, smaller number and poorer quality of services for rural areas 
comprising 74.7% of the population (lCMR 1975, Banerji 1985, Chatterjee 1988, 
ICORCI 1988). It is too early to halt NTP's attempts to reverse the imbalance. 
In June 1994 the Pre-Appraisal Mission of the World Bank suggested, 'to have further 
experience and to identify the most suitable strategy the project may be implemented in a 
limited area of 10 cities and 5 districts of 5 states', financed by its Project Preparation 
Facility (TB Div.1995b;6). Pilot Phases were small. Phase I initiated in October 1993 
covered 2.35 million people, in small pockets within four cities- Delhi (1 million), 
Bombay (350,000), Calcutta (300,000), Bangalore (250,000), and one rural area, namely 
2 taluks of Mehsana district of Gujarat State (450,000) (TB DivisionI995b). This was 
supported by the PPF and unspent SIDA money for the NTP, with technical support by 
the WHO, till the end of December 1994 (ibid). Sputum conversion rates at 2-3 months 
were reported to be 90% (Banerji 1996). Phase II covered 15.83 million people with 
World Bank Assistance of 1.2 million US$ (TB Div.1995b). Assessments by the WHO 
Technical Mission found the pilot phases to provide good results and the revised strategy 
was accepted (ibid). The RNTP aimed to reduce ARI by 8-100/0 a year from the current 2-
2.5%, increase case detection to 70%, increase cure rates to 85% and above, reduce 
relapse rates and chronic cases to less than 5%, and failure and case fatality rates to less 
than 2% (ibid). Its objectives were to emphasise cure of sputum positive and seriously ill 
sputum negative patients through supervised SCC and augmentation of case finding to 
70% only after achieving desired cure rates (TB Div.1995b). Strategies included passive 
case finding with sputum microscopy, standardised treatment regimens; creation of sub-
district supervisory units; regular uninterrupted drug supplies to the periphery; 
augmentation of organisational support at central and state levels for co-ordination; 
emphasising training, IEC, Operational Research, and NGO involvement; and increased 
budgetary outlays (ibid). The targets derived from IUATLD studies in small countries 
with substantial external assistance. It was unclear what the denominator for case finding 
was i.e. prevalence or incidence (Chakraborty* 1996) or how cure rates for non-sputum 
smear positive cases (500/0 of all cases) were to be determined. A senior Indian researcher, 
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appointed as technical consultant by WHO to write-up the RNTP proposal, left following 
disagreements regarding the concept of control, DOTS, and the lack of freedom, 'we have 
to accept everything' (interview 1996). This again points to the international locus of 
decision making and rigidities in policy change and to conflicts with the national level. 
Bilateral Agencies: WHO worked with international donors, including bilateral agencies 
to increase funding for TB. The Health and Population Division of the British ODA (later 
DFID, Department for International Development) after a process of dialogue and 
consultation, identified 'specific disease problems that are predicted to increase (TB, 
Malaria and HIV)' as one of three priority areas for funding in mid-1993 (Grose* 1995). 
Joint Pre-Appraisal Missions of the three international agenCIes (World 
Bank/WHO/ODA) took place in November 1994, February 1995, October 1995, 
February 1996. From January 1995, ODA supported Phase II of the RNTP for 18 months 
initially, in capacity building, training, research and service delivery (ODA 1995) by: a) 
strengthening the Central TB Division during the PPF period, till the larger World Bank 
project assistance was available (support for additional office space, equipment and 
salaries for continuation of extra staff); b) supporting the development! adaptation of 
training modules to be used during Phase II and subsequent scaling up of the project. To 
design a mechanism to reorient clinical and laboratory education for newly qualifying 
health staff; c) covering 5.3 million people under the RNTP at 2 sites in Delhi 
(Nehrunagar and Motinagar) and in Medak District of Andhra Pradesh state as ODA was 
'very interested in DOTS and to see if it is a workable solution'; and d) supporting 
operational research in these sites. 
From mid-1994 ODA also supported the WHO TB Programme promoting TB research in 
India by building up a cadre of young Indian researchers, outside of the NTI and TRC, 
through supporting Operations Research. A grant of £486,000 was allotted for 2 years 
and a research co-ordinator appointed in 1996 in Delhi, based at the WHO-SEARO 
Office. 
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DANIDA, the other bilateral agency involved, planned to integrate TB services with its 
support to leprosy work in tribal regions of Orissa using a community based approach 
(informal discussion 1995). Japan Grant Funds supported workshops and training 
programmes. 
Although international collaboration in the RNTP increased financial resources to TB 
control, and generated interest/debate among political leaders, the bureaucracy, 
academics, NGO's and the media (TAl 1995, 1996, newspaper reviews), it also caused 
considerable conflicts between groups. Select patients in the pilot sites benefited. 
However the process had problems with delays in staff selection, staff turnover, conflicts, 
suspicion, play of institutional and other interests and the development of bureaucracy 
(interviews 1995-97). As in the NTP, these impacted on implementation, even for the 
small populations covered. Attitudes of some international consultants were sometimes 
perceived to be patronising and unhelpful, as was the secrecy/lack of transparency of 
some national negotiators (interviews 1996-97). Negotiations regarding the loan between 
GO I, WB and WHO were protracted, taking over five years until 1997. The GOI wanted 
to cover the entire country with SCC (with more than half the country already covered 
over the past decade), while the WHO wanted it in stages. At one point the GOI said it 
would pull out of the negotiations and not take the loan. The WHO/WB too threatened to 
go to Parliament and expose a reported drug procurement scandal. Conflicts between and 
within donor/international agencies occurred, as they did within Indian groups 
(interviews and observations). Some wanted to demonstrate success quickly, pushing 
processes beyond their capacity, so that final negotiations and transactions were 
completed. The promotion of commercial interests through the well known aid and trade 
linkages were anticipated. Drug purchases accounting for 500/0 of the loan were to be 
based on international tender and preference to MNC's were possible, with the example 
from Bangladesh cited, where tenders were undercut below the 15% advantage given to 
national companies (Shiva 1994). The contracts for 1994 went to Ciba-Geigy (interview 
1996). 
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NGO's and Academics: NGO's became engaged in the policy change process/debate 
from 1993. Most had previous involvement in issues concerning TB and challenged some 
basic assumptions of the RNTP. The Voluntary Health Association of India (VHAI) , a 
national federation of State Associations, has articulated concern about the NTP since 
1978-79 (Shiva* 1996). Providing a platform for discussion on TB policy issues they 
organised a national consultation in 1994, smaller meetings between NGO's, with 
government policy makers, and with international organisations in 1995-96, bringing out 
publications and setting up a task force in 1996 (VHAI 1994& 1996, Shiva *199511996). 
The Nucleus for Health Policies and Programmes, Delhi was actively involved with 
preparation of critical documents (Banetji 1996) and in meetings. The Foundation for 
Research in Community Health (FRCH) with several research contributions since the late 
1980's. Action Aid, India, was involved with advocacy at national level and training/field 
involvement through partners at State/local levels (Action Aid 1996). 
Arguments raised by NGO's (from interviews and participation in several meetings 1994-
96) concerned the fate of the majority 4/5th of the population not covered by the RNTP, 
unfair disparity between proposed budgets for a small segment of the population while 
the majority remain in an under-resourced NTP, sustainability of the programme beyond 
the loan period, furthering international debt problems by taking World Bank loans, the 
ethics of conditionality being imposed by multilateral agencies, lack of transparency 
regarding negotiations, inadequate protection of the interests of TB patients by national 
policy makers in pursuit of personal interests, promotion of commercial interests of 
pharmaceuticals and manufacturers under the guise of better quality, and above all the 
continued neglect of general health services through which any TB programme would 
have to function. 
Academics critical of the RNTP hypothesised that community effectiveness would be 
around 55%, being dependant on several factors (best estimates as percentages): 
diagnostic accuracy 80%, treatment efficacy 95%, health provider compliance 90%, 
doctor compliance 90%, and coverage 90% (Joshi, at T AI 1995). It would probably be 
lower with lower rates for most factors (ibid). With poor organisational management, 
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possibilities increase of accelerating drug resistance consequent to introducing second 
line drugs on a mass scale (VHAI 1994). 
International NGO'slconsultancies: Smaller, less visible, players in the RNTP process 
were foreign consultancy firms/consultants/institutions to whom projects were 
subcontracted. Consultancy rates, access to national policy makers/information and non-
participation in implementation were resented by officials in India, especially when 
inexperienced academics come and learn the basics of TB and its control, while being 
paid as consultants (interviews 1996). Many felt that the furthering of career and home 
country institutional interests were at the cost of the programme/patients in India, through 
diverting funds and utilising the time of national policy managers. 
Examples of contracted consultancy groups include INMED, a US based NGO, 
contracted to develop strategies to involve NGO's and private practitioners in the RNTP. 
After a preliminary visit by INMED staff in March 1995, one day national meetings on 
the subject were organised in September 1995 and February 1996 (observations of 
meeting, September 1995). The morning sessions of one were devoted to participants 
being told about RNTP strategies and virtues with little discussion. Some consultants 
facilitating later working groups were inexperienced, asking participants (including Dr. 
Banerji and the NTI Director) why India needed an NTP, and continuing disastrously, till 
another person came to assist the facilitator. Senior Indian experts walked out of the 
session. Participants questioned the necessity and usefulness of expensive, uninformed 
consultants facilitating such meetings. A consultative process between powerful groups 
such as the public and private sector, with conflicting interests, requires strong and 
informed facilitation and mediation, if decisions and action are to result. 
The IDA in its support to the RNTP provided funds from the Netherlands Fund. A Dutch 
consultancy group FEMCONSUL T contracted to develop appropriate health education 
messages, conducted a mullet-centric rapid appraisal study assisted by local No's. Indian 
experts felt their findings, recommendations and outputs (FEMCONSUL T 1995) did not 
add to existing knowledge (interview 1996). 
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Important Issues: Several programme staff felt that failure of the RNTP was inevitable , 
without improvement of general health services (interviews* 1996). Others are apathetic 
and uninvolved, except a few in the Central TB Unit whose task it is to pilot the RNTP 
through. 
Internationally driven, specifically detailed strategies, linked to conditionalities, are 
moving the programme towards a centralised, vertical structure. It is argued that 
conditionalities are mechanisms by which the interests of the poor are protected against 
corrupt governments (interview 1997). In the NTP curiously, corruption at top levels 
occurred on a large scale after negotiations for loans, and the accompanying 
conditionalities, were initiated (6.7). 
The insistence on directly observed therapy elicited widespread doubts locally, nationally 
and internationally regarding its implementability and ethics (several interviews* 1996, 
Porter and Ogden 1997). Short Course Chemotherapy is accepted as best practice, despite 
differences regarding dosages, regimens and duration of treatment. There is however little 
consensus regarding observed therapy. By official definition in urban areas, patients are 
required to visit the health centre three times a week for the first two months of treatment 
(24 visits/patient), and swallow nine tablets/capsules in the presence of a health worker or 
any government functionary. Treatment for the remaining 4-6 months is unsupervised, 
during which non-adherence could occur. In rural areas health assistants (in addition to 
other work) are to visit the patients' homes, covering distances of 3- 5 lan, often walking 
in inclement weather, to supervise treatment for two months. Anticipating difficulties 
planners suggested involving family members, traditional birth attendants, school 
teachers, panchayat members, common standby's for public health problems in India. 
Previous NTI studies suggest that these are not sustainable alternatives. Staff suggest that 
observed therapy by a health worker is impractical in India. Many feel that attention to 
DOTS obscures and diverts attention from more important issues in policy 
implementation. Despite these arguments the stakes on DOTS are set very high by WHO 
and WB. 
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National Political Policy Processes: 
A very small group of national policy negotiators made space for introduction of the 
RNTP (two of whom were classmates). Key Indian negotiators were rewarded for their 
role (Banerji 1996), with 2 getting jobs in the WHO-SEARO Office, another a sabbatical 
at Oxford, and another moving on to a higher, more prestigious position from where he 
still negotiates for the RNTP. More importantly, from an implementation perspective 
none stayed sufficiently long to see the project start. None of the present implementors, 
including the highest, were part of the decision making process. 
The key government institution for the programme, the NTl, was distanced from the 
actual policy process. However staff from the Institute did not seize the opportunity 
proactively to make their views heard at important national and international meetings 
(interviews 1996). They suggested that decisions were made at levels beyond their 
influence. Hence, they adopted a wait and watch approach, pushing for inclusion of 
research to study the efficacy and impact of the RNTP (interview 1996). Institutional 
roles at different levels were replaced by short term contracts to national consultants/ 
annual contracts for supervisory staff in the field, often re-employing retired NTP staff 
making it likely that old methods will continue (interview 1997). A process of 
deinstitutionalisation disrupts relationships, reducing a sense of ownership, continuity 
and accountability. 
The post of DDG-TB was frequently changed during 1991-96, the period of policy 
change, with resultant lack of continuity, stability and leadership. Dr A took charge from 
1992-94. Dr. B, incharge of the National Leprosy Eradication Programme held additional 
charge ofTB for a few months in 1994. Dr. C, 'not a TB man' then took over for about 3 
months in early 1995 prior to his retirement. Dr. B was again given additional charge of 
TB till his promotion as Additional DGHS. Dr. D, from the Iodine Deficiency 
Programme then took over. Programme officers comment that "the NTP is orphaned at 
the highest level" and observed, 'we need a person at the top who can protect the NTP', 
especially during the crucial period of policy change. In July 1996 action was initiated by 
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the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against Dr.B for possessing wealth beyond his 
known sources of income (Asian Age, interviews 1996). It was rumoured that this was 
not NTP money but from leprosy. However financial misconduct in drug purchase during 
the pilot phase slowed negotiations with the WB/WHO (interviews 1995, 1997). Drugs 
were ordered for the entire country and without following the prescribed regimens, 
(shifting from intermittent to daily regimen). It was the first time in history that the head 
of the NTP was implicated in a scandal. 
During the same period a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed in the Supreme Court 
regarding a Rs.70,000 million (US$2.1 billion) scandal in the import of equipment by the 
Directorate General of Health Services (Bhushan* 1996, Lancet 1996; 1548), calling into 
question the integrity of another key negotiator in the RNTP. A Health Secretary known 
for honesty who had objected to certain issues during the period had been transferred 
(several interviews 1996). This obviously had the concurrence of the Union Health 
Minister who has been cited as being 'one of the most corrupt ministers we have had' 
(several interviews with senior officials). 
With this immediate political environment and quality of leadership it seems unlikely that 
the RNTP or the NTP will be able to achieve much. Staff are demoralised and 
demotivated and point to irresponsibility and lack of accountability of the national 
political, executive and technical leadership. Analysts draw correlation's between the 
large amount of external funds available with the Health Ministry and the sudden crop of 
financial scandals (Shiva 1996). 
6.5 Context and Processes in Pilot Phase Project Sites 
The Gulabi Bagh Pilot Project, the first Pilot Phase I site in the capital city Delhi, close to 
the seat of power, under pressure to be successful, reported 95.50/0 cure rates in the first 
year (TB Div .1995c). However numbers of patients were small (1197) and patient 
selection criteria left out problematic cases (VHAI 1994, discussions at national meeting 
on the NTP). The project had strong leadership/managerial authority, easy access to the 
central TB unit, international meetings and much publicity (ibid). Methods used did not 
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follow the global strategy and were not replicable. This pilot vertical programme, 
covering one million people, undertook active case detection. Health Visitors worked 
exclusively for TB, receiving financial incentives for case detection and treatment 
completion (Jhunjhunwala 1994). Implementation problems occurred early. Non-
compliance for sputum tests at the second month was reported to be 11 %, raising 
questions about sustainability of high cure rates. Recruitment of laboratory technicians 
for 5/1 0 sub centres was incomplete nine months after project initiation. Poor recording 
was observed with 22% blank entries for the third microscopy test. Delays in the working 
of the incentive system led to staff dissatisfaction (ibid). 
Bihar, economically one of the poorest states, with an estimated 1.2 million TB patients, 
known for poorly functioning government health services, was selected for the RNTP. 
The State government said it would participate only if the Centre provided all inputs 
including staff and failed to present its proposal for the RNTP grant, reportedly due to 
bureaucratic laxity, and finally was not included in the pilot phase (Blitz 1994). 
Mehsana district, the only rural pilot site in Phase I, is a rich, powerful district in Gujarat, 
with 4 state ministers including the Health Minister hailing from that region in 1996. The 
district is highly industrialised, with a plant of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, a 
large well developed co-operative dairy and a good highway connection to the capital city 
Gandhinagar and to Ahmedabad (an hour's drive). It is unrepresentative of India's 506 
districts. Gujarat has been one of the best performers in the NTP, being the only State to 
invest in special additional TB workers (ICORCI 1988). The State Joint Director of TB, 
known to be enthusiastic about TB work for long, was earlier the DTO in the pilot phase 
district having old established links with general health service staff. These factors 
favoured success in the pilot phase, but reduced the probability of its achievements being 
replicable in other districts and did not facilitate identification of operational factors 
important in the implementation of the RNTP, an objective of the pilot phase. Cure rates 
were 81 % in the first quarter and 66.5% in the remaining part of the first year (TB 
Div.1995c). 
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Certain implementation aspects do not get reported in assessments which limit 
themselves to outcomes such as cases detected, sputum conversion and cure rates 
, 
without specifying how these were reached. Active case detection in the first quarter 
ensured high rates. TB drug supplies were adequate, the problem being of over supply 
here and at other sites (personal visits, communications). One reason was the over 
estinlation by national policy makers of patients likely to be detected. In Mehsana, in 
response to drug indents for 1000 patients supplies for 3000 were received (interview 
1996). This was problematic as diversion of RNTP drugs to other parts of the State under 
the NTP required special permission and wastage was likely with expiry dates nearing. 
Cure rates in Mehsana were 70% among smear positive patients, while 12% defaulted 
and 9% died (ODA 1995). DOTS was provided by a range of people- MPW's, ANM's, 
Anganwadi workers (child care workers), sarpanch's (Panchayat chairperson), dai's 
(traditional birth attendants), relatives and voluntary workers. Due to lack of a vehicle no 
field monitoring was done and because of the administrative structures, the DTO's did 
not have administrative control over the PRC staff (ibid). The problems of the NTP thus 
continue to operate within the RNTP. A field visit to a PRC during this study, found it 
locked with no doctor or patients. The laboratory technician when called from her house 
was knowledgeable, and the laboratory and records were well maintained. 
In Pathanamthitta District, Kerala, staff, vehicles and resources from other parts of the 
State were diverted to the district during the pilot phase (TAl 1995), adversely affecting 
NTP services in those districts. Socio-economically the district was unrepresentative of 
the State, the patients identified/included in the first year too small, and duration too short 
to draw statistical conclusions (TAl 1995, Deccan Chronicle 1995). State governrnent 
medical experts questioned the advisability of introduction of intermittent drug regimens. 
Alternatives proposed were that funds be used to extend existing SCC regimens to all 
patients and improve administration of the NTP (ibid). 
At several pilot sites case detection were lower than expected. In Bombay, in 1994 of a 
target of 800 smear positive patients, only 180 were identified due to 'inefficiency and 
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apathy of those in charge ....... and lack of motivation among staff (The Daily 1994). This 
continued the following year (Uplekar*1996). Cure rates in the first year were 73% (TB 
Div.1995c). Madras also reported lower numbers of cases (Jagannath, TAl 1995). In 
Hooghly District, West Bengal, less than 20% of expected cases are detected and high 
drug toxicity rates are reported (Banerji 1997). Sputum conversion in new smear positive 
cases at three months ranged from 79.6% to 94.6% at the different sites (TB Div.1995c). 
Several questioned the disproportionate time spent by the central team on RNTP pilot 
phase areas covering 2.4 and later 13.85 million people, with relative neglect of the 
remaining 900 million under the NTP (interviews 1996). Achieving success rates in order 
to finalise loan agreements appeared to be an imperative. 
RNTP pilot projects in Madras and Bangalore, would reportedly not have been able to 
function as effectively without local NGO's participating (Radhakrishna* 1996, 
Ranganath*1996 ). Their community work covered the absence/apathy of government 
health workers. Some NGO's had other motivations such as evangelism/witnessing, and 
were not always consistent/sustained in their work, being dependant on availability of 
funds and trained staff (interviews 1996). 
6.6 Bottom-up Perspectives of Local Action 
6.6.1 Patient Perspectives: 
The Bangalore Municipal Corporation was a Phase I & II Pilot Site. During the first year 
in 1994, only 32 new sputum positives among 83 patients were detected from 250,000 
persons (TB Div.1995c), several through an NGO. Reportedly one of the poorest 
performing pilot sites (Luellmo* 1995), with leadership characterised by apathy, 
disinterest, poor supervision such that money remained unutilised (interviews 1996). For 
this study 15 RNTP/TB patients8 from 3 Corporation Dispensaries, interviewed in their 
homes, included seven women and eight men, with average age 35 years (15-75), from 
8 Though the number of patients are small, they were carefully selected. I~ was considered im~ortant t~ 
have a bottom-up perspective, consistent with the methodology of the entIre study. They add mformatlOn 
and support the analysis in 6.7 and district level data in Chapter 8. 
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low to lower middle income groups and nine castes. Four had family members/close 
friends with TB. One third had been hospitalised (one for a non-TB condition) prior to 
the RNTP treatment. All patients, except one, were diagnosed elsewhere and referred to 
the dispensary. Four received previous TB treatment at government sanatoriaihospitals, 
while one was treated briefly by a private practitioner. Significantly, in all patients except 
two going directly to the public sector, private public referrals occurred for confimlation 
of diagnosis/treatment. Five referrals of 15 were to public hospitals/sanatoria and ten to 
dispensaries. Thus most patients made plural use of services. Many patients were initially 
sceptical about corporation dispensaries with poor perceptions of services even for minor 
diseases. With the RNTP inter-public sector referrals occurred from public hospitals to 
dispensaries nearer patients' homes, decentralising services to peripheral institutions. 
Private public referrals occurred prior to the RNTP as is evident from patients with long 
histories of TB and active efforts by the RNTP, to work with private practitioners 
increased this. However patients in this study were selected from dispensary registers, 
therefore dispensary non-users treated completely by private practitioners were excluded. 
Excluding three chronically ill patients (two with unrelated chronic illnesses), average 
duration of disease when interviewed was a long 14 months, suggesting the need for 
earlier diagnosis. It was shorter than rural patients possibly due to better urban access to 
services, greater awareness, better quality care in the RNTP with assured drug 
supplies/decentralised services or due to the selection bias towards new sputum positive 
cases preferentially included in the RNTP. None were cured when interviewed as current 
patients were selected. 
Patients visited on average seven providers (4-11) for this illness. Of the 108 providers 
listed as visited (an underestimate since some could not remember all private practitioners 
visited), 34% were from the public sector. However among all, TB treatment was 
provided by the public sector, a pattern similar to rural patients in this study (under the 
NTP), indicating that private public referral and collaboration already occurs, and 
highlighting the predominant role of the public sector in TB treatment. 
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6.6.2 Gold Standards and Street Level Implementation of the RNTP 
a) Sputum Microscopy for Diagnosis was unsystematic suggesting poor practice and 
supervision. In only one patient were the required 3 sputum samples examined (two early 
morning and one spot specimen). Three patients had 2 sputum tests done- one early 
morning and one spot in two patients and two early morning samples in one patient. 
Among eleven patients with just 1 sputum test, spot specimens were examined in seven 
and early morning samples in four. However, 8115 patients had a sputum examination 
done elsewhere before referral to the MCD. 
b) X-rays for Diagnosis done in 12115 patients before referral to the MCD were utilised 
and second X-rays were not ordered. In only one patient was an X-ray advised. 
c) Monitoring Treatment with Repeat Sputum Microscopy at second month was done in 
all patients showing sputum conversion in 12/15, while 3 remained smear positive. There 
were no records of sputum tests at fourth and sixth month in any patient. 
d) Patient Education by Doctors/staff occurred with advice regarding duration and 
regularity of treatment, diet and negotiations regarding supervised therapy at the 
dispensary . 
e) Treatment: All patients were put on one of three Categories of Short Course 
Chemotherapy. In some cases, doctors responding to patient requests for injections, added 
regular multivitamin injections, defying therapeutic and economic logic. A few patients 
'tired' of taking nine tablets at a time, occasionally refusing to take them. Dispensary 
retained patient treatment cards, supposed to be signed by patients at each visit, were 
often altered with patients signing up for a week or more at a time, or not at all, according 
to circumstances. 
During a visit to an MCD, awaiting the doctor, it was noticed from the treatment cards 
that several patients had stopped treatment 1-2 months ago. Later after discussions with 
the doctor, the set of treatment cards were returned and on a second look all had been 
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brought up-to-date! (Because of the schedule of the study this set of patients was not 
followed up.) 
f) Directly Observed Therapy: was the most problematic aspect for all patients. 
Doctors always started DOT, but were flexible in responding to patient requests and most 
patients discontinued supervised treatment after varying periods. Individual difficulties 
faced included: elderly or chronic patients and pregnant women too ill or tired to walk; 
mothers unable to leave young children unattended; mothers overburdened with 
housework and childcare who discontinued on feeling better; a young person with a new 
job could not take time off three times a week; some felt giddy after the drugs and could 
not walk back and others thought the water was impure. Irregular and incomplete 
treatment, a problem that the RNTP was to resolve, was observed in this group of 
patients. 
g) Drug Supply: TB drugs were available at the dispensaries. Wastage occurred when 
patients discontinued treatment as each patient had a separate earmarked box of drugs. 
h) Corruption: Though some patients with other illnesses mentioned paying doctors in 
dispensaries, none of the RNTP patients paid anything, a contrast to frequent payment for 
'free services' observed in rural NTP patients. 
i) Patients felt positive regarding their experience with the RNTP, despite problems of 
delays/non-attendance by doctors and difficulties with supervised therapy. However 
many were irregular/discontinued treatment on feeling better, inspite of being forewarned 
about symptomatic relief and the necessity for complete treatment. While the word cure 
may have different meanings for patients, clinicians and epidemiologists, the life 
circumstances of people are important determining factors. 
j) Observations: During field visits it was noted that doctors were absent/late on several 
occasions without notice; staff were often rude and impatient with TB patients; 
paramedical staff were often slept, read novels and sometimes closed the dispensary 
early; the TB work depended on the commitment of individuals; optical equipment of a 
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microscope was not functioning; patients scheduled to come for observed therapy on 
specific days did not come; directly observed therapy was not undertaken but patients 
took boxes of medicine home though records were written up otherwise, questioning the 
validity of routine records on which assessments are made; patients sometimes did not 
follow the treatment at home; some patients could not understand how and when the 
tablets should be taken, finding directions on the combipacks confusing (Fieldnotes 
1996). 
k) Staff Perspectives: Staff were trained and knowledgeable about technical aspects of 
the RNTP. Drugs, equipment and supplies were adequate. NTI staff were not entirely 
satisfied with the laboratory work or implementation. Urban areas lack field staff for 
patient follow-up. Nurses and group D employees, who often seemed to have time, could 
not be asked to home visit, a task not in their job responsibilities. Staff were 
deputed/seconded for short periods to the RNTP, and retired staff taken as field 
supervisors on short term contracts, raised concerns regarding sustainability of the 
programme. Doctors had additional public health and clinical responsibilities, sometimes 
attending two clinics, while some engaged in private practice. 
It was disturbing and difficult to link intentions and actions from international to local 
levels. 'Implementation gaps' are observable in the RNTP inspite of priority attention, 
adequate resources, supply systems, training, and supervision. Day to day struggles in the 
lives of poor people, create complex social conditions wherein apparently rational actions 
are not simple or easily implementable. 
In Summary, 
• Policy content of the revised NTP is not very different to the NTp9 and focusing on 
content does not address deeper underlying problems, particularly that the NTP was 
never fully implemented as intended. The RNTP is also not as cheap or cost-effective 
9 Other than the insistence on DOTS, though the NTP has offered intermittent supervised therapy as one of 
its regimens since more than two decades. 
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as expected, and there are technical conflicts concerning directly observed therapy 
and drug regimens. 
• The Revised NTP did not emerge as a contained policy package at a point of time but 
evolved over several years, being driven by strong players and interests. International 
organisations in health, though appearing to playa purely technical role, also function 
in the politico-economic realm of international relations. Policy process was 
influenced using the leverage of funding and conditionalities. Negotiations regarding 
policy content/strategy involved bargaining and compromise and was characterised 
by conflictual processes. 
• Positive contributions of the policy change process included widespread attention to 
TB from central and state governments, NGO's, the private sector and the media, 
increased national funding and consequently drug supplies. 
• Despite substantial evidence in the literature since the mid-1980's regarding context, 
particularly close interactions of TB with poverty, there are few efforts by the public 
health community to engage with underlying political economy issues. 
• The political and economic context in India with structural adjustment, privatisation 
and globalisation is more complex than in earlier years and the policy leadership will 
need to steer through it. The rapid change in national policy leadership during this 
crucial period does not suggest genuine political support/commitment to TB control. 
• Policy processes at national level that are unconducive to good implementation 
included decision making by a small elite groups uninvolved with the programme, 
changing leadership, devaluing institutional frameworks, short term contracts, and 
corruption. Programme managers/researchers/implementors did not take proactive or 
assertive action in issues concerning their constituency. Pre-occupation with the 
RNTP led to relative neglect of the majority population under the NTP. 
• Widespread use of discretion altered the revised policy considerably during 
implementation. Even in high profile, well resourced, pilot phase projects with close 
international and national attention, technical policy content was modified with 
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substitution of passive by active case finding, use of smaller number of sputum 
microscopy tests, modifications of DOTS and reporting systems, making it difficult to 
know what policy was actually implemented and assessed. Apathy and disinterest 
were already manifest. 
• Desire to prove the model successful, influenced patient selection and suppressed 
negative feedback from implementation experiences. Critical input from academics 
and NGO's was unwelcome or ignored with little real policy debate. Implementation 
problems are likely to get accentuated in the shift from pilot to routine phase. 
• The implementor-patient interface was a decisive point in the policy and one that is 
usually overlooked. In the RNTP the explanatory factors for poor implementation 
such as financial resources, drug supplies, staff vacancies, and government 
commitment had been addressed and were not problems but gaps persisted. Poor 
living/social conditions of patients and behaviour/attitudes/relationship between 
implementor and patient seem important. 
• Contemporary policy discourse and planning regarding TB control continues an over-
emphasis on policy content. While implicitly recognising the need for better 
management, it does not address the structural components of change required to 
actualise this. It has undervalued process and implementation issues, been naive about 
political commitment, and has become mired in an unproductive RNTPINTP conflict 
with a dogmatic attachment to a particular package. Thus potential forces working 
towards improved TB care and control have become fragmented rather than 
combined. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPLEMENTATION AT STATE LEVEL 
7.1 Contextual Historical Background 
Mysore kingdom, ruled by Tippu Sultan, the last in the country to fall to the British, was 
not placed under direct rule, but became a semi-autonomous state by reinstalling its 
earlier non-brahmin royal family, the Wodeyars. A progressive, scholarly king in the late 
nineteenth century chose able, visionary 'Divans'(administrators) (Gangamma*1996) and 
developed an enlightened civil service (Vyasalu 1995). Health services developed within 
a liberal, welfarist administration evidenced by establishment of the KrishnaRajendra 
Hospital in 1876, the College of Indian Medicine (Ayurveda and Unani) in 1908, a 
medical college (Allopathy) in 1930, all in Mysore city, besides hospitals in other 
cities/towns (GOK 1988). The first primary health units serving rural popUlations in India 
were pioneered in the state in the 1920's, the first being established in Ramnagaram 
(RamaRao* 1994). Thus a tradition of state run health services was built. 
Early TB Work: 
A princess of the royal family succumbed to TB early in life. The Princess Krishna 
Jammani TB Sanatorium 1 was established in her memory in Mysore in 1918 by the 
Maharani of Mysore, Srimati Vani Vilas. With spacious buildings situated on an 85 acre 
campus on the outskirts of the city, and well trained staff, it offered treatment free of cost 
to the general pUblic. This was the period when sanatoria were the 'state of the art' 
approach in TB care. In 1938 the Lady Wellingdon TB Clinic was established in the 
centre of Bangalore city (part of the State of Mysore ) as an outpatient unit, also in 
keeping with latest trends in TB management (KST A records). Very soon after formation 
of the TB Association of India in Delhi, the Government of Mysore through Divan Mirza 
Ismail, its administrator, started the Mysore State TB Association 2(MST A) by 
1 Now run by the State Government and called the PK TB and Chest Disease Hospital. 
2 Changed to Kamataka State TB Association (KSTA) after the name of the state was changed. 
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Government Order [GO No.G 12735:9, Med.296.33.8] on 20th June 1939 with its office 
in Mysore (ibid). MSTA developed the Lady Wellingdon TB Clinic, provided financial 
assistance to private and public clinics and was registered as a Society in 1943. It 
followed the national pattern of government setting up a non-governmental association in 
which private, governmental and missionary/voluntary physicians3 participated with royal 
patronage. 'Government leadership was responsible for the establishment and 
functioning of a voluntary movement' (Sundareswara 1996;77). International events, 
particularly the Second World War into which India was drawn, did not allow for much 
activity by the Association (ibid). The MST AfT AI were doctor dominated, accepting of 
current international methods of TB diagnosis and treatment, and unquestioning of the 
British governments non-involvement in TB work on a larger scale. 
State Profile: 
While the population below the poverty line reduced from 1960-1990, Kamataka is in the 
category of States with the lowest decline in incidence of poverty (Vyasulu 1995). Overall 
40% of the population remains below the poverty line (WB 1996b). Regional 
concentrations of poverty occur, while infrastructural development, especially of roads, 
railways and industries, is unevenly distributed, being better in the southeast, the old 
princely state of My sore (Vyasulu 1995). 
Table 7.1 Current Demographic Profile of Karnataka 
Variable Current Status Comment 
Area 191,791 square km In southwest India 
Population 44.98 million (1991) Current growth a little less than 
50 million (estimate for 1997) a million a year 
Rural Population 69.08 % (27,066 villages & 254 decreased by 10% over 50 
towns/urban areas) years 
Scheduled Caste Population 16.7% These 23.4% are most 
Scheduled Tribe Population 6.7% vulnerable economically 
Literacy Rate (1991) 56.04% Total literacy drive in past 6 
females 44.3%, males 67.2% years achieved 100% literacy in 
rural 47.7%, urban 74.2% Dakshin Kannada district & 
improvements in others. 
Per Capita Income (1995-96) Rs. 7,155 at 1993-94 prices Range Rs. 13066 in Kodagu to 
Rs. 4,910 in Bidar District. 
Average District Income (1995-96) Rs.58512 million in Bangalore Inter-district variations affect 
at 1993-94 prices and Rs. 6416 million in Bidar infrastructure 
Source: ICHI 1996, GOK 1996 
3 All three groups currently considered important in policy. 
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Table 7.2 Health Status Indicators in Karnataka, 1995 
Indicator Karnataka India India-Targets for 2000 
AD 
Crude Birth Rate 25.5 28.5 21.0 
Crude Death Rate 8 9.8 9.0 
Infant Mortality Rate 67/1000 live births 80/1000 live births less than 60/1000 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Male 62.1 60.6 64.0 
Female 63.3 61.7 64.0 
Source: WB 1996b;46. 
7.2 The Early Post Independence Period of Policy Formulation 1947-60 
After Indian Independence in 1947 the State of Mysore joined the Indian Republic. The 
state capital shifted to Bangalore and in 1950 the TB Association shifted its office there 
for better coordination with the new government (Sundareswara 1996). Karnataka State 
(known till the 1970's as Mysore State) was created during the reorganisation of States in 
1956. It incorporated the princely state of Mysore (the largest component); the northern 
districts of Bidar and Raichur from the Nizam of Hyderabad's State; Belgaum and 
Dharwad districts from Bombay Presidency, Dakshin Kannada from Madras Presidency, 
and Kodagu which was a Class C State (Vyasulu 1995). The Presidencies had been part 
of British India while the others were semi-autonomous. The political histories, traditions 
and administrations of these regions of the new State were very different. Reorganisation, 
an issue of 'high politics' (Walt 1994) entailing major administrative changes dominated 
the agenda of politicians, the executive and bureaucracy during the 1950's and 1960's. 
Since then regional and language issues 4 continue to enlist the support of different 
groups, influencing the politics of the State. The new State government built its health 
care infrastructure on the existing network of primary health units and hospitals (GOK 
1988). Guidelines and financial support from the Indian government towards rural health 
4 Small political groups within the regions lobby for greater benefits or integration with neighbouring states 
because of historical differences. There are some disputes over which language should be the first language 
in specific regions. 
176 
services were based on population norms, a Primary Health Centre then covering 100,000 
people (Park 1994) attempting to redress urban-rural disparities. 
In the early 1950's, the BCG Campaign initiated and supported financially by the Centre 
was implemented in the State. With restricted resources, including of trained personnel, 
collaborative links between Government and NGO's in TB were close at national and 
state levels making the TB Association of India/the State Association appear like unseen 
arms of government. A State Government Order on 16/11/51 'approved and adopted the 
TB Seal Sale Campaign ... as proposed by the TB Association of India' (KSTA records). 
This was a campaign to raise public awareness and money for TB work. While the TAl 
played a more independent proactive policy role (Chapter 4), the KSTA was a lower 
profile, less critical ally of government, supporting programme implementation. 
In the late 1950's the TB Adviser to the Government of India5 and the State successfully 
bid to locate the National TB Institute (NTI) in Bangalore, against competition with New 
Delhi and Mysore city (Nair*1996). The Mysore Maharaja who became the first 
Governor of Mysore State, after a good deal of negotiation, made available at reasonable 
rates the 'Avalon Palace' in Bangalore (belonging to the royal family) and its spacious 
grounds to house the NT!. The TB leadership showed its capacity to negotiate 
successfully with central and state governments. There was a political need to diffuse 
national institutes away from Delhi at that time and thus the NTI was situated away from 
the centre of power and influence. However, while establishing the NTI in Bangalore was 
a triumph for MysoreiKarnataka State, it can be argued that its distance from Delhi cut it 
off from national level decision making, reducing its influence/capacity to advocate its 
philosophy and strategy in policies concerning the development of health services and 
national programmes, on which the NTP was dependent. 
While inaugurating the NTI in Bangalore in 1959 Prime Minister Nehru said, HI have 
come to inaugurate an idea, not an institution" (Issac* 1995). This reflected the thinking, 
questioning and challenging of relevance of then current global concepts in TB control to 
India by a small group. The Prime Minister aware of this ferment, approved attempts to 
5 A South Indian but not from Kamataka. 
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develop ideas and strategies relevant to prevailing Indian conditions. The Institute 
showed independence in its work developing the National TB Programme (Chapter 4). 
Dr. Halfdan Mahler worked at the NTI as WHO consultant for two years and several 
international TB workers came to Bangalore every year for courses and official visits to 
the NTL 
Early NTI studies conducted in Tumkur district made Karnataka a partner in the 
formulation of the NTP (DH&FW/GOK 1996). The NTP based on a philosophy of 
putting people first contained seeds of the primary health care approach (Banerji 1993). 
This is acknowledged in a portrait of Dr. Halfdan Mahler near the WHO library, Geneva, 
which has India as background with primary health care emerging out of Bangalore 
(Issac* 1995, observation). With collaborating State officials exposed to the philosophy 
and strategy, and the NTI as a resource for training and advice, implementation of the 
NTP in Karnataka was better informed and could potentially be optimal, but "the truth is 
different" said a senior official (interview 1996) as seen later. 
As the new programme was being formulated, existing policy processes continued. 
Besides the BCG campaign, State governments were encouraged by the centre to start TB 
Hospitals and Clinics (GOI, 1st and 2nd Plans). With health constitutionally a State 
subj ect, the Centre gained policy leverage through the instrument of part funding, 
sometimes from external sources. In 1960 Lady Wellingdon TB Clinic, which had been 
transferred from the MSTA to government (KSTA records), was upgraded with UNICEF 
support into a State TB Demonstration and Training Centre to demonstrate model 
outpatient domiciliary TB management and train key personnel from health institutions in 
the State (DH&FW/GOK 1996). 
The infrastructure of'TB Institutions' in the State, in 1964, at the time of policy change 
(Table 7.3) indicates earlier policy emphasis on specialised institutions/hospitals. 
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Table 7.3 TB Institutions ID Karnataka 1964 , 
Institutions Numbers Beds 
Sanatoria 12 1,895 
Hospitals 2 52 
Centre 1 -
Clinics 11 100 
General Hospital wards for TB patients 6 190 
Source. TAl 1964 
All these institutions, except six sanatoria, were run by State government, making the 
public sector the biggest player in organised TB care. It was perhaps not surprising that 
the NTP focused primarily on the public sector. The six sanatoria run by the voluntary 
sector, with 392 beds totally, were small (Bellary-40 beds, South Kanara -60, Bangalore 
80, Belgaum District -150, Mangalore - 40, and Gadag -22 beds) (TAl 1964). 
Government sanatoria were larger (two in Bangalore 430 and 184 beds, Bellary 240 beds, 
Mysore -389, Kolar 160, Mangalore 100) with a total of 1503 beds (ibid). Including its 
general hospital TB beds, government accounted for 1845 beds (82%) of a total of 2237 
beds, representing substantial public investment in capital and running costs. These early 
policies developed a life of their own, backed by specific stakeholders. Thus institutional 
care by TB specialists through sanatoria6, continued alongside integration of TB services 
with general health services, playing a prominent role even after three decades of policy 
change (Chapter 8). 
NGO's: The Mysore State TB Association was largely non-functional in the 1950's with 
a part-time clerk at its office located within the premises of the Bangalore Sanatorium 
(KST A secretary). It did not playa role in policy formulation of the NTP nor did other 
State level NGO's. NGO's in general health services then were fewer, involved with 
service provision and not public health, and not yet organised into State-level 
associations. After retirement in 1962, the first TB Advisor to GOI lived in Bangalore, 
initiating a reorganisation of the MSTA and building collaborative linkages (ibid). This 
points again to the role of individuals with dynamism, energy and organisational 
6 Later renamed TB and Chest Disease Hospitals. 
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competence. The office was shifted, a full time secretary appointed, and a committed 
active Secretary chosen. Office-bearers included government and NTI staff. The MST A 
in 1962 implemented a pilot project in Tumkur district to 'find out how voluntary 
organisations could assist the government in the NTP' (Benjamin 1965;1). The study 
guided by a committee of State government and NTI staff, was supported by the 
International Union Against TB (IVAT) and a member of the National TB Association of 
the USA (ibid). The Executive Director of the IVAT, Dr. J. Holm visited Bangalore, the 
project site and the NTI. Overlaps and cross cutting linkages, even then, between 
government, voluntary sector and private professionals is striking at organisational and 
individual level, both nationally and internationally. 
7.3 Implementing the District TB Programme (DTP) 1960-1990's 
Karnataka initiated implementation of the DTP (the functional unit of the NTP) in three 
districts in 1963, supported actively by State Health Minister Dr. Nagappa Alva 
(DH&FW,GOK 1996), a physician involved with the freedom movement. By 1968-69, 
thirteen more districts were included, and by 1974 the last three were covered, making 
Karnataka one of the first states to cover all its nineteen districts (ibid) 7. This did not 
mean that entire districts were covered or that all people had equal geographical access as 
implementation at peripheral institutions was prolonged and is still incomplete (Chapter 
8). 
To execute the DTP, District TB Centres established at district headquarters, with teams 
trained at NTI, were to train staff on site, set up supply systems, initiate recording and 
reporting systems in a phased manner in all government peripheral institutions. 
Infrastructure and training for DTC's were financed by central government; staff salaries 
and maintenance by state government; while drug supply was undertaken jointly. 
Administrative, financial, and technical processes were complex in a federal government 
system. As part of policy change by 1971, of 15 BCG teams 10 were integrated into the 
7 Other states took longer to cover all districts. 
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DTP's, and 5.4 million vaccinations had been done since inception of the campaign 
(DH&FPS 1971). 
State expenditure on the NTP was substantially more than the Centre, even when it was a 
100% centrally sponsored programme (Table 7.4). Its contribution continued increasing 
during 1966-68, covering the drop in central government funds during the period of 
drought and central political instability8. 
Table 7.4 State & Central Expenditure on the NTP in Karnataka, 1960's 
(Rs. in millions) 
Year State Centre Total 
1963-64 2.1 0.8 2.9 
1964-65 2.3 0.9 3.2 
1965-66 2.5 1.0 3.5 
1966-67 3.7 0.2 3.9 
1967-68 4.4 0.4 4.8 
1968-69 4.9 0.9 5.8 
1969-70 3.3 0.6 3.9 
Source: DH&FPS 1971 
Structural and functional changes in the State health services in the 1970's, transformed 
the NTP, affecting the working of the DTP. A restructuring of the State Directorate of 
Health and Family Welfare took place in 1978, reflecting conflicting interests between 
clinicians and public health specialists (Baily* 1995). Clinicians felt that a public health 
training (including the Diploma in TB) provided faster promotion avenues towards top 
administrative positions which had greater prestige, power over finances, better salaries 
and locations at district or state headquarters. Clinicians, even with postgraduate degrees, 
often working for long periods at PHC's, la/uk or district hospitals found entry into 
administrative positions more difficult. To equalise the situation the 19 District TB 
Officers (DTO) posts were abolished. Instead 48 Assistant District Health Officers 
(ADHO's) posts were created, including 19 ADHO's posted to DTC's (Krishnacharya 
8 Increased central support to the family planning programme (Rao 1994) inflated the central health budget. 
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1995). ADHO's at DTC's no longer required qualifications in TB or public health. A 
retired Joint Director (TB) tenned its impact on the NTP detrimental, "ADHO's are not 
trained to manage the DTP as expected (ibid;11). ADHO's at DTC's reporting to the 
District Health Officers, lack authority over the PHI's which report to it on the NTP. In 
contradiction to NTP plans, wherein two medical officers were to be posted to a DTC 
(one to manage clinical work, the other to visit PHI's, organising training, recording and 
reporting systems and supply lines), only one ADHO was posted (Gnaneshwar*1995). At 
the same time in 1978 the top State position of Assistant Director (ADG) of Tuberculosis 
was abolished and merged into a single post of Deputy Director of TB and Leprosy 
(Krishnacharya 1995). Powerful clinical lobbies and local pressures obscured the interests 
of the NTP and of rural TB patients. One could speculate whether these lobbies 
representing older interests and conflicts made use of a political opportunity offered by a 
changed party in power to further their position, with the first non-Congress State 
government in power then. In 1978 the Central government (Janata Party) introduced a 
monitoring system for the programme, following the 1975 ICMR evaluation, but with the 
basic structure weak and eroded in the State, the quality of monitoring reports and its 
impact on implementation are questionable. 
In 1980 the State government recreated the post of Assistant Director (TB) at a higher 
level of Deputy Director (TB) (Krishnacharya 1995), subsequently changing it to Joint 
Director (TB) (as were similar positions for leprosy, malaria, MCH). This position also 
lacked sufficient power in the health health services. Posts of District TB Officers were 
not recreated (ibid). ADHO's at DTC's functioned 'like any other medical officer in the 
system' doing primarily clinical work, without authority and with little interest in 
Peripheral Health Institutions and their staff (Sundareswara* 1995). The NTP had no 
powers to alter these structural changes made by the State. 
Administrative and financial responsibility for BeG vaccination shifted in 1978 from 
the NTP to the central government Expanded Programme of Immunization (Park 1994). 
However State health services are utilised for its implementation (Krishnacharya 1995). 
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Though comprising a part of government effort at TB control it is not included III 
financial analysis. 
In 1982 the Lady Wellingdon TB Demonstration and Training Centre was upgraded into 
the State TB Centre (STC) to supervise and monitor the NTPIDTP's in the State 
(DH&FW,GOK 1996). This appears to be a response to a need to monitor the NTP, put 
on the Prime Ministers Twenty Point Programme. The STC continued compiling reports 
routinely from DTC's, as it had from 1978, routing them to the Central TB Unit, GOI and 
the NT!. Most DTC teams in the State did not have Statistical Assistants recommended 
by the NTP and records and reports were maintained by untrained Treatment Organisers. 
The incomplete and confused state of registers and records in two districts (Hassan and 
Mysore) made analysis difficult (NTI 1994b). This was also noted in the mid-1980's by 
TRC staff in Raichur district as part of the 18 district Short Course Chemotherapy study 
(interviewI995). The NTI frequently raised the point that coverage and quality of 
monitoring from most states including Kamataka needed improvement (NT! 
Newsletters). There were few efforts by the STC to check/improve quality of reports, 
undertake cohort analyses, or more importantly take action on findings (interview 1996). 
Training components of the STC declined, with no long-term training programmes for 
treatment organisers/other staff since 1973 (Chikaiah*1995). It continued mainly 
outpatient, domiciliary clinical work, a service used for research studies by the NT!. It did 
not play the nodal leadership role envisaged by the NTP for an STC at State level. 
Whether this was possible in the given circumstances is another question. 
Short Course Chemotherapy was started in Kamataka during 1985-86 in a phased 
manner as part of its introduction nationally (DH&FW,GOK 1996). One district was part 
of the national 18 district pilot phase in the mid-1980's and by 1995, 17 districts of 
Kamataka were reportedly covered, barring Kodagu, Bangalore Rural and Uttar Kannada 
(Mahadevappa 1995). However a key drug Rifampicin was expensive, often not available 
even in larger hospitals and unavailable in sufficient quantities or irregularly available at 
PHI's, DTC's and at the TB hospital even in 1994-95 (interviews with staff). Availability 
of Short Course drugs in the market, used by urban private practitioners and given on 
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prescription by doctors in public health facilities (ibid), furthered stratification in access 
to treatment in favour of those with ability to pay. Coverage through the NTP was partly 
notional and unscientific with dangerous consequences of drug resistance.from irregular 
supplies and treatment. 
Expansion: The number of districts in Kamataka increased by one, in 1987, to twenty9. 
As the NTP planned DTC's for the average district with 1.5 million people, the 
Government of Kamataka expanded the number of DTC's for districts with populations 
over 2 million (despite a constant number of districts) creating six additional DTC's, 
mainly in economically disadvantaged regions (JD(TB) records 1996, Table 7.6). Mysore 
district with 3.1 million people was not included, because of the TB hospital and large 
number of public and private health care facilities available. The State government 
financed the expansion. In Districts with TB & Chest Disease Hospitals (Sanatoria), 
DTC's offer investigative and outpatient domiciliary services, while in districts without 
TB Hospitals, DTC's have inpatient facilities. Supply and maintenance of equipment in 
the 20 main DTC's was adequate in 80% (Table 7.5). However their usefulness is 
undermined by poor drug supplies, insufficient trained staff (Table 7.15) and corruption 
(interviews ). 
Table 7.S Equipment at DTC's III Karnataka, 1995 
Equipment Availability in 20 main DTC's 
X-ray Machines with Odelca Cameras 18 available of which 2 are not functioning 
Microscopes 20 
Refrigerators 18 of which 2 are not functioning 
Vehicles 19 of which 3 require repairs 
Source: JD (TB) 1995 
The infrastructure in 1995 through which the NTP functions/could function (Table 7.6) 
suggests that the structural base for the NTP through widespread peripheral institutions 
has been laid by government. 
9 This is different to other States like Orissa and Tamil Nadu where districts increased over the years 
requiring the establishment of new DTC's. 
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Table 7.6 Public Sector Infrastructure for the NTP in Karnataka, 1995 
Type of Health Facility Number Comment 
TB Centres (DTC's) 20 (in every Plus 6 additional DTC's *. 
District) 
X-ray Centres 178 Includes Taluk general hospitals, district 
hospitals, teaching hospitals, TB hospitals. 
Microscopy Centres 826 Includes PHC's. 
Referral Centres 748 Primary Health Units (with Dr's) and sub-
centres (staffed by HA's). 
TB Beds 2966 + 609 in Volag TB hospitals, voluntary 
sector can get Government grants in aid. 
* located In economIcally poorer dIstrIcts (Dt.s) In Sua (Tumkur Dt.), Davangere (Chitradurga Dt.), 
Koppal 
(Raichur Dt.), Hospet (Bellary Dt.), Yadgir (Gulbarga Dt.) & Sirsi (Uttar Kannada Dt.). 
Source: JD(TB) records 1996, Krishnacharya, 1995 
Table 7.7 Changed Infrastructure for TB in Karnataka Over Time 
Public Sector 1964 1995 Comments 
Sanatoria 6 7+2* Renamed TB & Chest Disease 
Hospitals. 
Sanatoria beds 1503 2148 
General hospitals with TB 6 19 Excludes medical college! 
wards specialist hospitals. 
General hospital TB beds 190 698 Wider spread in districts 
Centre!Clinic 1 + 11 -
District TB Centres - 26 New nodal point for public 
health approach to TB. 
Peripheral Health Institutions formally uninvolved Table 6.6 Integration could increase access 
in TB work to TB care. 
Voluntary Sector TB care through general clinics, 
Sanatoria 6 7 unertake community health! 
Sanatoria beds!% of total beds 392 (18%) 609 (17%) development work also. 
.. 
Source: TAl 1964, JD(TB) reports 1995, (*run by ESI & a MUnICIpahty) 
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Incremental changes occurred from 1964 with considerable infrastructural development. 
Sanatoria continued, though transformed into TB and Chest Disease Hospitals. Ten 
districts have TB hospitals/sanatoria (by government or NGO's), of which better 
developed districts Bangalore, Belgaum, Dakshin Kannada and Kolar have more than one 
each (JD-TB 1995). BCG continues under the Universal Immunization Programme 
through general health services, 26 new DTC's developed State-wide, increased numbers 
of peripheral health institutions enhanced potential access to TB care with only 12.5% of 
the 2082 peripheral institutions not covered by the NTP (JD-TB 1995). However political 
policy processes altered the NTP at State and district levels, disempowering key 
institutions (State and district TB Centres), diminishing their influence over peripheral 
institutions, which were also disabled by staff vacancies, competing interests of other 
programmes using the same infrastructure and poor drug supplies. 
A USAID supported time bound 'Expanded Programme of Health Education in 
Tuberculosis' was channeled by the GOI to the TB Association of India/its State 
Branches, in another instance of Government NGO collaboration (Krishnacharya 1995). 
From 1987-90 the Kamataka State TB Association (KSTA) conducted 
refresher/orientation courses in 15 districts, covering 1709 government and private 
physicians, 3169 paramedical staff, and orientation courses for 6108 community leaders, 
standing first among 25 States in India which implemented the programme (ibid). This 
project revived the KSTA though 'unfortunately the tempo is not maintained by the KSTA 
to continue the health education programme as recommended' (interview 1996). 
The Bangalore Municipal Corporation was one of the Pilot Phase I sites selected in 1993 
for the Revised NTP by GOIlGOK supported by the NTI and STC. As part of this process 
a Dutch group FEMCONSUL T conducted part of its field study in Bangalore in 
December 1994 to develop appropriate health education material for TB. The Joint 
Directorate(TB) seemingly unaware of the study or its outcome talked of developing their 
own audio-visuals (interviews 1996). During the earlier USAID project several 
educational materials developed by the TB Association were translated into Kannada, the 
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state language, by the KSTA with local illustrations. Absent linkages between different 
initiatives suggest a lack of policy management. 
Performance Indicators of NTPIBCG in Karnataka: 
a) Official data regarding BCG coverage (Table 7.8) base on targets fixed as percentages 
of eligible population. Coverage of eligible infants is 73.1 % compared to all India 
coverages of 92.6% (WB 1996b). Community based cluster surveys conducted by 
medical colleges as part of monitoring mechanisms indicate lower coverage's of 60% in 
some regions (Patel* 1995). 
Table 7.8 BCG Coverage in Karnataka 
Year Target Achievement % Achievement 
1989-90 11,01,100 10,67,960 97.0 
1990-91 12,01,700 12,25,048 101.8 
1991-92 11,48,400 11,33,730 98.7 
1992-93 11,85,800 11,89,461 100.3 
1993-94 12,29,367 12,54,385 102.0 
Source: DH&FW, GOK 1995 
b) The percentage of positives obtained from sputum microscopy of chest symptomatics 
is low in Karnataka (Table 7.9, NTI 1994d) suggesting poor selection of patients, poor 
quality laboratory work or altered patterns of respiratory diseases. 
Table 7.9 Sputum Positivity Rate in 1992 in Karnataka for SCC Districts 
DTC's pm's DTP's 
Expected 18% 8% -
Achieved 13.6% 5.6% 6.9% 
National Average 14.1% 6.1% 8% 
Source: Krishnacharya 1995 
c) The proportion of bacillary cases detected by the public sector is low as are treatment 
completion rates (Table 7.10) questioning the quality of functioning of public sector 
servIces. 
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Table 7.10 Public Sector Case Detection and Treatment Completion in the 1990's 
Year Total Cases Bacillary Cases % of Treatment Completion (all forms) 
Detected 
1992 69,380 17,407 (25%) 22.7% 
1993 67,040 16,386 (24%) 22.5% 
1994 76,541 17,546 (23%) 31.6% 
Source: DH&FW, GOK, 1995 
Though targets increased, new TB case detection decreased steadily from 78,400 in 1989-
90 to 67,040 in 1993-94 increasing the following year (DH&FW 1992-93, 1995). This 
was a period of economic crisis, political instability and budgetary stagnation/decline. 
Targets comprise 50% of sputum positives expected in a district. It is estimated that there 
are over 890,000 TB patients in Kamataka (1995) of whom 180,000 are infectious or 
sputum positive (Mahadevappa 1995). Thus 10% of the total expected number of cases 
were detected in 1994-95 by the public sector. If 50% of patients complete treatment 
government effort would account for 5% of patients cured. In 1991 treatment completion 
by patients on Short Course Chemotherapy was 46.5% against an expected 85%, and less 
than the national average of 48.8% (Krishnacharya 1995). Rates are lower with the 
Standard Regimen 20.1 % in 1992 and 30.1 % in 1994 (JD-TB reports). 
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Table 7.11 TB Case Detection in Districts of Karnataka, 1993-94 
Division/ District Target Achievement % Achievement 
I Bangalore Division 
1. Bangalore 9676 9187 94.9 
2. Bangalore Rural 3166 1195 37.7 
3. Chitradurga 4372 3689 84.4 
4. Kolar 4450 4342 97.6 
5. Shimoga 3823 3068 80.3 
6. Tumkur 4375 3274 74.8 
II Belgaum Division 
7. Belgaum 7064 4907 69.5 
8. Bijapur 5858 4076 69.6 
9. Dharwad 7022 4590 65.4 
10. Uttar Kannada 2316 1258 54.3 
III Gulbarga Division 
11. Bellary 3778 3568 94.4 
12. Bidar 2378 2638 110.9 
13. Gulbarga 5164 5238 101.4 
14. Raichur 4386 2933 66.9 
IV Mysore Division 
15. Chickmagalur 1934 1030 53.3 
16. Dakshin Kannada 5118 3773 73.7 
17. Hassan 2978 1451 48.7 
18. Kodagu 922 457 49.6 
19. Mandya 3300 3914 118.6 
20. Mysore(study district) 6000 3202 53.4 
STATE TOTAL 88,080 67,790 77.0 
Source: DH&FW, GOK, 1995 
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Districtwise TB case detection (Table 7.11) is very variable, being low in the study 
district. Thus core policy components of case detection/complete treatment are far from 
being achieved in the State. 
The present J anata Dal State Health Minister, holding office from December 1994, 
publicly reiterated commitment to the NTP, "The DTP ... has come to stay as an effective 
approach to tackle the problem on a community basis" (Mahadevappa 1995;3). In 1995-
96, government planned to extend Short Course Chemotherapy to three remaining 
districts. A proposal for six Additional DTC's in 1996-97 was being considered for better 
implementation of the DTP. Negotiations were underway with the Gal for World Bank 
Assistance to start the Revised National Tuberculosis Programme under Phase III, in 6 
districts in 1997. These announcements at public meetings portray plans as having been 
sanctioned and receive press coverage. The fact that the World Bank-Gal loan itself was 
still under negotiation at the time are seldom referred to. Public images thus created differ 
from realities. For example a Department report states, 'GOI has been approached for 
sanction of RNTP for the remaining 14 districts of the State' (DH&FW,GOK,1996;38) 
giving the incorrect impression that 6 were already covered. However progress is being 
made with improved drug supplies in 1996 in some regions (Sudarshan*, 
Acquinas* 1996). 
The TB programme should be located within the context of State health policy in the 
Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) which states, 'Health for the underprivileged may be the 
key strategy for HF A by the year 2000. The structural framework for the delivery of 
health programmes must undergo a meaningful reorientation in a way that the 
underprivileged become the subjects of the process and not merely its objects. This can 
only be done by emphasising community based systems. ' (GOK 1991). 
The Voluntary Sector/NGO's: 
Health and health related voluntary organisations in Karnataka10 increased in numbers 
over the decades, working largely with the poor, but often located in better off districts 
10 They are predominantly indigenous as in India in general, though using foreign financial resources. 
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(Narayan 1988). Districtwise distribution of a sample (Table 7.12) shows an uneven 
spread, with smaller numbers in economically disadvantaged districts (Bidar, Bijapur, 
Bellary, Gulbarga, Raichur, Dharwad, Chitradurga). Several have moved beyond medical 
care to community health, community organisation and development with a broad range 
of community based interventions, into which TB care is integrated. They range from 
welfare/service agencies, social development organisations, grassroots organisations, to 
advocacy groups and networks (Walt 1994). 
Table 7.12 Distribution of Health NGO's in Districts of Karnataka, 1988 
1. Bangalore (Urban& Rural) 158 11. Hassan 8 
2. Belgaum 19 12. Kodagu 8 
3. Bellary 9 13. Kolar 12 
4. Bidar 3 14. Mandya 12 
5. Bijapur 7 15. Mysore 36 
6. Chickmagalur 10 16. Raichur 10 
7. Chitradurga 1 17. Shirnoga 5 
8. Dakshin Kannada 35 18. Turnkur 5 
9. Dharwad 14 19. Uttar Kannada 18 
10. Gulbarga 0 
TOTAL 370 
Source: Narayan 1988 
State networks and associations, providing forums for discussions and an organisational 
framework for joint action include the Voluntary Health Association of Kamataka formed 
in the 1970's, the Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development, and State 
branches of the Christian Medical Association of India, the Catholic Health Association 
of India, among others. There are resource NGO's providing training, information and 
research support to others. Besides undertaking treatment of TB patients locally NGO's 
are involved in broader TB issues through their national networks. 
The Kamataka State TB Association, focusing specifically on TB, is involved in TB 
control and educational activities in dialogue with government (Sundareswara 1996). It 
organised National Conferences on TB in 1952, 1962, 1971 and 1996 (ibid). The USAID 
Health Education project helped renew the KSTA from 1987-90. Subsequently there was 
191 
a problem with possible financial misconduct requiring resignation of an office bearer 
(interview 1995). Renewed activity took place with a new Secretary from 1993. At the 
service level it supplies treatment cards, follow up booklets, TB drugs, BCG vaccine to 
NGO's and to government, and conducts training programmes for teachers (KSTA 
secretary). It has adopted Multi Drug Resistant patients for treatment with expensive 
drugs not available under the NTP (Mahadevappa 1995). These activities are conducted 
through District TB Associations with DTO's as Secretary. During the past year KSTA 
organised a State Conference on TB, supported continuing education meetings at 
Gulbarga and Mysore for paramedical and medical staff, renovated a ward at the SDS TB 
Hospital, Bangalore at a cost of Rs.230,000 collected through the TB Seal sale campaign, 
and conducted public awareness raising activities on 'World TB day' on 24th March and 
during the 'TB week' in February (Sundareswara 1996). The annual TB Seal campaign, 
conducted since 1951, sells TB Seals/Stamps to the general public for Rs.111. District 
Commissioners, DTO's and public sector undertakings are involved, with 40% of funds 
raised being kept by the District TB Associations for local use, and the rest shared by the 
state and national Associations (Gnaneshwar* 1996). In 1996 the State government held 
discussions with KSTA and the STC to start a Monitoring Cell for the State (KST A 
officials*1996). The STC is officially mandated to monitor the NTP, but NGO's may 
help improve quality of reporting. 
General Health Services in Karnataka 
The development and functioning of health services is critical to integrated programmes 
like the NTP designed to 'sink or sail with general health services' (Banerji 1993;66). 
Kamataka developed a widespread network of services over four decades (Table 7.13 and 
7.14). 
II In 1995 the Kamataka Association collected Rs.300,OOO with 99% from public sector employees, less 
than States like Kerala with collections of Rs.800,OOO in 1995 (Visweshwariah * 1996, presentation at 
KST A meeting). 
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Table 7.13 Development of Public Sector Health Services in Karnataka, 1951-1987. 
Health Institutions 1951 1987 
Hospitals with above 30 beds 23 134 
Teaching Hospitals 0 23 
District and Major Hospitals 20 30 
Hospital beds 5,481 26,646 
Dispensaries+Primary Health Units 282+125 1310 
Primary Health Centres 0 465 
Prmary Health Units with 6 beds 20 106 
X-ray Plants 15 126 
Nursing Schools 5 9 
Health & Family Planning Training 2 5 
Centres 
Auxiliary Nurse Midwife Training Schools 3 19 
Laboratory Technician Training Units 0 4 
X-ray Technician Training Units 0 10 
Source:GOK 1988 
The terminology for health institutions changed and further changes are in Table 7.14 
Substantial additions were made during this phase of infrastructural development that 
occurred nationally. 
Table 7.14 Public Sector Health Services in Karnataka, 1992 
Type of Health Service Number 
Hospitals- district, subdivisional, rural referral 239 
Tertiary hospitals (specialised, teaching) 17* 
Maternity Units 143 
Primary Health Centres 1198 
Primary Health Units 654 
Subcentres 7793 
.. 
*there are addItIonal specIalIsed hospItals for TB, leprosy, mfectlOus dIseases, mental 
health under the Directorate of Medical Education. 
Source: GOK 1991; WB 1996b 
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Studies show that over 45% of patients utilising public sector health servIces In 
Kamataka had annual incomes below Rs.15000 which is close to the official poverty line, 
while over 90% had incomes below the taxable levels ofRs.50,000 (World Bank 1996b). 
Existing private sector services grew during the 1980's. Located primarily in urban areas 
(80%) they account for 33% of hospital beds (World Bank 1996b). Majority of patients 
using private clinics in Kamataka belong to the middle and upper socio-economic classes 
(World Bank 1996c). Thus the public sector has the most evenly distributed, widespread 
services, covering all districts and rural areas and is utilised to a larger extent by the poor. 
7.4 Implementation Issues 
This section looks at political, policy and institutional leadership in the State; resource 
availability in terms of trained personnel, drugs and finances; and political processes of 
decentralisation, societal factors and social movements. 
7.4.1 Current Political Leadership and the TB programme 
Political leadership in the State is important in supporting the execution of the TB 
programme. The present Janata Dal Health Minister Dr. HC Mahadevappa, a physician, is 
reportedly sympathetic to the Dalil Sangarsh Samiti (social movement of the oppressed, 
see later) and the necessity to provide specially for the medical needs of the poor, for 
which a 'Green Card' scheme has been initiated providing annual medical check-ups and 
free access to treatment (Japhet*1996). He takes an active interest in activities of the 
Kamataka State TB Association as its President. During the past year he attended several 
meetings on TB, staying for the entire period (observation). With his active support 
KSTA hosted the 51st National Conference on TB and Chest Diseases in Bangalore 
organised by the TB Association of India. He attended sessions and presentations and the 
organisers said they have not had such active participation shown by any State Health 
Minister in the past (TAl 1996). 
However political analysts in Kamataka report that' institutionalised corruption' over the 
years by the political leadership has adversely affected civil services (Pinto 1992; 1837, 
1993). The current Minister has not escaped censure on this point. Contradictory 
194 
governmental positions promoting commercial interests and supporting the medical lobby 
(primarily clinical) suggest an inconsistent role in protecting the interests of the weakest. 
Since the mid-1980's Kamataka with ministerial support and connections has privati sed 
education in health sciences and has the largest number of private capitation fee medical 
colleges, dental colleges, schools for nurses and laboratory technicians. It has pennitted 
use of government hospitals as practical training sites for these colleges, which are in 
heavy arrears to government for the same. Experienced government staff leave and join 
private colleges for higher salaries, shorter working hours and private practice. 
7.4.2 Upgraded Posts and Downgraded Authority and Skills 
The top TB post in the State, though upgraded to Joint Director (JD) level, is primarily 
advisory to the health services with little authority over staff. The Joint Director has 
relatively little control over resources and budgets which are held by the Health and 
Finance Secretaries. A recent example cited below indicates how undervalued the post is. 
The incumbent, who functioned from 1993 till March 1996, was 'Acting JD' till about 6 
weeks before his retirement. During this period he was also Medical Superintendent of a 
300 bed Government TB Sanatorium on Bangalore's outskirts, a full time 9-4 job, after 
which he came to the State TB Centre for an hour to deal with pending work 12. The 
succeeding JD, the last of the TB/public health cadre, held position for 3 months before 
retiring. An important change in 1996 was that qualifications and experience in TBINTP 
or public health are no longer requirements for the top post, henceforth allocated on 
seniority in the State cadre (interview with senior official). Thus an orthopaedic surgeon 
or gynaecologist could be incharge of the State TB programme. This suggests another 
victory for the clinical lobby and indicates the weakening status of public health in the 
State. The justification given is that any doctor can perform what is seen as an 
administrative task. The public health and technical competence and leadership required 
for the task is inadequately recognised by the State government. Preoccupation with 
personal interests and goals at this level (seeking post-retirement jobs and consultancies, 
12 His non-availability at this office during the day affected staff work behavior adversely, e.g. not being 
present during office hours or whiling away time (observation). 
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building houses) adversely affects supervision and quality of work of the programme and 
staff morale (interviews 1996). Issues concerning inadequate leadership, commitment to 
the programme, dynamism and capacity at the top therefore arise. Good leadership with 
adequate authority and resources are widely recognised as essential for policy 
implementation (Crosby 1996). 
This trend repeats itself at District level, with District Health Officers now being 
appointed on seniority (with administrative training) and not on the basis of public health 
training (the study district DHO was previously a surgeon in a large city hospital). The 
consequences of equating public health with administration in the context of growing 
infectious diseases and TB can be speculated upon. At the next level the ADHO(TB) 
lacking power and administrative links with PHI's plays largely a clinical role at the DTC 
and a nominal role with the PHI's, "we need to have an administrative link between the 
PHI's and the ADHO-TB (DTO's) .... we should have the same powers as DHO's to take 
action when a PHC-MO says I can/will not do any TB work." (ADHO-TB*1995). 
Inadequate drug supplies to meet patient demand/needs leads to prescribing, altering a 
key policy goal of provision of free treatment to TB patients. At the crucial PHC-patient 
interface the NTP functions minimally with inadequate resources, poorly trained staff and 
little technical support. Medical officers often work without laboratory technicians 
because of vacancies, have poor drug supplies and lack authorisation to purchase drugs 
locally. Without supervision, support and systems of accountability they either refer 
patients or prescribe. This is the weakest level in implementation of the NTP (see Chapter 
8). Programme/policy ownership, a factor identified as being important for 
implementation (Brinkerhoff 1996) is inadequate at state, district and peripheral levels. 
7.4.3 Institutional Leadership by the State TB Centre (STC) 
State TB Centres were envisaged by the NTP planners to provide technical and 
administrative leadership to the State programme. Poor functioning of this institution has 
left DTP's inadequately supported (Krishnacharya 1995). From 1965-1972 the State TB 
Centre conducted annual one year training courses for TB Treatment Organisers (the 
name given by the NTP to paramedical workers in the DTC team. Their designation in 
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the State cadres subsequently changed to Senior Health Assistant.). This was influenced 
by the retired TB Advisor to GOI and conducted by a committed and able doctor during 
whose time "the STC was very efficiently run and maintained" (interviews 1996), 
pointing to the role of personalities with abilities to execute even within constraints. It 
was a multi-skilled course wherein para-medical workers were trained to handle all the 
operational elements of the NTP. Presently only one day orientation courses regarding the 
NTP are organised for Health Assistants as part of the general training (covering all 
programmes) at the State Health and Family Welfare Training Centre. While the NTI 
conducts training for DTC staff to maintain a standard approach nation-wide, it was 
envisaged that STC's would supplement training at State levels. This did not occur for 
most of the period. The Joint Director TB/STC could not prevent transfers of NT I trained 
staff from the NTP to other sections. Hence inspite of adequate numbers being trained at 
NTI, shortages of trained staff occur at DTC's. The STC library and journal collection 
stopped in the 1970's with no current literature available. The officer in charge did not 
even know where the collection was located (observation). Being up-to-date with 
concepts, the national and international TB situation and trends in training, is not 
considered important by the nodal State Centre. The training component of the Karnataka 
STC, envisaged in the NTP as a key role at State level, is currently almost non-existent. 
Operations research is undertaken at the STC, primarily initiated by NTI staff for field 
studies and clinical studies. These brought in project funding, additional staff and 
facilities such as a laboratory for culture and sensitivity, drug supplies and contact with 
outside experts. There is little evidence that these resources fed into the State programme. 
'7.4.4 Health Personnel for Implementation of the NTP 
Trained staff are a critical resource for implementing a programme. In the State there are 
shortages of some of the most important categories at DTC' s and in the general health 
services. Several senior staff echo the statement, 'the DTC team has disintegrated' 
(Ramesh*1995).The full team as planned are not posted/appointed, not fully trained 
(Table 7.15) or do not have the necessary authority. 
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Table 7.15 Trained Staff Position at DTC's in Karnataka, 1995 
Staff Category DTC's with trained staff DTC's with untrained staff 
District TB Officer 9 11 
Laboratory Technician 12 8 
X-ray Technician 11 9 
Treatment Organiser 15 5 
Statistical Assistant 10 10 
Source: JD (TB) records 1995 
Presently District TB Officers (ADHO-TB) need no specialisation or experience in TB. 
The few Statistical Assistants in the programme are usually seconded to the DHO's 
Office. Treatment Organisers the mainstay of the TB programme, have fewer new 
entrants getting trained at NT!. As discussed earlier staff trained in the NTP get 
transferred to other departments. A detrimental process of deskilling is occurring. A 
concern expressed by a senior NTI official is that when the cohort of senior staff 
disappear from DTC's and state levels there will be no one left who understands the 
technical basis and operational aspects of the programme. 
Seventy percent of Laboratory Technician's posts are presently vacant across the State 
Health Services, (RaviKumar*1996, Krishnacharya 1995), with 85% vacancies at PHC's. 
This adversely affects the diagnosis of pulmonary TB. According to a reliable source in 
mid-1996 there were 44 senior laboratory technicians posts vacant and 620 junior 
laboratory technicians posts vacant. The last regular recruitment was in 1986, though a 
few appointments were made in 1995 (DTC-LT*1996). Vacancies exist since 7-8 years 
following a ban on recruitment since 1987, with the State Government saying it had no 
money to increase its salary payments. Most Laboratory Technicians and Male Health 
Assistants in PHC's were appointed under the National Malaria Eradication Programme 
as malaria microscopists (there are a smaller number of pathology microscopists). Since 
the early 1990's with part of the malaria budget transferred to the State 'non-plan' sector 
(Mishra* 1997), difficulties are faced in finding salaries for these staff who are important 
for the NTP as well. A related feature is that training facilities for Laboratory Technicians 
and X-ray technicians in the public sector are poor and inadequate (Krishnacharya 1995). 
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Concerns regarding staff shortages are repeatedly raised in the State Assembly by 
legislators (Karnataka LA Debates 1994-95). A recent government circular was cited in 
which a 10% reduction in permanent posts was planned over time (interview 1996). As 
part of its negotiations for a World Bank loan the State Government agreed to fill medical 
officers posts by appointing doctors on short term contracts. Contract appointments were 
advertised and the first batch appointed on 10/2/92 with short term contracts. The total 
emoluments of these staff is lower than permanent staff, they lack job security, and 
receive no in-service training to manage an array of public health programmes operating 
from PHC's. With the short drug supplies available to them their role is minimised. 
Doctors on contract among those interviewed at district level did not treat TB patients, 
while regular appointees did, performing at least some elements of the NTP (though with 
inadequate drug supplies and no follow-up/defaulter retrieval). Appointing authorities for 
contract jobs varied. One year it was the Directorate of Health Services and the next year 
the District Commissioner (interviews). Contract medical officers have formed an 
association pressing for regularisation of their tenures. This is uppermost in their minds 
and agendas. 
Several appointees on contract jobs, both doctors and other health personnel, failed to 
report for work, having found better alternatives. For official records posts are 'filled', 
though in reality there is no-one working there, adversely affecting general health 
services and the NTP. This along with absenteeism explains the difference between 
official and unofficial data regarding vacancies. This discrepancy has been raised in the 
State Legislative Assembly. It was brought out that doctors especially with postgraduate 
qualifications prefer not to serve in rural areas. Health Ministers and the government in 
power do not reveal these aspects in their replies to questions raised in the Assembly. 
Only when Members of the Legislative Assembly bring information from their 
constituencies, with which they pursue the discussion does a truer picture emerge. 
A certain terminology of staff designations was developed for the NTP. Differences arose 
as States developed their own cadres and new thinking/ programmes from the Centre 
created new categories of health personnel with specific roles, sometimes related to 
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sources of funding especially for family planning and malaria. Names changed and so did 
responsibilities. Reports from DTP's follow the old NTP terminology. In Karnataka a 
Treatment Organiser at the DTC for the NTP is a Senior Health Assistant in the State 
health services, the employer. They perform duties with! without additional training. The 
State TB Officer (STO) in the NTP manual is the Joint Director (TB) and the DTO the 
Assistant District Health Officer in Karnataka. Staff in the general health services have 
undergone numerous changes. The Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM) and Basic Health 
Worker with no NTP responsibilities were converted into Multi-Purpose Workers (MPW) 
and subsequently to Junior Health Assistants responsible for BCG, sputum smears, 
motivation and follow-up of TB patients. This is indicative of the continuous change 
taking place to which the NTP responds and through which it is transformed. 
The private sector: 
Karnataka has pioneered establishing private medical colleges especially since the 1980's 
(SCHARA 1995). Of 18 medical colleges in the state 4 are run by government and 14 by 
private bodies (ibid). During the past 5 years, private colleges in dentistry, nursing, 
pharn1acy and laboratory technology have mushroomed. The growing capitation fee 
lobby is influential in state politics, not just in promoting higher education and learning, 
but running commercial businesses and furthering caste and class interests (Pinto 1993). 
The 'capitation fee,13 for a medical college seat was about Rs.4 million in 1996 
(interviews). It has altered the socio-economic background of students entering the 
profession and career choices are geared to making return from the investment made, 
with few willing to work in the public services. The majority ofPHC doctors interviewed 
in this study were from Government medical colleges or from government seats in private 
medical colleges l4• 
Additional dimensions of the 'informal economy' raised by respondents are payments 
made for getting jobs (sometimes) and for transfers. There are fixed rates for different 
13 Money required to be paid to get a seat in most private colleges, unlike government run colleges where 
entrance is on merit and social reservation. 
14 As a bargain to getting government recognition to run a medical college, private managements have to 
keep a proportion of seats for government candidates without payment of capitation fees. 
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posts and different regions. These financial investments affect work motivation and 
attitudes besides becoming a necessity to recoup the amount. This is a possible 
explanation for widespread private practice by government health personnel. 
State government staff are not allowed private practice, but get a non-practising 
allowance as compensation. However a retired Joint Director(TB) publicly stated that 
'private practice by medical officers in government service creates a problem in 
successful implementation of DTP" (Krishnacharya 1995;15). Respondents in this study 
say private practice is widespread on government premises, with patients also seen at 
home or at other private clinics. Medical representatives from pharmaceutical companies 
were seen visiting government doctors even in remote PHU's, who do not officially 
purchase drugs (observation). Of concern too is that a proportion of all grades of 
paramedical staff engage in practice, raising other legal and ethical issues. For policy 
purposes boundary lines between the public and private sector are difficult to draw. In 
this process of bargaining and accomodation patients rights as citizens to free healthlTB 
care is forgotten. 
The Chief Minister who promoted privatisation of various sectors, including amending 
Land Regulations, said in the Assembly after a scandal about kidney transplants, 'There 
are sufficient medical institutions in the private sector. There is a necessity to control the 
working of the private sector. In this regard my government proposes to bring a 
comprehensive legislation to make the private sector work more responsibly' (Karnataka 
LA Debates 20/3/95). No regulations were introduced and he moved on as Prime Minister 
of India for a short period. 
TB Drug Issues: 
The State Health Minister stated 'Good quality, adequate and regular supply of drugs are 
key factors for the success of the programme. The drugs are given free' (Mahadevappa 
1995 ;5). A senior central Government official says of Kamataka 'In all my 10 years I 
have always found a shortage of TB drugs in every health centre that I have 
visited .... Rifampicin is expensive .... States don't buy it, but depend entirely on the Central 
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Government. for its supply. ' This illustrates the gap between policy and practice. Short 
Course Chemotherapy is introduced into 17 districts by the State, yet the main drug 
necessary, Rifampicin, is usually in short supply. 
Sources within and outside Government indicate that for 2 years from 1991 the State did 
not supply Isoniazid, a vital bactericidal drug in both the standard regimen and short 
course chemotherapy. This is easy to produce, and costs a few paise. Shortages were 
experienced and recorded in Mysore district. It was the reason for one of the NGO's 
,VGKK, to initiate a campaign on TB drugs and related issues with the Voluntary Health 
Association of India (Chapter 8). Officials say that a tender given to a certain company 
was not honoured for a long time. Drugs are purchased in the public sector under the Rate 
Contract System under which the lowest tender has to be accepted. Several sources state 
that lowest tender may in fact be the costliest to all concerned with bribes paid at various 
levels, tenders rewritten! falsely written, the same company putting up 3 tenders, false or 
doctored quality control certificates being produced etc. This goes on at State and Centre 
inspite of an elaborate system in place to prevent such occurrences. 
Drug companies played prominent roles in meetings organised by the KST AfT AI, with 
large banners announcing their products and sponsorship of events, meals. Delegates to 
the national conference were given expensive gifts, sight seeing programmes were 
organised and for the technically oriented a variety of interesting quizzes were organised. 
A senior official said that after sponsoring one such state level event the concerned drug 
company was trying very hard to get the tender for drug supply to the state government 
(interview 1996). 
The top 3-4 drug companies have initiated continuing education programmes for doctors 
during the past 3-4 years. Some bring out regular newsletters and a variety of health 
education material for patients in different languages to be displayed in doctors clinics 
(interviews with phannaceutical representatives and observation). 
The State government in 1995 waived the Sales Tax on single ingredient TB drugs 
(Mahadevappa* 1996) in order to help reduce drug prices that had been showing a rising 
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trend over 5 years. Drug companies are now trying to get tax exemptions for combination 
drugs which are not promoted by the NTPIRNTP because of potential problems with 
bioavailability (TB Day meeting, 1996). 
Until recently shortages of laboratory supplies, X-ray films, and drugs, were reported 
with some improvements during 1994-95 (Krishnacharya 1995). 
7.4.5 Government Health and TB Budgets 
Nationally 80% of public spending on health is by the States, 200/0 being from the Centre 
(Mahadevappa* 1996). In Karnataka 18% of the state health budget comes from the 
Centre (ibid). In Karnataka unlike other States real growth rates in health expenditures 
were reportedly sustained at 4.4% annually in the 1980's, 5.7% in 1991/92 and 13.4% in 
1992/93 (WB 1996b). However government health and family welfare expenditures are 
low (Table 7.16). 
Table 7.16. Expenditures on Health and Family Welfare in Karnataka 
80/81 85/86 89/90 90/91 91192 92/93 93/94 
Expenditure on H&FW as % 1.26 1.33 1.25 1.18 1.11 1.29 1.29 
of State Domestic Product 
Per Capita expenditure on 19.00 22.12 26.00 24.12 25.01 27.83 30.20 
H&FW (in 1980/81Rs) 
Source: WB 1996b 
Seventy percent of the annual public sector outlay is under the Zilla Parishad sector e.g. 
in 1992-93 of Rs.2260 million, Rs.1600 was through the Zilla Parishads while Rs.660 
million was under the State sector (GOK 1991). 
In 1995-96 the public health care budget was about Rs.4,872 million (WB 1996). During 
the year Central Government Assistance to the State TB programme for drugs was Rs. 
16,870,000 and the State government allocated a matching amount ofRs.16.8 million for 
salaries, chemicals, stains, drugs, purchase of vehicles etc. (Mahadevappa 1995). This 
follows the pattern of Class II Centrally Sponsored programmes i.e. 50% central support 
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(other programmes such as family planning considered high priority by central 
government receive 100% support). 
External Sources of Financing: In the mid-1980s there was a financial deficit in the 
State, as at national level. In 1991 after liberalisation measures were introduced nationally 
by Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, the 
Congress Ministry in Karnataka (one of the few that remained) followed. The State 
government health sector received larger external funding than before (Karnataka LA 
Debates 1994a). In September 1994 the State Health Minister announced in the 
Legislative Assembly that foreign funding amounting to Rs.I0,440 million over five 
years had been! was being negotiated with several international agencies (ibid). He 
attributed this to the better health infrastructure and expertise available in the State, 
attempting to demonstrate good performance during a debate when members raised 
questions regarding inadequate availability of health services, staff vacancies, and drug 
budgets. 
Loans being negotiated in 1994-95 included (Karnataka LA Debates 1994-95): a) 
Rs.1330 million for the India Population Project (lPP) IX for development of primary 
health care infrastructure. b) Rs.420 million from Germany through their foreign ministry 
for secondary care at district hospitals; c) Rs. 1000 million from the Dutch government 
for development of accident carel emergency centres every 40km along the highway in 
response to the high incidence of accidents; d) Rs. 7000 million from the World Bank for 
development of secondary care institutions at la/uk and district headquarters; e) Rs.300 
million from World Bank for improvement of health facilities in Bangalore city. Interest 
rates on the loans ranged from 4-6% with deferred repayment over 15 years. Criticism by 
officials within the health sector were that India would get further into the debt trap, 
suggesting that efficient utilisation of local resources would be preferable. In Karnataka, 
interest payments on debt accounted for 12.7% of total revenue expenditure in 1994/95 
and public debt was 27% of State domestic product in 1994/95 (WB 1996b). Just one of 
the projected WB loans (State health systems development to upgrade secondary care 
hospitals) represents 4.7% of the current debt (ibid). 
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A large part of the proposals concern construction and repair of buildings, including staff 
quarters, and purchase of equipment. Besides increased staff recruitment on contract , 
drug budgets have increased for different levels of health services. State budgets and 
expenditures for drugs (general) are in Table 7.17. 
Table 7.17 Karnataka State Drugs Budgets and Expenditures, 1991-95 (In Rs.) 
Year Budget Expenditure 
1991-92 154.68 million 154.28 million 
1992-93 153.93 million 152.93 million 
1993-94 220.54 million 220.45 million 
1994-95 300 million n.a. 
Source: LA Debates 1995 
In 1992-93 national budgetary cuts in health and education following structural 
adjustment (SAP) were criticised with subsequent changes made through the social 
security net of SAP (Chapter 6). 
Drug budgets for the following institutions rose in 1993-94 from: 
PHU .......................................... Rs.20,000 to Rs.30,000 per year, 
PHe .......................................... Rs.30,000 to Rs.50,000 per year, 
Taluk General HospitaL ........... Rs.200,000 to Rs.250,000 per year, 
General Hospital (District) ........ Rs 250,000 to Rs.300,000 per year. 
Given the rise in drug prices the real increase is not significant. This may mask urban-
rural differentials. 
In 1991-93 with growing national fiscal deficits/problems out of central plan budgtary 
allocations of Rs.5 million for the NTP in Karnataka only Rs.2.3 million were expended, 
and of Rs.2.5 million in the State plan Rs.2.1 million were spent (JD-TB 1996). Gaps 
continued in the State plan budget in 1993-94 (Rs.1.3 million spent of 5. 7 allocated) 
(ibid). The 'quiet diversion' of Plan funds for urban hospitals/non-Plan purposes has been 
observed in several states (Chopra* 1995). By 1994-95 higher allocations reached the 
State as part of government to the Revised NTP. Central allocations tripled from 5 to 15 
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million and State Plan allocations from 2.5 to 8.5 million while expenditures also rose 
(JD-TB 1996). 
Expenditure for the 450 bedded SDS TB Sanatorium in Bangalore city during 1994-95 
was Rs.3.2 million for drugs and Rs.3.3 million for equipment (LA Debates 1995). This 
is from the medical education budget of the State government as it is a teaching hospital. 
Together with staff salaries and maintenance the expenditure of just one urban institution 
would be about 50% of the state share of the NTP budget. Better gains from domiciliary 
treatment are being lost by this policy. Expenditures of the SDS and PKTB Hospital are 
not reflected under the TB budget. This suggests that State governments spend more on 
TB than available figures indicate. Actual expenditure is hidden partly because of the 
method of reporting and partly because expenditures incurred on TB patients diagnosed 
and treated in taluk, district and teaching hospitals are not fully represented in the NTP 
budget and expenditure statements. Considering that State government investments 
exceed national and international contributions, it does not playa strong policy role. 
An Indian consultant to another WB project says that' lack of financial resources is not 
the reason why work does not get done '. Other reasons such as lack of management 
skills, apathy and corruption were cited as reasons for delays and derailment of projects. 
7.4.6 Democratic Decentralisation and Health Care 
India's ancient system of local governance through panchayats at village level received 
Constitutional recognition in 1950 after Independence. Most State governments legislated 
on Panchayati Raj by the 1960's but the system could not develop adequately due to 
insufficient political support, power and funding and an emphasis on developing a 
strongly centralised system. Elections to these bodies were not held for years. 
Greater powers to Panchayati Raj Institutions were devolved by the first non-Congress 
Janata Dal government during its tenure from 1983-89. The State Assembly approved the 
Kamataka Zilla Parishad, Taluk Panchayat Samiti, Mandai Panchayat and Nyaya 
Panchayat Act, 1983, which took effect from April 1987 (Vyasulu 1995). Elections for 3 
tiers of government below the State government were held. 
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Government health care services came under the purview of Panchayati Raj Institutions, 
comprising the Zilla Parishad (district council), Mandai Panchayat (taluk council) and 
Gram Panchayat (village council). There were several instances of confrontation between 
elected representatives and government health functionaries. Representatives raised 
questions at different levels of the 3-tier political structure and at the State Legislative 
Assembly regarding the functioning of PHC's, doctor/staff absenteeism and short 
working hours, inadequate and irregular drug supplies, and the need to address 
specifically rural medical problems such as snake bites. A mid-tenn evaluation reported 
some improvements in health services, including increased attendance by health 
personnel by 60%, as a result during that period (Chandrashekar* 1996). 
Strong negative reactions to this policy arose from the State Government Medical 
Officer's Association with objections to what was described as political interference. The 
government health services described as "being highly politicised themselves" 
(Jayaram* 1996) were preoccupied by this political change that impinged on their 
functioning. Their advocacy for change was met sympathetically by powerful policy elite, 
close to the medical lobby and health was removed from the purview of Panchayati Raj, 
reflecting the State's divided interests. Political instability for other reasons led to a 
change of Government and in late 1991 the Congress passed an ordinance superseding 
Panchayati Raj Institutions, which was challenged in Supreme Court (Vyasulu 1995). 
However it had caught the imagination of people, including the Congress at the Centre 
who perhaps saw it as a possible vote catcher. Central government tried to legislate on the 
subj ect attempting to create direct links from Centre to local government at district, 
bypassing State governments. This was widely opposed and the Bill was not passed. 
After much debate and modification the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act 1992 came 
into effect from 1993, delegating greater powers, functions and resources to elected local 
government, increasing the potential for autonomy and accountability. Three tiers of 
elected Local Government were set up below the State level. Following the earlier 
example of Kamataka, there were reservations of 33% of elected seats for women and 
reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their population. 
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The subsequent Kamataka Panchayat Raj Act of 1993 reportedly reduced the Panchayats 
autonomy, making Members of the Legislative Assembly active participants and 
increasing powers of the Chief Executive Officers/bureaucrats (Krishnaswamy 1993). 
There are 5,655 Gram Panchayats, 175 Taluk Panchayats and 20 Zilla Parishads in the 
State (GOK 1996). 
In Kamataka 30% the entire State budget is transferred to the Zilla Parishad sector (WB 
1996b), while 70% of the health budget goes to the Zilla Parishad from the State 
Treasury15 (GOK 1991). The President of the Zilla Parishad has the rank of a State 
cabinet minister and the office has officers from the Kamataka Administrative Services to 
execute its programmes. Government health staff including the District Health & Family 
Welfare Officer function under the administrative control of the ZP which is empowered 
to take action against them if necessary (Chinnaswamy*1996). There are once again 
reports of surprise visits by elected representatives at Zilla Parishad to health centres and 
hospitals. A Kuruba (tribal) man died of gastro-enteritis in Mysore District during the 
fieldwork of this study. The response from the local PHC was swift and energetic, with 
daily visits by health staff to the affected village for public health action. This was 
reported to be in part due to fear generated by Zilla Parishad action and extensive media 
coverage in the district newspaper. The previous year two doctors were suspended 
temporarily due to inadequate response following a similar episode. Issues of staff 
vacancies, non-availability of staff during working hours, low drug budgets, non-
functioning equipment, non-payment of bills, poor sanitation and drinking water supply 
are frequently raised in the State Assembly (Kamataka LA Debates 1995). The State 
Government Medical Officers Association has again opposed administrative control by 
the Panchayati Raj institutions. One of the demands during a one day strike in December 
1995 was' removal of political interference '(Gnaneshwar* 1995, newspaper reports). 
Some NGO's work with Panchayati Raj representatives creating an awareness 
specifically about the NTP and general health (Sridhar and Sudarshan 1996). The 
potentially positive impact of Panchayati Raj institutions through peoples participation in 
15 Compared to other sectors a greater and increasing proportion of the health budget is transferred. 
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improved supervision, functioning and accountability of government healthlTB care is 
widely recognised (Antia 1994, WB 1996c, Rangan et al 1997). The State NTP 
leadership does not appear to have responded to these political changes during the 1980's 
or 1990's. 
7.4.7 Societal Factors and Social Movements 
Several societal groups in Karnataka, as elsewhere, compete for social, economic and 
political gain. The State is also rich in social movements working towards social, 
economic and political justice, gender, environment, and health issues. If the social and 
economic roots ofTB are accepted then the contribution of these movements/groups to its 
control will be recognised. 
The dominant powerful caste groups in Karnataka are Lingayats constituting 15% of the 
State popUlation and Vokkaligas with 11 %. However they account for 9 of 13 State Chief 
Ministers so far, more than 50% of seats in the Legislative Assembly (53% currently), 
with their legislators presently comprising 56 and 67% of the two major political parties 
(Shastri 1996, Pinto 1992). Their representatives comprise about 50% of the Council of 
Ministers holding core ministries of finance, revenue, home, commerce and industry 
while others get welfare ministries including health. They also garnered benefits from the 
reservation policy of positive discrimination meant for socially marginalised groups 
(Natraj 1994). Historically disadvantaged groups, the Scheduled Castes (16.7%) and 
Tribes (6.7%) are under-represented with 7% of seats currently (Shastri 1996). With 
increasing community/political organisation, social analysis and reservations in formal 
education, they have gained greater awareness and assertiveness. Discrimination against 
them is increasingly resisted at individual and group levels, sometimes causing a 
backlash. Rising numbers of atrocities/incidents of violence have been reported against 
them (Sitaraman 1994). This may be partly due to increased reporting to the police and 
greater media coverage. The majority are still economically the most disadvantaged and 
are likely to have the highest rates of TB. However poverty affects all caste and religious 
groups though to different extents. 
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The Dalit Sangarsh Samiti (DSS) is a State level movement started by untouchable youth 
in 1979-80 as a struggle (Sangarsh) of oppressed (Dalit) social groups. It works towards 
raising awareness and consciousness of the socially oppressed particularly Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes regarding the causes for their social situation and their basic 
rights for equality and social justice. It is stronger in certain districts (Gulbarga, Mysore, 
Kolar) than in others. Over the years it has grown into 'an articulate and widely 
representative organ of the depressed classes' (Pinto 1994;897). Their attention has not 
yet been directed towards health and health care issues according to state level student co-
ordinator (Heggade* 1996). 
The Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha is a movement of landed farmers in the State. They 
lobby on issues such as fertiliser subsidies, inter-state sharing of water/ riparian disputes, 
against the entry of and monopoly by Multi National Companies in seeds etc. They have 
a widespread network but have also not taken up health issues. 
Environment groups such as the 'Apiko' movement organise people against deforestation 
of the Western Ghats and have also participated in water and life movements. There is an 
active movement against the Kaiga nuclear power plant. Some environment groups 
include the preservation of medicinal plants in their ambit and are presently having to 
battle against the patenting by US based MNC's of traditional remedies. 
Social movements have increased in numbers and in analytical and organisational 
abilities over the years. Their strength is that they are organisations of affected people. 
They are not yet actively involved in issues of access to health care and equity and social 
justice in the health domain. This space has been occupied by volags/NGO's. There are 
links between the two groupings since individuals in NGO's may also be members of a 
movement. Potentials of forging alliances with these groups and Panchayati Raj 
institutions for improved health, health care and TB care lie ahead. 
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In conclusion, 
• Kamataka state has developed several strengths, some created through policy 
interventions, beneficial to the NTP. These include a tradition of state health services 
in Mysore, the NTI as a technicallinfonnational resource, a data base from NTI 
studies conducted in Kamataka, a widespread network of health services, a better 
developed Panchayati Raj system than most States, an ability to negotiate funding 
and a fairly active voluntary sector. Its additional financial investment towards TB 
care, through TB hospitals and 6 extra DTC's, are underestimated. In comparison 
with 1947 there is greater availability of services, but in the NTP perfonnance is only 
moderate16 (ICORCI 1988) with low sputum positivity, case detection and treatment 
completion rates (DH&FW,GOK 1995, NTI 1994d). Explanatory factors for this are 
discussed below. 
• Political processes altered TB policy negatively in the State such that core technical 
elements of early case detection and complete treatment/cure are not achieved. 
Though the transfonnation of District TB Officer's posts to ADHO's has been 
justified by some as being a part of integration, the lack of authority/power and 
training/qualifications at this referral/managerial level hann the programme. The loss 
of public health skills in key positions (State and District TB Officer's) following 
conflicts with the clinical lobby, lack of a sense of policy ownership and weakening 
of key institutions like the State and District TB Centre's adversely affect technical 
and organisational support, training, supervision and meaningful monitoring required 
for the programme. This and lack of budgetary powers diminished the leadership 
roles of these institutions and led to gross neglect of peripheral health institutions and 
their teams. 
• The medical professional lobby functions as a strong interest group in the 
privatisation of the health/medical education sector, and in resistance by government 
16 It could be argued that the expectations against which gaps are measured are unrealistic. 
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medical officers to accountability to local government. Alliances between the medical 
lobby and State political leaders resist local government roles. 
• Institutionalised corruption, politicisation of different health cadres, apathy and lack 
of response to field problems are additional process factors crucially affecting 
implementation 
• These factors/forces were not challenged or addressed by the State leadership of the 
NTP or the NT!. Exclusive focus on techno-managerial factors further masks these 
implementation factors. There are few mechanisms by which the NTP and the 
interests of TB patients especially the poor are protected. There was no evidence as 
yet, from the NTP in the State of willingness or ability to work with Panchayati Raj 
institutions. Developing linkages with social movements in the State are an 
opportunity to address underlying social roots ofTB (Table 1.3). 
• Additional state resources for TB are spent on urban hospitals and not on rural 
peripheral institutions which provide better and more equitable returns. 
• Disempowered and under-resourced at State, District and hence peripheral level, the 
framework of the NTP has been eroded. The strength of powerful social groups is 
evident and the inability of the NTP in the State to hold its own against this could 
question its values and commitments. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
NTP DYNAMICS AT DISTRICT LEVEL 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a bottom-up view of TB policy and practice, with perspectives 
from patients, elected representatives, front-line government staff, NGO's and private 
. • 1 • practItIOners , covenng aspects often neglected in policy analysis. 
District Profile: Mysore district, profiled in Table 8.1, the largest of 20 in the state, 
exceeds the average district population of 1.8 million2. 
Table 8.1 A Profile of Mysore District 
Population 3.1 million Crude Birth Rate 26/1000 
Scheduled Castes 5,97,921 (18.9%) Crude Death Rate 9/1000 
Scheduled Tribes 1,02,102 (3.2%) Growth Rate 2.15% 
Area 11,954 sq.k:m. Maternal Mortality Rate 2/1000 live births 
Density per sq.k:m. 264 Infant Mortality Rate 70/1000 live births 
Literacy Rate 40% Gender Ratio 953 
Urban population .......... 30% Hospital bed/population ratio 1:1040 
Source: Mysore DH&FWO records, citing 1991 census; DH&FW/GOK 1995a. 
Per capita income during 1991-92 was Rs.6500, compared to Rs.5898 for the State. 
Endowed with natural resources it is one of the prosperous districts (FREHM 1996). In 
the 1990's the district achieved national health policy goals for 2000AD for crude death 
rate and demographic growth rate. Social stratification referred to in Chapter 7 exists, 
with tensions/clashes between dominant and disadvantaged groups in the study Taluks 
(Singh 1992). 
Fairly extensive Government health care infrastructure covering 11 Taluks of the District 
include a medical college with 5 teaching hospitals, 3 sub-divisional hospitals, 8 Taluk 
I A star following a name indicates that the source of information is an interview. 
2 The NTP was planned with an average district population of 1.5 million in 1962 (N agpaul 1989). 
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general hospitals, 9 Community Health Centres, 125 Primary Health Centres (PHe's), 50 
Primary health Units (PHU) and 732 sub-centres, 52 urban dispensaries and maternity 
homes and one mobile health unit (DH&FW/GOK 1995a, FREHM 1996). Specialised, 
institution based services are urban, more accessible to 30% of the population. Of 3502 
hospital beds, 56% are in Mysore city, the district headquarters (ibid). 
8.1.1 TB in Mysore District 
In the absence of a notification system, annual prevalence is estimated, with calculations 
used by the NTP for planning since 1962, and for developing targets since 1983. 
Table 8.2 Estimated Magnitude of Problem of TB in Study District, 1996 
Estimated prevalence of sputum smear positivelinfectious TB patients (411 000*) 12,400 
Estimated prevalence ofTB suspects with X-ray shadows (1611000*) 49,600 
Estimated incidence of infectious pulmonary TB (1/1 OOO/year* *) 3,100 
... 
*ICMR 1959, **TB DIVISlOnlDGHS 1995 
Extrapulmonary and childhood TB are additional. The NTP is expected to detect 50% 
(6,200) sputum smear positive patients annually. 
Based on 1955-58 survey data (ICMR 1959) the method assumes a static epidemiological 
situation over four decades, and uniform epidemiological patterns in diverse regions and 
socio-economic groups. Estimated utilisation of government health facilities3, 
extrapolated from 1960's research, discounts increased availability of public/private 
services, greater awareness and ability to pay and altered proportions of patients 
detected/treated by different sectors. 
8.2 The Mysore District TB Programme (DTP): 
ActorslInstitutions and Implementation Processes: The NTP conceptualised a 
framework of relationships between institutions, building from Primary Health Centres, 
District TB Centres to the State TB Centre (STC). The DTP was introduced in Mysore 
District in 1966. Planners envisaged a 5 year period for DIC's to become functional and 
3 The method assumes that a substantial proportion use government services. 
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implement the DTP in the 50 Peripheral Health Institutions (PHI's) estimated in an 
average district (Nagpaul*1996). This included constructing4/equipping DTC buildings, 
positioning a trained DTC team, while implementation at PHI's included on-site staff 
training and organising supplies, recording and reporting systems (ibid). Of Mysore 
district's 240 PHI's (1996), 125 (52%) are incorporated under the DTP, leaving 480/0 of 
PHI's and their popUlations uncovered (Mysore DTC records 1996). Suggestions for an 
additional DTC made at a meeting of District TB Officers has not been taken up 
(interview 1996). 
The NTP assumed rapid development of general health services and their involvement in 
TB work. This is only partly actualised 35 years later. In the 1980's expansion of primary 
care infrastructure took place nationally and is evident in the study area. PHC's in HD 
Kote taluk increased from 1-11 between 1984-1995 (Mysore DH&FWO records, 1996). 
Several Primary Health Units5 were upgraded to PHC's, and a PHC at Taluk headquarters 
town converted to a 50 bed General Hospital in 19906. While structures exist, lack of real 
resources of trained staff and drugs (FREHM 1996), and excessive focus on family 
welfare? diminishes their functional efficacy. Only half the health facilities in the district 
are involved in the NTP (Table 8.3). 
4 In the 1980's on average there were 60 PHl's/district with 1.8 million people (Nagpaull~89), 
5 an earlier pattern of smaller medical care units, without beds, fewer staff and no commumty based 
servIces. , 
6 An NGO collaborated by donating an X-ray machine and constructing a building for health educatIon 
activities. It has also supported some PHe's in the laluk with furniture, equipment, TB drugs and 
occasionally buildings (MYRADA director*1996), , 
7 E d'ture on family welfare grew at 23%per year, primary health at 18% and secondary/tertIary care at 
xpen I , , &'. 'I If d 16% (DHFW/GOK 1995a). Primary health infrastructure development was to facIhtate laml y we are an 
paid for by the India Population Projects (ibid), 
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Table 8.3 Peripheral Health Institutions Implementing the DTP in Mysore District 
Peripheral Health X-ray Microscopy Centres* Referral Centres* Total 
Institution's (PHI's) Centres* (PHC's)* (Sub-centres) 
Total number 17 45 178 240 
Implementing DTP, use Short 17 30 14 61 
Course Chemotherapy 
Implementing DTP, use - 15 49 64 
Standard Regimen 
Total implemented 17 45 63 125 
Source.Mysore DTC records 1996 *X-ray centres mclude 4 Dlstnct/teachmg hospltalslDTC, 10 Ta/uk 
General Hospitals, and PHC's with X-ray facilities. Microscopy centres are PHC's equipped with 
microscopes. Referral Centres are PHU's and sub-centres without diagnostic facilities. 
Peripheral Health Institutions with capacity to participate in the NTP are just over 62 
(Table 8.3). The majority 178 referral centres/sub-centres staffed by one/two health 
assistants, without microscopes/TB drugs have negligible NTP involvement 
(interviews/observation 1996). Short Course Chemotherapy is available only from 660/0 
(30/45) ofPHC's and 250/0 (61/240) of all PHI's (Mysore DTC records 1996). 
The TB Hospital treats large numbers of patients from different parts of the district with 
SCC. Treatment of those coming from Standard Regimen areas gets altered during the 
shift back to PHI's/private practitioners, causing irregular/incomplete treatment. 
Patient/doctor interviews (public and private) indicate that taluk/district hospitals, 
particularly the Mysore TB Hospital are important referral centres providing diagnostic 
services, inpatient facilities and specialist consultation. The NTP focus on the DTC, 
classifies hospitals as PHI's in the same category as PHC's not according recognition or 
role to their expertise/specialised facilities. 
Staffing: Shortages of PHC Medical Officers in the district occur for various reasons. 
With no appointments by the Karnataka Public Service Commission since 1990, the State 
government appointed 500 doctors on one year renewable contracts8 from 1994, of whom 
8 They receive lower fixed emoluments with no increments. Only 341/500 reported for duty, thus shortages 
continue, though for the records posts have been filled (Mahesh* 1996). 
216 
53 are in Mysore district (comprising the majority of government medical officers in 
1996) (Basavaiah*, Mahesh*1996). While serving short-term purposes of providing 
primary medical care, these doctors untrained in national programmes/the NTP because 
of brief tenures, are unfamiliar with administrative procedures of indenting, reporting etc. 
They are also preoccupied with extending contracts through organisation of an 
Association (interviews 1996). These local processes affecting the DTP have not elicited 
any response from State TB programme managers. 
The taluk hospital with 50 beds and 7 sanctioned Medical Officers posts, had 2 MO's 
working during the study period. Although recently changed rules post specialists to laluk 
hospitals (where their expertise can be used) rather than PHC's, the private sector still 
attracts with better financial returns. There are shortages of women MO's with only one 
each in the two taluks. 
Forty five percent of the 70 Laboratory Technicians (LT's) posts in the district were 
vacant in 1996 (DH&FWO records 1996), the percentage being higher in other districts. 
32 serve 3.1 million people (11100,000). HDKote Taluk had two Laboratory Technicians 
in the public sector for a popUlation of 215,000 while Yelandur taluk had none for its 
population of70,000. A significant proportion of microscopist sILT's paid by the National 
Malaria Eradication Programme spent most of their time working for it, though HD Kote 
taluk is free of malaria9 (ibid). Salary payments have recently been transferred to the 
States which may freeze/reduce the number of posts (Mishra* 1996). Vertical programmes 
thus affect integrated programmes in the field. 
Resource constraints in Karnataka led to a freeze on new recruitment's for permanent 
posts (Jayaram*1996). Litigation regarding the reservation policy also delayed 
appointments. MandaI Commission recommendations I 0 of 65% reservations for 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Castes were challenged, with 
Supreme Court ruling that reservations should not exceed 50%. Legal proceedings took 
9 Targeted numbers of routine blood tests for mala.ria parasites are done for patien~s wi~ fever. 
10 Reservations for socially disadvantaged groups lfl central and state government Jobs lfltroduced after 
Independence as a form of positive discrimination. 
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several years during which proportions of posts could not be worked out, delaying 
appointments (interviews 1996). Thus a variety of processes affect the NTP. 
The system of continuing on-site education and quality control does not work. During 
supervisory visits which are infrequent, slides are not cross checked. The State 
Laboratory Technician's Association, with district branches, concerned primarily with 
salary issues, is weak due to small numbers. 
Other vacancies (Table 8.4) adversely affect national programmes including the NTP. 
Table 8.4 Staff Vacancies in Mysore District 
Staff Category Vacancies 
Health Assistants (Male) 15-92% in different taluks (48% in HDKote Taluk) 
Health Supervisors (Male) 32-75% in different taluks (67% in HDKote Taluk) 
Health Assistants (Female) 16% in three taluks 
Health Supervisors (Female) 14.6% in the district 
Clerical Staff 34 % in the district 
Source: FREHM 1996 
Equipment: Poorly functioning X-ray machines/radiographic facilities in the public sector 
are compensated by the voluntary/private sector in the study area (Table 8.5). 
Table 8.5 Radiographic Diagnostic Facilities in Study TalukslMysore District 
Health Facility Observation 
HDKote General Hospital ..... (public) Not working during study period, 
X-ray technician had no work. 
Yelandur PHC 
" 
Unutilised since installation 18 months ago, 
no technician. 
PKTB & Chest Disease Hospital, Mysore 
" 
Not working for 3 months during study. 
DTC, Mysore 
" 
Functioning, miniature films only taken. 
One NGO hospital in each taluk & in Mysore Machines in working order. 
Private diagnostic centres in Mysore and Machines working, get referrals from public 
neighbouring taluk headquarters hospitals and private practitioners. 
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These factors severely handicap diagnosis/monitoring of treatment under the NTP, 
adversely affecting technical content/conduct of the programme. Though raised by 
evaluations (ICMR 1975, ICORCI 1988) these issues have not been acted upon. 
Health Education: There was no health education material on TBINTP at the District 
Health Education Office, though abundant material was available on Family Planning, 
immunisation, with a smaller range on leprosy, malaria, AIDS and Japanese Encephalitis. 
Case Detection under the DTP in Mysore District: Table 8.6 gives the number of sputum 
examinations and case detection at the Mysore DTC over time. From 1983-84 targets 
were established and monitored for these two aspects of the NTP, assuming that cases 
detected would be completely treated. 
Table 8.6 Diagnostic work under the Mysore DTP over time 
Sputum Examination Case Detection 
Year Target Achiev- Percen- Target Bacillary X-ray Extra- Total %* 
ement tage pulm. 
83-84 12600 11875 94 5172 136 1314 762 2212 43 
84-85 12600 22056 175 5544 158 2325 571 3054 55 
85-86 12600 19763 157 5544 607 2680 304 3591 65 
86-87 13200 12853 97 5604 576 5321 231 6127 109 
87-88 15600 27094 174 5564 829 5359 177 6365 114 
88-89 13200 30592 231 5556 1364 4817 408 6589 118 
89-90 12000 14855 124 5940 1762 4859 498 7119 120 
90-91 12000 15462 133 5940 2450 6942 243 9635 162 
91-92 12000 21042 175 5940 1313 2914 253 4480 72 
92-93 13027 13086 101 6000 715 2293 279 3287 55 
93-94 13225 15191 115 6000 956 1921 301 3178 53 
94-95 13050 18883 145 6336 976 2529 330 3835 60 
Source: Mysore DTC records, * percentage achievement 
Despite large and increasing numbers of sputum tests, the proportion of sputum positive 
cases detected was low, with an average of 5.7% (less than the expected 10%). The ratio 
of bacillary to non-bacillary cases improved from 1: 15 in 1983-84 to around 1:4 from 
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1990-91, the shift occurring after leadership change at the DTC. A doubling of X-ray 
positive cases occurred after 1886-87 when a new X-ray machine with Odelca camera 
from a SIDA grant replaced the older machine from the 1960's. 
Records showed that monthly variations were marked. A majority of sputum tests were 
done at larger urban specialist/teaching hospitals/taluk hospitals rather than rural PHC's. 
Sputum examinations reported as part of the monitoring system, include 3-5 repeat tests 
done for hospitalised patients. The total number thus does not indicate increased 
diagnosis in the periphery closer to patients homes, as expected by NTP planners. 
Though PRC's have targets for sputum examinations ll , these were infrequently done at 
PRC's (patient interviews 1996). Validity of routine monitoring data is questionable. A 
pilot cohort analysis in Mysore district reported wide discrepancies between different 
records maintained, such as the TB Case Index Register and Quarterly DTP Reports (NTI 
1994b). National and international analysis for assessments and policy making, based on 
such data, could mislead. 
In 1994-5, the Mysore DTP detected 976 new sputum positive cases (15.7 % of the target 
of 50% or 7.8% of estimated prevalent cases in the district). Given low treatment 
completion in the public sector (Table 8.7), 2-3.5% of prevalent infectious TB patients 
complete treatment in Mysore District. The natural history of the disease achieves a 330/0 
spontaneous cure (NTI 1974). 
Treatment Completion: A cohort study found treatment completion rates in Mysore 
district lower than the national average (Table 8.7). Cure rates could not be calculated due 
to lack of data on treatment outcome and on final sputum smear examination (NTI 
1994b). 
II 2% of outpatients, though this was dropped in 1996 with adoption of the target free approach 
(Basavaiah* 1996). 
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Table 8.7 Treatment Completion Rates in the Mysore DTP 
TB Classification Completion Rate 
Bacillary TB 
On Standard Regimen 17.0% 
On sec 43.8% 
X-ray suspects 18.8% 
Extrapulmonary TB 24.7% 
Source: NTI 1994b 
Speculation on Possible Impact of Interventions on the Epidemiology of TB: Programme 
planners estimated that the NTP should detect and cure a number equivalent to the 
incidence of infectious pulmonary TB to begin to impact on the problem 
(Nagpaul*1995). In Mysore district 3,100 new patients with infectious pulmonary TB 
need detection and treatment annually. Though average annual case detection between 
1992-95 was 3433, detection of bacillary cases was 882 on average i.e. 280/0 of potential 
incident infectious pulmonary TB patients. With current treatment completion rates 
(Table 8.8), 4.8%-12.4% of the 3,100 incident infectious cases (Table 8.2) get cured. 
Using NTP estimates that the private/voluntary sector treat an equal number, and 
assuming similar performance, 10-250/0 of incident bacillary cases are cured annually as a 
result of medical intervention. This is insufficient to influence disease transmission. 
TB drug shortages were a major problem cited by staff and borne out by records. 'This 
causes us, the health system to default. In addition to patients defaulting it results in us 
producing (drug) resistance' (DTO*1996). DTC's receive drugs worth Rs.lOO,OOO per 
year, 60% from central government, for which DTO's indent annually, based on number 
of cases treated. Supplies are from the Madras General Medical Stores. These had not 
been received though eight months of the year were over. Forty percent is from the State 
Government, supplied from Bangalore. The DTC retains a fair share of the supply for its 
own use distributing smaller quantities to PRC's, resulting in greater shortages closer to 
the periphery, particularly for expensive drugs like Rifampicin. Resorting to 
prescriptions, an act of discretion, is justified because of circumstances perpetuating 
221 
medical and phannaceutical interests. There is no evidence of government health 
personnel lobbying government to improve drug supply or create legal local alternati\'es. 
The issue was taken up with the State Health Secretary by NGO's (Sudarshan* 1996). By 
late 1996 the drug supply situation improved in the DTC with the State Government 
increasing its budget partly in anticipation of external aid. 
DTC staff observe that the large majority of patients treated by them are poor. Income 
levels are not recorded to validate this, but observations over 12 visits did. Economically 
poor patients and elected representatives say they depend on government hospitals for 
treatment, most often at the TB Hospital. Public providers felt that incomplete treatment 
was more common among the poor, linking it to an inability to pay. 
Qualitative Aspects: Several visits to health institutions for staff interviews/infonnation 
(Table 8.8) provided occasions for observations. 
Table 8.8 Visits to Health Facilities 
Type of Health Facility Number of Visits 
Visits to Sub-Centres 21 
To PHCfPHU's 27 
To the Taluk General Hospital 6 
To PKTB & Chest Disease Hospital 3 
TotheDTC 10 
Timing and Availability: Recorded observations reveal that staff often came late and left 
work early. If this was the doctor, other staff just waited or left. Sometimes Health 
Assistants and untrained staff treated patients. There seemed to be infonnal agreements 
between staff regarding their absences. In some PHC's found closed, doctors were 
reported to come once in a few days or for 2-3 hours/day (interviews 1996). Patients were 
not infonned in advance regarding absences, nor were there notices or alternate 
arrangements. Besides misusing salaried time, and wasting resources of the entire unit, 
credibility with patients was lowered. This is an important factor driving patients to the 
private sector. Staff often commute from nearby towns for lack of staff quarters 
(especially in sub-centres), water supply, or personal reasons such as children's 
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education. In contrast private practitioners who also commuted, are available for longer 
hours, often working a seven day week (interviews). 
Staff Patient Interaction (observations): While some doctors were polite, kind and 
thorough, others were mechanical, 'disposing' patients quickly and casually. There was 
often no opportunity for patients to ask questions. Some Health Assistant's were rude and 
brusque, particularly with poor patients, resulting in occasional arguments. 
A policy relevant finding is that the public sector does not provide free treatment. Taking 
money for services was common at every level except from the really poor and destitute. 
The amounts were small12 with staff accepting whatever patients gave. Money collected 
does not go to the centre to improve services but to staff on government salaries. Doctors 
sometimes bought medicines from Mysore with their personal money, dispensing them to 
patients on payment, interpreting this as social service. While compensating for poor drug 
supplies and saving patient's trips to the nearest town pharmacy, doctors benefited as 
well. Thus there was a process of accommodation on both sides. Many felt there was 
nothing wrong in receiving/giving small amounts of money. 
Staff Perspectives: Staff salaries were reasonable with PHC medical officers getting 
Rs.9,500/month, junior health assistants starting with Rs.3460/month and junior 
laboratory technicians Rs.3,315/month. However staff quarters were inadequate/non-
existent and house rent allowance very low. The PHC buildings were poorly maintained, 
sometimes with water supply and electricity problems. There were no telephones or 
transport!3 and health workers walked to cover the villages under their care. Vacancies 
were greater in remote centres with only 3114 staff working in one PHC. Payment of 
money for getting jobs and transfers is common practice. A major problem concerned 
drug supplies in general. Annual drug purchase budgets of Rs.50,OOO for a population of 
25,000 or Rs.2/head was insufficient, 'stocks for the year are enough to last 2-3 months 
only'. Also, 'we give our indents but we get whatever they have'. Doctors perceived the 
drugs they received as being of poor quality, 'people throwaway the tablets because they 
12 Commonly Rs.2 for sputum cups, Rs.5 for sputum examinations., Rs.l 0-20 for. X-rays, Rs.5 for a few 
drugs with prescriptions for the remaining drugs available from prIvate pharmacIes.. . 
13 A new scheme is to provide loans to health workers to purchase personal mopeds (mtervIews). 
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don't work and then lose faith in us. ' Non-responsiveness to local need caused reduced 
credibility, 'The main stress at the PHC is on prevention, though the main needs of the 
people are for curative care. I see so many Acute Respiratory Infection's these days, but 
have no antibiotics/drugs. And I am supposed to concentrate on cholera when we hardly 
have any cases. ' Thus resorting to private prescriptions was justified by them. On the 
other hand they made little effort to pressure government to improve this situation. Health 
workers felt dependent on doctors, suggesting that much depends on their 
personality/ability. Field workers expressed uncertainty, 'when we refer patients to the 
PHC we can never be sure if anybody will be there, if the sputum test will be done, or any 
action taken '. Working conditions were difficult. 
Thus, implementation processes resulted in extremely weak peripheral institutions. With 
underdevelopment of the institutional framework within which it functions, compounded 
by a lack of power/authority and resources, the DTC cannot play the key role assigned to 
it. Other public sector actors were also ignored as discussed below. 
Local Resources- Role of the TB and Chest Disease Hospital: With 470 beds and 164 
staff this specialist hospital (administratively/financially under the State Directorate of 
Medical Education), trains medical students, nurses, DiplomalMD students in TB and 
Chest Diseases and provides a substantial proportion of patient care in the district (Table 
8.9). 
Table 8.9 
Year 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Five-year Patient Statistics, TB Hospital 
Inpatients* Outpatients* 
Men Women Children Total 
3148 7674 4660 1847 14,181 
3818 7685 4819 1820 14,324 
4315 7776 4948 1796 14,520 
4242 9231 5299 1848 16,441 
4135 10755 6299 2269 19,323 
.. 
-Source:PKTB &Chest DIsease HospItal records. Repeat VISIts/non TB chest cond 
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itions a re included. 
It has chest physicians, cardiothoracic surgeons, post graduate students, 44 trained nurses 
and student nurses on its staff. It offers laboratory and radiographic services with 
diagnosis usually being made within a day. It runs its own pharmacy. Inpatients are given 
free treatment, food, and accommodation on a nominal charge, but outpatients often have 
to purchase medicines. Patient retained record booklets, providing informationlhealth 
education, printed by the Mysore District TB Association, are available to patients at a 
charge of Rs.I. Additionally the Employees State Insurance Hospital and Railway 
Hospital have agreements with the PKTB and Chest Disease Hospital for admission of 
patients. Outpatient, domiciliary treatment is undertaken by them. 
The hospital is a major resource and actor in TB treatment and care in the District, widely 
known among patients, families, people, elected representatives, and private medical 
practitioners throughout the district even in remote areas (interviews 1996). PHC doctors 
refer patients here rather than to the DTC. However for the NTP it is just another 
Peripheral Health Institution. NTP programme managers and others critique TB hospitals 
for prescribing irrationally. At worst it is unlikely to be more irrational than other 
institutions, and if true, there are few NTP efforts to alter practices. They appear to be 
remnants of historical underlying conflicts between clinical and public health approaches. 
In Karnataka 9 TB and Chest Disease hospitals are financed by State Government (JD-
TB reports 1996), of which three are attached to medical colleges, providing post-
graduate education. This study reveals that TB hospitals treat a large number of TB 
patients in the district, particularly the poor, and need more active involvement in the 
NTP particularly in training in which it could support and supplement the DTC I4 . 
Referral links exist but more balanced institutional linkages with the DTC would help. 
From a policy perspective, a major player at district level is marginalised by the NTP, as 
is the role of la/uk general hospitals. Government is not a single actor and different 
subgroups if not competing, do not usually collaborate and co-ordinate sufficiently. 
14 Besides training it could take care of all TB patients co-infected with HIV in the district. Upgrad~d 
laboratories with culture and sensitivity facilities could monitor drug resistance, and cross-check shdes 
from peripheral institutions. 
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National analysis does not take account of these subplayers within government, part of 
the overall effort in TB control. 
In summary, the institutional base for primary care through which the NTP could function 
has increased particularly in the 1980's. However 48% of peripheral institutions are not 
involved in the NTP, and the work of other PHI's is minimised by lack of real resources, 
suggesting that in the field 'the emperor has no clothes'. Primary care institutions are 
funded and driven by the family welfare and malaria programmes and are apathetic 
towards TB. Institutions with better TB care capacity continue to be urban based, though 
their role is underestimated by the NTP. Political forces influence staffing. Processes of 
accommodation occur between patients and providers, though patients appear to have 
little choice. Leadership (DTO's and MO's) at DTC's and PHC's has little power or 
authority. This weak base promotes patients to use the private sector. 
8.3 Patient Perspectives 
Patient Profile: The Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Nayakas and Soligas), the majority of 
the sample15, were predominantly landless labourers. A few had small plots of land, 
usually dry and un-irrigated. Daily wages in the area were low, Rs.15-20 for women and 
Rs.25-30 for men. Employment was not always available, being largely seasonal or 
related to projects such as digging of a canal, and work was physically demanding. This 
group represents the poorest segment, with one person being destitute. Lingayats and 
Vokkaliga's higher up the social hierarchy, owned some land. Though links between 
poverty and TB are recognised, what came as a surprise was the extent to which the 
disease led to indebtedness, landlessness and further impoverishment among this group 
(Table 8.18). On a national scale the magnitude would be enormous. Without social 
security patients and their families, victims of circumstances are left to fend for 
themselves. About 18% (11/68) in this study had a family history of TB, accentuating the 
vicious social cycle. A demographic profile of the patients is given in Table 8.10. 
15 Selection given in Chapter 3. 
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Table 8.10 Demographic Profile of TB Patients 
Characteristic Yelandur Taluk HDKote Taluk Total 
Total Number 42 26 68 
Gender 
Female 22 10 32 
Male 20 16 36 
Age Groups 
00-18 years 3 5 8 
19-45 years 26 13 39 
> 46 years 13 8 21 
Caste Group 
Scheduled Caste 27 8 35 
Nayaka (S Tribe) 8 14 22 
Lingayat 4 2 6 
Vokkaliga 2 1 1 
Other 1 1 4 
Marital Status 
Married 26 18 44 
Unmarried 8 6 14 
Widow 5 2 7 
Widower 1 
- 1 
Deserted 2 
- 2 
Villages represented 24 17 41 
Patient's initial choice: A wide range of health providers were approached (Table 8.11). 
Table 8.11 First Health Provider Ever Approached 
Health Provider Yelandur Taluk HDKote Taluk Total 
n=42 n=26 
Public 11 14 25 (36.7%) 
Private 17 6 23 
Voluntary 1 2 3 
HerbaV Home remedies 6 3 9 
Temples/ Astrologers 7 1 8 
This refers to the first visit only, with subsequent visits to other providers, shifting more 
to the public sector. The continuing shift between health providers during different phases 
of seeking a cure from the 'bazaar' of TB treatment is striking. 
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Role of Community Health Volunteers and Health Assistants: Community Health 
Volunteers
16 
play no role in the NTP as 'health confidantes' situated in villages, during 
early symptom stages or later in the treatment. No patient used their presence/services. In 
the study area they do no health work presently, although they continue to collect a 
monthly honorarium ofRs.50. 
Junior Health Assistants (HA's) make home visits and five patients, significantly the 
poorest and in greatest social need, approached them for help. However effective action 
did not result other than being given a couple of tablets (possibly paracetamol) which 
'didn't work' and being told to go to the PHC. HA's paid routine home visits to 54 out of 
68 patients indicating an established presence in villages where many patients know them 
by name. However, having gone there, no initiative was taken to identify 'chest 
symptomatics' and in no patient was a sputum smear taken at home. Interestingly, many 
of the patients histories referred to the period in the 1980s when policy shifted to active 
case detection, targets, monitoring with involvement of HA's in motivation, sputum 
smear collection during home visits. Positive action by HA's was limited and included a 
smear taken from one patient later in the PHC; a referral letter given to another, and in a 
third the patient and family were actively persuaded to go to hospital. 
During the treatment phase 5 patients were injected streptomycin by the HA's. Not 
legally permitted to inject, other than for immunisations, they made pragmatic 
decisions. Three patients said the injections were given free of charge and two paid a little. 
Two HA' s were said to have given health education (how to prevent airborne spread of 
infection, giving up smoking/alcohol), and in helping overcome negative and suicidal 
feelings. Thus HA's potentially play positive roles, though presently this occurs 
occasionally. 
More generally, HA's had low credibility among patients/their families, not having 
established reputations of being helpful: 
16 I tr d ed in 1978 they were links between communities and government health services. 1 worker 
n 0 uc 'd' ' 'I looked after 1000 people, after a 3 month training, playing an educational role and proVl mg mmor al ment 
treatment. 
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-They are most often dismissed as being 'of no use '. 
-The almost universal reference to them was as 'those people (who come unasked, said 
one) write on the walls and go away' (a recording system for the malaria programme). 
-' they did not enquire about our health and we did not say' was common; 
-or even if they asked 'we did not tell them anything '. 
~Patients said 'TB is a big disease and they do not anything about it '; 
~'iftrained big doctors are of no use, what can these people do '; 
~'we do not take tablets they give, being afraid that something may happen '; 
-'government has not trained them to treat TB, they do not know sputum testing, they can 
do nothing about TB '; 
~'the tablets they give are only worth 15 paise and are useless '; 
~'these people talk unnecessarily and go and tell all the neighbours '; 
~'even after telling them about having TB, they did not give me TB tablets but non-TB 
tablets '; 
~One young man, studying for his B.Sc. and Secretary of the Ambedkar Youth 
Association said he got very annoyed with the HA threw away his pencil, scolded him 
and warned him not to come again. He felt that HA's offered no real help or service and it 
was a waste of government money to pay them a salary.; 
~In another better off patient's case, the HA 'used to visit 2-3 times a week and have 
butter-milk', but the mother did not disclose anything about her daughter's TB, 'as there 
would be no gain and why talk .... it may affect the marriage prospects of my daughter '. 
~ More serious comments, though infrequent, were that one or two HA's 'run private 
clinics and make a lot of money' and 'the HA is not available for us Scheduled Castes, 
she injects everybody but not our caste '. 
They were identified by one or two as doing family planning work and caring for mothers 
and children. In 2 patients a blood smear was taken and a few more received 2 tablets for 
fever (presumptive treatment for malaria) which either 'didn't work', caused giddiness, or 
were not taken at all. They did not visit remote hilly tribal regions of the taluks, these 
populations being covered by voluntary organisations. Thus nationaVinternational health 
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programmes get transformed and altered at grass-root level and the script continues to be 
rewritten further on. 
On the whole Health Assistant's did not play an effective role in the NTP. It is important 
to question why this is happening as health workers were effective in the NGO's in the 
same taluks. On the one hand government workers did not receive adequate 
supervision/support/feedback regarding the NTP from medical officers. The PHCIDTC 
did not provide leadership, precept, motivation or ongoing training required for the 
purpose. Medical officers themselves were hindered by poor drug supplies/resources, 
inadequate powers, little support and an over-emphasis on certain programmes. On the 
other hand there was a lack of accountability to people and to the health system. 
Diagnosis: Table 8.12 indicates the type of health provider at which TB was first 
diagnosed in this group of patients. 
Table 8.12 Health Providers at which Diagnosis of TB was First Made 
Health Provider Yelandur Taluk n-42 HDKote Taluk n-26 Total n-68 
Public Sector 24 8 33 
PHC 1 1 2 
DTC 0 0 0 
Taluk Gen .Hospital 8 3 11 
PKTB&CDH 11 4 15 
KRHospital, Mysore 4 1 5 
Private Sector 14 9 23 
Within Taluk 4 2 6 
At Mysore 3 7 12 
Neighbouring Taluks 7 0 7 
Voluntary Sector 4 8 12 
VGKK 2, KTrust 2 SH 5, Camp 1 *,HMH 
2** 
*Camp orgamsed by MYRADA WIth techmcalmputs by the DTC 
**MYRADA had a referral arrangement with Holdsworth Mission Hospital, Mysore 
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The crucial finding is that negligible numbers were diagnosed at PHC's closest to 
people's homes, envisaged by the NTP to be the anchor of the programme I 7. 
Geographical access to health care, which was at the heart of the philosophy of the NTP, 
has not been actualised in the process of implementation. 
The role of the DTC also was minimal with no patient diagnosed there. Only 2-3 visited 
later during treatment for drug collection, being referred by a voluntary organisation or 
the TB hospital. Even allowing for selection bias and chance, if substantial diagnosis was 
taking place at the DTC, it is unlikely to be completely missed in this sample. 
A shift can be noted from the pattern in Table 8.11 (first health provider ever) III 
comparison to Table 8.12. Patients who used herbal medicines, temples etc. became 
redistributed among the 3 sectors, with larger proportions of patients diagnosed by the 
public and voluntary sector. Though the number going to private providers remains the 
same, they are not the same patients or the providers that appeared in Table 8.11. Private 
providers first visited were often those closest, usually within the laluk, and rarely made 
the diagnosis. Diagnosis tended to be made in Mysore or Taluk Headquarters. Issues of 
competence and quality of carel 8 among private and public providers needs consideration 
in policy making, which presently speaks rather generally about these sectors. 
Diagnostic Methods and Treatment: Despite concerns regarding over-reliance on X-
rays instead of sputum microscopy, in this sample 66/68 patients had sputum tests done 
for diagnosis. The first sputum test was done by public providers in 54% and the 
remaining by private and voluntary providers (Table 8.13). Most patients had repeated 
sputum tests, usually at public hospitals, as they shifted from one provider to another. The 
TB and medical college (KR) hospitals do sputum tests at admission, midway during 
17 This was realised by planners in the 1970's though according to their figures about. 70% ~f case 
detection was occurring at the DTC's and about 30% at peripheral institutions and thIS was mcreased to 
50% after targets for PHC's were introduced in the 1980s. ~ll institu~io~s i~ the ~istrict othe~ th.an the DTC 
are classified as peripheral institutions. Thus secondary/tertIary care mstItutIons SItuated at dIStrIct 
headquarters were equated with rural PHC's and p~ov~de much of the ~ .care. 
18 Besides issues of equity, mandate, lack of orgamsatton and accountabIhty. 
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hospitalisation and before discharge. An important finding is that PRe's do a negligible 
number, which is not what policy makers had envisaged. 
Table 8.13 Provider at which Sputum Microscopy was First Done 
Provider PK TB Hospital Taluk Gen.Hospital KR Hospital PRe NGO Private Not tested 
Number 21 8 5 3 12 16 2 ?+1 
The Logical Link between Diagnosis and Treatment: Of concern is the large number of 
providers used by each patient and the disjunction between providers making the 
diagnosis and those undertaking the major part of treatment. Only in 17 out of 68 patients 
was diagnosis and treatment largely completed by the same provider. The range narrowed 
down in this group with 8 patients being 'held' by voluntary services and 9 by the 
government TB hospital. Seven additional patients relied partly on the public sector. 
Patients made several visits to a range of health providers in their search for a cure, an 
observation made by other studies (Uplekar and Rangan 1996). The actual visit at which 
diagnosis was made varied (Table 8.l4) and was often only after repeated visits, due to 
doctor delays19 and inherent difficulties in diagnosing TB early. 
19 Diagnostic delay is the duration of time from symptom onset to institution of effective therapy. Its two 
components include patients delay from symptom onset to seeking care and.d~ctors delay from first 
presentation to institution of adequate therapy. Long delays increase transmISSIon (Murray 1994). 
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Table 8.14 Visit at which TB was Diagnosed 
Visit Number Yelandur Taluk HDKote Taluk Total 
Visit 1-3 22 7 29 
1 8 1 9 
2 6 2 8 
3 8 4 12 
Visit 4-5 14 13 27 
4 8 8 16 
5 6 5 11 
Visit 6-9 5 6 11 
6 1 2 3 
7 2 3 5 
8 1 1 2 
1 0 1 
Analysis of the main provider loop revealed that most TB treatment was provided by 
public providers, especially the TB Hospital linked to PHC's/General 
Hospitals/phatmacy prescriptions. The DTC, the pivot of the programme, was 
conspicuous by its absence in this picture. Voluntary agencies provided complete TB 
treatment to the smaller number of patients they catered to. Only one private provider 
completed treatment to cure, but in exchange for rights over the patient's (a widow) land 
for a period of 5 years. 
Diagnosis and treatment is thus provided largely by secondary/tertiary care hospitals 
rather than primary care networks. At PHC's there were problems of drug shortages, of 
all or some drugs; negative staff attitudes and behaviour ('they treat us like sheep', 'the 
nurse scolded me') and less frequently non-availability of doctors. Patients spoke with 
strong feelings about these experiences, most often discontinuing treatment at these 
times. Concepts held by policy planners of good quality, humane services, available close 
to peoples homes, free of cost, that would reduce suffering and help control disease are 
yet to be realised. 
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Hospitalisation: A major surprise was the high rate of hospitalisation (73.50/0) in this 
sample (Table 8.15), in contradiction to a cardinal feature of domiciliary/ambulatory 
treatment of the NTP. 
Table 8.15 Hospitalisation of TB Patients 
Hospitalisation Yelandur Taluk n=42 HDKote Taluk n=26 Total 0=68 
No. not hospitalised 8 10 18 
No. hospitalised 34 16 50 
No. hospitalised once 23 14 37 
No. hospitalised 
twice 9 0 9 
three times 2 1 3 
4 times 0 1 1 
This could possibly be due to delayed diagnosIs in thIS group of poor patIents resultmg in 
more advanced disease. Of the 18 non-hospitalised patients, 9 were treated by voluntary 
agencies, even though they had hospital facilities. 
No gender difference was observed in the functioning of the programme towards this 
group of patients. 
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Role of Voluntary Organisations: 
Table 8.16 TB Patients Treated by Voluntary OrganisationslNGO's 
NGO Treatment Yelandur Taluk n-42 HDKote Taluk n=26 Total 
Entire treatment by NGO 2 3 5 
Treatment mainly by NGO 8 1 9 
Part treatment by NGO 5 3 8 
a) discontinued (poor impression) 3 3 
b) approached by HW:not gone 2 3 5 
c) plan to go 1 1 
In Yelandur taluk where TB treatment is provided by the voluntary sector under contract 
to government, 15/42 patients (37%) had been to the NGO and ten were very satisfied. 
For the main part of their treatment others used public services at district headquarters or 
neighbouring Taluk General Hospitals. This Taluk does not have a Government General 
Hospital. Barring two Soliga tribal patients, all the others used a mix of public and private 
providers. 
Herbal Remedies, Temples and Astrologers: 32/68 patients used one or more of these at 
some time, though none experienced relief from their use. In a small but significant 
number diagnosis and onset of treatment was delayed consequently. However in several 
cases traditional healers advised patients that 'this was a hospital disease', recognising 
that the problem was beyond them and referring patients. 
Disease, Dispossession and Disability: There were distressing socio-economic problems 
prior and consequent to getting TB (Table 8.17), impacting on treatment and progression 
of the disease process. These findings were revealed by unstructured interviews, (not 
specifically sought/probed but raised spontaneously by patients), and probably 
underestimate the true dimensions of the problem. 
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Table 8.17 Social Consequences of TB and Effect on Treatment 
Impact Yelandur Ta/uk n 42 HDKote Taluk n=26 Total n=68 
Economic Effect 
*mortgaging/selling 23 16 39 (5]0 ll) 
assets; taking loans 
Disability& Inability 
to work 8 10 18 (26.5%) 
Effect on Treatment 
(delayed, irregular, or 23 13 36 (53%) 
incomplete) 
TB increased impoverishment and indebtedness because patients had to sell! give up their 
livelihood. They sold small pieces of land/one or two cattle they owned, mangalsutras 
(necklace which is a sign of marriage), homes, furniture and even household utensils. 
They took loans from family, friends and neighbours. Inability to work meant a loss of 
income for landless labourers, usually increasing the burden on the wi felhusband , who 
also had to be care giver and look after the children. Uplekar and Rangan (1996;29) 
report TB related indebtedness among one third of patients studied. It is also reported 
from a study of poverty in Ahmedabad (meeting 1996). Quantitative data cannot grasp or 
express the suffering that patients/their families went through or the efforts made in 
seeking a cure. The fairly widespread magnitude of social consequences was experienced 
as a problem as big as the disease. This aspect was not directly addressed by any sector, 
except a few panchayat members who directed developmental loans to affected families. 
Nationally and internationally this problem is submerged by the predominantly technical 
I . 20 frame of TB contro strategIes . 
In summary, patients lack confidence in health workers and peripheral institutions and 
use a range of provider services. Public sector hospitals play an important role in the 
treatment of TB patients, particularly for the poor and hospitalisation rates are high. The 
social consequences of indebtedness and disability were distressingly high. 
20 It is worthwhile recalling that in most industrialised countries social security was provided in addition to 
free treatment. 
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8.4 Local Government as a Political Resource 
Local Government at District Level and Health: The Zilla Panchayat (District Council) 
with a President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer, leader of the Opposition and 
members, has Standing Committees (Sthai Samiti 's) on various subjects including health, 
which meet every month (the State Health Minister was present at a meeting attended by 
the researchers). The President of the Zilla Parishad has the rank of State Cabinet 
Minister, wielding considerable power. 
The Mysore Zilla Parishad raises about Rs.l 0 million per month from local taxes. The 
State Government of Kamataka provides an annual supplementary budget of Rs.80-1 00 
million. The Zilla Parishad allocates Rs.20 million annually to health, with Rs.150-
200,000 to each Gram Panchayat. The proportion of the State health budget for the 
district coming through the Zilla Parishad (ZP) has increased to 70% (DHO* 1996) 
indicating a transfer of power to local government. ZP budgets vary according to 
popUlation, area and taxes raised. 
Health is under the purview of Panchayati Raj, with the District Health Officerihis staff 
reporting to the ZP. ZP members sit on Committees such as the Drug Purchase 
Committee and district health staff attend meetings of the ZP Standing Committee on 
Health. ZP members reportedly visit health institutions, raising questions regarding 
functioning of government health centres at Standing Committee meetings. A few staff 
members have been suspended pending enquiries. Political mechanisms increase the 
potential of accountability between health services and people. Patient's and peoples 
interests can and have been represented and mediated at ZP and state assembly levels. 
However party and personal interests, traditional vested interests, drug company and 
doctor's interests also playa part, with members sometimes supporting and promoting 
certain interests. 
This political process of learning, negotiation and accommodation between different 
interests offers a window of opportunity for active/constructive participation at 
state/district levels by political actors health, for long the preserve of professionals. 
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The State Health Minister21 felt that health facilities were sufficient in number but with 
low quality service, insufficient drugs/equipment, personnel shortages, and inadequate ZP 
budgets (interview 1996). Ascribing these to defects in the administrative machinery, he 
felt they could be remedied. At a Standing Committee meeting attended by him, he 
emphasised the need for total improvement of quality of services (observation of meeting 
1996). He outlined steps taken by government including the appointment of doctors on 
contracts, and the World Bank loan for development of district hospitals. Both he and the 
ZP President talked of problems faced by gram panchayats, need to solve internal 
conflicts, misuse of power, and transfer of officials involved. The ZP President said that 
good health required pure drinking water, unpolluted air, well ventilated housing. The 
public works department was behind schedule requiring attention. They thus articulated 
broader interests. 
The ZP Vice President, a 29 year old woman lawyer and business owner from the 
scheduled caste community with social involvement's before being elected, is described 
as 'dynamic, fighting for the poor, possessing an ability to redress the common person's 
problem, interested in women's issues '. Officers from the Karnataka Administrative 
Services comprise the executive wing. 
Role and Functioning of Gram Panchayats (GP) regarding Health: GP's cover a 
popUlation of 10-15,000 with representatives for every 1000. They meet every month to 
discuss developmental programmes channelled by state and central government through 
them, identifying individuals/families who can avail of loans/schemes. Gram Panchayats 
playa negligible role in health, with members not authorised to look into the affairs of the 
PHC. Only the President/Chairperson sometimes does so. 
Ten percent (Rs.15,000) of the annual GP budget ofRs.1,50,000-2,00,000 can be used for 
health, while education gets 15%. The health budget is used primarily for preventive 
measures such as environmental sanitation, drainage, chlorination of water, DDT 
spraying, responding to epidemics of gastro-enteritis, cholera, Japanese Encephalitis if 
21 Who comes from the study district. 
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they arise. The budget is only for group or collective measures and not for individual 
support to patients from severe/chronic diseases. GP funds are utilised in collaboration 
with PHC staff. There can be a collusion between the two to misuse funds (interviews). 
GP's are empowered to raise local taxes from fairs, temple festivals, use of common 
water tanks and common lands, new constructions etc. However these are most often not 
levied. 
There was a general feeling that GP members lacked powers to do much. 'You cannot 
execute anything without money' they said (interview 1996). Discussions centre around 
Integrated Rural Development Programmes, Bhagyajyoti (electricity) etc. and rarely 
cover health. 'We are basically politicians, we have to do programmes which can get 
people's attention quickly.' Within Gram Panchayat's, power is concentrated in the 
President, Secretary and Treasurer. Budget information may not be revealed to members. 
Differences of opinion sometimes delay programmes. Younger articulate members saw 
their role as raising critical questions in meetings and getting programme benefits from 
the ZP to the periphery. 
Eighteen elected representatives from Gram Panchayat's in the two taluks, four from the 
Zilla Panchayat and eight staff members working in the Zilla Panchayat office were 
interviewed. What was striking was their youthfulness, enthusiasm and confidence. The 
sample was skewed in favour of SC's and ST's to reflect their perspectives in particular. 
Feedback on General Health Services: Five of 18 felt that general health services at 
PHC's were satisfactory, though with shortcomings. Older respondents mentioned the 
increased number of services, improved quality and increased transport services making 
access easier, over the years. The majority were dissatisfied saying: 'PHC's are not 
answerable to anyone; they do not function to their fullest potential; they are of no use to 
the poor; they are useful only for headaches, coughs and colds; government only 
emphasises Family Planning through the PHC's; there is not one person who has said 
that his disease was cured at the PHC; it is only a name-board- there is nothing inside; 
only very poor people go to PHC's and even for them no useful purpose is served there; 
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Government believes in PHC's, but those who live there cannot. The PHC's are there 
only to give employment. ' One outspoken tribal graduate said, 'If the government is good 
all the departments will be good. The (policy) statements of governments only lie on 
paper and in lectures delivered in Delhi. Public health facilities are of no use to the 
public. ' 
Drug supplies: The majority (14/18) were dissatisfied about drug supplies, widespread 
practices of giving prescriptions, inferior quality of drugs 'fit only to be thrown out', and 
the need to pay for drugs/services, saying that 'one may as well go to private doctors '. 
These comments were not specific to TB suggesting that inadequate and irregular 
supplies of TB drugs, brought out by all other aspects of the study, are part of a wider 
problem of availability and quality of drug supplies to government health facilities. 
Health staff including their attitudes and behaviour received strong adverse comment 
from the majority. Doctors were too few, absent during working hours, unavailable at 
night since most commute, ('do diseases only come during the daytime?' asked one) 
interested mainly in earning money, lacking interest in and concern or respect for patients 
and the public, besides being involved with local political conflicts, (' doctors look upon 
Gram Panchayat members with contempt and GP presidents boss over doctors- politics 
should not enter the health services). Another said that' doctors function under rules and 
face punishment if they do not' and should be more responsible. 
Negative attitudes/rude behaviour of other staff received more adverse comment, with 
several experiences cited, 'nurses treat us like animals, they shout; they consider people 
as slaves; it will be good to abolish the designation of Multi Purpose Worker's, instead of 
wasting money paying salaries. They are of no use regarding public health matters; The 
intention of MPW's may be good but their timing is not; I have not seen or heard of them 
testing sputum or blood;' and finally, 'PHC's are working as if they are dead'. 
Payment for free services was widespread, 'staff are not honest', 'every PHC takes 
money', 'there is more of corruption than anything else.' "though called a poor man's 
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hospital, they extract money from everybody', 'people have to pay for services or get 
inferior medicines which cause problems', <they prescribe medicine for which also we 
have to pay'. Other felt 'Nobody will ask for bribes openly, they take money secretly. 
Which department does not take money to get work done? But in the health department if 
you say with courage that you will not give money, work can be done,' Giving Rs. 5-1 0 is 
not a large amount. It is not a bribe at all, it is only enough to buy coffee or cigarettes '. 
While the four fold increase in number of Peripheral Health Institutions in HDKote laluk 
over the years was appreciated, several commented on the lack of admission, X-ray and 
surgical facilities. Others problems mentioned included mal-administration, 
overcrowding, long waiting times, poor condition of some buildings and distance for the 
elderly and children. 
All elected representatives, except two, knew TB patients in their area by name. Four had 
relatives with TB, one of whom had died. In their experience, the government TB 
'sanatorium' in Mysore was identified as the primary source of treatment, particularly for 
the poor, by 12/18. Only two each mentioned the voluntary and private sector as 
alternatives. Four said patients go to PHC's especially in the early stages, implying later 
shifts. Some specifically mentioned the PHC's incapability of treating TB, 
acknowledging that, <treatment at local hospitals' would be most convenient for people. 
A few GP members intervened actively, taking patients to hospital or securing loans 
under developmental schemes for the family22. 
The majority were sceptical of the role of private practitioners in TB treatment especially 
for the poor. Comments included: <Private clinics are not to be trusted; I am disgusted 
with private hospitals, people have made their profession crooked for earning money; If 
one gets admitted to a private hospital he is as good as a pauper; Though the disease 
may be diagnosed they don't disclose it to the patient, because they want to extract as 
much money as possible; and finally they are referred to government hospitals. ' The link 
with the profit motive was quite apparent to them and not particularly favoured. 
22 Pointing the way to innovative, supportive roles at village level that could make a difference. 
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Comments regarding a voluntary sector hospital provide insights into the effects of 
attitudesibehaviour, 'They treat patients with respect. Even if one is a stranger they ask 
you to sit with a smile. They respond to our needs and offer friendly advice. ' 
The Panchayat system provides mechanisms for greater accountability, for broader 
support to patients/their families, and for integration of health with development efforts. 
The NTP has not yet responded to this renewed opportunity. 
8.5 Voluntary Organisations as Actors in TB Care & Control 
Both taluks have voluntary organisations working in health and development, within 
which specific components of TB control are embedded. Prioritising work with 
marginalised sections of society, they base on philosophies of empowerment, self 
reliance, and community organisation (interviews). Each organisation evolved its own 
strategies of intervention regarding overall work and for TB, including relationships with 
government. 
Yelandur Taluk (population 71,715 over 40 villages) has two related NGO's: 
Vivekananda Girijana Kalyana Kendra (VGKK, Vivekananda Tribal Welfare Centre) 
based in BR Hills works for integrated tribal development, including community health, 
with the Soliga people of Mysore District since 1981. A related, autonomous Karuna 
Trust started in 1987 covers the entire taluk, which was hyper-endemic for leprosy, with a 
leprosy control programme. Following the National Leprosy Control Programme it used a 
vertical approach with special para-medical workers and house to house survey, 
education and treatment (SET), using multi-drug therapy. Prevalence rates dropped from 
21.411000 in 1987 to 0.3911000 in 1993 and incidence rates from 3.82 to 0.75 in 1992 
(Karuna Trust records, 1996) and over 1000 patients were cured (ShivaKumar* 1996). 
District Health Office records indicate a reduction in the number of leprosy cases in all 
taluks during the period with increased case detection and treatment. 
The programme increased the experience, expertise and credibility of the NGO team. 
Success resulted in insufficient work for health workers, as occurred in several leprosy 
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control projects23• Karuna Trust expanded activities to cover epilepsy (from 114/1990) 
and community mental health, for which there were no facilities in the public/private 
sectors in the taluk. The vertical approach was continued in the new programmes, though 
the project later aims to develop into a community based comprehensive health project. 
Processes in all projects included use of experienced consultants, linkages with national 
training and research institutions, national professional associations, and the state 
government. 
The NGO team found TB a problem in the community with the NTP functioning poorly. 
Government PHC's detected 3 cases in the taluk in 1990, 5 in 1991 and lacked basic TB 
drugs, isoniazid and thiacetazone (Sudarshan 1994). Following a decision in 1990 to start 
a TB control programme, discussions were initiated by the NGO with the State 
Government at Secretariat level. 
Agreement with Government: A government letter dated 15/10/91 from the Joint Director 
TB instructs the DTO, Mysore, 'to implement the TB Control Programme at 
VGKK .... (as) there are facilities for detection ofTB with laboratory and X-ray units, and 
administrative staff. The TB programme was to start from 1111191. This was a relatively 
limited mandate with authorisation to function as a peripheral health institution in the 
NTP. Following negotiations with the State Government, 'responsibility for 
implementing the NTP in Yelandur Taluk was offiCially given to Karuna Trust from 
1/4/92' (Sridhar and Sudarshan 1996;39). The Directorate of Health Services supplied a 
microscope and agreed to provide drugs and laboratory reagents through the District TB 
Centre from where regular collections were to be made. The entire team received training 
and manuals from the National Tuberculosis Institute at Bangalore. All other 
expenditures (salaries, transport) were the responsibility of the Trust. 
The programme objective 'to reduce the prevalence of TB in the community to a level 
where it ceases to be a public health problem' (Sridhar and Sudarshan 1994;39) is the 
23 The Indian Council of Medical Research, GOI, in the 1980's had experimented with the integration of 
leprosy and TB control partly to overcome this. 
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same as that of the NTP. However modifications to the NTP strategy were Inade. The 
programme does not function through government PHC's but has an alternative structure 
with the Karuna Trust Health Centre at taluk headquarters as base with a doctor 
, 
microscopy and a team of paramedical workers. The relationship between the two 
structures at field level for TB work is unclear. The MO of the programme had never 
visited the government PHC's till this researcher's visit, though field 
supervisors/paramedical staff are in regular contact. Initially DTC staff visited Karuna 
Trust, 'acting very bossy ... .labelling patients as lost very easily, without making any 
efforts for defaulter retrieval and wanting to take the treatment cards away to the DTC' 
(Krishnan*1995). The Trust supervisor refused and there were few subsequent visits. 
Thus a relatively conflictual relationship exists at a key level. 
The vertical approach of previous intervention programmes continued for TB, though the 
NTP is integrated with general health services. Since infrastructure and staff existed, it 
could be implemented. Instead of passive case finding, active case detection was 
undertaken with house to house visits by paramedical workers on an ongoing basis. Six 
paramedics cover 14,000 households (travelling on bicycles), collecting sputum 
specimens from chest symptomatics, and sending smears to the Karuna Trust Health 
Centre, with each round taking a year. Self reporting patients come to weekly Sunday 
chest clinics (the market day) or to daily OPD's. Most cases are diagnosed by sputum 
microscopy with approximately 30% requiring X-rays, the latter done at the VGKK 
hospital at BR Hills (Sridhar* 1996). All investigations/treatment are free of charge. 
An NTI consultant visits occasionally to discuss management of complex cases. Standard 
technical procedures were followed: a) Sputum microscopy: overnight sample with 
instructions regarding specimen collection, repeat examinations, cross checking by 
doctor, b) minimal use of X-rays, c) recording system with local data analysis to guide 
the programme. 
NTI chemotherapy guidelines are followed. Short Course Chemotherapy used for newly 
diagnosed sputum positive TB patients was later expanded to all sputunl positives. 
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Finding incomplete treatment among a substantial number and based on an understanding 
of the psychology of patients, clinic based supervised treatment for 2 months was 
introduced with biweekly, ambulatory, intermittent chemotherapy24 (Sridhar* 1995). 
Missed doses are reportedly followed by home visits by paramedics. In case of genuine 
inability to attend the clinic, paramedics give supervised treatment in patient's homes. 
Supervised treatment has been difficult even in the intensive two month phase and 
incomplete treatment continues (Sridhar* 1995). 
In 1992-93 there were serious problems with drug supplies from the DTC (Sudarshan 
1994). Alternative local arrangements ensured uninterrupted drug supply through 
donations, free supplies from drug companies and local purchase by the Trust, leading to 
formation of a 'drug bank'. Currently attempts are being made to decentralise drug 
distribution through drug depots (for leprosy, TB, epilepsy) located within 2-3 km from 
people's homes. About 25% of drug requirements were supplied by the DTC 
(Krishnan* 1995). Different drugs were not available at different times. Even sputum cups 
were in short supply. Visits to the DTC for drug collection were tedious, 'the DTO was 
usually not available', taking a whole day to get some drugs. Varying strength of drugs 
supplied in different batches occurs, with patients having to change the number of tablets 
they take, causing confusion. Staff members commented on private practice and use of 
government drug supplies by DTC staff, who keep TB drug stocks especially of 
Rifampicin for themselves. Private practice at PHC's was also reported (several 
interviews 1996). Further enquiry by VGKK revealed State and country-wide drug 
shortages in 1992-93 (Sudarshan 1994, VHAI 1994). Explanations given were that the 
Centre had problems in drug purchase (for unspecified reasons), and that States had not 
contributed their 50% towards drug purchase (Sridhar and Sudarshan 1996). A campaign 
was initiated with the Voluntary Health Association of India nationally concerning drug 
supply and other issues regarding the NTPIRNTP (Chapter 5). Dr. Sudarshan, Founder 
and Secretary of VGKK25 , Vice-President of the VHAI at this time was active in the 
24 2 (SHRZ)2/4(RH)2 or 2(EHRZ)2 14(RH)2 . 
25 Recipient of the international Right Livelihood award and natIonal awards. 
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national advocacy process. Repeated representation at State and Central levels improved 
the drug supply situation (Sudarshan* 1995). 
Family folders are maintained with regular recording and reporting systems. From 
December 1991 till March 1995 i.e. in 40 months, 254 TB patients (all forms) were 
registered for treatment. The estimated prevalence of sputum positive TB in a population 
of 70,000 is 280 patients and of X-ray suspects 1,400 while the estimated annual 
incidence is 315. Speculative reasons for the lower than expected case detection, inspite 
of community based efforts include reduced prevalence following treatment by the 
private sector/government institutions in Mysore leaving only incident cases, missed 
diagnosis due to health worker (investigator) and diagnostic errors, and patients still 
attending government institutions and not disclosing their illness to health workers 
conducting surveys. 
Table 8.18 TB Case Detection at Karuna Trust 
Period Total Cases Bacillary X-ray Positive Extra-pulm. Comment 
1991-92 15 5 10 - preproject 
1992-93 103 61 35 7 1 S survey 
1993-94 80 53 19 8 ongomg" 
1994-95 56 43 11 2 
" " 
Source: Dr. Sridhar, Dr. Sudarshan & teamNGKK & Karuna Trust records 
Table 8.19 Epidemiological Rates of TB in Yelandur Taluk (Karuna Trust) 
Year Rate Bacillary All Forms 
1992-93 Prevalence rate 0.85/1000 1.4/1000 
1993-94 Incidence rate 0.70/1000 1.111000 
1994-95 Incidence rate 0.57/1000 0.7011000 
Source: Dr. Sndhar, Dr. Sudarshan & teamNGKK & Karuna Trust records 
Data collection was by a team trained and experienced in the conduct of surveys. 
However the complexities of TB including case definitions are often underestimated. 
Rates are lower than expected and have apparently reduced further within 3 years. 
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Table 8.20 Treatment Outcome at Karuna Trust 
Year Cured Lost Died LCA 
1991-92 10 2 2 1 
1992-93 65 (63%) 27 9 1 
1993-94 39 (48.7%) 29 5 3 (4 missing) 
Source. Dr. Sndhar, Dr. Sudarshan & teamIVGKK & Karuna Trust records 
Treatment non-adherence is 27.5% (19.1 % among sputum positives, 36% among sputum 
negatives), while it is 20/0 for leprosy (Sudarshan* 1995). Patients often continue and 
complete treatment with private practitioners (ibid). Project staff hypothesise that similar 
results could be obtained with an integrated approach. Treatment failure of 5.8% is 
reported, mainly among patients who had taken Rifampicin containing regimens 
irregularly previously (Sridhar*1996). Two patients on second line re-treatment regimens 
are regular. 
The total annual expenditure of Karuna Trust was Rs.450,000 for implementing leprosy, 
epilepsy, TB, mental health, dental health, and eye care programmes (Sridhar and 
Sudarshan 1996). The average expenditure was Rs.6.25/personlyear (about 10 pence) 
make the approach highly cost-effective (ibid). 
Staff salaries are modest and less than those of the government. Paramedics receive a 
monthly salary of Rs.1,500 while government Junior Health Assistants receive Rs.3,500-
4000. Staff turnover is not very high. Local tribal youth have been trained for the base 
hospital (including as laboratory and X-ray technician) at BR Hills. Factors responsible 
for gains of the programme are cited as a combination of committed health workers and 
medical staff, motivation, leadership, working environment, honesty and sincerity at 
managerial level. Others in the organisation say it is not dedication, but jobs to be 
performed, employment opportunities when there is unemployment, and the management 
demanding certain levels of performance (interviews/correspondence* 1996). 
Special features included village awareness programmes once in 3-4 months, flexible 
working hours/days with workers going at 7 am to meet people before they leave for 
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work, and special Sunday clinics, close team functioning, supportive leadership and a 
willingness to engage in broader issues. 
There are two main NGO's involved in TB work in the second taluk26 . One has a hospital 
in a remote area, working primarily for the Jenu Kuruba tribe and the rural population in 
the area. It provides good quality diagnostic and therapeutic care to patients reporting to it 
and is given a grant by the second NGO for free TB treatment. The second NGO involved 
in development work throughout the taluk has created a network of grassroots peoples' 
organisations, and collaborates with government in various programmes particularly 
poverty alleviation27• It sees its TB work in the provision of housing for the poorest. It 
also provides see TB drugs to the local PRe, covers TB treatment costs at the other 
NGO hospital and helps in the organisation of TB detection camps in collaboration with 
the DTe. Seriously ill patients are referred to a mission hospital in Mysore, and their 
hospitalisation/treatment costs met. There are eleven other NGO's, several with 
dispensaries treating individual TB patients and most of them also involved with 
community organisation/education and development work impacting indirectly on TB. 
Policy lessons from the TB work of NGO 's 
NGO work in the district was initiated in response to perceived need and by the initiators' 
own need for social engagement. Leadership was strong with a deep 
spiritual/philosophical base and a developmental approach. Teamwork was closer with 
members manifesting a greater sense of ownership and involvement, even working on 
lower salaries. Their rapport with people was crucial, especially 'treating patients with 
affection'. TB was one dimension of their health/development work (such as community 
organisation with formation of sangha 'slwomen's/farmers groups, co-operatives, income 
generation, children's educational activities, water supply and irrigation) through which 
26 The Vivekananda Youth Movement running Shankar Hospital and other programmes and MYRADA-
~LAAN. aluation of 12 years work showed that poverty levels decreased by 20% though 35% of the n ev . 
population was still below the poverty line defmed as below Rs.ll ,400 per capIta per year 
(D'Souza* 1996). 
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they participated in the social, economic and cultural life of the taluk. NGO's took the 
initiative in the relationship with government. 
Inspite of wide-ranging work involvement, the attention paid to the TB programme was 
greater than the PHC's. However the rapid increase in and large number of programmes 
may dilute specific programmes like TB. The importance of the smallest functional unit 
and on the people (staff) working there, of evolving local innovations such as drug banks, 
of local analysis and utilisation of data can be applied at DTC level. Vertical approaches 
with active case finding have not achieved gains. Adequate, uninterrupted drug 
supplies/finances have not completely reduced implementation problems, suggesting the 
role of additional factors. The conflictual relationship with government, with 
collaboration at some levels seems inevitable and perhaps necessary in the circumstances. 
8.6 The Private Health Sector in TB Care 
The private sector comprises a very diverse group in the taluks and district headquarters. 
Mysore city has high technology hospitals like the JSS Medical CollegelHospital, 
Basappa Memorial Hospital doing kidney transplantation's and the Bharat Cancer 
Hospital. At taluk level, GP's with widely different training, run single practitioner 
clinics. Yelandur Taluk (population 70,715) has 17 private practitioners with 8 allopaths 
(MBBS degrees), 5 Registered Medical Practitioners (RMP's), 2 homeopaths, 1 ayurved, 
and 1 GCTM (Certificate in Traditional Medicine). There was one nursing home with 25 
inpatient beds, three doctors (MBBS), nursing assistants, a laboratory where doctors and 
an untrained assistant did simple investigations, and their own pharmacy. 12% of patients 
sought health advice/treatment from folk practitioners, wandering 
mendicants/ 'Yelavara's', astrologers and priests forming part of local health traditions 
(private, low cost). There were 3 private pharmacies, 2 at the taluk headquarters and 1 in 
a large village. 
There are differences between this geographically compact, better off taluk well 
connected by road transport, relatively close to Mysore city, and HDK taluk, socio-
economically the poorest in the district. In HDK there are fewer private practitioners, a 
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smaller proportion with an MBBS degree, with clinics located in the headquarters town 
or larger villages along the highway28. More practitioners commute from 
Mysore/elsewhere. Private pharmacies established during the past 5 years at taluk 
headquarters and larger villages stocked TB drugs in both taluks. Medical representatives 
fron1 pharmaceutical companIes interviewed regularly visited/supplied private 
practitioners (who sell medicines from their clinics) and government PHC medical 
officers in the area even in remoter areas29. 
TB treatment practices: Six out of 17 private practitioners in Yelandur taluk and 5 out of 
approximately 2030 in HDKote Taluk were interviewed. 
Initial investigations for TB were done by referrals to private diagnostic centres in nearby 
towns, with links usually established between particular centres and doctors. After 
diagnosis, patients were often referred to the PKTB and Chest Disease Hospital in 
Mysore, to Karuna Trust in Yelandur or to the HD Kote General Hospital, the free 
treatment being considered a better option for poor patients. Long and expensive 
treatment, with rising drug costs, was problematic. One doctor estimated the cost of 
treatment to be Rs.7000. Some practitioners felt that a large proportion (upto 75%) of 
referred patients did not actually go. 
Five doctors treated very few TB patients, up to 3-5/year and the others less. They 
estimated that 20-25% of their patients get cured, with incomplete treatment being 
common. They all felt that poverty and under-nutrition were important reasons for 
incomplete treatment and for inability to control TB. TB patients are forced to earn their 
livelihood inspite of their disease, making it difficult for them to come regularly for 
treatment. They suggested that excessive smoking and alcohol consumption, especially 
by men, adversely affected treatment completion and outcome. Working single handed, 
with a part-time assistant for cleaning and odd jobs, they do not follow up patients, nor 
keep records (except the nursing home). Their strengths as perceived by patients was 
availability, including evenings and weekends and friendlier attitudes. 
28 Public sector facilities/doctors are better distributed geographically than private doctors. 
29 This suggests private practice as PHC drug supplies are from district headquarters. 
30 In a la/uk with a large geographical area and population. 
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They felt people had little faith in PRC's due to drug shortages and other problems. They 
however referred to the government TB 'sanatorium' patients with advanced disease, 
complications or the poor for whom free food/accommodation were an important need. 
One said, 'If TB is to be controlled, the poor have to be first fed with nutritious food. And 
TB drugs must be available free of cost. TB is curable but it is important that government 
policies are systematically implemented. It is best not to discuss this issue because if I go 
into the politics of it I may take recourse to foul language '. 
Levels of professional knowledge varied, with the trained allopaths being the best. The 
others had patchy knowledge about the disease, knew the names of one or two drugs, and 
not the duration of treatment or dosage. Their ability to provide good quality services for 
a complex disease like TB is questionable. Voluntary sector doctors commented on 'the 
negative impact of private practitioners ... due to their irrational diagnosis and regimens, 
lack of follow-up, and the heavy financial burden on patients. '(Sridhar and Sudarshan 
1996;42). There is a qualitative difference between private practitioners in cities and 
remoter rural areas and no regulation of practices. 
Practitioners were not members of the local branch of the Indian Medical Association, 
except one who gave up its Presidentship considering it 'useless'. Organisational 
mechanisms were deficient for contact, information dissemination, and educational 
strategies for this dispersed and varied group. Interest too was low with no practitioner 
attending continuing education programmes of the Mysore District TB Association 
during 1994-96. 
Competition between practitioners exists with five practitioners starting practice on a one 
kilometre stretch of road in RDKote taluk over the past 6 years. As one mentioned they 
have to share the patient load between them and are not on talking terms. One also 
lamented that the nearby Government PRC got more patients than all of them put 
together. None of them refer patients to the PRC even for simple laboratory 
investigations though this is the one PRC with a trained laboratory technician. The PRC 
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MO has not taken the initiative to meet the practitioners. Interestingly all of them 
commute from Mysore. 
It would be instructive though difficult to study cure rates/treatment completion in the 
private sector. It is curious that policy makers, concerned about poor cure rates in the 
public sector, advocate greater involvement of the private sector whose achievements in 
this respect are unknown or worse. It also seems insufficient for policy to make general 
recommendations/references regarding 'the private sector', involving practitioners with 
diverse training, expertise and skill. 
The private sector is a complex non-homogenous group and strategies to involve them 
should base on ground realities in each district. 
In conclusion, 
• An implementation gap with incomplete popUlation coverage (520/0), low case 
detection/treatment completion is evident in this relatively well-off district, in a State 
with moderate socio-economic development and fairly widespread health services. 
Even in the best scenario situation, of the NGO covered taluk, implementation was 
lower than expected, suggesting there are inherent difficulties in TB programmes. 
• The public sector plays an important role in TB treatment, especially for the poor, but 
not in ways envisaged by the NTP. Cardinal features of integration, availability of 
services closest to peoples homes, domiciliary and free treatment are not being 
practised. Public sector health institutions closest to peoples homes in rural areas, 
with very limited real resources, are non-functional in key tasks of the NTP of case 
detection and treatment and TB care is not integrated at this level. Patients express 
preferences for utilising PRC services but find them ineffective. They then use a 
range of providers, for both diagnosis and treatment. Instead of the planned route 
from peripheral institutions to District TB Centres, a majority of patients go to private 
providers or PRC's in the early stages, bypass the DTC and then go to the 
TB/district/taluk general hospitals, which offer better professional and diagnostic and 
252 
• 
therapeutic facilities. Thus urban secondary care institutions financed and managed 
by State government playa dominant role in TB care. Hospitalisation rates were high. 
Implementation altered policy fundamentally and State/district programme managers 
were unable or uninterested to influence this process. 
• In spite of increased numbers of health facilities over time (Public/private/voluntary), 
this improved access to medical care, by itself was insufficient to improve TB control 
significantly, pointing to the need for specific policy inputs in the operational units. 
• While techno-managerial factors such as lack of sputum microscopy and irregular 
drug supplies are immediate explanatory factors for poor programme execution, 
underlying factors that emerged include: 
~ Negligible ownership of the programme at DTC and PHC level. Frontline staff! 
institutions do not value good TB care/control, accept the status quo, and make few 
efforts to give feedback, bring about change or lobby for improvement. 
~ A disempowered DTC cannot provide the leadership or organisational/technical! 
moral support and supervision required for the programme. This is repeated at PHC 
level where doctors function irregularly. Staff behaviour and organisational problems 
drive people elsewhere including the private sector. 
~ Staff vacancies and inadequacies are caused by socio-political factors (reservation 
policy, focus on malaria programme, short-termism with doctors on contract) . 
~ Health Assistants, preoccupied with competing programmes and personal goals/ 
practices, neglect the NTP, though workload (numbers ofTB patients) in their areas 
are small. 
Lacking direction and support they are unable to playa potentially positive role. 
~ Burden of payment for 'free' services at public health facilities, even for sputum cups 
and sputum tests, in addition to indirect costs of treatment, are disincentives for poor 
patients completing regular treatment. 
~ Ill-developed systems of financial/technical/programmatic accountability result in no 
pressure on the system to perform. 
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-- Patients, particularly the poor, are helpless, unprotesting, unorganised players in this 
process, paying the price of prolonged suffering/ill-health with socio-economic 
consequences of indebtedness and invalidism. They could playa more assertive role 
as the biggest stakeholders in the programme. No steps have been taken by the 
voluntary sector or the Gram Panchayats to organise them. The policy takes little 
cognisance of the social causes and consequences of the disease. 
-- Inability of the NTP policy managers at state or national level to respond to these 
contextual and process issues weakens policy implementation. 
• Lack of power, real resources, capacity and accountability engender disinterest and 
apathy at PRC's and the DTC, making them weak partners/links in the NTP. 
Standardised, simplified methodologies evolved for use in peripheral institutions are 
rendered non-functional by these factors. 
• Private for profit providers, a mixed group, with varying educational backgrounds, 
types of health facilities, often undertake plural practice (modem medicine and other 
systems) with little regulation. Substantial proportions in the Taluks untrained to 
diagnose/treat TB with allopathic medicines, referred patients to hospitals and were 
explicitly unwilling to undertake follow-up. Private practitioners qualified in modem 
medicine referred poorer TB patients to public hospitals for financial reasons. Their 
role in TB care particularly treatment was limited in this group of patients. 
• NGO's were liked by patients and demonstrated better achievements (though less 
than expected), with low programme costs and positive health worker contributions, 
within supportive programmes. Their critical, issue raising role, deriving from 
grassroots work was a constructive contribution to policy process. Integration of TB 
work not only with health, but with development and awareness raising are feasible at 
• 
local level. 
Decentralised local governance providing opportunities for accountability and local 
participation, is yet to be utilised by the NTP. 
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• NTP's neglect of implementation weaknesses, apparent after three decades, suggests 
that the policy is strongly influenced by the power of dominant interests promoting 
select programmes, keeping services in larger urban institutions, and starving 
peripheral institutions of resources. Values of social justice in the care of TB patients 
are not evident. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction: 
This study set out to explain the factors underlying the acknowledged gap between the 
goals of the National Tuberculosis Programme (NTP) in India and its actual 
implementation. The choice of TB as the focus of study was because of the continuing 
magnitude of the problem in India and elsewhere, which demanded an ongoing quest for 
more effective methods to alleviate suffering related to the disease. The application of a 
technical method or package for TB control at national level is through policies and their 
processes. While progress has been achieved in the development of policy content, there 
has been little work on policy process in TB control. The focus on the implementation 
gap was to further understanding of the interplay of deeper forces, so as to inform policy 
process. 
Although a number of analyses and authoritative evaluations identified weaknesses in the 
TB programme from the 1960s, and made recommendations, implementation problems 
continued to exist. This study hypothesised that these problems and gaps cannot be 
explained only by technical or managerial deficits, but that societal and political issues, 
played an important role. This, if established, would have broader policy implications. 
Therefore a policy analysis approach was adopted, focusing analytically on the nature of 
the problem, on policy content and particularly on policy processes, actors and context. 
Though TB and its control is a highly researched area, this is the first time this framework 
is being applied to TB control policy. A specific contribution of the study is that it 
incorporated a participatory, bottom-up approach, with views from TB patients, 
particularly the poort, from elected people's representatives and front-line staff. It has 
1 They have been considered and valued as partners and subjects in the study and not as beneficiaries or 
objects. 
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thus adopted an integrative approach looking at the interaction between all levels of the 
policy process, including international influence on policy, national and state level policy, 
as well as what actually happens at district and taluk level and how patients are affected. 
It thus differs from much policy analyses that tend to remain at national or macro level 
and are implicitly top-down. Because this study explicitly adopted a value base of social 
justice and equity, and the poor are disproportionately at risk of TB, a sample of 
impoverished patients was consciously selected and the focus was on the public sector 
which is mandated to deliver free services. 
It was necessary to use this analytic approach with the biological and epidemiological 
aspects of the disease as backdrop. The study therefore started with a review of these 
aspects (presented in Annexe 1 and Chapter 1), and then explored how these were 
translated into TB policy and practice. 
An implementation gap identified in quantitative terms is reported in this thesis at 
national (Table 1.4), state and district levels. Epidemiological, public health and 
operational parameters all point to a gap, although unrealistic expectations due to the use 
of prevalence rates of the 1950s, may accentuate its dimensions. Additionally, 
considerable suffering due to TB, observed among impoverished patients, adds a tragic 
qualitative dimension to the gap. Deficits were observed, to a smaller extent, even in the 
best scenario situation, where an GO used community based TB interventions with 
assured drug supplies and finances, in a compact talk for over three years, suggesting that 
the problem is complex. 
The gains made by the government's TB programme in India since 1947, and particularly 
the NT., are recognised and reported in this thesis. These include research studies 
evolving the concept and content of the NT.2, infrastructural growth, institutional 
development, and aspects of the pharmaceutical policy. 
In this chapter the discussion of policy and implementation processes is presented within 
the framework used for the study, namely, the nature of the problem, policy content, 
2 Contributions that influenced international thinking included studies on chemotherapy, the concept and 
operationalisation of National TB Programmes, and protective efficacy ofBCG. 
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context, and processes (including actors), though they all interact and overlap. A policy 
approach is necessarily broad in scope and needs to consider several aspects influencing 
mass interventions. Some insights concerning the biological aspects which were not 
primarily studied here are based on the literature. 
9.1 Kaleidoscopic Complexity of the Problem of TB 
Certain biological aspects of the problem are important in the context of TB control. 
Several factors such as the ancient coexistence of Mycobacterium tuberculosis with 
humankind, its ability to lie dormant intracellularly, to mutate in its efforts for ecological 
survival, and the incompletely understood mechanisms of pathogenesis, suggest that it is 
biologically difficult to eliminate TB3 (Annexe 1). Furthermore with one-third of the 
global (and Indian) population infected and at lifelong risk of developing the disease, the 
possibility of elimination becomes more remote. Even control programmes require long-
term sustainable strategies. 
When applied within an overall framework of improved living conditions through 
development, history shows that public health approaches could accelerate the natural 
decline of a TB epidemic. However in TB treatment and control it has been repeatedly 
seen that several technical approaches promoted as being scientific at the time, were later 
disproved, in serious doubt or of limited value. These included experiments with 
immunotherapy, gold therapy, various surgical procedures, sanatoria, drug monotherapy, 
BCG, use of thiacetazone and standard or conventional therapies4• This followed from an 
incomplete understanding of disease processes and suggests that continued research is 
important. Despite more recent scientific advance, knowledge gaps persist and hence 
rigid approaches to policy content require caution. Interest groups and conflicts were 
associated with the promotion of different technological methods such as mass miniature 
radiography, hospitalisation etc. On the other hand sustained care for TB patients, 
3 The TB programme in India never considered elimination, but this has been discussed in the USA and 
other countries. 
4 Accelerated reduction in industrialised countries from 1950-70 occured with standard drug regimens 
often considered obsolete today. 
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community level and national action have shown positive results over the past four 
decades, with use of varied methods, suggesting that factors other than technical content 
also playa role. 
Globally, historical and current evidence shows that social forces playa powerful role in 
the development and transmission of TB. These include unequal societal relations and 
structural factors resulting in impoverishment with poor nutrition and housing, social or 
political disruption, instability, and war or conflict. 
This study finds that besides it being a factor associated with the causation of TB, 
societal relations are also strong mediating mechanisms, influencing the adoption and 
implementation of TB control programmes. This is evident in urban-rural disparities in 
health services reducing access to rural patients, the lack of coverage of 40-50% of the 
popUlation by the NTP through non-implementation at peripheral institutions, 
stratification of TB services with better care for the organised sector and government 
inaction on policy recommendations deriving from evaluations. The strength of dominant 
social groups is further evident in the privatisation of medical education and health 
services providing access to private care5 for those with ability to pay, in the influence of 
medical professionals over policy and continuing dominance of clinical over public 
health approaches, in older policies that support institutional care over domiciliary 
treatment, in keeping the NTP under-resourced and in the disproportionate attention given 
to family planning/welfare. This comprises an important set of explanatory factors for the 
implementation gap, particularly from the perspective of deprived social groups. 
Although the NTP policy is to provide universal services, its implementation is deeply 
affected by these structural and societal factors. 
Values of social justice and equity are yet to be realised in practice. That the NTP in the 
1960s tried to shift the balance of power from urban to rural, from vertical to integrated, 
from specialist to generalist is also part explanation for the implementation gap, as it 
elicited resistance from strong forces described earlier. Thus, not only is TB linked with 
5 Which is not necessarily better quality. 
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poverty but this study shows that powerful societal forces and interests resist the 
widespread application of TB control measures by non-decisions, non-action or non-
implementation. 
More recently, international social forces under a sense of threat from rising TB rates in 
established market economies, especially among immigrants and ethnic minorities, are 
initiating and pressing for policy changes during the 1990s, using the leverage of funding 
and conditionalities. Current strategies such as directly observed therapy, shift the burden 
of responsibility to the most powerless, namely to patients and front-line health workers, 
without providing the means (resources beyond those required for drugs, such as for staff, 
transport and compensation for wages lost etc.) for the strategy to work. 
Impact of poverty: Improved socio-economic and living conditions have consistently 
resulted in the disease declining in different regions of the world. In India, the fruits of 
economic growth have benefited 60% of the population (though disproportionately even 
among this group), while disparities have widened. About 400 million persons or 40% of 
the popUlation living below and around the poverty line continue to be impoverished. The 
interaction between poverty and TB and its effects on families was evident at local level. 
This study found high levels of indebtedness due to TB among poor patients, enmeshing 
them further in the poverty cycle. Poverty was a bigger problem than TB faced by these 
patients. Importantly they depended on the public sector, with all its weaknesses, for TB 
treatment. 
The problem of poverty, inequity and hence of TB in affected groups could be 
exacerbated in the present period, inspite of its overarching goals of economic growth 
because of insufficient commitment (national and global) to reducing disparities in 
wealth health and health care6. Further as argued earlier, societal factors were , 
overshadowed by policies determined by a strong biomedical paradigm. Though links with 
6 In various parts of the world there is evidence that TB is associated not only with HN, but clearly with 
growing poverty/social disruption for certain sections of ~ociety. T?is ~s evident in E~stem Europe. In 
India because of lack of notification of TB and of analysIs of momtonng data by socIal class, and because 
of widespread acceptance of its links with poverty, population based data/trends by social class is more 
infrequent. 
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poverty and TB are repeatedly reported and acknowledged, politico-economic and 
developmental approaches to its control were inadequately pursued by policy makers. 
Opportunities to change policy direction were missed. For instance health being integral to 
development as part of Primary Health Care in 1978 provided a chance to place TB control 
in a wider context. However vertical disease and problem based approaches and selective 
interventions received stronger support from national political, bureaucratic and 
technocratic decision makers, reinforced by international financial support and policy 
advice. The impact of these policy choices, for instance the family welfare and malaria 
programmes on the functioning of the health care system and its impact on the NTP, has 
been described. More recently, efforts towards Renewal of Health For All in the 21 st 
Century have again brought issues concerning development, equity and sustainability into 
the public health debate (WHO 1997c7). However the TB public health community (Indian 
and global) is uninvolved in the international and national meetings and processes 
connected with this initiative. 
Finally, this biological and societal complexity is further overlaid by the technical and 
operational difficulties of diagnosing and treating TB. The diffuse spread of TB patients 
throughout India (2-3 sputum positive patients spread over 600,000 villages); clinical 
difficulties in diagnosis (dependant on the training and clinical acumen of several thousand 
doctors and the availability of diagnostic facilities); problems with treatment adherence 
(representing an interplay of doctor, system and patient factors); programmatic complexities 
such as ensuring uninterrupted drug supplies; and problems of drug resistance and co-
infection with HIV, all make TB control a challenge both at macro and micro level. 
This study supports those policy analysts who suggest that the nature of problems 
influences policy performance. Complex, interdependent problems (such as TB), rooted in 
many causes, with large diverse target groups, and many actors involved over a prolonged 
period, make it difficult for programmes to meet their objectives (Howlett & Ramesh 1995). 
7 The researcher attended three such international meetings. 
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9.2 Policy Content 
Policy content in the health sphere compnses of the scientific rationale for the 
interventions based on an assumed understanding of cause-effect relationships, and the 
specific technical components. The concept of an NTP and some of its key elements were 
developed in India, contributing also to global TB policy. Conflicts in the choice of 
specific technical elements are clearly discernible. These included a focus on sputum 
smear positive patients with lower quality drug regimens for the remaining 50% of 
sputum negative patients; choice of less expensive though less effective drug regimens 
such as isoniazid mono therapy and isoniazid+thiacetazone combinations; controversies 
over the use of mass miniature radiography. Recent tensions are around blister packs, 
drug dosages and use of intermittent therapy in the SCC regimens of the RNTP. 
Sometimes state interests over-rode the interests of patients and society and at other times 
commercial interests prevailed indirectly, with market availability influencing practice of 
technical content. 
As with any radical policy change, the NTP which could be described as a research based 
conceptual model, differing from existing practices and policies, faced resistance. 
Because the NTP standardised and demystified methods, relying theoretically on 
generalists in countrywide government health services to treat TB, the individualised 
practices of TB specialists and dominant medical professionals that were sometimes 
irrational were challenged, though unsuccessfully. As discussed, within government 
health services, policy content was greatly altered during implementation. Old policies 
and approaches continued, modifications were made and the NTP was reinterpreted at 
State, District and peripheral health institutions, such that original NTP concepts 
concerning policy content were not practised or were unrecognisable. Thus policy intent 
was far from what was executed. The NTI and TRC who developed the policy content 
and strategy, lacked administrative authority and were powerless to correct the policy 
distortions that took place. The initial group of policy makers and researchers had also 
moved on and some of the passion was lost. 
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Further, due to lack of attention to societal factors, policy content has been exclusively 
concerned with the medical and public health aspects of the problem, identified earlier as 
surface phenomena (Table 1.3). Technical interventions did not work as optimally in the 
field as under research or rigorous programme conditions (Chapter 4, 5)8. The main 
components of policy content of the NTP such as early diagnosis, passive case finding, 
reliance on sputum microscopy, domiciliary treatment with short course chemotherapy, 
integration with general health services, have been officially accepted policy in India for 
long. But inadequate attention was paid to their detailed implementation in practice, 
diluting their potential impact. 
Thus in the field, as discussed in Chapter 7, diagnosis is often delayed by providers, with 
patients visiting several providers before diagnosis. This increases the potential for 
disease transmission. Sputum microscopy was most often not done in primary health 
centres and quality control not maintained (through cross checks, use of concentration, 
back-up with culture). Poor drug supplies, poor quality drugs, erratic availability of short 
course chemotherapy to only a small proportion of patients, and high hospitalisation rates 
revealed chaos in therapy. Inadequately functioning general health services, as attested by 
patients and elected representatives, adversely affected the functioning and credibility of 
an integrated programme like the NTP. Data from the district suggests that increased 
access to medical care by itself does not improve TB care or control, which requires 
specific policy inputs. 
Further, computation of expectations of number of cases or targets for districts in India 
are based on old data, on prevalence rates, and on all-India extrapolations from studies in 
specific geographic areas, though regional variations occur between districts, taluks and 
social classes. These led to wrong estimations, particularly overestimation's of the 
problem, accentuating perceptions of the implementation gap. The gap is probably 
smaller than appears at first sight. Over-estimations were noted in the RNTP pilot phase 
8 Reasonably good outcomes from TB programmes using existing knowledge and technology have been 
demonstrated in countries/situations with strong government committment (Cuba) external financial 
assistance (IUATLD programmes), though the popUlations of the countries were small and achievements 
have not been sustained in some. 
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areas where case detection was always much lower than expected. The NGO with a 
community based programme for over 4 years in the district study had the same 
experience9. With increased public and private health services during the past 40 years 
and greater access to care, moving from prevalence to incidence data may be more 
realistic in developing expectations of potential cases. The use of targets based on those 
assumptions have thus resulted in overdiagnosis, particularly of sputum negative X-ray 
suspects, and unnecessary treatment. 
Assessments of programme implementation rely primarily on epidemiological and public 
health indicators e.g. case detection, sputum examinations, treatment outcomes, case 
holding, buttressed by extrapolations and estimations from epidemiological surveys 
regarding impact. Little attention is paid to how such data are collected. Routine data 
from the monitoring system used for analysis is incomplete and unreliable, as this study 
showed at the district, reducing the accuracy of assessments and becoming misleading. 
This is demonstrated even in the revised NTP pilot sites. Data also relates only to the 
public sector. The absence of a notification system further limits an understanding of the 
problem. Information concerning finances and drug supplies at district level are not 
available. Analysis of processes and policy process indicators are lacking. Information 
gaps are major lacunae in the organisation of a programlne, and systems need to be built 
up that can be used meaningfully at district level, as has been done by the NGO (Karuna 
Trust) in the district. 
Finally this technocentric approach for the NTP foreclosed the need to build alliances 
with social movements and the need for intersectoral linkages. Rehabilitation was given 
up in the 1960's and issues such as social security and financial support for poor patients 
marginalised. 
9 This has been the experience of other NGO's as well. Missed diagnosis and inadequate implementation 
may account for some of the difference. 
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9.3 Policy Context 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there was political support during the BCG Campaign and the 
fonnulation of the NTP until 1962. Soon after, during the critical period of early 
implementation, the policy context (1962-70) became particularly unfavourable. Two 
wars, three successive years of severe drought, the death of two Prime Ministers, and 
economic problems with devaluation of the rupee in the 1960s, meant political leaders 
were involved with crisis management, and support to TB policy diminished. Increased 
dependence on external aid including food aid in the 1960s led to conditionalities 
concerning family planning, with strong support from the local elite. This affected the 
Ministry of Health leading to its bifurcation, creating divisions and strong competing 
interests, adversely affecting the NTP at every level by diverting resources and attention. 
Peripheral institutions and field staff (auxiliary nurse midwives now called health 
assistants) were funded by the family planning/welfare budget, all staff had to meet 
targets and increasingly coercive methods were used till 1977. Oil price shocks, 
unemployment and political instability in the 1970s aggravated the situation. Though 
State government expenditure on TB control in Karnataka is higher than central 
government, it is spent on large urban institutions and as such does not support the 
philosophy of the NTP. With inadequate financial and political support at State level for 
the right strategy, the quality and .credibility of the NTP suffered. The context during the 
1990s with structural adjustment and the growth of coalition politics has created further 
complexities, uncertainty and some instability and appears unconducive to effective 
implementation. Growing corruption at high levels in the Ministry and Directorate of 
Health referred to in Chapter 6, destroys morale and diminishes gains that have been 
made. Policy leadership was not always strong enough to steer the policy through these 
crises over the decades and ensure implementation. 
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9.4 Policy Process and Implementation Factors 
Political processes strongly influenced the policy. During the early phase, central 
government supported TB control, with the first Prime Minister and Health Minister both 
taking an active interest in it. Starting from the 1950s a state dominated framework 
generated research that was different to disease oriented research, which is more often 
driven by purely scientific, professional, or pharmaceutical and corporate interests and 
funding. The research-based evolution of policy content of the NTP in India was 
mandated politically as part of a broader post-independence national policy process, 
which used the instrument of planning (five year plans). Research was directed to be 
socially relevant, nationally applicable, to function within financial constraints and to be 
scientifically sound. Thus policy content, sometimes assumed to be the rational, scientific 
component of policy in the health sector, was determined by a political process which 
influenced the type of research questions asked, research methodology employed, and the 
institutional mechanisms set up to translate research into policy. However, this research 
base did not ensure success in implementation, which took place in different 
circumstances, encountering several difficulties. 
Political support to the NTP at the centre was inconsistent, being fairly high till 1962, 
declining till 1982, and then receiving some attention through the Twenty Point 
Programme. It rose in the agenda in the early 1990s receiving substantially greater 
funding with the revised NTP. Although political support at national level is considered 
important, this does not necessarily translate into good implementation practices, as is 
evident from experience of the government's Twenty Point Programme and the pilot 
phases of the RNTP. Strong authoritarian central political pressure could be counter-
productive as the use of targets in TB and forms of coercion in other programmes (family 
planning) have shown. 
At state level in Karnataka, the NTP was supported in the 1960s when a physician cum 
political freedom fighter was state health minister, followed by relatively low support, 
until the current period of renewed interest. The state government invests more money 
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than the centre in TB but unwisely, in larger institutions, and not at primary care level 
where it is most necessary, effective and accessible. Political priority can be gauged by 
resource allocations of finances, personnel, and drugs for TB. Inspite of political rhetoric 
resources have been low and insufficient both at central and state levels. Being under-
resourced provides an immediate and important reason for poor performance. 
Inter-dependence of political and policy leadership and the role of personalities III 
leadership positions were found to be important in this study. During the early phase, 
national policy leadership in TB was dynamic, with the ability to negotiate with political 
leadership at central and state levels, with international agencies, to commission and learn 
from research and experience and to change policy when necessary. It created influence 
and position for the TB programme, generated resources and built institutions. Evolution 
and implementation of the TB programme was best when good national policy leadership 
promoted leadership at other organisational levels. In the 1970s state and district 
leadership weakened, with a low sense of policy ownership. Team leadership for the NTP 
at peripheral health institutions never developed and continues to be a major weakness. 
The NTP' s power or level of influence is weak and fragmented. This accentuates the 
ineffectiveness of a thinly spread intervention strategy (through general health services) 
for a problem diffusely spread across a large popUlation. The central TB unit in the 
Ministry of Health is small, a legacy from the past when it depended on national institutes 
(which are advisory) and state centres. It currently functions in some competition with the 
National TB Institute, which has greater technical expertise and experience and was 
designed and mandated to be the enginehouse and watchdog of the NTP. In the absence 
of strong policy leadership each group tends to be relatively isolated, promoting their 
institutional interests. Power at State and district levels is weaker. As shown in Chapter 6 
the medical lobby within government reduced the power of District TB Officers in an 
internal conflict with public health professionals. Power for the NTP is non-existent at the 
crucial implementation level through the 21,800 primary health centres and 4,432 public 
sector hospitals. Consequently, these peripheral institutions are characterised by apathy 
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towards the NTP. Poorly functioning weak peripheral institutions serving the majority 
rural population, reflect power relations in society and is an important reason for poor 
implementation. 
Not only was leadership in TB declining in the 1970-80s, but there was increasing 
politicisation and corruption at different levels. Later the institutional base at national 
level was further eroded in the 1990s, with frequent change of top leadership, the 
devaluing of existing institutions in policy making with adoption of international policy 
packages and increasing use of short term contracts. Further, weak institutional structures 
at state and district level (state and district TB centres) could not provide the technical or 
administrative direction or support, especially with the disjunction between planners, 
programme managers and implementors. Due to a lack of infrastructure and authority, the 
DTe's, with incomplete or partly untrained teams are almost non-functional in the 
execution of their key role of training, providing supportive supervision to peripheral 
teams, organising supplies, and managing the recording and reporting system. 
Peripheral primary health centres are the weakest link in the NTP, with vacanCIes 
(particularly of laboratory technicians), non-performance (particularly of health 
assistants), and apathy characterising the crucial point of contact between patient and 
provider. Accommodation between personal and programme interests and goals, and 
extensive use of discretion and re-interpretation completely alter the NTP. Negative 
attitudes and rude behaviour towards poor patients also reflects social relations. Payments 
made for free NTP services and prescriptions given for drugs make regular treatment 
difficult in addition to closure/absence of staff at peripheral health institutions. The 
credibility and performance of these centres is low. 
At all levels TB programme managers and staff tend to work within the constraints of the 
system, rather than question it or attempt actively to change it. This role has been left to 
the NGO' s. However inspite of its many problems, the public sector (especially 
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government district general/TB hospitals and taluk hospitals, funded entirely oy State 
governments), playa large role in TB care in the district lO• 
Support to the growth of an unregulated private for profit sector, including the 
pharmaceutical sector, undermined the NTP and public sector. Direct and indirect 
policies, promoted the private sector, such as subsidies to medical education producing 
graduates for the private sector, support to capitation fee medical colleges, allowing or 
turning a blind eye to private practice by government medical officers etc. More powerful 
sections of society with ability to pay accessed private services, reducing pressure on the 
public sector to perform. The pharmaceutical policy had ensured availability of TB drugs 
at reasonable prices on the market, though shortages were consistently reported in the 
public sector. A weakened public sector further promoted growth of private services 
particularly from the 1980's. At local level, private sector practices in the district (and in 
other studies specifically looking at TB treatment practices) are irrational, unregulated 
and not always in the interests of patients. With mixed training backgrounds, 
competencies, interests and commitments, in rural areas private practitioners usually 
referred patients after a time when TB was suspected, (especially the poor), to 
government hospitals and were uninterested in follow-up. As one of them bluntly said 
'TB control is not our business'. Their role in the NTP seems limited. 
Different groups in the voluntary sector (sometimes called the non-profit private sector) 
played an important policy role in TB by placing it on the agenda, taking responsibility 
and supporting policy formulation in the early phases. Contributions to policy discourse 
from the critical and analytic, advocacy role of NGO's, deriving from grassroots work 
and upholding the interests of the poor are important. Marginalising voluntary sector 
participation in policy to just alternative service provision limits their role, though 
innovative approaches may be evolved. 
10 The sample of patients were derived from lists of those attending government and NGO institutions, 
though they had all used the private sector as well. Patients usi?g only th~ ~rivat~ sector would not be 
represented. However, given the relatively small number of pnvate practI?oners m ~e talu~ and the fact 
that say that they refer TB patients, it is unlikely that a significant proportIon of patIents partIcularly the 
poor, would be completely treated by them. Hence this would give a fairly true picture for this region. 
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Voluntary sector efforts at the district with a community based TB programme 
demonstrated that achievements are possible, with low programme costs and positive 
health workers contributions, within supportive programmes 11. The role of committed 
community health workers in improving TB programmes, especially treatment 
completion, has been reported from Ghana, South Africa, Korea (Grange 1993) and 
Bangladesh (Chowdhury 1997). The integration of TB work not only with health, but 
with development and education/awareness raising at village/family level are new 
approaches, in which panchayats could participate. However NGO's are sparsely and 
unevenly distributed and cannot be viewed as a policy alternative for TB control. The 
NGO's in this study, and their involvement in TB work, were also unrepresentative of 
NGO's in general. 
Thus a policy analysis approach to understanding the implementation gap in the NTP has 
revealed that it is essential to include the underlying societal forces and the political and 
economic stakes operating at national, international, state and local levels that influence 
policy process and implementation. These factors cannot be adequately grasped by 
techno-managerial frameworks and methodologies, though they do provide supporting 
evidence. 
9.5 Policy Implications from this Study 
• TB policy should address not only what needs to be done (policy content), but how it 
is to be achieved at various levels. While considerable work has been done regarding 
technical aspects at an operational level, more detail is required to actualise them in 
different states and districts. More importantly, strategic policy level planning is 
required which specifically focuses on implementation issues. Suggestions arising 
from this study are discussed below. 
• 
Leadership has emerged as a crucial element, and leaders need to be carefully chosen 
at national and state level. Expertise in the technical and administrative aspects of TB 
II Though case detection was lower than expected (at ~ciden~e l~vels), treatment completion or cure was 
72.5%, which was higher than the NTP achievements m the dIstrIct, 
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control, need to be supplemented by abilities to create political support and adequate 
authority for the TB programme, to mobilise resources, interact with a variety of 
agencies, foster growth of important institutions, and nurture leadership at district 
level. This requires commitment, vision, imagination, flexibility and human relation 
skills in addition to competence. Current trends of leadership choice on the basis of 
seniority, a rapid turnover and lack of actual decision making power will hinder this 
process. District leadership by the district TB officers form the backbone of the 
programme in the 506 districts. Mandatory professional training requirements with 
regular continuing education inputs, adequate authority to take action at peripheral 
institutions in relation to the TB programme, sufficient resources so that their 
credibility is not undermined, and a complete team including an additional medical 
officer are all necessary components. If these are compromised, successful 
implementation is unlikely to result. Human resource development thus far 
underestimated, comprises a foremost component of policy implementation. A 
programme of this complexity need the best personnel, who will then require 
adequate recognition and compensation. 
Institutional actors, particularly the National TB Institute, the TB Research Centre, other 
research and educational centres, and State TB Centres are important in giving technical 
direction, in monitoring and evaluation and providing an information base, in maintaining 
quality and providing training/continuing education. While several of the institutions 
have a rich tradition in research and training, their role has been undermined in the 1990s. 
They too require the necessary status, authority and resources. 
Thus leadership at about 550 nodal points12 throughout the country, covering over 950 
million people is essential for the TB policy. 
• Structural changes giving greater autonomy, responsibility and resources to states for 
the TB policy would make it more responsive to local conditions. 
12 Central TB unit, national institutes, 25 states, Union Territories and 506 districts. 
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• Policy makers and programme managers at national, state and district levels (the 
leadership) need to recognise the extent to which societal disparities, political 
processes and competing interests within the health sector influence the 
implementation of the NTP. They can then build strategies to identify areas of need; 
negotiate with organisations of medical professionals, the pharmaceutical industry, 
federating agencies of NGO's; promote the philosophy of the NTP more assertively 
and effectively and counter resistance. For instance, districts in greatest need (those 
more economically disadvantaged as measured by the development index, with more 
difficult terrain's, with less developed health services, and poor performance in the 
NTP according to monitoring reports) could be identified and preferential support to 
the NTP provided by the centre, including the National TB Institute, through 
channelling of resources and development of local expertise and human resources. 
Currently, disbursement of financial resources/supplies to DTP's based on 
performance, results in the better states getting a larger share. 
Further the incomplete coverage and urban bias in the NTP needs to be corrected by 
developing the remaining District TB Centres and extending implementation to all 
peripheral institutions, particularly Primary Health Centres. The strategy needs to build 
from bottom upwards strengthening the base, particularly Primary Health Centres with 
capacity building, provision of means and resources (staff, diagnostics, drugs, transport) 
and adequate supervision and encouragement. Medical officers need more regular 
professional training inputs, perhaps with a system of being accredited by the NTP 
through State TB Centres. They need to be accountable to District TB Officers for the 
performance of the NTP in their areas. Links with Gram Panchayats, district TB 
Associations and local NGO's could help ensure that adequate financial and social 
support reaches poor TB patients. This may cause problems, including some misuse, 
which could be handled locally. The role of health assistants in the NTP needs to be be 
reconsidered and readopted by the policy, though with the current target-free approach. 
Flexibility and use of discretion is required at this critical level of implementation and 
while the policy can provide guidelines, it has to build on trust. TB patients require 
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skilled attention for associated medical problems and side-effects, besides support in 
coping with the psychological effects of the disease. Building up the self confidence and 
self-worth of peripheral health teams, and showing that their contributions are valued can , 
enhance their performance rather than using the present hierarchical, top-down, 
prescriptive approaches, that may not suit the circumstances. 
• The historical review suggests that the policy environment and political processes are 
never going to be easy or optimal. Therefore a strong policy leadership is required to 
be able to respond to contextual changes and steer policy implementation. The idea of 
compact and knowledgeable task forces at national and state levels comprising 
government and NGO representatives to monitor implementation and support the 
programme has been made and merits consideration. Mechanisms providing backing 
to and developing linkages with poverty alleviation and housing programmes need to 
be established. 
• In the context of social disparities, the public sector plays an important role in TB 
treatment and control, to counterbalance these forces. It is the only sector which is 
organised, which is paid for by the tax-payer and mandated to provide services, and 
which can be held accountable. The private sector, with profit making interests, have 
never been consistently involved with TB or with issues concerning poverty. 
However their potential needs to be recognised by the NTP, and educational strategies 
evolved through the Indian Medical Association and its branches. Regulation of 
private sector practices is another important though difficult issue. 
• Active measures are needed to provide financial and social support to materially 
deprived patients through panchayats utilising existing local development schemes to 
ensure employment for affected families and improved housing. Local voluntary 
agencies/ philanthropists could also assist. The inclusion of patients with advanced 
disease (the criteria for which would need to be developed), as suffering from a 
disability, would entitle them to rehabilitation and some disability benefit. 
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• 
• 
Local government (zilla parishad, gram panchayats) could increase local 
participation, accountability and link with development, housing besides specific 
support to affected families. 
Other actors, particularly NGO's13, have played policy roles as watchdogs, Issue 
raisers and researchers. If programme managers took greater cognisance of critical 
issues raised by NGO's, the media and legislators, they would find an additional 
source of information regarding field realities. 
• It is frequently reiterated that the policy content is technically sound. However, as 
seen from the district data and from various evaluations, the implementation of the 
NTP alters and distorts policy content in the field. The technical component forms the 
essential core of the policy. Focus on the policy process dimensions will enable the 
proper implementation of policy content namely early diagnosis especially at primary 
health centres, maintaining the quality of sputum microscopy, and completion of 
treatment. Additional technical elements such as notification, action oriented analysis 
of data at district and state level, regulation of TB treatment practices of the private 
sector, monitoring drug resistance at state level, policies for chemoprophylaxis (used 
by the private practitioners), treatment of TB patients who are HIV positive or have 
AIDS or are dually infected with Kala-azar etc, and safeguarding health personnel 
working with TB, are in need of policy attention and action. 
In conclusion, by taking a policy analysis approach this study demonstrates that several 
factors, other than technical issues, affect the success of implementation. It highlights 
conflicts and dilemmas at different levels. The interests of patients, of medical 
professionals (public and private), of allied health professionals and workers, of the 
pharmaceutical and diagnostic industries and of the state in TB control are 
interdependent. Though apparently working towards a common goal, they represent 
inherently strong conflicting interests, needing mediation and resolution, so that the well-
being of the majority of patients is safeguarded. 
13 The TB Association of India, Voluntary Health Association of India, Medico Friend Circle, Foundation 
for Research in Community Health, ICORCI, Nucleus for Health Policy and Planning, Community Health 
Cell. 
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ANNEXE 1 
TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF TUBERCULOSIS 
RELEVANT TO CONTROL POLICIESIPROGRAMMES 
Historical, epidemiological, sociological and technical knowledge concerning tuberculosis 
relevant to public health policy is briefly reviewed in this appendix. Socio-political 
dimensions are included as they form an integral part of the knowledge base required for 
control strategies. 
1.1 History, Scientific Understanding and Societal Factors 
1.1.1 History: Tuberculosis is an ancient infectious disease (Stead and Dutt 1994). 
Comments on its history (ibid, Snider 1994, Daniel et al 1994) cite work by Pierry and 
Roshem, 1931; Buickstra, 1931; Perzigian and Widmer, 1979; Morse et ai, 1964; and 
Manchester 1984. Key points that emerge are: tuberculosis has been found in skeletal 
remains dated around 8000 BC in Germany; and around 2500-1000 BC in Egypt; was 
mentioned in ancient Chinese writings; was written about in the Sanskrit Vedas suggesting 
that pulmonary tuberculosis was known in 1500 BC (Metcalf 1991); was recognised by 
Hippocrates (c.460- 377 BC); by Sushruta in India around 500 AD; and was found in an 
Inca mummy of about 700 AD. It is mentioned in classical Indian texts including the 
Ayurvedic Samhitas (Gothi 1982). These findings suggest that the tubercle bacillus co-
existed with human beings in various regions of the world since early times. Like other 
organisms, in the process of evolution it developed complex ecological relationships with 
its host, indicated by its ability to survive in a dormant state within host cells for years 
(Smith 1994), by varying strains and virulence of the bacillus and the presence of non-
pathogenic environmental bacteria. Tuberculosis probably occurred sporadically during this 
time (Daniel 1994). Two important periods in the epidemic spread of the disease among 
major population groups, that have been identified, appear to have been: 
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a) the period of agriculture and cattle domestication when people started living in larger 
communities with increased population density during the sixth and seventh millennia Be 
(ibid); and 
b) the second period, which has been recorded, is of industrialisation and urbanisation 
, 
starting in England in the sixteenth century. The substantial increase in TB mortality in the 
latter half of the 1700' s, accounting for nearly 20% of all deaths in England in the 16-17th 
century, was 'undoubtedly linked to the overcrowding and deplorable socio-economic 
conditions that prevailed during the early years of the industrial revolution. Similar 
increases in tuberculosis mortality were observed in several countries during their periods of 
industrialisation.' (Murray 1989; 1789). Epidemic waves occurred in different regions of the 
world (Grigg 1958). It is suggested that the epidemic 'spread world-wide as a result of 
infected Europeans traveling to and colonising distant sites' (Daniel 1994; 14). Theories 
linking susceptibility to tuberculosis with genetic factors, race and creative genius were 
made at various times. These gave way to recognition of the association of socio-economic 
and environmental factors such as poverty, overcrowding and poor living conditions with 
the disease (Dubos and Dubos 1952, McKeown 1979). Besides migration, colonialism and 
war led to increased tuberculosis in populations (Metcalf 1991). Tuberculosis death rates 
increased in all countries at war, during the first World War, from 1915 to 1919 and in 
England the decline was halted for 10 years from 1939 during the Second World War 
(Dubos and Dubos 1952). War related social disruptions, displacement and deprivations 
were responsible for the changes (Snider 1994). Its close links to the social history of 
humankind are further evident in contemporary times (1.2.5). 
1.1.2 Scientific Understanding: Tuberculosis, the dreaded 'white plague' or 'consumption' 
in the tenninology of the last century, has been the subject of extensive scientific study. 
Important biomedical! technological milestones cited in reviews (Snider 1994, Daniel et af 
1994, Stead and Duet, 1994) are: recognition of the infectious nature of tuberculosis by 
Girolamo Fracastoro in 1546; autopsies recognising the formation of lung nodules termed 
'tubercles' by Dutch physician Franciscus Sylvius in 1679; recognition credited to Laennec 
that TB in its various forms and sites is a single disease in 1819; experiments by French 
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surgeon Jean-Antoinne Villemin published in 1868 about its transmissible nature; Pasteur's 
experiments in 1862 suggesting airborne transmission; Robert Koch's isolation of 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis in 1882 as the causative agent of tuberculosis; development of 
an acid fast stain by Ehrlich in 1885; its subsequent refinement by Ziehl and Neelson; and 
the discovery of X-rays by Roentgen in 1895, the latter three of key importance for 
diagnosis. Subsequent discoveries of tuberculin testing (intradermal skin test) to identify the 
presence of infection by Von Pirquet (1902) developed further by Mantoux (1910), the first 
human trials of BCG vaccine by Albert Calmette and Alphonse Guerin in France in 1921 
and of specific anti-TB chemotherapy since 1944 (streptomycin by Waksman and co-
workers), 1952 (isoniazid), and 1966 (rifampicin) lead to improved treatment for 
individuals and better control measures at public health levels. 
The enquiry into tuberculosis was at the core of the development of modem, scientific 
medicine, of microbiology, pathology, immunology, chemotherapeutics, and thoracic 
surgery (Banerji 1993). Koch's postulates helped establish a powerful medical philosophy, a 
new paradigm (ibid), the germ theory of disease causation over the prevailing miasmatic 
theory, leading to an underestimation of the socio-economic character ofTB and the role of 
living conditions in its spread (Ratledge et a11989, Grange 1993). 
Scientific understanding lead to efforts towards disease control. Establishment of the 
infectious airborne nature of TB led to a public health movement in the USA and spitting in 
public became socially unacceptable and regulated (Daniel 1994). BCG is the oldest and 
most widely used prophylactic vaccine even today (Fine 1994). Strengthening of the 
medical armamentarium raised hopes of controlling the disease in society to levels such that 
it would cease to be a major public health problem (WHO 1964). However the 1960's 
debate about eradicating/eliminating tuberculosis was critiqued by MacLeod (1963). 
With a substantial decline of the disease in Western Europe/the established economies in 
the 1950-60's, scientific interest, research priorities and funding shifted away from 
tuberculosis (WHO 1993). TB control became primarily a matter of implementing known, 
universally applicable interventions/strategies (Porter and McAdam 1994). 
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1.1.3 Societal Factors: Frost (1939) in the USA suggested that tuberculosis had been on 
the wane long before effective therapy was introduced. Dubos and Dubos (1952;210) wrote 
concerning the social nature of the disease, 'By 1900, it had become obvious that 
tuberculosis was most prevalent in the poorest elements of the population, and that healthy 
living could mitigate its harmful effects'. The Societies and Leagues from 1890 comprising 
the anti-tuberculosis movement represented 'a farsighted citizenry who saw in tuberculosis 
a social disease that was not likely to be solved by a conventional medical approach' 
(ibid;211).They suggested that the impact of social and economic factors be considered as 
much as the mechanisms by which tubercle bacilli cause damage to the human body (ibid). 
McKeown (1979) showed that decline in TB mortality rates in England and Wales preceded 
widespread use of BeG and development of chemotherapy. Highlighting a different 
perspective, Snider(1994) cites the work of Wilson (1990) and Newsholme (1924) 
attributing the decline of tuberculosis to reduced exposure to infection resulting from 
segregation of persons with infectious TB and to Poor Law Infirmaries in England. 
Historical investigations into the spread of tuberculosis in South Africa and its high 
prevalence among miners, migrant labour, and black townships highlighted the societal 
dimensions (Packard 1989). Tuberculosis remained a problem in the developing world 
affecting about 80 % of the global population despite control programmes spanning three 
decades (WHO 1988). 
From the late 1980's a resurgence of TB in developed countries and increasing rates in 
several developing countries is associated with HIV co-infection, increasing poverty, urban 
congestion, homelessness, social and political breakdown, migration and war and 
inadequate health services (WHO 1993, Iseman 1997). In East Europe and the former 
USSR TB was under control till 1989 with a decline over 40 years, but subsequently has 
experienced increased incidence and mortality even among the productive age groups 
(WHO 1994b). This has been attributed to political changes and breakdown in inter-
regional dependence, disintegration of the economic and civil situation of many countries, 
population displacement, increasing poverty with growing overcrowding and under-
nourishment in many countries (ibid). 
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1.2 Epidemiological Factors 
1.2.1 Agent: Tuberculosis is a bacterial infectious/communicable disease most commonly 
caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis and less frequently by M bovis. In certain areas 
persons infected with Human Immunoeficiency Virus (HIV) develop infections due to M. 
avium intracellulare (Godfrey-Faussett 1994). There are other members of the 
Mtuberculosis complex (Manjunath 1991). 
The virulence of M tuberculosis varies, with the South Indian strain less virulent than 
British and Thai strains (WHO 1965). It is possible that the varying biology of the 
Mycobacterium is reflective of an adaptation of the bacteria to its host and environment 
(ibid). There is as yet imperfect knowledge about the organism, partly because of 
difficulties inherent in working with it in the laboratory till recently. Methods of molecular 
biology, such as DNA finger printing used in the Tuberculosis Genome Project, is 
furthering understanding of the biological processes of tuberculosis (porter and McAdam 
1994), and generating useful knowledge for the further development of diagnostics, 
chemotherapeutic agents and vaccines (Orme 1997). 
Several atypical mycobacteria present in the environment resemble M tuberculosis but are 
non-pathogenic. They prime protective immune pathways (Rook and Stanford 1994). 
Differential response to BeG in countries where they are present was thought to be due to 
their immuno-modulating effects. One such Mycobacterium vaccae, being experimented 
with as an immunotherapeutic supplement, is reported to accelerate cure (ibid). It is a fast 
growing mycobacteria found in Uganda. Other environmental mycobacteria are M 
parafortuitum, M aurom, M obvense and the slow growing M. scrofulaceum (Stanford 
1991). 
1.2.2 Transmission: Tuberculosis is transmitted directly from person to person or 
mammalian host to host, with no intermediate carrier/vector (McNeill 1976). 
a)Tuberculosis caused by Mtuberculosis is an air borne infection spread by droplet nuclei 
containing bacilli (Snider 1994). These are produced by patients with active pulmonary TB 
(with cavitation of the lung associated with productive cough), whose sputum tests are 
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positive for the bacilli. Coughing, sneezing and even speaking releases bacilli into the air 
and uninfected persons inhale them by just breathing. Experiments by Pasteur in 1862 
suggested air borne transmission, which was conclusively proved by studies by William 
Wells in the 1930's (ibid). The method of spread was demonstrated by delivering untreated 
air from a TB ward to guinea pigs in an animal exposure chamber by Riley in 1957 (ibid). 
Close contacts of smear positive patients are at maximum risk (Stead and Dutt 1994) with 
infection rates of25-50% in overcrowded conditions (Comstock 1982, Styblo 1984). Much 
transmission occurs in enclosed environments (Snider 1994). Most spread of infection from 
sputum positive cases of pulmonary TB occurs before case detection (Kamat et al 1966). 
Hospitalisation/segregation thus would not reduce transmission substantially. In some 
studies infection rates in contacts of smear negative, culture positive patients is not different 
to that in the community. Studies estimate that untreated smear positive patients infect 10-
14 healthy persons annually and usually excrete bacilli for about two years, thus causing 20-
28 new infections before dying or becoming sputum negative (WHO-SEARO 1994). 
Therefore priority in control programmes is given to diagnosis and treatment of sputum 
positive patients. 
Newer techniques of DNA fingerprinting! found 30-40% of new TB cases in New York 
City and San Francisco resulted from recent transmission, challenging earlier views that 
90% of new cases were from reactivation and 10% from recent infections (NIAID 1994). A 
retrospective re-evaluation of data from the French national survey (1962-70) on prevalence 
of primary resistance indicates that in 66% TB was recently transmitted (Marchal 1997). 
This and other similar findings suggest that TB is more easily transmitted than thought and 
development of disease occurs quicker than earlier anticipated (Upham 1994). Following 
contact with an infectious case about one in six (15%) become infected (Enarson and 
Rouillon 1994). There is increasing recognition that health care providers are at high risk of 
contracting tuberculosis, besides the socially deprived, homeless, drug addicts and HIV 
positive persons (Onne 1997). Occupational risks of physicians developing TB were 
observed as being high in the 1940-50's in the USA (Murray 1989). 
I specific strains of the organism are identified by their genetic factors (NIAID 1994) 
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b) Infection due to Mbovis caused by consumption of milk from infected cows was 
common in Europe and a Royal Commission in the early 20th century established the 
epidemiology, bacteriology and pathology of bovine TB (Grange 1996). Pasteurization of 
milk and elimination of diseased animals as part of effective bovine TB control measures, 
led to reduced spread of bovine tuberculosis in England and Europe (ibid). Bovine infection 
was considered uncommon in India. Ukil (1930) cites studies by Soporkar who found 
Indian breeds to be resistant to tubercular infection, and of Joshi who found no growth of 
tubercle bacilli from cultures of cows milk. Cultures from extrapulmonary foci of 
tuberculosis did not isolate bovine tuberculosis. Reports of bovine tuberculosis were 
however reported from Madras. A 1995 veterinary conference in Madras expressed concern 
about prevalence of TB in cattle in India. 
1.2.3 Host Immune Response, Infection and Disease: An understanding of cell 
mediated immunity (CMI), the main immune mechanism in tuberculosis, grew in 1973 with 
recognition of the role of Thymus derived lymphocytes in eMI (Onne 1995). The 
complexities of the host immune response and the ability of the bacilli to reside within host 
mononuclear cells are such that precise mechanisms ofkillinglcontrolling the bacilli are still 
not fully understood, though there are several hypotheses (ibid). 
A degree of Delayed Type Hypersensitivity (DTH) to tuberculin develops in most 
individuals within 6-8 weeks of infection with M tuberculosis or related bacteria (Fine 
1994). This response measured by tuberculin skin testing2, indicates the status of infection 
in individuals, and since the 1950-60's was used to assess prevalence of infection in 
populations (WHO 1965). The shift from using two tests (strong and weak) to one (using a 
low dose) reduced the incorrect inclusion of non specific mycobacteria3, altering existing 
ideas of prevalence of infection (ibid, NTI 1990). The average Annual Risk of Tuberculosis 
2 Skin reactivity to a small quantity of injected tuberculin, indicative of a past infection with the tubercle 
bacillus, was discovered by Von Pirquet in 1907 and is of epidemiological val~e (G~an~e 1 ~9~; ~6). In the 
Mantoux test, commonly used for the purpose, tuberculin PPD (purified protem denvatIve) IS mJected 
intradennally and induration if any is measured 48-72 hours ~ater ~Narain ~ 992~. . 
3 At 16mm or more most reactions are tuberculous. Intennedlate SlZe reactlOns m IndIa could be due to 
cross reactions from organisms that rarely cause disease (NTI 1990). 
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Infection (ARTI)4 is considered a good epidemiological index to evaluate the TB situation 
and its trend, though there are limitations when the ARTI is less than 0.5% (Raviglione 
1995). It has been estimated by Styblo that for every 1 %ARTI 50 new smear positive cases 
ofTB develop per 100,000 per year (ibid). 
Cell mediated immunity evoked by the bacilli cause a nonspecific inflammatory response in 
the lung tissue and corresponding lymph nodes, termed the primary complex (Grange 
1994). Depending on adequacy of the immune response, the bacilli become sequestered in 
dormant foci which in 90% do not progress to clinical illness (Murray 1989). These persons 
are infected with tubercle bacilli, but do not have tuberculous disease (ibid). Infection is 
followed by a 10% lifetime risk of progressing to clinical disease (WHO 1993), particularly 
if immunocompromised or under physical or emotional stress (Snider 1994). In India while 
35% of the total population, is infected only 2% are diseased (NTI 1994c). In most the 
host's immune system overcomes the primary infection (Grange 1994). Two to six weeks 
after primary infection a certain level of CMI develops to M. tuberculosis antigens, with the 
formation of granulomas around bacilli. These may get calcified and are detectable on chest 
X-ray as a calcified primary complex. The presence of dormant foci of bacilli that can get 
endogenously reactivated later into post primary disease, slows the process of 
reduction/elimination of tuberculosis in a community (Styblo 1991, Murray et al 1993) as 
the risk of reactivation or breakdown cannot be entirely prevented. It has taken decades for 
infection rates to reduce substantially even in developed countries. 
Prior to the onset of allergy and immunity, escape of bacilli into the blood stream from the 
primary lesion in the lung, can cause foci to develop in other parts of the body. This could 
occur in the kidneys, ends of long bones, spine or brain. In infants and young children 
serious forms of tuberculosis, such as miliary tuberculosis and tuberculous meningitis, may 
develop. These occur much less frequently in adolescents and adults. 
4 The proportion of the population which will be primarily infected or reinfected (in those previou~ly 
infected) with tubercle bacilli during a year, expressed as ~ per~entage. ~r .rate (Styblo 1991,40) .. It IS 
usually estimated from age specific prevalence of tubercuhn skm senSitIVity (Enarson and ROUlllon 
1994,20). 
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In young adults there is a female excess in disease, though there is a male excess in 
tuberculin positivity (Fine 1994 citing NTI 1974). It is suggested that this could be due to 
gender differences in manifesting Delayed Type Hypersensitivity or susceptibility to the 
disease or to additional physiological stresses of child bearing (ibid). In older adults 
tuberculosis occurs due to endogenous reactivation or by reinfection. The proportion varies 
according to the level of risk of infection in the population, with greater endogenous 
reactivation when transmission rates are low (Fine 1994 citing Sutherland 1976). 
Atypical environmental mycobacteria present in some regions, including India, cause 
increased tuberculin positivity (WHO 1965), but with smaller indurations as infection due 
to atypical mycobacteriae produce an immune response in the host. 
Concepts of TB control and eradication/elimination are linked to levels of infection and 
disease in a country. The Centers for Disease Control, USA, and Styblo define elimination 
in developed countries as occurring when '1) the incidence of the disease is less than 1 per 
million, or 2) the prevalence of TB infection in the general population is under 1 % 
(Gonzalez 1994;191). The USA aims to reach this goal by 2010 while in The Netherlands it 
is accepted that it cannot be reached within the next three decades (ibid). 
1.2.4 Natural History of Disease in Individuals and Populations: In individuals, of 
those infected, approximately 10% have lifetime risk of progressing to clinical disease, 
particularly if immunocompromised or under physical or emotional stress (Snider 1994). 
Five percent may develop "early" progressive disease within 5 years of exposure, and the 
remaining 5% may develop "late" recrudescent disease after several decades of infection 
(Stead and Dutt 1994, Snider 1994). In the latter the dormant bacilli get reactivated and 
cause disease at any time during the individuals life time, often precipitated by physical or 
psychological stress or an immuno-compromised condition. An untreated patient with 
pulmonary tuberculosis can infect 10-15 persons during their lifetime (WHOITB/95). 
The latent period between primary infection and clinical disease varies from weeks, months 
or years. In 1968, Sutherland estimated that about 80 % of disease occurs during the first 
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two years after infection. It appears that the risk of progressive disease soon after primary 
infection is a function of the age at which infection occurs The n·sk· hi h . d fi 
. IS g In un er }ves, 
lower (less than 5%) between 5 and 12, and 10-20% in young adults (Fine 1994;56). 
Childhood tuberculosis is more frequently meningeal, miliary and extrapulmonary. 
Diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis in children is difficult leading to underestimation of its 
prevalence. 
In populations, historian McNeill (1976), quoting Dubos specifically regarding 
tuberculosis, suggests that symptomatology of infectious diseases alters from the time a 
disease is first introduced to a population, to the third generation exposed, by when 
resistance develops in the host population. In TB acute fulminating disease patterns, high 
prevalence among children and high mortality rates give way over time to more fibrotic 
forms affecting older age groups (Grigg 1958, Enarson and Rouillon 1994). TB declined at 
about 4% per annum prior to introduction of chemotherapy and was subsequently 
accelerated up to 10% in certain groups (e.g. military recruits in The Netherlands) and by 
5.3-5.5% in Europe and the USA till recently (Enarson and Rouillon 1994). 
Indian data concerning natural history is discussed in Chapter 1 (1.2.6). Similar patterns 
occurred earlier in Europe and the USA. TB mortality rates of 190-200/100,000 for white 
Americans and 400/100,000 for black Americans at the tum of the century indicate the 
magnitude and social distribution of the problem in the USA (Guttmann Rosenkrantz 
1987). Dubovsky (1991) cites hospital TB case fatality rates by William Farr in 1885 as 
being 62% in the first year, 85% in the second year and 950/0 in the fifth year after 
presentation. He cites hospital trials in the United States by Ferrebee and Palmer from 1947 
covering over 10,000 patients. A year after non anti-microbial treatment patients had a 
mortality of21 0/0, 54% were sputum positive and 250/0 sputum negative. In the early 1950's 
combination treatment with streptomycin and PAS reduced mortality to 3%; while 32% 
remained sputum positive and 65% became non-infectious. By 1963, mainly through the 
impact of isoniazid and streptomycin, PAS and pyrazinamide mortality rates dropped to 
1 %, sputum negatives increased to 95% and only 4% remained sputum positive (ibid). The 
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declining incidence of tuberculosis in the USA and Europe was accelerated by the 
introduction of chemotherapy and modem methods ofTB control (Murray 1989). 
It was estimated in 1950, that since 1900 5 million people died prematurely due to 
tuberculosis. The mortality in 1950 was 34,000 or 221100,000 (Dubos and Dubos 1952). 
However mortality rates have declined steadily in England and Europe since the nineteenth 
century i.e. before introduction of vaccines and chemotherapy, pointing to the powerful 
impact of improved housing, nutrition and living conditions (Mckeown 1979). WHO 
estimates currently that of 90 million new cases 30 million are expected to die between 
1990-99 without improved world-wide control (Raviglione 1995). Others suggest that this 
is an overestimation (Enarson and Rouillon 1994). It also assumes a high 33.3% mortality 
rate. 
Epidemiological evidence regarding disease patterns of TB in India over time suggest a 
declining trend in the epidemic. Infection rates among children 0-4 years decreased from 
2.1 % in 1961 to 1.2% in 1982; the relative distribution of cases among the 5-39 year age 
group and 40 plus age group was 1: 1 in 1961 and 1:4 in 1985; sputum smear posi ti ve case 
rates declined from 189/100,000 in 1961 to 68/100,000 in 1985; and decline of serious 
forms of TB like miliary TB and meningitis (NTI 1994c). TB mortality rates decreased 
from 250/100,000 in 1949 (ibid) to 50/100,000 in the 1990's (Datta 1994). 
1.2.5 Environment: The influence of the environment on TB engendered by poverty, 
through overcrowded housing, undernutrition, poor living/working conditions with 
associated psychological stresses has received wide acknowledgement. Evidence linking 
TB and socio-economic factors continues to be reported. In British Columbia, Canada, 
between 1980-82, annual notification rates were 242/100,000 in the lowest socio-economic 
groups and 211 00,000 in the highest groups, with similar patterns in Edmonton and Calgary 
(Enarson and Rouillon 1994). In South Africa TB is uncommon among well to do Whites 
and highly prevalent among Blacks who are poor, live in overcrowded tenements, are 
undernourished and have high unemployment rates (Thomas 1997). Higher TB notification 
rates among the homeless and poorer sections of society in Britain has been reported from 
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studies in the 1980-90's with a social class gradient in mortality from TB (Mangtani 1995). 
For instance of the 12% increased notifications between 1988-92 in England and Wales, 
there was a 35% increase in the poorest 10th of the population, 13% in the next two, while 
in the upper 70% there was no increase (Bhatti et al 1995). Part of the increased TB in the 
USA since the mid-1980's is attributed to inner city deprivation, homelessness and lack of 
access to care (Murray 1989). Besides HIV co-infection, household crowding was an 
important force in New York City's TB epidemic, strongly associated with poverty, 
dependence on public assistance income, larger household size, Hispanic ethnicity and 
greater social isolation (Drucker 1994). Among the homeless in the USA, TB infection rates 
were 32%, and prevalence rates of active disease 1.6-6.8% (higher in shelters with large 
numbers of HIV infected adults) (Tulsky and Long 1996). The TB situation in Eastern 
Europe since 1989, in the absence of HI V as an important factor, highlights linkages with 
deprivation and social dislocation. It is suggested that in China urban rural differences in 
TB rates (in 1987, 419.1/100,000 and 693.7/100,000 respectively) reflects the greater 
impoverishment in the countryside (Wallace 1996). 
In the political environment, the gaps between rich and poor are increasing internationally. 
From the mid-1980's to 1994, the negative transfer of resources from developing countries 
increased through debt/capital/interest repayment (Benatar 1996) reaching up to US$8.4 
billion, while structural adjustment programmes caused a net transfer of US$178 million 
from poor countries to Northern commercial banks from 1984-1990 (Balasubramaniam 
1996; 141 0). Evidence from Africa suggests that Structural Adjustment Programmes have 
been associated with increased food insecurity, undernutrition, ill-health and decreased 
access to health care for the two-thirds of the population already living below the poverty 
line (Loewenson 1993). Underlying causes of poverty internationally and nationally need to 
be addressed as a deeper level of preventive action for TB control (Table 1.3) and for better 
health and well-being of a large proportion of the global population. 
To sum up the effects of the environment 'TB remains the quintessential disease of socio-
economic misery. Wherever there is poverty with its attendant crowding, malnutrition and 
poor hygiene, tuberculosis flourishes' (Murray 1989; 1794). The perceived association 
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between social deprivation and TB and the high TB incidence in Europe in the nineteenth 
century was a factor 'leading to movements for improved living conditions (Grange 1993). 
Though 'elimination (of TB) will be impossible as long as poverty, overpopulation and 
malnutrition characterise large portions of the earth' (Stead and Dutt 1994; 1), there is less 
clarity now of how to integrate societal factors into intervention strategies, with dominant 
medical and public health approaches focusing on biomedical and techno-managerial 
aspects. 
1.3 5Diagnosis of Tuberculosis and Case Finding comprise key components 
of control strategies (Grange 1993). 
1.3.1 Sputum microscopy (of specimens stained by the Ziehl-Nielsen method) has been 
accepted over the past four decades as being capable of detecting a substantial proportion of 
sputum positive infectious patients (Baily et a11967, Toman 1979, Godfrey-Faussett 1994). 
Others suggest that microscopy on unconcentrated sputum specimens is a cheap but grossly 
insensitive tool (Iseman 1997, Hopewell 1995). Extrapulmonary and childhood TB cannot 
be diagnosed with sputum examinations (Hopewell 1995). The quality and quantity of the 
sputum specimen, quality of smear, staining technique, time spent on examination, the 
bacterial load etc. affect the sensitivity and specificity of the test (Rao 1970). Results 
depend on the skill, aptitude and experience of staff (Chadha 1995). The proportion of 
culture positives that are also smear positive varied in Indian studies from 40-48% to 73-
87% (ibid). Sputum microscopy requires quality control and is an appropriate technology 
the infrastructure for which exists in India. Examination of three specimens, with two spot 
samples on consecutive days and one overnight sample, is advisable to reduce false 
negatives and false positives (TB Div.1995a). With fluorescence microscopy larger fields 
are examined through low power objectives, requiring a shorter time for examination and 
yielding marginally more true positives (Toman 1979). However its disadvantages include 
high cost, need for uninterrupted power supply with no voltage fluctuations, advanced 
5 Strategies for TB control include a) Early case detection and complete treatm~nt. This is,th~ ~ost 
important. b) BCG has little role in preventing transmission. c) Chemoprophylaxt~ used for mdlvlduals 
exposed and at risk, and particularly for HIV positive persons. It is not part ofNanonal TB Programmes 
because of cost, compliance and organisationaViogistic problems. 
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technical skills for handling and maintenance of optical equipment, frequent repairs and 
changes of bulbs (ibid). 
1.3.2 Radiology: Observer error is widely reported in using chest X-rays to diagnose 
pulmonary TB with interpreters showing a high degree of inter and intra-reader variation 
(Chadha 1995). Only 30% of those diagnosed on single X-rays at State TB centres were 
culture positive, with estimations of the proportions declining to 10% in peripheral centres, 
resulting in considerable over-diagnosis (Nair 1974). 63% were cited as culture positive in 
another Indian study (Toman 1970). Very small proportions of culture negatives in both 
studies, 3-4%, became culture positive on follow-up (ibid). Several studies in Europe and 
the USA found under-reading in 26-43% of films (Toman 1979). An IUAT international 
study found a high degree of disagreement concerning abnormalities in the respiratory 
system (ibid). A substantial proportion of patients are wrongly diagnosed as TB and 
unnecessarily treated (WHO 1974, ICORCI 1988). Thus it is not recommended to start 
treatment on radiographic findings alone (WHO 1974) as X-ray diagnosis of tuberculosis is 
unreliable (TB Div.l995a). Radiographic facilities are additionally expensive to set-up and 
maintain, being available only at district centres and in urban private diagnostic centres. 
1.3.3 Culture is more sensitive, specific and reliable but is expensive, requiring 
specialised facilities and personnel and is slow, taking 4-6 weeks for results (Toman 1979). 
Greater use is suggested to facilitate earlier case-detection (Hopewell 1995). 
Newer polymerase chain reaction (PCR) based tests6 for rapid diagnosis of pulmonary TB 
maybe used in national reference laboratories and for research in the present Indian situation 
(Chadha 1995). Problems of diagnosis of paediatric and extrapulmonary tuberculosis and 
the need for rapid detection of drug resistant tuberculosis remain (Godfrey-Faussett 1994). 
1.3.4 The objective of case finding/detection as an integral part of a public health 
oriented TB control strategy is to identify sources of infection in the community, treat them 
6 The method employs amplification of a segment of DNA and can detect ~ few bacterial cell~ .in. a sputum 
specimen within 4-5 hours (Chadha 1995). Blood based PCR assays are bemg tested for sensltn'lty and 
specificity with varying results (Condos 1996, Aguado 1996). 
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and reduce disease transmission (Toman 1979). Citing an early NTI definition, case finding 
is an 'organised and systematic effort to discover the largest possible number of cases in the 
community on a continuous basis with an acceptable, practicable and cost-effecti\'e 
methodology using simple standardised tools' (Chadha 1995). Emphasis was on early case 
detection and passive case-finding (Banerji & Andersen 1963). Case finding and treatment 
(case holding) have conceptually been a single functional entity under NTP's (WHO 1974). 
In practice there was greater emphasis on meeting targets for case detection with large 
proportions of patients taking irregular incomplete treatment (GOIIWHO/SIDA 1992). 
1.4 Treatment of Tuberculosis 
Prior to the discovery of anti-TB chemotherapy bed rest, a dry climate, fresh air and good 
food for those who could afford it, was the only option for patients with tuberculosis (Porter 
& McAdam 1994). From the mid-nineteenth century the sanatorium movement grew for 
about 100 years. An unintended effect of this treatment strategy was the spread of disease to 
unexposed populations, as has been documented in South Africa (Packard 1994, Metcalf 
1991). Surgical procedures such as artificial pneumothorax and pulmonary resection were 
used from the late 19th century (Dubovsky 1991). 
In 1946 the first trial of streptomycin against tuberculosis was reported initiating the era of 
chemotherapy. Problems of resistance led to the search for new antibiotics and to the use of 
multiple drugs (as new drugs were discovered). Effective drug regimens were developed 
through a series of clinical trials conducted by the British Medical Research Council 
starting in the 1940's with streptomycin, streptomycin and PAS, isoniazid alone, 
isoniazid+streptomycin+PAS for 18-24 months, later reduced to 12 months (Snider 1994, 
Porter and McAdam 1995a). 
There are two categories of drugs: a) bactericidal and/or sterilising7 - streptomycin, 
isoniazid, rifampicin and pyrazinamide; b) bacteriostatic- ethambutol and thiacetazone 
(prabhakar 1996, VanScoy and Wilkowske 1992). They have all passed the patent period 
7 With ability to kill the persistors, measured by relapse rates during a two year follow-up period 
(Prabhakar* 1995). 
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(Weil 1994) with the last, rifampicin being introduced 30 years ago. Newer classes of broad 
spectrum antimicrobials such as the quinolones, macrolides, rifamycins and betalactans that 
could possibly play a role have not yet been adequately studied in animal models or in 
human clinical trials (ibid). 
The development of low cost standardised regimens made mass chemotherapy possible 
through TB control programmes (WHO 1965). 'This more than the actual discovery of the 
drugs themselves, was the real breakthrough' (ibid; 16). They included the demonstrated 
effectiveness of domiciliary treatment (Tuberculosis Chemotherapy Centre, Madras 1959) 
and intermittent therapy (Tuberculosis Chemotherapy Centre, Madras 1964). Money spent 
on the cheapest sanatorium bed was calculated to provide 1000 domiciliary cures, while the 
maintenance of a bed covered costs for 300 domiciliary courses (WHO 1965). The shift 
from prolonged 18 month to 6-9 month Short Course Chemotherapy (SCC) following the 
introduction of Rifampicin, pioneered by the British Medical Research Council under Fox 
and Mitchison in 1975 (Snider 1994) and 'demonstrated first in developing countries' was 
another advance (WHO 1982;21). Good response (98-100% sputum conversion) and low 
relapse rates (less than 5% disease reactivation during 2-5 year follow-up) were obtained in 
clinical trials (WHO 1993b). It reduced non-adherence, case fatality, relapses (Enarson and 
Rouillon 1994). SCC achieves good results under certain conditions but is less optimal in 
most others with difficulties in drug supplies, case holding and supervision (Grange 1993). 
The reasons for its success in developed countries 'include low rates of primary drug 
resistance, well developed health services and insurance schemes to cover the costs of 
treatment, good patient education, and supervision of treatment in hospital' (WHO 
1993b;3). Because of immediate costs limited popUlations in developing countries were 
covered by short course treatment. Two regimens were recommended for 'programme 
conditions in developing countries': a) isoniazid plus thiacetazone often supplemented by 
streptomycin in the initial phase, and b) twice weekly supervised streptomycin plus 
isoniazid with an intensive daily phase when possible (WHO 1982; 18). The WHO 
suggested joint pool procurement schemes for essential TB drugs and the possibility of 
323 
loans to national governments from the World Bank and regional development banks for 
TB drug procurement (ibid). 
Patients' non-completion of treatment, non-compliance or non-adherence has been long 
recognised as a cause of treatment failure (Grange 1993). While technical strategies to 
overcome this include supervised therapy, combination tablets, blister packs, pill checks, 
urine tests and hospitalisation, physician attitudes, behaviour and relationships are 
important (ibid, 219). 
The introduction of chemotherapy resulted III unintended consequences such as drug 
resistance and large numbers of incompletely treated chronic excretors who increase the 
sources of infection in a community (Enarson and Rouillon 1994). By reducing the 
dramatic consequences of the disease, political commitment to public health programmes 
and research efforts declined (Iseman 1997). Forty years following the introduction of 
chemotherapy more new cases occur annually than ever before (p 1)8, with low cure rates, 
high mortality and increased transmission from the enlarged reservoir of infection in 
developing countries, where 95% of the world's TB cases occur (WHO 1993b). It is 
suggested that 'chemotherapy has failed to have a significant impact on tuberculosis 
morbidity' (ibid, 1). 
To minimise these public health programme dimensions of chemotherapy include: well 
organised drug procurement and distribution systems that ensure uninterrupted and 
adequate supply of good quality drugs, good infrastructure and management systems, 
training and continuing education of staff, supervision and patient education. It would also 
include community involvement in support of patients' completion of treatment. 
1.5 Drug Resistance 
Drug resistance9 in TB has been observed since streptomycin was introduced (Toman 
1979). Biologically drug resistance occurs with Mycobacterium tuberculosis because of its 
8 In India there were an estimated 5 million TB patients in 1959 (ICMR) and 13-14 million in 1994 (NTI 
1994c). 
9 Bacilli continue to grow in vitro in the presence of high concentrations of the drug (Toman 1979) 
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ability to Inutate and adapt. As newer TB drugs were discovered after streptomycin multiple 
drug regimens were developed to overcome the problem of resistance. Poor 
chemotherapeutic practices also cause drug resistance, leading to treatment failure, relapses, 
spread of resistant tuberculosis and development of multi-drug resistant TB (Nunn 1994). 
Drug resistance 'is a sensitive measure of the quality of a tuberculosis programme' 
(Enarson 1995 ;98). 
During the 1950's it was common therapeutic practice (ibid) and WHO policy to use 
isoniazid monotherapy (interviews 1996). Primary drug resistance occurring in patients who 
have not received TB chemotherapy before, is caused by infection/transmission of resistant 
organisms from another patient (Toman 1979). It is a parameter to assess the amount of 
resistant bacillary transmission in the community. Secondary or acquired drug resistance is 
due to incorrect chemotherapy and develops while the patient is on treatment due to non-
adherence or faulty prescribing (ibid, Snider et aI1994). When it is not possible to obtain a 
reliable history of previous TB chemotherapy the term initial drug resistance is used and 
includes true primary and undisclosed secondary resistance (ibid). Though a resistant strain 
does not return to sensitivity in clinical practice, single drug resistance, especially if 
primary, does not impede success of a triple drug regimen (ibid). 
More recently, the emergence of Multi-Drug Resistant (MDR)TB 10 which does not respond 
to Short Course Chemotherapy is a cause of concern. Retreatment with ofloxacin and 
cycloserine costs 30-35 times more than SCC and requires hospitalisation (Portaels 1994). 
Though MDR is not yet a major world problem (ibid), the implications of its spread are 
senous. 
Findings from New York City suggest that most drug resistant cases were due to person 
to person transmission and not due to poor treatment compliance or treatment failure 
(NIAID 1994). Of significance to the current policy debate is the WHO recommendation, 
'We cannot afford to produce rifampicin resistant TB by introducing rifampicin in the 
continuation phase without supervision. Our recommendation is that when introducing 
10 A strain is considered multi-drug resistant when it is at least resistant to isoniazid and rifampicin 
(Portae Is 1994 citing WHO definition). 
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rifampicin, mechanisms have to be in place to ensure patients take their drugs.' (Kochi 
1994;7). The importance of well organized and functioning TB programmes with 
uninterrupted drug supplies in minimising drug resistance is widely recognised. 
Development of drug resistance is commonly ascribed to patients' non-adherence (WHO 
1993), but physician and health system factors, and biological mechanisms of the bacteria 
also playa role. 
Data from India on drug resistance is given in Chapter 1, 1.3.2 
1.6 TB and HIV Co-Infection 
It is established that people dually infected with the tubercle bacilli and human 
immunodeficiency virus are at increased risk of developing tuberculosis (WHO 1993). 
Immunosuppression (of cell mediated immunity measured by CD4 lymphocyte counts) 
by HIV makes it the most significant risk factor for progression of primary TB infection 
to disease or for reactivation of a dormant focus (Murray 1989, Narain 1992). TB 
increases progression to AIDS in HIV infected persons (WHO 1993). Globally in 1990, 
305,000 cases of tuberculosis attributable to HIV were cited as occurring, of which 
230,000 were from Africa (Porter & McAdam 1994a). In 1992, an estimated 4 million 
were dually infected worldwide since the onset of the HIV pandemic, 95% in developing 
countries (Narain 1992). The epidemiological impact of HIV on the TB situation depends 
on the prevalence of the two infections in the community, the annual risk and trend of TB 
infection, the breakdown rate of TB infection to disease and detection and cure rates of 
sputum positive cases (Styblo 1991). Increased TB incidence has been observed in 
countries where both infections are prevalent (ibid, Snider et al 1994). Studies are cited 
showing the risk of active TB in dually infected persons to be 3.8% per year with a 
lifetime risk of 50% or higher (Porter 1996). Persons with dual infection are 30 times 
more likely to get sick with TB than persons who are HIV negative (WHO 1996). WHO 
estimated that globally HIV contributed to about 40/0 of new TB cases in 1990 and was 
expected to rise to 14% by 2000 AD (Kochi 1994). In Africa, the proportion is higher 
with about 50-60% of TB due to HIV (ibid). It is estimated that globally about 5 million 
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persons are infected with both HIV and TB with three-quarters of them in Africa (WHO 
1994b). Because the occurrence of HIV and AIDS is greatest in the 15-45 year age group 
the excess of TB cases following HIV Occurs in this age group (Enarson 1995). In Africa 
20-44% of AIDS patients had clinical TB, while it was 25% in some Latin American 
countries (Narain et aI1992). 
Conventional diagnosis of TB in HIV positive persons is complicated by increased 
frequencies of false negative tuberculin skin tests, sputum smear negative pUlmonary and 
extra-pulmonary disease and atypical radiological manifestations (De Cock 1994;41). 
Studies are cited documenting increased drug side-effects, relapses and mortality 
following treatment (Porter and McAdam 1994a;306). Short Course Chemotherapy is as 
effective for TB among HIV positive as among HIV negative patients (Narain 1992). In 
IUATLD assisted programmes treatment results of TB patients with HIV are reasonably 
good suggesting that well organised TB control programmes might contain the excess TB 
caused by HIV (Enarson 1995). TB with HIV however increases the demand and 
pressures on general health services (WHO 1993b). In countries with a high prevalence of 
TB, WHO and UNICEF recommend BCG administration to non-symptomatic infants, 
even when the mother is HIV infected (Narain 1992). Preventive chemotherapy, 
commonly with isoniazid alone for 6 months or rifampicin and pyrazinamide for 2-3 
months, in dually infected persons is considered important to reduce the increase in 
clinical TB due to HIV (ibid). 
In India HIV prevalence is low but increasing. Till mid-1994, 15000 HIV positive 
persons (predominantly HIV-l), and 559 patients with AIDS were reported, probably an 
underestimate (Pais 1996). Ninety percent of HIV infected persons were 15-45 years, 
from socio-economically disadvantaged groups, with a male to female ratio of 5: 1 (ibid). 
Several case studies report tuberculosis as a common clinical presentation. In Kamataka 
and other states prevalence was estimated to be 1 % among patients with Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases (TB&HIV 1994). Data regarding TB among persons infected with 
HIV in India is given in Chapter 1. 
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Conclusion: Substantial scientific knowledge concerning TB has been gained during the 
past century. Though knowledge gaps continue and newer related problems haye 
developed, effective interventions exist that are applicable at individual, community and 
country level. Inspite of adequate scientific knowledge and technology, TB takes a heavy 
toll worldwide particularly from economically poorer countries and people who comprise 
the majority of the global popUlation. More cases of TB exist presently than before. 
Though partly due to demographic reasons, it points to the need to recognise other 
societal forces that result in persistent transmission, to the importance of implementation 
of public health oriented TB policies and to support alternate lines of inquiry and action. 
There need be no conflict between a societal and technological approach. The application 
of available, sound technical approaches is part of an egalitarian, politically committed, 
societal approach. 
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ANNEXE 2 
INFORMATION SOURCES: DOCUMENTS AND INTERVIE\VS 
2.1 Sources for national documents/ reports: 
A: a) The National Tuberculosis Institute, Bangalore; b) NTP Evaluation/Assessment 
Committees; c) The Directorate of Health Services, Ministry of Health, New Delhi; d) The 
Tuberculosis Research Centre, Madras; e) The Planning Commission, N.Delhi; f) The 
Tuberculosis Association of India, N.Delhi; g) The Voluntary Health Association of India, 
N.Delhi; h) Medico Friends Circle; i) All India Drug Action Network j) Professional 
journals and reports. 
B: Review of - a) News reports on NTP/TB in select English language national newspapers 
in 1996 obtained from the documentation service of the Voluntary Health Association of 
India and a contracted news-service agency. b) Questions raised in Parliament about 
NTP/TBI functioning of general health services with which NTP is integrated, through the 
Public Policy Division of the Voluntary Health Association of India and review of Lok 
Sabha Debates. 
2.2 List of persons interviewed/met at national and international levels 
For historical and current information this included professionals involved with the NTP 
from its early phases, those presently holding responsibility, those concerned with drug 
policy and NGO 's. 
1. Dr. DR Nagpaul, Rtd. Director, NTI currently Scientific and Technical Advisor, TB 
Association of India, New Delhi; 
2. Dr. D Banetji, Rtd. Professor, Centre for Social Medicine, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 
currently Founder Director of Nucleus for Health Policies and Programmes, New Delhi; 
3. Dr. GVJ Baily, Rtd. Director NTI, Bangalore; 
4. Dr. SP Tripathy, previously Director TB Research Centre, Madras and Rtd. Director 
Indian Council for Medical Research; 
5. Dr. Radhakrisbna, Rtd. Director, Institute for Research in Medical Research, Madras; 
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6. Dr. Kul Bhushan, Rtd. Scientist, NTI, Bangalore; 
7. Mr. SS Nair, Rtd StatisticianlDirector Evaluation Unit, Directorate General of Health 
Services, New Delhi, currently Director, Institute of Communication, Operations 
Research and Community Involvement, Bangalore; 
8. Dr. P Chandrashekar, Rtd. Director NTI, Bangalore; 
9. Ms. Seetha, Rtd. Sociologist, NTI, Bangalore; 
10. Dr. AK Chakravarty, Rtd. Acting Director, NTI, Bangalore; 
11. Dr. V Benjamin, Rtd. Professor of Community Medicine, Christian Medical College, 
Vellore, currently President, Society of Community Health Awareness, Research and 
Action, Bangalore; 
12. Dr. KK Datta, Director, National Institute of Communicable Diseases, GOI, N Delhi, 
previously DDG(TB), DGHS; 
13. Dr. Khatri, DDG(TB), Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS),GOI, N Delhi; 
14. Mr. R Srinivasan, Rtd. Secretary Health, Ministry of Health, GOI, New Delhi; 
15. Dr Mrs P Ramachandran, Member- Health, Secretariat, Planning Commission; 
16. Mr. P Chopra, Joint Secretary Health (TB), Ministry of Health, New Delhi; 
17. Dr. J Abraham, Dept. of Economics, Planning Commission, GOI, New Delhi; 
18. Dr. B T Uke, Director, NTI, Bangalore; 
19. Dr. R Prabhakar, Director, TB Research Centre; 
20. Dr. Mrs. P Jagota, Dpty Director, NTI, Bangalore; 
21. Dr. LBS Dey, TB Unit, DGHS, New Delhi; 
22. Dr. D Das, TB Unit, DGHS, New Delhi; 
23. Dr. P Biswal, TB Unit, DGHS, New Delhi; 
24. Dr. Jadav, Regional Consultant, TB Unit, DGHS, New Delhi; 
25. Dr.Dass-Sharma, Regional Consultant, TB Unit, DGHS, New Delhi; 
26. Dr. Selvakumar, Dpty. Director, TB Research Centre, Madras; 
27. Dr. Sowmya Swaminathan, Asst. Director, TB Research Centre, Madras; 
28. Dr. L Suryanaryana, Chief Medical Officer, NTI, Bangalore; 
29. Dr. Chadha, Epidemiologist, NTI, Bangalore; 
30. Dr. S Chandrasekaran, Chief Medical Officer, NTI, Bangalore; 
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31/32. Mr. Vembu and Mr. Sathyanarayana, Monitoring Section, NTI, Bangalore; 
33. Ms.R Rajalakshmi, Statistical Section, NTI, Bangalore; 
34. Dr. Ralte, District TB Officer, Kohima, Nagaland (at NTI, Bangalore); 
35. Dr. N Rama Rao, Director, State TB Centre, Hyderabad 
36. Dr. BM Soni, Asst. Director (TB), Ahmedabad, Gujarat; 
37. Dr. Parmar, Acting District TB Officer, Mehsana, Gujarat; 
38. Dr. S Mishra, Asst. DG, National Malaria Eradication Programme, New Delhi; 
39. Dr. M Issac, Professor of Psychiatry, National Institute of Mental Health & 
Neurosciences, Bangalore; 
40. Mr. KM Kaul, Project Officer, Dept. of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, Ministry of 
Chemicals and Fertilizers, GOI, New Delhi; 
41. Mr. MM Sharma, Technical Director, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd.(IDPL), 
Corporate Headquarters, Gurgaon; 
42. Mr. Rakesh Buddhiraju, Marketing Division, IDPL Corporate Headquarters, 
Gurgaon; 
43. Mr. Jain, Director, IDPL Corporate Headquarters, Gurgaon; 
44. Mr. S Chakrabarti, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Bangalore; 
45. Dr. I Quadeer, Professor, Centre for Social Medicine, IN University, New Delhi; 
46. Dr. M Rao, Assoc. Professor, Centre for Social Medicine, IN University, New Delhi; 
47. Dr. R Priya, Asst. Professor, Centre for Social Medicine, IN University, New Delhi; 
48. Dr. Rajesh Kumar, Asst. Professor, Dept. of Community Medicine, Post Graduate 
Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh; 
49. Dr. B Jhunjunwala, Economist, New Delhi; 
50. Dr. R Narayan, Coordinator, Community Health Cell, Bangalore; 
51. Dr. M Uplekar, Consultant, Foundation for Research in Community Health, Bombay; 
52. Mr. A Mukhopadhya, Director, Voluntary Health Association of India, New Delhi; 
53. Dr. PN Sehgal, Rtd. Director National Institute of Communicable Diseases, currently 
Consultant, VHAI, New Delhi; 
54. Dr. M Shiva, Head, Public Policy Division, Voluntary Health Association of India, 
New Delhi and Secretary, All India Drug Action Network; 
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55. Dr. A Sengupta, Delhi Science Forum, New Delhi; 
56. Mr. C Srinivasan, Director, LOCOST, Baroda; 
57. Mr. BK Keayla, Convenor, National Working Group on Patent Laws, Centre for 
Study of GATT Issues, New Delhi; 
58. Mr. Narula, Corporate Manager, Lupin Laboratories Ltd., New Delhi; 
59. Mr. A Sachdeva, Secretary, TB Association of India, New Delhi; 
60. Dr. P Rao, Secretary, Drug Action Forum, Karnataka; 
61. Mr. Amitava Guha, Federation of Medical Representatives Associations of India, 
Patna 
62. Dr. Almas Ali, Consultant, Voluntary Health Association of India, New Delhi 
63. Dr. Manjunath, VGKK, Yelandur and Mysore 
Respondents from International Organizations interviewed for the NTP or RNTP 
1. Dr. MVH Gunaratne, WHO Advisor to SEARO, New Delhi on Communicable 
Diseases, working particularly on TB; 
2. Dr. K Shein, Essential Drugs Programme, WHO-SEAROffice, New Delhi; 
3. Mr. R Grose, India Desk, Dept. For International Development (UK), New Delhi; 
4. Dr. J Porter, Senior Lecturer, Clinical Sciences, London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, coordinator ofDFID Aid to the RNTP in India and member of the 
WHO/World Bank assessment team for the RNTP; 
5. Dr. R Fryatt, Health Division, DFID, New Delhi; 
6. Ms. A Khalak-Dina, DFID, New Delhi; 
7. Mrs. Anna-Kari Bill, Health Division, SIDA Office, Stockholm (was in SIDA Office, 
New Delhi in the 1980's when SIDA supported the NTP and 2 years in the WHO, TB 
Unit, Geneva); 
8. Dr. Hans Rosling, Dept. for International Child Health, Uppsala University, Sweden; 
9. Prof. G Dahlstrom (telephonically), University ofUppsala, Sweden, member of 
SIDA mission assessing SIDA funding to the NTP; 
10. Mr. G Tiroler, Uppasala University, Consultant for SIDA on Disability and 
Rehabilitation to India; 
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11. Dr. G Holmgren, ICH, Uppsala University, Sweden; 
12. Dr. G Kvale, Centre for International Health, Bergen, Norway and three MPhil. 
students working on TB; 
13. Dr. W Fox (telephonically), Rtd. TB Research Unit, British Medical Research 
Unit (Founder Director, TB Research Centre, Madras), Surrey; 
14. Prof. Patrick Vaughan, Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine; 
15. Mr. A Veliath, UNICEF office, New Delhi; 
16. Dr. Pankaj Mehta, Bangalore, (worked with UNICEF in the USA); 
17. Dr. P Kok, Asia Desk, MEMISA, The Netherlands; 
18. Dr. R Baastian, Tubingen Institute, Wurtzberg, Gennany; 
Discussions with: 
19. Mr. R Bumgarner, Global TB Unit, WHO, Geneva; 
20. Dr. J Almeida, Global TB Unit, WHO, Geneva; 
21. Dr. T Frieden, presently with WHO-SEARO, New Delhi; 
22. Meeting with Dr. Paul Nunn, Global TB Unit, WHO and Health Policy Unit staff, 
LSHTM; 
23. Mr. Srinivasan, Office of World Health Reporting, WHO, Geneva. 
Several other officialslprofessionals were met during the course of the study. 
2.3 State and District Level Interviews 
1. Dr. HC Mahadevappa, Hon. Minister for Health, Govemement of Kamataka; 
2. Dr. Vishveshwaraiah, Joint Director (TB), DH&FW, Bangalore; 
3. Dr. Nagraj, Rtd. Joint Director (TB), DH&FW, Bangalore; 
4. Dr. Ranganath, Project Manager, RNTP Pilot Phase Project, Bangalore Municipal 
Corporation; 
5. Dr. S Shekar, RNTP Pilot Phase Project, Bangalore Municipal Corporation; 
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6. Dr. Saraswathi Devi, MO Adugodi Bangalore Municipal Corporation Dispensary; 
7. Dr. GN Srinivas, MO Neelasandra Bangalore Municipal Corporation Dispensary; 
8. Other Staff at three Bangalore Municipal Corporation Dispensaries 
9. Dr. SV Rama Rao, Rtd. Dean Government Bellary Medical College; 
10. Mr. Sundareshwar, Hon.Sec., Karnataka State TB Association, Bangalore; 
11. Dr. Kishore Murthy, Consultant, GOK- WB State Health Systems Development 
Project; 
12. Senior Health Assistant, Lady Wellingdon State TB Centre, Bangalore; 
13. Dr. Chandrashekar, Professor, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, previously 
Member of the State Legislative Council; 
14. Mr. Jayaram, Registrar,Office of District Commissioner, Mysore; 
15. Dr. Ambrose Pinto, Political Scientist, Principal, St. Joseph's Evening College, 
Bangalore; 
16. Dr. G. Pais, Director OXF AM, Bangalore Office; 
17. Dr. Paresh Kumar, Sociologist, Mysore University; 
18. Dr. Gnaneshwar, District Tuberculosis Officer, Mysore, three repeat interviews; 
19. Sri. Chikkaiah, Treatment Organiser, DTC, Mysore; 
20. Observation of supervisory visit of Dr. Sathyanarayana to DTC; 
21. Dr. H.P .Ramesh, Med. Suptd. PK TB & Chest Disease Hospital, Mysore; 
22. Sri. Ramesh, X-ray Technician, DTC, Mysore; 
23. Dr. Chinnaswamy, District Health & Family Welfare Officer, Mysore District; 
24. Mr. A Sait, Deputy Commissioner, MysoreDistrict; 
25. Junior Lab. Technician, District Tuberculosis Centre, Mysore; 
26. Dr. H Sudarshan, Sec., Vivekananda Girijana Kalyana Kendra, BR Hills, Mysore 
District; 
27/28. Dr. Sridhar and Dr. ShivKumar, Medical Officers, VGKK and Karuna Trust, 
Yelandur, Mysore District; 
29. Dr. Jyothi, Medical Officer, VGKK, BR Hills, Mysore District; 
30. Dr. S Ullal, VGKK, BR Hills; 
31. Sri. Krishnan, VGKK, BR Hills, Mysore District; 
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32. Sri. Rajanna, Community Organiser, Kamna Trust, Yelandur, Mysore District; 
Health Workers, Kamna Trust, Vasu, Mahalakshmi, Nanjundaswamy; Laboratory 
Technician, Mallu; other workers, Bhagyalakshmi; Kumar; Kurien; 
33. Dr. Sr. Acquinas, Medical Officer, Holy Cross Hospital, Kamagere, Mysore District; 
34/35. Dr. Vivek & Dr. Prasad, MO's, Shankar Hospital, Kenchanahalli, Mysore District; 
36. Mr. William D'Souza, Director, MYRADA-PLAN, Handpost, HDKote Taluk,. 
37. Mr. Vijay Kumar, Project Officer and other staff, MYRADA-PLAN, HD Kote Taluk 
38. Dr. HS Shiva Kumar, HDKote General Hospital, HDKote; 
39. Sri. BS Somanna, Laboratory Technician, HD Kote General Hospital; 
40. Sri. V Thimma Shetty, Pharmacist, HD Kote General Hospital; 
41. Sri. GT Devegowda, President, Mysore Zilla Panchayat 
42. Smt. Rathnamma, Vice- President, Mysore Zilla Panchayat 
43. Meetings with Mahila Mandals (Womens Groups) at villages Muruganahally, 
Ambedkar Nagar, Gulligatte, Mentihadi at HD Kote Taluk, Mysore District; 
44. Meeting with Dr. Sukant Singh, and medicallhealth teams from CMAI, Holdsworth 
Memorial Mission Hospital, Mysore, and Tibetan Settlements, Mysore District; 
45. Staff from the Organisation for the Development of People, Mysore; 
46/47. Sr. Mariola and Sr. Philomena, Shanti Grama Abhivriddhi Kendra, HDKote Taluk 
48. Sr Concepta, nurse, M&RF Hospital, Naganahalli, HD Kote Taluk; 
49. Fr. Kiran Kamaliprasad, working with bonded labourers, Centre for Non-Formal and 
Continuing Education, Bangalore; 
50. Fr. J D'souza, Centre for Non-Formal and Continuing Education, Bangalore; 
51. Sri. Nanjundaiah, Development Worker, Fedina-Vikasa, HD Kote Taluk; 
Staff from Holdsworth Memorial Mission Hospital, Mysore: Ms. S Balraj, Nursing 
Superintendant; 
52. Sri. Devendra Heggade, Dalit Sangharsh Samiti, Bangalore; 
53. Dr. Prabhakar, MO, Primary Health Unit, Beechanahally, lID Kote Taluk; 
54. Dr. Lalitha P, LMO, Primary Health Centre Sargur, HD Kote Taluk; 
55. Dr. SM Mahadevaiah, MO, Primary Health Centre, Sargur, HD Kote Taluk; 
56. Dr. Basavaiah, MO, Primary Health Centre, N.Belathur, lID Kote Taluk; 
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57. Dr. B Mahesh, MO, Primary Health Centre, Hampapura, lID Kote Taluk; 
58. Dr. Somashekar, MO, Primary Health Centre, Annur, lID Kote Taluk; 
59. Dr. Ranga Nayaka, MO, Primary Health Centre, Madapura, lID Kote Taluk; 
60. Sri. Venkatnarayanappa, Senior Health Assistant and other staff, Primary Health 
Centre, Sargur, lID Kote Taluk; 
61. Smt. TA Nanjamma, Junior Health Assistant, N Belathur PHC, lID Kote Taluk; 
62. Smt. AC Minnu, Junior Health Assistant, Hampapura PHe, lID Kote Taluk,. 
63. Sri. Zahir Yusuf, Laboratory Technician, Hampapura PHe, lID Kote Taluk; 
64. Sri. PL Swamy, Junior Health Assistant, Hampapura PHe, lID Kote Taluk; 
65. Smt. Komala, Group D Employee, Hampapura PHe, HD Kote Taluk; 
66. Smt. S Jnanamitra, Senior Health Assistant, Annur PHe, HD Kote Taluk,' 
67. Smt. Renuka, Junior Health Assistant, Annur PHe, HD Kote Taluk; 
68. Smt. Rathnamala, Junior Health Assistant, N.Begur PHe, lID Kote Taluk; 
69. Smt. Devamma, Junior Health Assistant, N.Begur PHC, lID Kote Taluk; 
70. Smt. Sudhamani, Junior Health Assistant, Madapura PHC, lID Kote Taluk; 
71. Sri. Narasimha Murthy, Junior Health Assistant, Madapura PHC, 
72. Smt. P A Shanti, Junior Health Assistant, lID Kote General Hospital, 
73. Sri. KN Nagaraju, Community Health Volunteer, Kolagala, lID Kote Taluk; 
74. Dr. Cariappa, private practitioner, Handpost, lID Kote Taluk; 
75. Dr. Joshi, Private Practitioner, Hommarahalli, lID Kote Taluk; 
76. Dr. Usha, Private Practitioner, Hommarahalli, lID Kote Taluk; 
77. Dr. Mallappa, Private Practitioner, Hommarahalli, HD Kote Taluk; 
Elected Representativesfrom HD Kate Taluk 78-88 
78 Sri. Kullananjaiah, Gram Panchayat President, Kandahally 
79. Smt. Ningamma, Gram Panchayat Vice- President, Hampapura 
Ten Gram Panchayat members 80. Sri. Shivabasavagowda, Hampapura; 81. Smt. 
Nanjamanni, Kolagala; 82. D. Siddarajaiah, Chikkanayakanahally; 83. Maridas, 
Kalegowdanahally; 84. Mahadev, Thumbusoge Post; 85. Aslam Pasha, N Begur; 86. P 
Shanataraju, Saloor Hundi; 87. Puttachennamma, Mellahally; 88. Govindraj, HDKote; 
Bhaskar, HDKote; 
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89. Sri. Nagaraju, Bill Collector, Bidrahally; 90. Sri. Siddaraju, store keeper, 
Kenchanahally; 
91. Dr. K Satish, MO, Gowdahalli Primary Health Centre Yelandur Taluk' , , 
92. Dr. M Nanjundaswamy, MO, Yelandur PHC, Yelandur Taluk; 
93. Dr. Kantamani, LMO, Yelandur PHC, Ye1andur Taluk; 
94. Sri. GS Narayan Prasad, Senior Health Assistant, Yelandur PHC, Yelandur Taluk; 
95. Sri. Lingaiah, Senior Health Assistant, Yelandur PHC, Ye1andur Taluk; 
96. Sri. Shivamallappa, Junior Health Assistant, Ye1andur PHC, Yelandur Taluk; 
97. Smt. S Vijayakumari, Junior Health Assistant, Yelandur PHC, Yelandur Taluk; 
98. Smt. Rudramma, Junior Health Assistant, Yelandur PHC, Yelandur Taluk,' 
99. Smt. HS Kamalamma, Junior Health Assistant, Santhe Marhally PHC, CHNagar 
Taluk; 
100. Sri. Channaju S, Junior Health Assistant, Gowdahally PHe, Yelandur Taluk; 
101. Sri. Puttaswamy, Group D Employee, Gowdahally PHe, Yelandur Taluk," 
102. Sri. Nanjundaiah, Junior Health Assistant, Honnur PHe, Yelandur Taluk; 
103. Sri. Shivamalappa, Junior Health Assistant, Honnur PHC, Yelandur Taluk; 
104. Sri. Puttamadu, Junior Health Assistant, AgaraMamballi PHC, Yelandur Taluk; 
105. Sri. Basavanna, Community Health Guide, Kamagere, Mysore District; 
Elected Representatives from Yelandur Taluk 106-113 
106. Smt. Shakuntala, Gram Panchayat President, Mambally; 
107. Sri. Srinivas, Gram Panchayat President, Yeriyur; 
Gram Panchayatmembers: 108. KMahadev, Yergambally; 109. Basavarajappa, Melhally; 
110. Madamma, Kunagally; AP, Chinchahally; 
111. Sri. PC Mahalingashetty, Gram Panchayat President, Chamarajanagar; 
112. Sri. Neelaiah, PUC, Yeriyur; Sri. Manjunath, Lecturer, Malavalli; 
113. Dr. Ramesh, Private Practitioner, Yelandur; 
114. Dr. Shivaswamy, Private Practitioner, Yelandur; 
115. Dr. Santosh, Private Practitioner, Yelandur; 
116. Dr. Nagraj, Private Practitioner, Ronnur; 
117. Dr. Lakshman, Private Practitioner, Soorapura; 
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118. Dr. Mariyappa, Private Practitioner, Melbally; 
119-125. Six staff from the Mysore Zilla Parishad Office 
TB Patients from Mysore District- 75 (under the NTP) 
TB Patients from Bangalore- 15 (under the Revised NTP) 
2.4 Meetings Attended 
1. 1994- National Consultation on the NTPIRNTP organised by VHAI in New Delhi. 
2. September 1995- GOIIWHOIWB Meeting on Role of Private Practitioners and 
the Voluntary Sector in TB Control in New Delhi. 
3. October 1995- National Meeting on the Role of the Voluntary Sector in the NTP 
organised by Action Aid and NTI, Bangalore. 
4. December 1995- 50th National Conference on TB and Chest Diseases organised by the 
TB Association of India, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. 
5. January 1996- Meeting organised by the Kamataka State TB Association for the Release 
of TB Seals, Bangalore. 
6. February 1996- National Meeting on Primary Health Care organised by the Christian 
Medical Association of India, New Delhi. 
7. March 1996- Public Meeting on TB and its Control organised by the Kamataka State 
TB Association, Bangalore. 
8. May 1996- Meeting ofTB experts on the RNTP organised by the Community Health 
Cell and Voluntary Health Association of India, Bangalore. 
9. August 1996- Meeting on the Impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme on 
Health, Ahmedabad. 
10. November 1996- 51st National Conference on TB and Chest Diseases, Bangalore. 
11. Sept.-October 1997- Meeting on the Monitoring of Equity in Health, WHO, Geneva. 
12. November 1997- Meeting on Globalisation and Sustainability of Health Systems, 
WHO at Helsinki. 
13. December 1997- Meeting on Inequalities in Health, WHO in London. 
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ANNEXE 3 
CHECKLISTS OF QUESTIONS 
A cohort analysis conducted by the NTI in Mysore district had documented the 
implementation gap (NTI 1994b). Records from the District TB Centre concerning number 
of sputum positive and suspected cases detected and put on treatment revealed gaps 
between expectations and actual outcomes. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted at State and District level to a) understand 
processes/ mechanisms at State and District level for planning, communication, budgeting, 
training! continuing education! supervision, monitoring of the NTP in the public sector and 
of relationships if any with the private sector, and b) explore perceptions regarding the 
implementation gap and explanations for it. 
Checklist of Questions for District Officials 
Is TB a problem in the district? How would it rank in comparison to other health problems? 
Where do patients, particularly the poor, usually go for treatment? What is the role of the 
private for profit sector and the voluntary sector? What are your perceptions regarding the 
functioning of the NTP? What are its main components? What are its achievements? Based 
on your experience why have expectations not been met? What are the major areas of 
problem? 
Staff 
o Availability of part or full component ofDTC team trained at NTI during past 5 years. 
o Pattern of vacancies; transfers; private practice. 
o Budget head for staff salaries (general pooll specific programme), adequacy, delays. 
o Number of PHI's in the district trained by the DTC team. 
o Frequency of supervisory visits. 
o Methods of communication from PHI to district level. 
o Workload, job satisfaction related to NTP work. 
Drugs 
o Drug regimens in use - SR /SCC/ DOT. 
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o Drug supply: adequacy, regularity, delay, supply close to expiry dates. 
o Reasons for problems- procedural, logistic, financial. 
o Method of indenting, basis of estimation of need, source of supply. 
o Availability/ price in the open market. 
Equipment 
Microscopes, stains, stationery - availability and condition. 
Transport 
Availability of vehicles and fuel for supervisory visits. 
Patient Related Factors 
o Perception of adherence, reasons for non-adherance. 
Health Education 
Health Education materials available, source, utilisation. 
BCG Coverage 
F or the past 3 years. 
Other 
Role of Multi Purpose Health Workers and Community Health Guides in case detection and 
follow up. 
o Impact of Panchayati Raj since 1988 on the health services, Role played by Panchayati 
Raj members. 
Information Collected From PHI Records 
1. Population, area and number of villages covered. 
2. Type of PHI - referraV microscopy/ X-ray centre. 
3. Number of subcentres attached. 
4. Recommended staffing pattern and actual staff in position. 
5. Job responsibilities of male and female MO's, Health Supervisors, MPW's, and CRG's. 
6. Staff turnover/ transfers/ absenteeism. 
7. Data regarding TB patients as mentioned in 9.3.2 
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8. Nearest referral centre for TB. 
9. Transport available in the centre. 
Checklist of Questions for PHI MO's 
o Period of service as a PHC/ PHI MO and at this PHI, number of transfers. 
o Is TB a problem in the area. 
o What activities are undertaken under the NTP (regarding case finding, treatment, follow 
up, referral). 
o Explore issue regarding integration of health services 
- what are the priority areas of work at the PHC, could these be ranked in importance. 
- budget heads under which payment of staff is done. 
- to whom do they report. 
- difficulties and advantages experienced in NTP being integrated with general health 
servIces. 
- impact of Family Planning! Welfare programme and VIP. 
o Explore activities concerning case detection 
- what is done if tuberculosis is suspected. 
- do TB patients come direct to the PHC's, are patterns shifting. 
- who does the sputum smear, availability of microscopist with training in examining 
sputum specimens, availability/ condition of microscopes and stains, workload in terms of 
number of specimens to be examined per day/ for the past month! year. 
- What are their perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the MPW's work in NTP 
in sputum examination and possibly in follow up. Are only male MPW's involved or also 
female. What have been the consequences of involvement of MPW's for case detection and 
collection of 
smears during home visits. 
- in what way does the DTC support them. 
_ any formalised quality checks on microscopy. 
_ are repeat sputum tests done at 3/4 and 6/8 month, is it feasible. 
_ when is the report given, how is it communicated to the patient. 
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o Regarding Treatment 
- availability of all necessary drugs regularly throughout the y Ar th 1 . d 
ear. e ere regu ar peno s 
when shortages Occur eg at year e dAr' 
n. e any partIcular drugs more prone to shortages. 
- what is the basis and method of indenting for TB drugs, is it done annually, from where 
are 
supplies made. 
- if drugs are not available what is done, which is the nearest pharmacy. 
- what is the cost of treatment by a private practitioner for consultation and for drugs. 
- what is their explanation for drug shortages. 
o What percentage of patients get cured. 
- What are the reasons that patients do not continue treatment. 
o Functioning ofBCG vaccination work through the DIP programme. 
o Knowledge regarding the budgeting ofNTP 
o Importance given to NTP by the State DHS. 
o Role and scope for decision making and action by the STO, DTO. 
o Perceptions of strengths and weaknesses of NTP. Do they perceive an implementation 
gap? What are the explanations based on their experience. 
o Satisfaction with NTP related work. 
o Problems faced in relation to NTP. 
eg.a) organisational - staff position, regularity of salaries, transport availability, drug 
supplies, availability of diagnostic methods. 
b) other factors - pressure to perfonnl workload resulting from other programmes such as 
FP, DIP, malaria; excessive paperwork; transfers; political interference; lack of support 
from DTC/ STC/STO/State DRS regarding TB; 
c) patient related factors - default, under-utilisation of services; explore explanations for 
the same. 
o Do TB patients In the area prefer to use public or private sector servIces; their 
perceptions of reasons for the choice. 
o Working conditions- salaries, housing, transfers, facilities for children's education. 
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Questions for Senior and Junior Health Assistants and other staff 
a) What activities do you undertake in regard to tuberculosis control in your area? 
b) What problems are faced in this work? 
Observation of monthly meetings at the Primary Health Centre and District Health and 
Family Office regarding importance given to TB. 
Questions for Patients with TB (Translated into Kannada) 
o What were the initial symptoms you had? When did these start? 
o What did you do to alleviate these symptoms: did you use home remedies; go to 
traditional healers; private practitioners of the modem system; the local pharmacist; the 
sub-centre MPW; the PHC; the Community Health Centre; the taluk hospital; the DTC; 
the medical college hospital; a private nursing home; any other? 
o Did MPW's from the sub-centre visit you, what advice did they offer, did they take 
some phlegm for testing? 
o What was the time period between onset of symptoms and first visit to a health care 
provider? 
o Did you shift! move from one health care provider to another? If so between whom, 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
after what period and why? 
Was your sputum tested? Did you have a chest Xray? 
What medicines did you take and for how long? 
What did the doctor tell you about the disease? What advice was given to you? 
At what intervals did you visit the health centre for collection of medicines? 
How frequently did you see the doctor? 
Did you have any problem related to the medicines? 
Were you satisfied with your experience of the public health system? 
If yes, did you complete treatment with the public sector? 
What were the costs involved? 
If not satisfied, what were the problems: distance, poor transport facilities, non-
availability of staff during visit, attitude of doctor, attitude of other health staff, need to 
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meet different staff at each visit, irregular or non availability of drugs, payment for 
service, long waiting time. 
o Did you go to private doctors? Were you satisfied? What were the total costs of 
treatment ie for consultation, investigations, drugs, transport, loss of wages. 
Questions for Elected Representatives (Translated into Kannada) 
o What is your opinion regarding services provided by the PHI? 
o If found satisfactory, what are the reasons? 
o Ifnot satisfactory, what are the main problems? 
o Do you know anyone with prolonged cough, fever, and loss ofweightl tuberculosis? 
o Do you have any specific comments regarding tuberculosis treatment at the PHI? 
o What is your opinion regarding the services of private practitioners? Are such services 
available? Are people satisfied with their services? If yes, why and if not what are the 
main problems? 
o Where do poor people from your area who have tuberculosis go for treatment? 
o Did the introduction of Panchayati Raj in 1988 have any impact on the functioning of 
the general health services? 
o What are the responsibilities of elected representatives towards health services? 
In what way could elected representatives help to improve the services? 
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